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Researching and writing a dissertation would be impossible and ultimately soul-
destroying if it were not for the assistance and support that a young historian receives 
during the overall duration of the process. Presenting new research on the 
interrelationships of art and science is a tricky business that requires a certain type of 
dialogue between not only these two divergent fields, but also between ideas and data 
points that are better known and material with which the reader may be entirely 
unfamiliar. The readability and critical framing of the first three chapters is entirely the 
result of long conversations with Dr. Katherine Arens, which I will treasure in memory 
for the rest of my life. Having researched this material from a standpoint in the history of 
sciences—that is, outside the concerns of art history—Dr. Arens was able to convince me 
that steering into these foreign waters was beneficial and that a study of this kind would 
interest readers other than myself and my committee. She was also essential in 
encouraging me to consider modes of research, analysis, and writing that fell outside 
conventional art historical methods and assumptions which, I believe, created the 
foundations for everything new and fresh in the forthcoming pages. Her encouragement 
of starting from scratch and not relying on previous analyses, other than as comparative 
data points, was a major source of inspiration for both this project and other work since 
then, including my first major scholarly publication. I could never have written this 
dissertation without her generous contributions. 
Nor could this project have come off without the guidance of Dr. Linda 
Dalrymple Henderson, my dissertation adviser. Dr. Henderson stepped into the role of the 
suspicious reader with respect to this new material and challenged me to make it both 
reader-friendly and connected to earlier, mostly divergent studies of the context and the 
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artists in question. She knew I was onto something, but made me work to prove it to an 
outside reader, which made the thrust of the project what it is. The most difficult thing 
about writing a lengthy work that is the product of a lot of research is stepping outside 
one’s own mind in a manner that lets the reader into the story that the author is telling. 
My original inspiration to consider the contacts between art and science was, like many 
other historians from my generation and earlier, inspired by Henderson’s groundbreaking 
work on modern artists who were interested in science. There was no better critical reader 
of this material and my method than her. 
As for the rest of my committee members, their contributions, like those of the 
above two scholars, came over the time I have been in graduate school. Dr. Richard Shiff 
taught me that looking and thinking should be on equal terms. Scrutiny in both cases was 
particularly beneficial in the chapter on Max Ernst. Dr. John Clarke taught me to 
continually question my own assumptions and to remain tenacious in the craft of writing. 
I wrote this entire dissertation with him in mind, so I could avoid allowing myself the 
fallacious luxury of assuming my reader knew what I meant. Dr. Michael Charlesworth 
taught me to have patience with my own thoughts, meaning that I should give myself the 
time to think as hard as I could about what certain texts can mean for the context and for 
my own work as reader; not only what a text means but what it allows. That and he 
introduced me to Michel de Certeau, whose shade pervades this entire dissertation. 
Outside of UT, many scholars offered different kinds of support that was always 
welcome. In particular, Dr. Gavin Parkinson and Dr. Stephanie Taylor threw me a crucial 
lifeline in giving me the chance to research and present on a topic that was unrelated to 
the dissertation, which I would recommend to any ABD reading this. It was entirely 
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outside this project, and it allowed me to think about something else for a while, which 
was extremely helpful. That, and I got a publication out of it that is unrelated to the 
dissertation, which made me very happy and convinced of my abilities. Dr. Michael 
Taylor has been one of the best friends I could hope to have in the field of art history. He 
encouraged not only this project but other endeavors, and graciously participated on a 
panel I organized—again, unrelated to the dissertation—for a conference that took place 
when I was wrapping up the writing of this project. Another person who has been 
gracious is Dr. Fae Brauer, who participated on this conference with Michael and who 
opened her home to me and my fiancé while I was studying in Paris. Her work on this 
time period was a massive inspiration to me and my thinking about the different contexts 
and science that I was interrogating. Another person I had the pleasure of meeting and 
befriending during this project is Dr. William Camfield, who was also very nice in 
opening his home to me while I was in Paris. Bill is the model of the scholar I want to be 
someday, a true scholar gentleman in every sense of the term. His warmth, 
encouragement, and unfailing curiosity to know more about and have fresh perspectives 
on artists he has studied provided me with so much encouragement at a crucial stage in 
my project. That and he showed me the ropes when it came to getting into the Doucet 
archive, which was not easy! 
I would formally like to thank the entire staff at the Bibliothèque littéraire Jacques 
Doucet for their patience with yet another clueless American. In particular, Monsieur 
Yves Gaonac’h was extremely generous and very kind at every step of the way. His 
suggestion that I examine the press clippings collected by Tzara and Picabia altered my 
sense of Dada entirely and essentially redirected my entire trajectory of inquiry. Merci. 
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My chapter on Max Ernst and other work on him I have done would not have 
been possible without the generosity of the staff at the Menil Collection in Houston. In 
particular, curators Dr. Kristina Van Dyke, Claire Elliot, and Michelle White welcomed 
me into their institution and made my stay a true delight. Geri Aramanda made my 
research possible, as did Phil Heagy (retired). Ellen Hanspach was an instant friend, and I 
will treasure always the memory of us poring over the surfaces of Max Ernst’s paintings, 
trying to figure out how he did it. 
I would also like to thank M.E. Warlick, Samantha Kavkey, Elliott King, David 
Raskin, James Elkins, Simon Anderson, the late Robert Loescher, Kathryn Hixson, Lynn 
Boland, Maureen Howell, Amanda Butterfield, Brad Schauer, Matthew Schauer, Eirik 
Agustsson, Craig Stapleton-Corcoran, Shawn Rice, Rebecca Downing, Dr. Ann 
Reynolds, Dr. Steve Bourget, and Dr. Glen Peers. 
My family has been more supportive of me than I could have imagined, 
particularly with respect to my undertaking this kind of project in this kind of job market. 
I truly could not have remained in graduate school were it not for the financial and 
emotional support of my father Richard and mother Mary. My two sisters Anna and 
Vanessa, despite teasing me about having too many books and writing papers for fun, 
could not be sweeter and more wonderful. My grandparents, Walter and Gen Stoklosa, 
have been a constant presence in my life for as long as I can remember, and their weekly 
letters to me during my entire time in college was a constant source of support. Their 
work ethic is somewhere in my DNA, which really made the day-to-day slogging 
possible. They lived through the Depression; I had to write a dissertation. Clearly, I had 
more than enough genetic fuel to make it through. 
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I met my fiancé Jamie Lee Rice right at the beginning of this undertaking and 
became engaged to her toward the very end of it. She has weathered the entirety of the 
process with me, from bouts of anxiety and doubt to dealing with the cryptozoological 
monstrosity that is me without sleep, to living in a phone booth size Paris apartment. The 
life partners of people writing their dissertations are the unsung heroes of the entire 
process. She was closer to the daily grind of the work than anyone else. Her patience, 
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Scholarship on Dada and Surrealism has established that psychology was a major 
intellectual source for artists in both groups. However, a burgeoning amount of recent 
work in both the history of art and of science indicates that types of psychology other 
than psychoanalysis permeated the historical context of the avant-garde. In the late 
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dominant science of the body and mind, which grounded psychic phenomena in 
structures of conduction in the nervous system. Modern artists saw within this discourse a 
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On June 23, 1916, in a cramped, hot, smoky dive of a bar on a dingy backstreet in Zurich, 
a young man was carried onto a makeshift stage by his new friends: an Alsatian draft dodger, and 
a young Romanian Jew in flight from romantic intrigue. The man being carried onstage was 
neither some punk icon avant la lettre, nor was his immobility the product of strong drink or 
opium (he generally abstained from both, but smoked like a chimney). His motile limitations 
were due to his costume—a stiff cardboard construction that looked a bit like the offspring of a 
lobster and a muffler.  
The young man’s friends deposited him on a darkened stage in front of three easels, each 
of which had a transcription of a poem he was about to read. He first recited the poem on the left, 
then the right, and finished with reading the poem in the center. The first, a work called Labadas 
Gesang an die Wölken, also known simply as Wolken, contains the following lines: 
The poet in question, Hugo Ball (DATES) did not think of these works as poems, but as sound 
poems [Lautgedichten], a new form of tonal modality involving the voice. His friends, the 
Alsatian artist Hans Arp and the Romanian poet and critic Tristan Tzara, were at work inventing 
other modes of new poetry. The work quoted above was likely named after Ball’s friend Rudolf 
Laban, who ran a dance school in Zurich, and although he never participated with the Dadaists 
directly (his students did, however, extensively), he shared Ball’s interest in spontaneity and new 
forms of performative gesture. 
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 By this point, Ball had failed at everything he ever attempted. His dissertation on 
Nietzsche, abandoned. His work in the theatre was more prestigious, perhaps, but not enough to 
result in a stable position in any one city. He knew prominent artists and actors, such as the 
Russian painter and theorist Wassily Kandinsky, but the war dashed his hopes for concerted 
work with these figures, killed certain of his close friends (including Franz Marc and Hans 
Leybold), and would eventually force him out of Germany. Ball’s life in Munich at this point 
resembles a bad joke—he could not even get drafted in that town. During WWI, that prohibition 
meant his health was atrocious. As an expatriate in Zurich, he led a miserable existence by 
working as a pianist and sketch writer for a small vaudeville troupe, and sometimes worked as an 
itinerant pianist for café owners who would begrudgingly allow him to play for tips. On that hot 
June night, Ball was thirty years old. 
 It is an age at which people often start to feel old for the first time, and Ball was certainly 
qualified to feel worn down. For the son of a traveling shoe salesman and a staunchly Catholic 
mother, he had reached the age at which the expectations began to seem overwhelming: a solid 
living, a home, possessions to fill it, and a family. Ball had none of these, and his only 
companion at the time, the actress and poet Emmy Hennings, had struggled with morphine 
addiction and purportedly had to resort to prostitution at certain points in her life. They were 
sickly. Scholars tend to heroicize these moments in the history of the avant-garde, because as 
comfortable bourgeois intellectuals, the hardships associated with being an artist are totally alien. 
That and everyone likes to retroactively root for the underdog. Ball’s situation did not 
necessarily improve when he succeeded in talking his way into a position as entertainment 
director for a small café he renamed the Cabaret Voltaire; on the surface, his situation resembled 
his earlier work for vaudeville. But that was just the surface. 
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 A very different work of art can provide the other bookend for the period under scrutiny. 
It is a small collage that is not terribly well-known, made by the German artist Max Ernst. He 
had been drafted, and suffered some badges of courage, albeit from rather mundane occurrences: 
a mule’s kick and a cannon’s recoil, basically both the result of being in the wrong place at the 
wrong time. Ernst’s time in the military likely led to his abandonment of university studies and 
his participation in avant-garde artistic events, which led to his father disowning him. The work 
in question, Sitzender Buddha, looks like something from the rubbish bin of Viktor 
Frankenstein’s laboratory. Ernst assembled appropriated images of cerebral anatomy that he 
clipped from various print sources, but the arrangement of images looks nothing like the human 
brain, but rather like some macabre cauliflower. Ernst intensified this feeling of mutation by 
drawing new organic elements in pen and ink that resemble cerebral channels or knots of 
nervous tissue, which creep across the printed images like some introduced species of ivy. 
 These two works are general examples of Dada, but appear to serve one another only as 
emphasis that the movement in question fomented heterogeneity as a way to avoid being co-
opted by an art market that liked its art movements in neat little packages. Ernst’s work contains 
imagery of brains mutating into forms that scientists would be hard pressed to classify in terms 
other than nightmarish. Yet the caricature of mental change Ernst represented in this work is 
deeply similar to what Ball sought in his performance, but understanding the ways in which that 
similarity exists requires a journey through a domain of psychology that has been forgotten or ill 
represented by historians of art. Within this similarity is a domain of critical address that, I 
believe, is a major dimension of avant-garde practice between the two wars. Like Dada, it has 
barely been understood. 
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Scholarship on Dada and Surrealism has established that psychology was a major 
intellectual source for artists in both groups. However, a burgeoning amount of recent work in 
both the history of art and of science indicates that types of psychology other than 
psychoanalysis permeated the historical context of the avant-garde. In the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, physiological psychology, for example, was the dominant science of the 
body and mind, which grounded psychic phenomena in structures of conduction in the nervous 
system. By carrying out thousands of different experiments on reaction time, reflex, or stimulus 
response, scientists in this field believed that they were establishing normative formulae of self-
formation that contained neither phenomenological essences nor behaviorist guiding structures. 
Modern artists saw within this discourse a fascinating and new theory of experience. Yet they 
were suspicious that a single structure of the psyche’s bodily substrate was destined to form in a 
system that was so open to continual reformation. In my selective history of the avant-garde’s 
reception and response to physiological psychology, I will argue that artists worked within and 
partially according to the basic tenets of this discourse, but that they reshaped its superstructural 
projections away from formations and taxonomies of normalcy in consciousness and action. 
 The majority of psychologists in the first half of the twentieth century were physiological 
psychologists. The multifaceted discourses and theories in this field all drew on the writings of 
Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), on whom I focus as the major source for critical artistic 
approaches to the field’s overall theories. Through the thousands of tests he conducted and, 
subsequently, by means of the dozens of psychologists he placed in universities around the 
globe, Wundt established both the popular idea that the psyche relied on nerves and the 
institutional practice of studying mental operation indirectly by experimenting on nervous 
reactions. These practices gave rise to a general culture of experiment and provided Wundt with 
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the bases for his theories of nervous formation and change, which he outlined in his landmark 
Grundzüge der Phyiologische Psychologie (1874), which served as a standard text for the 
discipline well into the twentieth century. In painstaking detail, this text established the reliance 
of thought patterns and communicative expression on mutable processes of nerves. Rather than 
relying on immanent ontological categories of mental operation that were above experience, 
Wundt based mental development on habitual modes of reaction and movement that rose from 
gradually established paths of nervous conduction in the body. 
 Wundt’s theory that psychic formation relied on properties of conducted nervous energy 
through bodily tissues reflected a more general turn in nineteenth century European culture 
toward exploring new energy systems that were based initially on thermodynamics and were in 
reaction to the supposed threat of heat death. Pioneering discoveries such as Wilhelm Röntgen’s 
x-ray (1895), J. J. Thomson’s investigations of the electron, studies of radioactive material by 
Pierre and Marie Curie, and the development of wireless telegraphy further stimulated this 
popular interest in energy. The latter, in particular, focused attention on the ether of space, 
understood to transmit vibrating waves ranging from X-rays to the Hertzian waves of wireless 
telegraphy. Subsequently, early quantum physics and Einstein’s theories of relativity, which 
would become popular in the 1920s, further highlighted the issue of energy. In the early years of 
the twentieth century, this scientific ferment contributed to the view that beyond the sensory 
world there existed what Linda Dalrymple Henderson has recently termed a “meta-reality” of 
pulsing energies and invisible dimensions.1 To an individual living at this time, the nature of 
reality itself seemed to change on a daily basis, as breakthrough discoveries were disseminated in 
newspapers and popular science journals across Europe. Wundt’s theories formed part of this 
popular face of science, because his major texts served as introductory college textbooks in 
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courses on psychology, philosophy, philology, and anthropology. Based on this fascination with 
new realities, both artists and the general public came to view space as a vibrating field of energy 
and rhythm. 
 Energy and rhythm were central concepts for Wundt, who investigated the human mind 
and nervous system in terms of qualitative and quantitative properties of vibration, conduction, 
and intensity. But unlike the new concepts of space and matter from physics, Wundt’s theories of 
the nervous system placed mutable qualities of energy within a person’s body as the basis of 
selfhood and created an inherently mutable subject position in which the self virtually 
overflowed with a mutating web of vibratory conduction paths that could shift with the 
introduction of new and unconventional movements. In a culture preoccupied with energy, 
Wundt’s new view of the potentials within the moving and sensing self were particularly 
interesting to the early twentieth century avant-garde.  
 Wundt opened the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig in 1879, but the lab gives 
only half the story of Wundt’s overall endeavor and of his place as an intellectual source in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Understanding what Wundt’s ideas offered to 
radical artists requires attention to his fulsome theories of culture that grew out of his laboratory 
work. He differed categorically from the subsequent generation of psychologists who trained 
with him and contributed to the spread of physiological psychology in his belief that the 
mechanical and hermetic conditions of laboratory experiment could only tell a scientist so much 
about the bodily substrate of mental life, and that this small portion consisted of only the most 
rudimentary phenomena of nervous response, sensation, and perception. One sees throughout 
Wundt’s long life a departure of his students from their teacher toward developing new 
experiments on higher mental functions like memory, the emotions, or volition.  
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 Outside the laboratory, but always in its conceptual territory, Wundt turned his focus to 
culture in the twentieth century. Beginning in 1900 and ending in 1911, Wundt published ten 
massive volumes comprising a work titled Völkerpsychologie, in which he outlines and pursues 
his belief that the higher mental operations of a human being are (1) culturally inculcated and (2) 
historically relative. In its thousands of pages, he outlined how the history of the psychological 
development of the human race was based on different systems of movement—habitual practices 
of action and reaction among people that were based on a relatively similar structure of nervous 
conduction. Wundt connected his historico-philosophical projection to his earlier experiments on 
the mechanics of nerve formation and reformation that he had outlined decades ago in his 
Grundzüge. In a paradigm shifting connection of science to cultural history, Wundt argued that 
one could gauge the development of the human subject’s mind as a point within a broader 
civilization by examining the cultural productions of the group, which consisted of language, art, 
myth, and customs of all kinds. Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie was decidedly hypothetical, but the 
science on which its claims were based had decades of authority behind it.  
 In tandem with the lab, Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie expressed a basic tenor of 
evolutionary mental development that one could perceive in the changing morphology of cultural 
production. The more specific nature of localized evolutionary trajectories made the 
development of mind far more relative to the shared action patterns of particular cultures from 
certain time periods. The conductive energies of a shared nervous morphology gave rise to 
different structures of collective endeavor within a certain historical context. Diversity of mental 
culture was Wundt’s main focus. Normalcy of higher mental function was still a focus of labs 
across Europe, but this equally powerful theory established that a nerve-based psyche could be 
extremely diverse and depended on where one was in space and time. Thus, during the early 
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twentieth century, the Völkerpsychologie problematized the authority of the laboratory and its 
established discourse of normalcy from within the heart of its institutional boundaries. 
 
Methodological Approach  
 On the rare occasion when extended discussions of Wundt’s work appear in the 
humanities, scholars most often approach his work according to the methods of the French 
historian and critical theorist Michel Foucault (1926-1984) framed science. In his diverse studies, 
Foucault treated science as a discourse of power that structures knowledge and defines 
subjectivity—a view that many historians who study institutional science share. For example, 
studies by Anson Rabinbach, and Jonathan Crary operate according to the Foucauldian method 
of placing discursive chains into a broad epistemic field in order to determine the manner in 
which power relations are established and maintained. In The Human Motor (1990), Rabinbach 
has shown how this science established that a rational person was an organic and therefore 
knowable entity, like gravity or thermodynamics. That view had immediate applicability to 
studying how one might improve the normative output of the subject’s labor power in the 
burgeoning industries of mass production. In several texts, Crary has analyzed psychological 
studies of attention as being symptomatic of its loss in an expanding culture of urban spectacle 
that fostered distraction.2  
These three scholars have successfully undertaken institutional critiques that have made 
physiological psychology into an ideological keystone of modern industrialized Europe. But they 
have not addressed the way in which this field appeared to radical artists who picked and chose 
ideas that they frequently combined with other, often contradictory, notions from separate fields. 
Of course, making this claim cannot simply enable one to look past the politically charged nature 
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of science or any other discourse; indeed, this earlier scholarship was essential for my 
establishment and theorization of how the avant-garde reshaped the premises of this discourse. 
 When the avant-garde looked to physiological psychology, they recognized its 
problematic social place and worked within the discourse in order to undermine and divert its 
stated ambitions into radical forms of social reformation. In its original context, physiological 
psychology was more usable than restrictive. Its usability opened it into a field of opportunity for 
critical address, manipulation, and subversive, covert retooling of more than individual 
perceptions. In the light of science offering critical potentials, rather than unstoppable control, 
my study has benefited from the theories of Foucault’s colleague, the French historian and 
theorist Michel de Certeau (1925-1986), who outlined methodologies that can augment or correct 
the more sweeping archaeological methods of Foucault. Certeau encouraged historians to focus 
on how people work within and often according to the basic causality of an ideological or 
restrictive discourse, but knowingly, in order to deviate from its more normative structures in a 
manner that undermines its stated intent to establish societal laws. He called this mode of 
practice a tactic, which is the general manner in which artists approached physiological 
psychology. Foucault himself offered a tactics of historiography that initially required 
withholding critical voices from the context under scrutiny. Certeau outlined why this silence 
made Foucault’s work a departure point rather than a model: “If it is true that the grid of 
‘discipline’ is everywhere becoming clearer and more extensive, it is all the more urgent to 
discover how an entire society resists being reduced to it, what popular procedures (also 
‘miniscule’ and quotidian) manipulate the mechanisms of discipline and conform to them only in 
order to evade them, and finally, what ‘ways of operating’ form the counterpart, on the 
consumer’s (or ‘dominee’s’?) side, of the mute processes that organize the establishment of 
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socioeconomic order.” 3 In Certeau’s model of tactic, one approaches a discourse with a knowing 
suspicion of its stated claims to objective authority and reshapes that discourse according to the 
base causality of its mainline epistemological conditions.  
The approach of the Dada and Surrealist artists, in addition to other figures in this study 
occurred with a similar knowing suspicion of physiological psychology’s stated claims to 
objective authority. These artists drew strength from each other in their shared desire to confront 
society in a manner that reshaped its basic conditions of experience. Artists took the two basic 
ends of Wundt’s overall developmental trajectory—new motion and cultural production—and 
combined them in order to explore how new motor activity among a small group within a context 
of cultural production had the potential to alter consciousness. My study will show how artists 
worked within the discourse of physiological psychology in a manner that openly challenged its 
claims to authority.  
 In situating Wundt’s theories alongside responses from selected members of the avant-
garde to this psychology, I faced a problem that scholars who focus on the relationship between 
radical art and science often face: why would a group of artists, whose interests are decidedly 
anti-positivist, be interested in this branch of psychology, which has long since come to stand as 
a pinnacle of positivist approaches to the mind?4 In addition to this question, I had to confront 
another, perhaps larger question: How did the artists’ approach to this science differ from their 
contemporaneous interest in psychoanalysis? Answering both of these questions will depend on 
how one frames the nature of the discourse itself. Physiological psychology contained within its 
supposed objectivist tenets the gateways to its own reshaping; it provided major guidelines for 
how experimental application of new forms of gesture and movement could alter the contents of 
one’s psyche, rather than simply illustrate its pre-existent conscious or unconscious structures.  
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State of the Literature on Wilhelm Wundt in Art History  
Art historians have often touched on Wundt’s theories as a subject of interest for the 
international avant-garde, but have never acquainted the reader with a basic outline of his 
theories in historical and intellectual context. This omission makes him into a sort of ghost of 
Modernism; he is there, but in an ephemeral way; a name cited, a couple basic ideas mentioned, 
and nothing more. But given the diversity of these connections, it would appear that it is high 
time for a focused examination of Wundt’s theories, coupled with a more in depth analysis of 
how certain artists critically reshaped his work. 
Unsurprisingly, Wundt’s ideas pervaded the German-speaking world. Both Corinna 
Treitel and Daniel Cottom have described how he lent a dissenting voice to debates on spiritism, 
which was a major avant-garde interest.5 In her study of the German art historian Alois Riegl, 
Margaret Olin has established Riegl’s intellectual debt to Wundt.6 Both Robert Brain and Juliet 
Koss have connected Wundt’s work to the interest that German cultural figures like Wilhelm 
Worringer and Georg Fuchs had in debates on phenomena of empathy.7 In a recent study on 
Kantian theories in art, Mark Cheetham notes that the German art dealer Daniel Henry 
Kahnweiler, Picasso’s first dealer in Paris, was a close reader of Wundt’s work and used his 
theories as an intellectual source for his writings on Cubism.8 In his studies of more critically 
minded German intellectuals of the 1920s and 1930s, Frederic J. Schwartz recently established 
Walter Benjamin’s indebtedness to Wundt’s theory of apperception in the composition of his 
landmark 1935 essay “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technical Reproducibility.” More 
recently, he has connected Wundt’s ideas on apperception to the deeper interest among critical 
thinkers like Siegfried Kracauer in phenomena of distraction.9 
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In the context of Russian art, Charlotte Douglas was one of the first scholars to note 
Wunt’s important role for the avant-garde, who encountered his theories through both primary 
sources and secondary literature.10 A center point of this transmission was the physician Nikolai 
Kulbin, who was close to artists and was able to offer more user-friendly versions of Wundt’s 
complex theories. Henderson has noted that P.D. Ouspensky’s Tertium Organum owes a 
significant debt to Wundt’s notion of “sensory feeling,” or the notion that the senses have a pre-
conscious unity. Gerald Janacek has outlined how basic ideas from Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie 
diffused through the popular press in Russia during the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, where Russian poets including Mayakovsky and Khlebnikov read about and 
incorporated these theories into the development of radical poetry.11 Another Russian artist who 
read Wundt was Wassily Kandinsky, whose uncle translated Wundt’s work into Russian in 1911-
1912, which coincided with the publication of his Blau Reiter Almanak (which included an essay 
by Kulbin), in addition to acquainting non-Russian artists like the Dadaist Hugo Ball with the 
recent work of the Russian futurists. According to John Gage, Kandinsky’s interest in 
synaesthesia was likely fueled by Wundt’s discussion of it in relation to Goethe’s earlier theories 
of color, which he reinforced with current scientific authority.12 Margaret Olin has suggested that 
Wundt’s rejection of hierarchy between vision and touch, coupled with Wilhelm Worringer’s 
focus on tactility in his theories of empathy, provided major intellectual sources for both 
Kandinsky and Gustav Klimt.13 The diverse outlooks of these figures from the history of culture 
and the frequent contacts that many of them had with each other illustrates the sheer international 
scope of connections to Wundt’s work and its usability by many different artists. 
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
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 This study differs from uses of other psychological methodologies in that I cannot 
guarantee reader familiarity with Wundt’s ideas. Thus, the first two chapters will introduce a 
selection of Wundt’s most prominent theories. The first chapter outlines Wundt’s ideas from his 
Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie (1874) on rudimentary nervous function and the 
way in which he plotted the relationships among bodily movements, the senses, and psychic 
function. My goal is to introduce in as clear a way possible how Wundt understood the 
mechanics of the nervous system. These mechanics formed the focus of his lab experiments, 
which had a particular social dimension of testing and usage of instruments that is necessary for 
comprehending how situating these theories in a particular social dimension facilitated the social 
view of psychological objectivity. Based on this context of experiment, Wundt made the key 
argument that one could not test higher mental functions, which were the subject matter for 
comparative analyses of cultures.    
 The second chapter introduces selected concepts from Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie, which 
was his response to queries of how one should study higher mental functions. In particular, I 
focus on how Wundt discussed the mentality, language, and art of so-called “primitive” cultures, 
which remains an essentially unexplored source of interest for the avant-garde fascination with 
non-Western cultures. Intriguingly, Wundt’s notion of primitivism connected the mental level 
and horizons of primitive experience to particular systems of movement. In order to establish the 
popularity and applicability of Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie in the historical context, I will 
construct a comparative analysis of different approaches to this work by Emile Durkheim, Franz 
Boas, and Wilhelm Worringer. In particular, it was Worringer who provided avant-garde artists 
with the idea that mental change through an alteration of nerves was most potent when it was 
undertaken by a small group of like-minded individuals or a subcollective. In contrast to the 
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individualist orientation of empathy, Worringer drew on both the theories of German art 
historian Alois Riegl and the Völkerpsychologie in order to present his own version of this 
Wundtian method and define abstract art as a new form of subcollective movement that could 
yield new forms of thought among a group, rather than an individual stylistic endeavor of the 
plastic arts. Both the first chapter and this one will therefore establish the discursive presence of 
Wundt’s thought.  
 The third chapter establishes the popularity that the reshaping of Wundt’s theories in this 
fashion had throughout Europe, a prominence that did not begin or end with Dada and 
Surrealism. One route of diffusion that Wundt’s ideas took was through revolutionary 
approaches to musical pedagogy and choreography. The first of these approaches I examine is 
the life work of Emil Jacques-Dalcroze, a Swiss born musical pedagogue, who taught a 
heightened sensitivity to rhythm by having his students undertake courses in which they moved 
in certain ways to specific sequences of rhythm. His systems of eurhythmics drew extensively on 
basic Wundtian theories of nervous change. He also drew on the notion from the psychologist’s 
later Völkerpsychologie, that collectively changing the nature of the nervous system promised to 
give rise to new forms of orientation to pre-existent cultural production. Foremost among the 
Dalcroze theories that I shall spotlight is the power that collective movement (Turnen) had to 
shift nervous conduction paths as the initial stage of nervous reeducation. Dalcroze sought to use 
his method to reorient his students to pre-existent forms of music. More radical users, by 
contrast, used his methods to orient bodies to rhythms of a different sort. For example, the 
Austrian philosopher and occultist figure Rudolf Steiner read Wundt’s work critically and used it 
as the basis for his belief that collective group movement could build organs of higher perception 
in a person’s body that allowed them to witness higher, occult realities that they could then 
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communicate to an audience through the group movements of Eurhythmie. In addition to 
Steiner’s radical use of eurhythmics, the German Rudolf von Laban was a choreographer who 
used Dalcroze’s theories to equally revolutionary ends with the help of former Dalcroze students 
Suzanne Perrottet and Mary Wigman. As many scholars know, Laban’s students had extensive 
contact with members of the Dada movement in Zurich and it is my contention that one of the 
motivating factors for this contact was the approach to movement that both groups had, which 
drew on a radical reading of Wundt’s work. 
 Dada, of course, was very different from Laban’s overall artistic program and other 
approaches to rhythmic group movement in Switzerland, which all utilized techniques of 
ascendant complexity in the building of new harmonious practices and social reform. Thus the 
fourth chapter will outline how members of Zürich Dada did to Laban’s theories what Laban did 
to Dalcroze; they selectively borrowed, reshaped, and intensified certain tenets and practices 
according to the common intent to reshape the bodily substrate of mental life in and through the 
sphere of cultural expression. Foremost among these practices is improvisation. In addition to 
plenty of evidence detailing contact with Wundt’s ideas, period texts by Dada artists indicate 
connections of artistic endeavors to physiological psychology that utilize its basic causal 
structures to rebuild the expressive minds of the group’s members. Out of collaborative and 
improvisational movement, one may read Zürich activities as an ironic reenactment of laboratory 
experiments that took place in Leipzig, both in terms of the focus on arbitrary movement and the 
collaborative social dimension of expression. Only in Zürich, artists sought to change the group, 
rather than classify it. 
 The fifth and final chapter explores the impact of Zürich Dada on the artistic practice of 
the German artist Max Ernst. I frame his early graphic work and collages from the early 1920s as 
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enacting a dual mode of engagement with Wundt’s ideas. On the one hand, Ernst’s contacts with 
both Arp and the Dadaist Kurt Schwitters inspired highly polished graphic works that are built 
out of improvisational coordination of different graphic processes that one may frame as a 
cultivated discord of bodily movement. On the other hand, Ernst created powerful visual 
representations of physiological otherness in his collages of twisted organs and mutating 
anatomy. I then move on to consider his contacts with Zürich Dadaists during his time in the 
Tyrolean Alps in which he collaborated on improvised collages and texts, in addition to 
inventing his well-known method of frottage. 
 Ultimately, my goal for this dissertation is to acquaint the reader with a dimension of 
psychology that has received rather one-sided treatment in the humanities, if it has appeared at 
all. Scrutinizing these theories offers a new way to understand gesture and artistic creation as it 
relates to the psychology of twentieth-century culture. In a broader sense, this study seeks to 
provide a demonstration of the way artists utilized science critically by reshaping its tenet to suit 
their political and creative needs. It is also my hope that this study will invigorate continued 
interest in forms of psychology other than psychoanalysis and thus will give scholars in the 
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Nerves, a User’s Guide: Wundt’s Theories of Elemental Nervous Change 
 
 
“He never learned to play.” – Edwin Boring on Wilhelm Wundt1 
 
  
 Wilhelm Wundt published the first edition of his Principles of Physiological 
Psychology (Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie) in 1874, and the work was 
subsequently revised and updated six times by 1911. Born in 1832 to a Lutheran minister, 
Wundt began his scientific training in 1851. Throughout his long career, he established 
myriad experimental methods for studying the activities and formation of consciousness 
by examining physiological processes in the human anatomy and nervous system. In 
doing so, he drew on the field of experimental physiology that was in full bloom during 
the second half of the nineteenth century in the different work of Johannes Müller, 
Gustav Fechner, and Hermann von Helmholtz. These three scientists had established the 
study of human physiology as an experimental discipline that was on the same level as 
physics. Wundt’s revolutionary gesture was to take this method of inquiry and carry it 
over as the means to comprehend psychic processes. 
He spent a crucial semester in 1856 studying with Johannes Müller (1801-1858), 
the early pioneer of experimental physiology.2 Müller’s major contributions to the 
developing field of physiological psychology were his laws of specific nerve energy that 
appeared in his gradually published Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen (1833-
1840). The essential tenet of these laws was that one is not directly aware of an object, 
but rather is only directly aware of an overall experience that nerves cause. Müller argued 
that nerves are the intermediaries between perceived objects and the mind.3 He thought 
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that five different kinds of nerves filled the human body—one for each sense. Each type 
of nerve transmitted a particular kind of nervous energy that registered in the mind as a 
specific sense quality. The details of experience would determine the nature of how these 
nerves interacted. For example, if one witnessed an explosion, the noise and flash of light 
would generate separate qualities in the mind that are transmitted by different nerves. 
Thus, the quality of a sensation will depend on what particular nerves are triggered into 
servicing the brain with data. Müller made the nervous system into the key interface 
between self and world. It was the active force in determining how experience and 
thought came to exist, and his view enabled greater interest in phenomena of cerebral 
localization, or the different ways in which distant nerve paths meet in the brain. 
Major publications on the human mind and senses appeared during the 1860s that 
fed Wundt’s interest in this gradually emerging field of physiological psychology. In 
addition to the works of Müller, he devoured the psychophysical theories of Gustav 
Fechner (1801-1887), whose 1860 text Elemente der Psychophysik posited a functional 
relationship between body and mind based on measuring thresholds of stimulus 
response.4 Fechner was a mathematician, physicist, and philosopher who tried to measure 
the energy of a mental event in coordination with levels of physical intensity and 
ultimately sought to link these energies to degrees of physical effort. He drew on the 
earlier theories of physician Ernst Heinrich Weber (1795-1878) to develop what he then 
called Weber’s law. This formula describes the functional relation between the 
measurable magnitude of a stimulus and that of a sensation one can only infer, due to an 
unavailability of the psyche to experimental testing.5 Fechner established a tenet, later 
echoed in Wundt’s work, that a scientist cannot measure individual sensation, but that 
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measuring a stimulus and the necessary levels that were required for a particular 
sensation to enter consciousness was possible. Fechner called these different threshold 
values limen, or the points at which sensations are actualized and known in consciousness 
by either acknowledgement or attention. Wundt echoed Leibniz in calling this 
phenomenon “apperception.”6 Fechner’s indirect measurement of mental events through 
stimulus testing and threshold experiments formed a major pillar of Wundt’s later 
structure of physiological psychology.  
Another scientist who inspired Wundt was Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894), 
whose work had included major studies on optics and hearing that furthered Müller’s 
notion of specific nerve energies that met in the brain.7 In his classic study of hearing, the 
Tonempfindungen (1863), Helmholtz connected the human nervous system to telegraphy, 
the popular new technology of his moment that had captivated public attention.8 In his 
“telegraph theory” of the nervous system, he stated that myriad nervous conductions had 
no particular differences, but that these fibrous canals in the body were like telegraph 
wires that passively transmitted electricity.9 From this analogy, he argued that the real 
site of interest is the termination point of all these nerve paths in the brain. In the midst of 
these electrical analogies, Helmholtz also established the landmark theory that human 
physiology obeyed general laws of thermodynamics, especially the law of the 
conservation of work or energy.10 Wundt, by connecting nerves to psychic formation with 
an entire regiment of experiments, would extend this tenet to psychic function, but the 
mechanical nature of Wundt’s approach to the nervous system would ultimately be the 
most concerted attempt to plot the nature of the system’s dynamism and mutability. 
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Wundt returned to Heidelberg in 1856, took his doctorate in medicine, and 
worked as an assistant professor of physiology for the next seventeen years, which 
included working intermittently with Helmholtz. During this time, he began to develop a 
theory of experimental psychology, in which physiological experiment could serve the 
interests of psychological investigation. Wundt stayed in Heidelberg until 1874. During 
the last two years of his stay, he published the landmark Principles of Physiological 
Psychology.11 This text became the standard textbook for introductory courses in 
psychology and laboratories of experimental psychology, of which Wundt’s was the first. 
Having opened in Leipzig in 1879, His lab revolutionized studies of the mind by offering 
a concerted program of study for young psychologists and soon, many flocked to his lab 
from all over Europe and the United States.  
 By 1890 Leipzig had become the center of physiological psychology. By this 
year, according to Edwin Boring, Wundt had succeeded in getting “experimental 
psychology permanently established in the world of science.”12 His theories and practices 
were prevalent across Europe, although that would change as the field continued to 
develop. In contrast to the elemental focus of Wundt’s laboratory, many of his students 
began to work against their teacher’s belief that higher psychic functions could not be 
tested through experiment, but only inferred. Wundt’s response to these second-
generation psychologists is addressed in chapter two. However, in order to understand the 
nature of his response to these later occurrences, an introduction to the content of the 
Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie is necessary.  
 
Basic Features of Wundt’s Overall Theory 
 24
In the most general terms, Wundt had a psycho-physical point of view that 
accounted for both the mind and body of individuals within the social-historical world.  
He used physiology to study phenomena of sense perception as bodily processes that 
form part of this environment.13 Earlier scientists like Müller, Fechner, and Helmholtz 
had established regimens of tests for understanding how a human’s anatomy and 
physiology functioned both habitually and in reaction to change. Wundt absorbed this 
pre-existent availability of testing bodily energies and expanded drastically upon it, 
particularly in his scrutiny of the nervous system, which established these experiments as 
the bases for investigations of psychological processes. He sought to plot how 
“experimental modification of processes of life as practiced by physiology oftentimes 
effects a concomitant change, direct or indirect, in the processes of consciousness – 
which, as we have seen, form part of the vital processes at large.”14 Wundt’s real 
breakthrough, as many historians of science have realized, was his application of a 
particular, pre-established system of experiment from the natural sciences 
(Naturwissenschaft) to the study of mind and consciousness (Geisteswissenschaft). 15 
Wundt’s laboratory practice in Leipzig altered categorically the social view of 
psychology. One had to be a physiologist in order to be a psychologist. 
One also had to experiment. Based on its thousands of different tests, the fact that 
physiological psychology often goes by the name “experimental psychology” is fitting. 
Wundt needed a lab so that psychology could draw from “the fullness that modern 
physiology puts at its disposal for analysis of conscious processes,” including effects of 
language and learning.16 He believed that only experiment could uncover the full range of 
nervous function that formed the basis of psychic function. In this manner, his method 
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would create a balanced, synthetic field of physiology and psychology.17 This belief had 
a philosophical consequence as well. Testing another’s nervous reactions distinguished 
Wundt’s theories from the legacy of inductive philosophy, which generally included a 
scientist drawing his theories from an observation of himself.18 As Wundt saw it, the 
nervous system was slightly transformed or refocused in every act of self-observation. 
Observing changes in another gave one a particular window into the interconnection of 
body and mind, for an experimenter thus directed his thought processes solely toward 
observation, rather than simultaneously experiencing the phenomena of the test himself.19  
But Wundt sought to do more with his method than critique the work of 
philosophers and scientists who used induction. His laboratory proposed a structure of 
mental formation that encompassed both inter- and intrasubjective phenomena—in short, 
it outlined a basic structure by which all people developed mental capacities through a 
bodily substrate of mental life (körperlichen Grundlagen des Seelenlebens). Wundt 
intended that his Grundzüge would provide the theoretical bases and practices of 
experimental inquiry to balance physiology and psychology in a structure of mutual 
support. He outlined this forceful dialectic in the early pages of this text. For example, he 
argued that, on the one hand, physiology erred when it used sensation both abstractly (as 
an idea) and as an element of an idea, or quality of a perceived object taken in through 
the senses.  The term “sensation” in physiology was thus often being applied to both 
simple and complex contents, which created a great deal of elasticity for the term.20  On 
the other hand, psychology erred when it described sensation as both the result of exterior 
stimuli and then as an idea, which connoted that it depended on internal conditions.  
Psychology also posited memory images as ideas, which confused entirely new nervous 
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excitation from current sources and guided reactions to current stimuli based on a 
subject’s customary orientation, emotions, and memory.21 Distinguishing between senses, 
feelings, and ideas set physiological psychology apart from other disciplines that relied 
on flawed notions of experience. Each discipline had a weakness the other could 
strengthen.  
Based on the authority of this new epistemological dialectic, physiological 
experiment on willing subjects enabled Wundt to argue that the best model for any state 
of consciousness was flux that resulted from its various connections of experiential data 
to physiological processes in the nervous system.22 But rather than poeticize this flux, 
Wundt made it far more elemental and largely unknowable. He used experiment to 
present a massive diversity of physiological phenomena as a seemingly infinite range of 
transitory conscious phenomena. Continual reconstitution of peripheral nervous fibers 
guaranteed that base aspects of the moving self—which form the base of the thinking 
self—were fleeting, which meant that a controlled experiment could only study the nature 
of dynamic processes, rather than reconfirm the function of a concrete structure.23 In 
Wundt’s view, the mind was continually changing, and continually open to change, rather 
than strictly determined by biology, pure ideas, or logic.24  Shifting from belief in 
immanent mental awareness to observation of mental formation created a focus on bodily 
movement and gave the nervous system a new quality of volatility that Wundt then 
proceeded to study according to pre-existent methods of physiological experiment.25   
Experiment quickly showed Wundt that nerves could balance habitual orientation 
and remain open to change. This dualism of structure fascinated him and provided a site 
for further experiment that yielded new complexities of mental formation. Based on this 
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attention to functional reciprocity between established structures and alteration, observing 
another’s reactions caused movement to become the central phenomenon of study in 
Wundt’s lab, in all its forms: conductive processes of nervous transmission, reaction 
time, eye movement, and thresholds of touch. Focusing on how movement both 
constitutes and changes psychological processes expanded Helmholtzian bodily 
thermodynamics into the territory of consciousness and made it the foundation of psychic 
processes, which immediately became more multi-faceted—neither nativist nor 
empirical, but inherently mutable. Instead of emphasizing a fixed and immanent sphere of 
consciousness, Wundt sought to show how movement characterizes a reaction to stimulus 
that may alter how experience is processed into consciousness. These views drastically 
altered how one conceived the relationship between mind and body.   
Observing how many movements arose independently of volition led Wundt to 
locate the most elemental valid psychological events at a level of phenomenal sensation 
that was below a level of subjective awareness and at a scale that was generally beneath a 
person’s capacities of observation. When experiments yielded different connections 
between movement and thought, this diversity reinforced his belief in degrees of 
consciousness, in which many forms of experience are neither attended to, nor fixed. 
Earlier psychologists, Fechner in particular, had established varying thresholds of 
awareness for sense intake and reaction, but Wundt’s connection of these subliminal 
phenomena to the formation of consciousness was more focused, and made the 
establishment of thought rely less on prior intellectual performance and far more heavily 
on barely perceptible physiological processes of movement-based reaction. Testing the 
 28
body’s ambulatory reactions to simple stimuli would allow one to indirectly understand 
the base levels of mental formation. 
In focusing on rudimentary stimulus response, Wundt’s lab discovered that 
mental change most often became manifest in forms of movement and reaction that 
appeared incongruent or outside habitual modes of sensory and cognitive orientation. 
Unexpected reaction altered structures of movement-based response, which had 
immediate (but not immediately knowable) connections to the formation of thought. 
Thus, new phenomena of physical life – especially movement – could change conscious 
processes, but in ways that are not automatically clear. The inherent mystery in this law 
of causality became an intensely poetic premise for avant-garde artistic production, but 
for the moment, I shall focus on how Wundt’s lab practice shifted epistemologies of the 
mind and movement. 
  In the light of this newly realized combination of observable movement and 
opacity of mental function, Wundt recast the Cartesian mantra (Je pense donc je suis) 
into "I experience, therefore I can think.” Thus, he reframed the mind and body as 
phenomenal formations of experience based on habitual arrangements of nerves that 
could change at any moment with the repeated absorption of discordant stimuli.26 
Studying the nature of these formations and reformations required that one investigate (1) 
which physical processes directly affected conscious processes, and (2) how conscious 
and unconscious processes facilitated or inhibited individual physical processes. 
Beginning a study of thought processes with inquiries of nervous conduction meant that 
Wundt and his team were in for long years of work.  
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 Their data created a continuous upsurge of complexity for how the nervous 
system was an interface of mind and body, self and world. Studying mental formation by 
experimenting on the body illuminated physiological “modes of connection” between 
different nervous fibers that referred specifically to the relationships between conscious 
processes and substrates of the body that cause changes in thought.27 In consequence of 
this focus, both consciousness and the senses – especially in relation to forms of 
movement – were to be important to the scientist. Testing bodily reaction illuminated the 
different ways in which nerves produced shifting levels of limits and facilitation. Basing 
selfhood on nerves generated an expansive area for studying mental development. 
Testing movement responses would uncover how the nervous and psychic enablers of 
ambulation formed. It is to these specific techniques of testing and the social dimensions 
of their application that we now turn. 
 
The Culture of Experiment: Techniques and the Social Dimension of Wundt’s Lab 
Historians of psychology have closely examined Wundt’s lab in terms of its 
philosophical assumptions, its material culture of instruments, and the social dimension 
of its practices. In its initially modest spaces in the storage closets of a lecture hall, 
Wundt and his students reconceived the mind from the ground up in terms of charting 
and measuring nerve reactions under the interpretive umbrella that these varying charges 
coursing through the tissues formed the basis of the psyche. Techniques of inquiry in the 
Leipzig laboratory have a social dimension that is utterly foreign to the notions of 
psychological analysis in which scholars of the humanities are better versed. 
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In this culture of experiment, the mind was knowable through collaborative 
studies of habitual and unconventional bodily stimulation. Wundt's project relied on 
observing and defining processes according to an activist model, in which a system could 
continually reshape itself in reaction to new experiences.28 Base causality framed what 
was, in fact, an unpredictable dynamism of mind and body.  
Given the breadth of experiments conducted over the decades when Wundt’s lab 
was at its height, a historian can initially approach this mass of data by sorting the 
experiments into two broad categories: those of testing bodily movement with 
instruments, and those of cutting (pathologisch) into the body in order to examine its 
tissues. These categories differ in terms of enabling focus. Testing plots bodily energies 
through recording manipulation. Dissection introduces more drastic disruptions of tissue. 
Of course, one must keep in mind that Wundt and his students viewed these different 
investigations as elements of a single practice. I shall focus on the tests of bodily 
movement and will address pathology in a later chapter.29   
Testing and measuring bodily reaction with instruments allowed scientists to 
study the relations between definite areas of the cortex and peripheral sensory organs.  
One could also focus on paths of conduction in the central organs of the brain.30 Carrying 
out experiments on the conduction paths in the nervous system generally included 
enhancement or interruption of conduction.  But the nervous system has a seemingly 
infinite variety of reactive zones and possible phenomena. Sole reliance on this method 
would produce an infinite variation.  Consequently, this method was at best an aid for 
other experiments including microscopic histology of tissue and dissection.    
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Studying conduction altered tissues, but far less invasively than dissection. This 
technique generally involved sending electric currents through tissues, which caused a 
muscle to contract in reaction to this excess irritation or disruption. Wundt examined the 
nervous system initially by studying its molecular mechanics in conditions that were as 
simple as possible, which the scientist could arbitrarily alter and observe according to 
application of controlled variables.  In this simple environment, one can better grasp the 
nature of a stimulus, which Wundt defined as “any outside affection of the nervous 
elements that serves in some way to arouse or modify their functions.”31  In such cases, 
nervous stimuli were either internal (from within the body) or external.32 The external 
type could be manipulated by electric shocks or currents that “destroy the molecular 
equilibrium of the nerve elements, and create a peripheral contraction in the muscle 
fibers.”33 Functional derangement allowed for more immediate observation and 
calculation of nerve mechanics. One could also implicate the senses more fully and apply 
a stimulus, either electrical or sensory, and measure the time of a person’s reaction to it.  
A person taking reaction tests could, for example, press a button upon perceiving 
a flash of light. This process gave observers a sense of the mean time it took a stimulus to 
travel from the nervous tissues to the brain. In another test, a white circle on a black 
background or a black circle on white would appear arbitrarily to the subject, who would 
then have to press one of two buttons, depending on what had appeared. In each case, the 
focus of the experiment was to map the tissues in which a nerve impulse from the 
corporeal periphery traveled to the brain. The stimulus’s appearance in consciousness and 
responsive act of will sent by the brain was only estimable after comparing the 
measurements of the stimulus traveling to the brain and the overall time of the subject’s 
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responsive movement. These measured times were very short, often in milliseconds, 
which meant that the lab needed instruments for measuring these bodily thought 
processes.34 
 One of these instruments was the chronoscope (figure 1), which originally 
measured the speed of ballistics.35 In 1840, the British scientist Charles Wheatstone 
constructed a two-step process to measure the infinitesimal interval between the firing of 
a gun and the striking of its target. He stretched a thin line across the mouth of a gun 
barrel that was connected to the device. Pulling the trigger broke the string and its 
connected electric circuit, which activated a separate switch that closed a circuit on an 
electric clock that moved its hands until the shell struck a target and broke the circuit, 
thus stopping the hands.36 In this way, Wheatstone continued his contemporaneous 
experiments on the velocity of electricity and measurement that overlapped with his 
invention of the telegraph with William Cooke in 1839.37 
 In 1842, Swiss watchmaker Mathias Hipp refined Wheatstone’s invention by 
regulating his clock with a spring that vibrated 500 times per second. The hands on this 
clock were not connected to the rest of the mechanism by any sort of machinery. At the 
start of the experiment, an electromagnetic coil activated the clock, but a small piece of 
metal prevented the movement of its hands. Interrupting this current, which marked the 
introduction of the stimulus, allowed the hands to move, and the subsequent registry of 
reaction by the subject on a small switch closed the circuit and stopped the hands.38 But 
electromagnetism was not yet an exact science, especially when it came to the powering 
of instruments. The electromagnetic contracting and releasing of the clock ran on wet 
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chemical batteries that could display varying voltage levels, which would affect the 
registry of an interval. 
 Wundt’s way around this problem was his employment of an outside instrument 
known as a control hammer (fig. 2) that could offer comparative regularity to the 
measured interval of the chronoscope in tests that he and his students performed 
separately from the subject. The control hammer helped calibrate the chronoscope.39 This 
instrument consisted of a small weight at the end of a thin rod that was suspended with an 
electromagnet. Interrupting the current caused the hammer to drop past one contact point, 
which opened the circuit on the chronoscope, causing its hands to move. Then, it fell past 
another contact which closed the circuit, stopped the clock, and registered the interval on 
a chronoscope. If the determined interval of the control hammer matched the registered 
time on the chronoscope, then the instrument was accurate. Determining the interval of 
the control hammer required yet another instrument called a chronograph. 
 Wundt introduced the chronograph (fig. 3) as a way to register all of these 
intervals by graphic means in relation to a single mean measurement generated by the 
machine independently of the other instruments.40 The chronograph looks a bit like a 
modern day seismograph and consisted of a paper cylinder that had been darkened with 
soot, which rotated ten times a second. As the cylinder rotated, a small device traveled on 
a track across the cylinder on a small arm that was perpendicular to it. This small device 
held a beard hair that was glued to a tuning fork, which gave off electromagnetic 
vibrations at a rate of 1,000 times per second. These little vibrations of the hair left a 
small, wavy line of negative registry on the darkened paper that registered time in 
milliseconds. This small line was a standard against which other intervals could be 
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compared. Within this little device were also three pins. These pieces were electrically 
connected to the chronoscope, so that starting the clock left a mark on the paper, and 
stopping it left another one. The third was open for the registry of another mode of 
response in case the experiment was more complex.  
 Thus, the three machines would act in concert to measure all kinds of reaction 
time and each other’s function: the chronoscope measured the reaction, the control 
hammer regulated the chronoscope, and the chronograph maintained the interval of the 
control hammer and registered the reaction time from the chronograph, which created a 
comparative graphic trace of the time between an initial stimulus and the subject’s 
reaction to it. As several scholars in the history of psychology have noted, reliance on 
instruments lent a technical overtones and regularity of measure to constructing an 
accepted normalcy of mental operation.41 But this history of instruments omits the sheer 
mutability Wundt presented as the essence of the nervous system—a mutability that was 
(somewhat paradoxically) reinforced by instruments of infinitesimal measure. While 
these tests could plot reactions with mechanical exactitude, Wundt’s own theories from 
the Grundzüge continually emphasize the problems and complications that arose within 
tissues that are under experimental scrutiny. These complications were not due to errors 
in instruments, but were the functional properties of nerves. 
Given this use of instrumentation in the mapping and measuring of nervous 
phenomena, scholars have often accused Wundt of constructing a mechanistic 
representation of mental formation. Two major contributing factors helped its scientists 
avoid this trap. First, the scale and breadth of Leipzig’s inquiry helped its scientists 
remain focused on describing processes of thought and nervous formation as processes 
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(Vorgängen) in the truest sense, rather than establishing an essentialist model of how the 
mind worked. 42 Wundt’s elemental focus helped him avoid framing mental processes as 
being an issue of stimulus and response in a purely mechanical way. Any physiological 
modification by means of exterior stimuli can alter the functioning of one’s 
consciousness.  Lab tests helping to isolate and document these processes would include 
modifications or manipulations of certain aspects of daily activity in order to test 
reactions and modifications of conditioned response.    
Second, studying how nerves changed also contributed to Leipzig’s avoidance of 
physiological functionalism. One could test an extent process or observe how that process 
changed with the introduction of a new stimulus. In tests of extant processes, controlling 
the conditions of testing fostered the formulation of psychological effects into organically 
based categories of subject formation that, in turn, enabled further systematic analysis of 
causal relationships in more tests. In combination with studies of present processes, tests 
that involved altering the conditions of reactive movements or stimulus response in 
individuals, their natural environments, or the focus of attention used to sort out 
experience itself (again, by initiating bodily motion) created a representation of 
consciousness as a system of processes that continually and constructively changed in 
response to “functional derangements (funktionelle Störungen)” of its nervous substrate.43 
In the lab, Wundt and his students tested how mental processes formed and changed, 
which meant that functional derangement became a major condition of testing. 
Physiological psychology interpreted conscious processes “by their reference to 
physiological conditions (Bedingungen),” but the main intent of testing during this time 
was the belief that many of these conditions became noticeable only when nervous 
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physiology underwent outside modification.44 Once a process had a certain degree of 
regularity, one probed its scope by varying the intensity and duration of applied stimuli. 
That mode of reference required constant monitoring and redefinition according to an 
innovation in the scientific paradigm of experiment that “enables us to arbitrarily vary 
(willkürlich variierbar macht) the conditions of our observations” in a way that allows 
one to grasp the diversity of mental phenomena that derive from experience.45 
Understanding initial levels of thought formation required focus on base nervous 
reaction, which had the highest mutability. Understanding a conductive process required 
modification of its normative balance of conductive energies. Arbitrarily modifying 
stimuli allowed scientists at Leipzig to track how changes to nerves affect the mind, but it 
replaced a unilateral model of continuity with an unpredictable self-generated complexity 
that was the property of the observed tissue itself. 
In addition to the ramifications of these foci on processes, Wundt warned the 
reader of the Grundzüge that isolating one process would, by necessity, change how it 
interacted with other processes and with the psyche. In short, studying nerves caused 
these tissues to change in unpredictable ways. That factor led to two basic problems 
associated with stimulus testing. First, phenomena of concomitant irritation occurred 
when an applied current spread to areas of tissue that were not under direct scrutiny, but 
that nonetheless altered the nature of reaction. Nerves were like a string of firecrackers: 
setting off one triggered any others that were connected to it. Wundt thought that a 
multitude of tests could help experimenters distinguish elements of true reaction from 
concomitant irritation, but there were still discrepancies of cause. Second, given that one 
area of the bodily periphery had several different contact points of representation in the 
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cortex, it was difficult to tell whether, for example, a motor reaction was triggered by a 
cortical reception of a direct excitation in the muscle fibers (the desired site of testing) or 
a stimulus received from some other sense impression in the cortex that had nothing to do 
with application of the current.46 Essentially, these two issues spotlighted the 
permeability of tissues and the openness of these nerve endings to change as an effect of 
new stimuli. Nervous receptivity could not be compartmentalized and any stimulus 
inevitably ran into other impulses in the centers that one could not predict. Experiment 
could only establish a sliver of psychophysical function, and trying to observe the very 
object of study only increased these complexities. Testing showed how truly volatile 
nerves were. 
This volatility, however, had a testable extent. Wundt knew that any number of 
aberrant conditions could lead to varying test results.47 Once repetition had established a 
mean coherence of determination, only then could other sets of experiments unfold that 
deliberately and systematically varied the nature of conditions and stimuli, complicating 
and expanding the data set in a manageable fashion, often by increasing the intensity of 
the applied stimulus. Arbitrary modification showed how the nervous bases of thought 
responded to the changing nature of experience. Thus, the testing was not a measurement 
of concrete processes; it was most often a study of how a dynamic system mutated in 
response to a changing flux of stimuli. Other forms of change were social and concerned 
the fluidity of roles in the social context of the Leipzig laboratory. 
In comparison to criticism of omniscient analyses in institutional psychology, 
Leipzig’s collaborative social dimension and the requirements of experiment among its 
practitioners have received little study.48  Kurt Danziger has outlined how Wundt’s 
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laboratory experiments “took the form of a collaborative activity in which the participants 
frequently exchanged experimenter and subject roles.”49  David K. Robinson has 
described how most experiments at Leipzig had three basic positions: the subject 
(Reagent) took the test, the experimenter (Experimentator) conducted it, and the observer 
(Beobachter) recorded the technical conditions of the test and its results (fig. 4).50 This 
social dimension is inextricable from the nature of experimental practice, because this 
group had to follow Wundt’s four basic requirements for experiment and how one 
participated in it.  
These rules drew on physiological experiment and were thus familiar in the 
natural sciences of the day.51 First, the observer (Beobachter) must know when the event 
under examination is to begin. Second, the observer must attend closely to the entirety of 
the experiment, which was no small task, given the tedious focus of the Leipzig tests. The 
next two requirements concerned the nature of testing. Wundt’s third requirement 
dictated that it should be possible to repeat every observation several times under the 
same circumstances as a way to guarantee control and constancy in the test results. The 
fourth requirement held that arbitrary modification of attendant circumstances should 
determine the mean nature of conditions under which a reaction occurred. As outlined 
above, experimenters believed that multiple stimulus tests with different forms of 
arbitrary modification would expand knowledge of nerve function. But the social practice 
of experiment had other consequences beyond data management. 
This particular social dimension of collaborative lab practice couched within it a 
major ontological belief in its seemingly innocuous practicality of cooperation. Danziger 
has argued that these collaborative experiments met the need to “provide evidence of 
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these universal intraindividual processes and their special forms of determination known 
as psychic causality,” or higher forms of thought.52 But one should remember here that 
evidence of a phenomenon’s existence was not the phenomenon itself. To use a metaphor 
of computer hardware, they were testing circuits, not observing the function of the whole 
motherboard. Nervous impulses gave indication that psychic causality existed, but its 
nature was only ever open to inference in the laboratory context. Wundt’s intent to 
establish shared experience on basic characteristics of nervous functionality within 
overlapping, culturally shared action patterns fostered this overt tonality of interchange 
and collaboration.53 Leipzig scientists gathered data in a collective endeavor that 
represented mind and body as interactive pieces of the same functional instrument. They 
perceived these basic techniques of formation to be relatively uniform among members of 
a society. 
Wundt always taught his students that elemental functions of charge and 
transmission were partially connected to higher functions, but cautioned that these 
operations were outside the boundaries of experimental inquiry.  One could not hope to 
understand the mind solely by recourse to these rudimentary experiments: “Such a task 
holds out absolutely no hope of accomplishment, since the isolated stimulation or section 
of a conduction path in the interior of the brain presents insuperable obstacles.”54 Thus, 
while an experiment may have implicated psychic processes, the lab understood that 
these phenomena were not immediately measurable. Second-generation psychologists 
would think otherwise, but Wundt’s limitation on experiment explains why, out of over a 
hundred articles in Philosophische Studien detailing the results of a great many more 
experiments, nearly half the projects were dedicated to tests on reflexes or reaction time, 
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while only about ten percent directly considered psychic phenomena.55 Given this lion’s 
share of testing, Wundt was able to build upon an already complex structure of sensory 
phenomena and carry it over to its possible affects on the formation of mental operation. 
 
Reconceiving the Senses 
 Based on his mass of accumulated data, Wundt refined Helmholtz’s establishment 
that the different senses were, in fact, simply different processes of nervous movement. 
Unlike Helmholtz, however, Wundt coupled this belief with studies of how mutable its 
structures could be. Nerves were not just passive conductors, but were more like ivy that 
grew and twisted in reference to new conditions.  
All the senses also had a basic similarity concerning knowable qualities of 
operation. For Wundt, the senses mattered only in the specific means of transmitting data 
to the higher regions of the brain by means of different conduction paths. He considered 
these phenomena inseparable from movement, and thought that each sense has a distinct 
physiological mechanic of conductive style.  Consequently, one had to study each sense 
in terms of its visual appearance and its mechanics of conduction.56 For Wundt, all the 
different kinds of sense data gathered together in a big knot of tissue called the cortex, 
where it combined with various channels of motor nerves. 
The cortex was the real undiscovered country at this point. Wundt acknowledges 
that “it is impossible, as things are, to put a physiological or psychological interpretation 
upon many of the structural features that have already been made out . . . The course of 
the paths is, however, too complicated, and their origin too uncertain, to admit of any but 
an ambiguous result.”57   In other words, functional characteristics of the higher regions 
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of the intellect and brain were shrouded in mystery. Wundt’s descriptions of the higher 
region of the brain demonstrate his resistance to placing determinate interpretations on 
the brain structures other than characterizing basic functional processes and the mehanics 
of change. He remains rather general in his discussions of organs in the brain.58  In his 
text, Wundt includes a cross section of the pons, which transmits charges from the 
cerebellum to the cerebrum, in order to illustrate how “extraordinarily complex” it is, and 
to emphasize how many conduction paths that were formerly or subsequently divergent 
meet in the pons (fig. 5).  It is a bottleneck of nerve energy.  For Wundt this small organ 
exemplifies “the composite character of the physical substrate of mental life” and 
emphasizes why one cannot simply assume that s/he can study higher mental functions 
directly in single experiments: the nature of the tissue and its housing of sense data is 
manifold to an extreme degree.59   
Sense data was composite in two ways. First, different sense data from distant 
peripheries of the body merged in the cortex. Second, one of these peripheral areas or 
senses had many different connection points in the cortex. Sense data not only came 
together in nearly indiscernible ways, but came together in a multiplicity that one did not 
necessarily see on the periphery of the body. 
According to Wundt, distinct centromotor (cortical motor nerves) and sensory 
conductions come together in the cortex and were differentiated only in terms of 
conductive paths. The essential characteristic of the cortex was its bringing together of 
elements that are spatially separate at the periphery, but that “cooperate for the unitary 
discharge of function.”60  Differences in the regions of the cortex, where all nerve energy 
travels, “are in every case merely relative differences in the number of particular 
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elements and in the development of the layers.”61 Any sense data presented to 
consciousness is concomitant, which happens when more than one sense sends charges to 
the cortex. All the impulses of movement and sense data are concomitant in the cortex, so 
all sense data converges in a single place.  The notion of specific elementary nerve 
function was difficult to maintain, given the nature of the cortex.  One nerve charge in the 
cortex always involved several other distinct charges of different varieties. 
The term “manifold representation” (mehrfachen Vertretung) describes how one 
area of the body has several means of representation or connection in the cortex. Certain 
parts of the cerebral cortex are not necessarily areas of specific function or parts that are 
specific reflections of peripheral organs or reflective centers of a higher order.  “Centers” 
in Wundtian physiology are reciprocal meeting places for connections between distant 
organs or physiological functions that facilitate higher interactive practices by connecting 
to one another in the cortex. Motor or sensory areas of the cortex differ only with respect 
to the cell forms.  Like geological layers in a section of landscape, the stratification of 
nervous tissue is never uniform with respect to relative thickness of its layers or the 
content of those layers as it relates to the ratio of different types of nerve cells in a given 
content area.  In sum, “not only are the essential morphological elements the same, for all 
divisions of the cortex, but their general arrangement also presents no really significant 
differences.”62  Wundt located the highest complexity on the outermost layer of the 
cortex itself, which has branch paths of nerves that form “a meeting place, in which 
conduction paths of the most various kinds come into contact with one another.”63 The 
cortex was a major functional center of reaction and basic thought processing, but the 
exact nature of its functions was impossible to delimit. Consequently, Wundt thought lab 
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tests should remain at this most basic of levels, because even at this level, issues of mind 
and body were already complex. 
General qualities of sense as energized tissue far outweighed any particular 
quality that a sense displayed. Ruminating over particularities of sense data constituted 
philosophical projections for Wundt. The senses were styles of transmission; simple 
components of a larger nerve mechanics. Based on these findings, Wundt argued that 
studying individual sensations was pointless philosophy, because “mental elements are 
never given directly as contents of consciousness in the uncompounded state.”64 One is 
never aware of non-concomitant sense data.65 In the abstract, therefore, one could 
conceive of simple sensations, but in practice, these would always appear in 
consciousness as a manifold of sensory data and subjective feeling. A conscious idea, 
then, was understood as manifold sensory data grasped as a meaningful whole. Any sense 
that one had of anything was already a large composite. Each sensation of this composite 
was an irreducible, objective element of mental life, but not directly correlated with 
anything in it, because one could not cherry pick particular sensations from the cognate 
of sense data that had already merged in the cortex. For Wundt, thought formed out of 
movement and became composed somewhere between tissues and ideas. Testing the 
nature of nervous conduction in its reference to conscious processes had to remain 
simple, because it was already very complex.  
Wundt’s establishment of conditions of conduction helped categorize this 
complexity by ruling out simplistic, specified analyses of nerve function and lent 
quantifiable elements to the qualities of this dynamic process. Complexity of the senses 
depended entirely on nervous conduction and these conditions were guidelines that 
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helped one understand why this system was so complex. The specific natures and 
characteristics of conduction paths were of crucial importance for Wundt in theorizing 
the relationships between physiology and psychology and made the careful exploration of 
the system’s dynamics through experiment of utmost importance.  He formulated 
analyses of these relationships according to four principles. 
 First, the principle of manifold representation dictated that every peripheral area 
on the body (eyes, or skin, for example) that falls under control of the brain and nervous 
system has several means of representation in the central cortical region.66 Second, one 
finds ascending complication from the peripheral nerves to the cortex, meaning that the 
number of branch paths in the nerves increases rapidly from periphery to cortical center.67 
Third, conduction in the higher centers may travel in different directions.  Centrifugal or 
centripetal conductive movement of nerve charges unfolds by the activity of the nerve 
cells.  Every nerve cell has the potential for excitation and inhibition.  These different 
directions of conduction are not universal to the entire nervous system and all of its cells, 
but develop a direction with respect to function. The fourth principle of conduction is 
central colligation (zentralen Verknüpfung).  Often, sensory organs that lie far apart from 
each other nonetheless function in concert.  This phenomenon of sensory cooperation is 
the result of merging within the cortex.  For example, locomotion requires many different 
parts of the body, but in the cortex, these functions lie very close together.68  Cortical 
conduction centralizes functional areas of the periphery by uniting them in the cortex.69   
Due to this cortical activity, any supposedly separate function actually consists of 
many functions and had immediate connections to psychic phenomena. Absorbed stimuli 
would move toward the brain and into structures that had an immediate effect on the 
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psyche. Once in the cortex, sensations participated in a multiplicity of ideas, in which 
subjective emotions or other elements of consciousness that accompany these ideas were 
themselves always “complex” or manifold -- constructed, but never in a complete state 
that was transparent to knowledge. This relationship between sensations, ideas, emotions, 
and thought processes was the great mystery of physiological psychology, but Wundt 
knew he could not attack it directly. Instead, he purposefully focused on movement, 
which he understood as containing a psychic dimension.     
If the simplest movements had plausible psychic consequence, then it was not 
immediately clear how much a movement reaction to an unexpected stimulus could affect 
the psyche, or, respectively, how much the psyche conditioned the performance of a 
reflex movement. Reflex is the simplest central function that approximates most clearly 
to a pure conduction of stimulating processes. Reflex phenomena are purposive, or—in 
Wundt’s sense—evidence of organic, nervous functionality. “Purpose” means the system 
works, but not that it gives evidence of motivational (psychic) intent.  These basic 
reactive movements became the subject of an entire regimen of tests that plotted the 
multifaceted characteristics of this most basic movement form. In reflexes, Wundt 
believed the cortical substance modified its form of unidirectional conduction from 
sensory to motor paths.70   
But given that the centrifugal trajectory of nerve energy in a reflex comes from 
the cortex, all movement had some kind of connection to the psyche. Possible presence of 
psychic processes in reflexes is an issue regardless of the known connection between 
movement and psychic phenomena, especially because the two related areas had such a 
dizzying range of complexity and manifestation. When he studied reflex, Wundt sought 
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to uncover whether it is a pure mechanical consequence of stimulation, or psychical 
actions that evince a certain amount of consciousness.  Self-regulation of reflex processes 
indicates mechanical necessity.  But consciousness of some sort also plays a role.  Wundt 
writes that “there is no reason whatever why a sensory stimulus should not release a 
reflex movement and arouse a sensation or idea at one and the same time, so we cannot 
take the absence of all conscious process as the direct criterion of a reflex movement.”71   
The seat of reflex response in the brain, no matter how simple the reflex, raises the issue 
of possible proximity to psychic functions.  Reflexes may occur at the periphery, but 
impulses to movement begin in the brain. 
 
Practice: Nervous Formation of Habits 
A reflex response appeared to have a regularity that depended on whether one was 
accustomed to certain stimuli. One could build a threshold of expectation for it. For 
example, flinching at a loud noise is less likely to happen if one is at work on a firing 
range. Even then, this person would likely flinch if a similar noise occurs while s/he was 
at home. Basic reflexes were not just raw energy. Wundt and his team found that the 
nervous system had processes by which a certain regularity of function came under 
enforcement. But this regularity was more than just mechanics, because, as the above 
example illustrates, these regulatory systems were most often specific to certain spaces 
and one’s general awareness. The nervous system was an interface between self and 
world, but all its paths met in the cortex, where it came into contact with psychic 
function. Thus the psyche’s connection to space depended on a balance between how 
nerves became habituated or accustomed to certain practices and remained open to 
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change in a manner that allowed for a functional reshaping or reconditioning of the 
subject to new spaces and stimuli. These two polar ends of habituation were practice 
(Übungsphänomene) and pathmaking (Bahnung).  
Thermodynamics guided the functional reciprocity of these two phenomena. The 
complexities of Wundt’s subject of study required regulatory processes in the body and 
philosophies applied to it from outside that could aid one in comprehending the nature of 
its morphology. At the time, Wundt’s lab practices appeared to repeatedly confirm 
Helmholtz’s earlier breakthrough discovery that basic laws of thermodynamics governed 
the human body’s processes. The fundamental model that Wundt taught his readers was 
that the model of conservation of work could be carried over to nervous processes and, 
ultimately, to the development of psychic processes.  
But in contrast to Helmholtz’s earlier model of nerves, Wundt had established that 
nerves were not merely passive conductors, but that these fibers were very malleable. 
Nerves were not, however, completely chaotic. A healthy nervous system is a functional 
mechanism that works to reduce nerve stimulation in accordance with laws of mechanics 
that concern the conservation of work and energy. Following the conventions of physics 
to explain such relations of stimulus and response, as many in his generation did, Wundt 
defined this energy in terms of mechanical work, or as “any operation that changes the 
position of ponderable masses in space.”72  Because mechanical work is so easily 
measured, it qualifies as perhaps the most convenient scientific metaphor used to model 
nerve functions experimentally.  Instruments fostered the metaphor with infinitesimal 
precision. Even the movement and change of distance between molecules could be 
conceived of as another form of work.  In either case, physics provides well-articulated 
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models for the work of position and motion remaining in constant and predictable 
equilibrium.  This model, moreover, could be extended to internal molecular work, in 
which particles of mass were in constant motion, despite their appearance of rest.  At the 
uppermost level of theorizing subject formation, even the equilibrium of the healthy 
nervous system could be construed as resembling these other physical properties that 
operate according to the law of the conservation of work. 
External work by means of contraction or stimulation of nerves will give way to 
an opposing recovery of released energy. In this vision, neither body nor mind can ever 
been seen as fixed or at rest, but rather as continually at odds with itself, as nerve cells 
undergo “the constantly varying play of excitation [Erregung] and inhibition 
[Hemmung].”73 For Wundt the secret to discerning mental faculties required that one 
began not from the highest possible realms of human consciousness, but from the most 
rudimentary forms of consciousness in the physical world.  Conservation of work at the 
atomic scale encouraged analyses of infinitesimal occurrences in the human corpus. 
Process driven self-governance in systems happened far below the scale of human 
consciousness. Lab tests had confirmed the existence of a great deal of microscopic 
phenomena triggering mental alteration through movement. Consequently, Wundt argued 
that nerve cells and nerve tissues drew from the evolutionary logic of cell growth and 
evolution.  
The self-generative causality and self-regulating capacities of the nervous system 
gave it a propensity to form habitual patterns of action and movement in the nervous 
substrate of the psyche that Wundt called “practice” (Übungsphänomene). Practice arises 
from repeated irritation that increases the excitability of the nervous system and the sense 
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organs to which it is attached.74 Observing and arbitrarily modifying thresholds in the 
body required knowing how cycles of orientation were repeatedly impressed on the 
nervous system to form habitual modes of conduction to the brain. Of utmost necessity in 
this model was the body’s contact with space through movement.75  
Any practice has a base causality of formation. Once triggered, excitation by 
irritation in the nerves does not vanish immediately. Applied stimulus increases both 
excitation and inhibition.  A momentary stimulus will not usually cause excitation, since 
inhibition is in too high a quantity. But repeated stimuli decrease negative molecular 
work in proportion to positive, so that repeated stimuli cause excitation. As a result of 
this factor, “if several stimuli are successively applied at such intervals that each falls 
within the period of the decline of stimulation set up by its predecessor, the irritability of 
the nerve is increased.”76 Wundt thus provided an image of the body/mind link as a 
seething tissue of contradiction seeking to keep itself from becoming derailed as it 
confronts waves of stimuli.  Moreover, it was not clear in advance whether inhibition or 
excitation of the irritation would win out and become more prevalent, and what the 
body’s capacity for change and resistance might actually be. One had to test its capacity. 
Testing reactions allowed an experimenter to establish the functions of a practice 
in greater detail. In these habitual responses, “certain processes of excitation are 
facilitated: a result . . . can be produced most directly by an enhancement of excitability 
within the nerve paths” on which the nervous irritation runs its course and causes 
heightened excitation.77  A major enabler of practice was the function of inhibition in the 
nervous system. In this function, the habitual paths of nervous conduction that practice 
had established could work together to inhibit the introduction of discordant charges that 
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unexpected stimuli introduced into the system. Inhibition might come from the higher 
centers and lessen the irritability of lower lying reflex centers.   
In Wundt’s view, nervous formation and resistance to instantaneous absorption of 
all nerve charges gives the body and mind its overall functionality. Practice and 
phenomena of inhibition aid in establishing a functional regularity of nervous conduction 
that formed the immediate basis of psychic operation. Testing the reactions of the body 
allowed one to realize how these regulatory phenomena arose. Wundt abstracts the 
causality of nervous practice from the effects that it produces in other tissues “which 
always make their appearance after a considerable interval” and constitute in their 
summation fundamental phenomena of practice.78   Practice helped the body avoid 
fatigue.  Its seat was the nervous system, “which is so constituted as to be very readily 
changed by stimulation: the change manifesting itself in a continuously increasing 
effectiveness of subsequent stimuli.”79  
Given their function as an interface, peripheral nerves most often displayed the 
phenomena of practice.  These peripheries were on the front line of movement and were 
most closely knit to spatial conditions.  This process recurred in the context with 
attending modifications of molecular processes that the nervous system underwent during 
transmission of stimuli. Practice has two main consequences. First, coordinated 
movements that were first difficult became easier.  These movements that required 
continuous voluntary control now occurred involuntarily or automatically.  Second, the 
malleability of the nerves compensated for rather than reconstituted the “functional 
disturbances” that reordered the relationship of nerves to the centers in the brain.80   
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Phenomena of practice became the physiological hardware that enabled the 
functional absorption and processing of experiential data.81 Thus, the most basic 
movement reactions were already intensely complicated in ways that no single 
experiment could uncover. Despite this complexity, Wundt was still able to outline five 
basic steps of any movement reaction, which were the most rudimentary indicators of 
practice.82 First, sensation was the movement of the nerve impulse from a sense organ to 
the brain by way of the nervous tissues. Second, perception marked the entry of a nervous 
signal into the field of consciousness. Third, the signal received focusing through 
apperception or attention. This focusing was entirely more difficult, if not impossible, if 
the stimulus was outside habit. Fourth, the brain released an appropriate response that 
became an act of will or volition. The fifth step was responsive movement, a purely 
physiological phenomenon which placed the body’s absorptive and reactive tissues as the 
initiating and concluding steps on either side of three other processes that, according to 
Wundt, could only ever be estimated.83  
Continuity and sequence in these movements arose as a quality of repetition. Ease 
and automatism of movements that were once voluntary and sometimes difficult 
demonstrated “increasing facilitation of the excitatory processes in consequence of their 
frequent repetition.”84 New techniques that required continual monitoring by volition 
became habitual or automatic if one repeated them enough times.  Since this psychology 
presented consciousness as an array of alternatively malleable action sets—rather than an 
all-embracing motivational and narrativistic unconscious that irresistibly guides all 
actions or determines reactions—then consciousness must be construed in relation to the 
stimulus provided. This model of unconsciousness concerns a varying level of awareness 
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and hinges on whether volition or thought is needed to trigger action, or if it is automatic. 
But its broader area concerns whether a subject can sense change occurring, and if so, 
how much of it.  The nature of that state of unaware being and doing will change if one 
manipulates conditions that caused the gesture or reaction to be unconscious in the first 
place. The role of volition in Wundt’s process was be an application of psychic energy or 
attention to the realization of a task.  Volition allowed one to actively manipulate 
attending cognitive structures. 
 Volition did not play an observable role in all movements, but within these 
movements, one often saw the effects of practice. For example, reflexes have neither 
psychic causation nor conscious intermediaries, but they are rather “related by their 
purposiveness to psychically conditioned movements.”85   With prior knowledge of 
Wundtian theory, one can read between the lines in this instance.  Purposeful movement 
resembles psychically conditioned movement by the common place of habit.  Reflexes 
and psychically conditioned movements each indicate the workings of nervous habit.  
One is simply more conditioned than the other—not in some imminent sense of will, but 
simply as the result of more repetition, like a trail in the forest.  “Will” in the Wundtian 
scenario is a habitual combination of many different physiological processes, which make 
reflex and psychic conditioning two different but deeply related consequences of nervous 
mechanics, with psychic conditioning being the result of a structuring process that began 
with reflex. 
For Wundt's model, the continuity of this process matters a great deal, because the 
existence of mental functions can never be inferred from the gross physiology or physical 
nature of organic movements.Instead, these functions can only be inferred from certain 
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special conditions that accompany or attend their performance—from the interplay of that 
physical nature with environmental stimulus, as in the example of the firing range. One 
can trace this interplay by plotting how the characteristics of any external stimulus impact 
the body: the stimulus will provoke a specific nerve reaction, and the repetition of these 
reactions will then contribute to the formation of habit and thus to the building blocks of 
consciousness. Stimulus affects habit and molds movement around it; consciousness lies 
at the boundary between the doing and the realization of the act. Thinking about this 
thought process will probably not correspond to that stimulus and the neurological 
response to it, simply because so much sense intake and movement occurs prior to any 
noticeable psychic activity. But this movement of the muscles yields “only an indirect 
measure of the processes of nervous excitation.” 86  In short, accounts of gross anatomy 
will by no means grasp in its entirety what is going on in the neurological subsystems of 
the muscles. Any stimulus also functions as a psychical quality, so that when the body 
changes, mind changes, and the reciprocal, but when the body moves, it is not always 
clear why.87 
Experiment could help one partially investigate how to plot the complexities of 
this issue, because the relationship that Wundt posits between triggering stimulus and 
observing reactions becomes stronger by guaranteeing a relative constancy of the 
substantive state of the muscle or tissue that forms the subject of experiment in the lab. 
To be sure, this is a mythical limit condition.   Moving from contraction to nervous 
process requires conditional controls to facilitate comprehension of how the contractile 
substance relates to the nervous processes initiative.  Thus, a narrowly defined 
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experimental condition, focused on specific nervous processes, can potentially produce 
the most observable results. A researcher simply had to do it thousands of times. 
"Observation" in these terms needed to be qualified, for in any structure of habit 
or practice, which lent regularity to a system, it only appears that the nervous system is 
displaying regularity or rest. In fact, its molecular compounds are in continual motion: 
the image of rest is conditioned only by reference of the data to mechanical modeling.88 
This image is again a product of the analysis strategy used.  If the mass of nerves in the 
system is in fact unstable, then the scientist posits it as existing at a higher level of work. 
That work is manifest externally when a compound passes from an unstable state to a 
stable one and thus releases energy or causes a movement.    Ultimately, the stability of a 
physiological system resulting from interior molecular work must renew itself after 
losing energy in external molecular work by the retransformation of its atomic contents.  
Stimulation of a nerve changes this situation entirely. Often, the body will move in new 
ways that cause the nervous system to undergo change. 
 
Pathmaking: Forging New Experience 
In Wundt’s theory, these changes to nervous tissue were known as “pathmaking” 
[Bahnung]. Nerve energy that is inhabitual (outside practice) in the nature of its stimuli 
will flood the system, unless nerves compensate for it and sort out ways to process these 
new excitatory impulses by developing new clusters of nerves and conductive paths for 
the recently introduced charge. Thus the conservation of energy, in which forms of 
energy never dissipated but changed form, also applied to arrangements of nerves, which 
were the essence of mental energy. As a conductive system within the body, the nervous 
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system reshaped itself in accordance with thermodynamics, but in this space, it had quite 
a bit of room to move. Changes in the cortex never replicated any previous arrangement, 
but shifted with every introduction of stimuli that are strong enough to break a path and 
alter the nature of experience and sensory distribution.89   Compensation rather than 
reconstitution indicates that a stimulus has caused nerves to “strike out new paths” within 
the central nervous system.90  In contrast to the facilitation of action by repetition that 
characterizes one form of practice, “under suitable conditions, the stimulation may strike 
out new paths within the central substance: we may accordingly designate this latter 
effect of practice, in contradistinction to direct practice by repetition of function, as 
pathmaking.”91 For Wundt, forging new pathways for conduction in the brain could 
initiate for process-based rehabituation of physical experience and its attending, gradual 
emergence of psychic consequences in the mental life.   
Thermodynamics guided this basic dichotomy of repetition as facilitation and 
alteration in a framework of preservation. When an irritation runs through a nerve cell in 
a given direction, the cell becomes predisposed to direct other charges, in accordance 
with the conservation of work. In this instance, reconstitution of prior forms or complete 
resistance to an irritation would create too much nervous and physical stress for the 
organism. Consequently, the process works toward rearrangement. In these formations, 
the body shaped the mind far below the limen and scale of one’s awareness.   
Sense intake was often subliminal and at the cellular level, so the majority of the 
process would probably be unconscious, meaning that one would experience forms of 
reactive movement that looked and felt discordant, rather than being entirely aware of 
how and why pathmaking was occurring within one’s nervous system. If the person 
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cannot help but change, then it is generally for self-preservation. Thermodynamics 
certainly lent functionality to the system, but at the level of nervous change, new 
movements triggered the alteration of conduction and substantiated the belief that 
“processes of conduction in the central substance at large cannot be confined within fixed 
limits; elements which, under normal circumstances, the excitations are annulled by 
concurrent inhibitions must be able, under the new conditions of practice introduced by 
the destruction of former conduction paths, to enter into new functional connections.”92 
New paths can be forged.  Habitual conductive paths may inhibit the transmission of 
discordant charges to the brain, but if these new charges are repeated, then the nervous 
system reshapes itself and develops new conduction paths that transmit new stimuli of 
energy.93 Frequent repetition of stimuli enhances irritability, gradually reduces inhibiting 
forces in the nerve paths, and thus builds physiological and psychological techniques of 
experience by means of practice, which signals habit formation. Like a thresher through a 
garden maze, pathmaking might cut a swath right through that harmonious tissue.   
 One immediately grasps the functional reciprocity between these two forms of 
practice and their inherently cyclical and process-based nature.  Repetition of a stimulus 
will always cause an alteration of nervous substance; whether that alteration is one of 
facilitation or pathmaking will rely on the charge and its comparative relation to previous 
nervous structure. If a stimulus does not immediately travel down a habitual path, then it 
sets forth irritations and excitations in the nervous system that carve new paths.  This 
fresh path, like any path, continues to function only by means of repeated traversal. 
Pathmaking describes the mechanics of how one deliberately alters practice.  The 
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malleability of the nervous system requires that certain paths rearrange at any given 
moment in order to process the charge, or to recompose and make new paths.  
One can more fully appreciate this dynamic in two supporting phenomena known 
as “preferential conduction” and “transference.” Wundt posited a law of preferential 
conduction for analysis of how nerves transmit stimuli. This law is the foundation of 
habit.  Irritations or disturbances to which one has become accustomed often travel down 
preferred lines of conduction.  Pathmaking has taken place, and the repetitious response 
to stimuli has stabilized this specific, miniscule section of the nervous system.  Irritations 
that excite the system and exceed the boundaries of preferential conduction often require 
the forging of secondary conductive paths by means of auxiliary courses and repetition.   
Transference is a function by which the transmission of stimuli carries over into 
these auxiliary courses. This phenomenon facilitates pathmaking in the production of new 
experiential habits and depends on the morphological nature of nerves.  Each nerve 
ending is dendritic; it looks like a little root system with a main conduction path and a 
group of subsidiary paths. When the primary path suffers excess irritation, the secondary 
paths act as conduits for the excess energy. The existence of these secondary paths 
supports belief in the phenomenon of transference, or the transfer of a nerve charge from 
one to another or several other conductive paths.94 The law of conservation of work 
explains the necessity of principal paths of conduction, but also of secondary paths “for 
the conduction of unusually intensive excitations, or for the transferences required by 
simultaneous movements, sensations, and reflexes.”95  Differentiation of conduction 
paths in the higher regions relies on different conditions that define the nature of these 
higher paths. It involves more than one conductive path and may become pervasive and 
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habitual if repetition causes successful transference of nerve energies to expression in 
movement.  Transference is a key element in making a highly volitional activity 
gradually shed its associated exercising of will.   
Once the conductive paths have been laid, repetition conditions the response of 
the body to the nerve charges at the atomic level, and eventually the subject manifests 
new movements, practices, and actions that appear natural and effortless.  Consciousness 
undergoes a metamorphosis during this process, especially from the gradual decline of 
volition in the subject. Phenomena of transference arise especially from movements that 
involve the intake of simultaneous sensations.  These forms of action indicate formations 
of determinate conduction paths that function only under specific conditions of combined 
irritation or increased excitation.96  
  
From Path-Breaking to Cultural Education and Resistance 
As a base phenomenology with neither essences nor a priori categories, this 
model of physiological psychology also has in it an implicit commitment to defining 
mind as implicated in the world, not in any way prior to it.  The artists mentioned in the 
Introduction and those that will be studied in more depth below took from Wundt’s 
theories the base causality of nervous and mental change, but not the overall Geist of 
normative authority that German science rapidly built in the second half of the nineteenth 
century.  
Within this model of experimentation lies a project of education or 
transformation.  The key trait of physiological psychology that transfers into an 
educational program lies in these techniques of deliberate, experimental alterations of 
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experience, for as Wundt had argued, “it is the essence of experiment that we can vary 
the conditions of an occurrence at will and, if we are aiming at exact results, in a 
quantitatively determinable way.”97 One studied the nature of absorption by shaping 
nerve mechanics deliberately, which had an immediate applicability to shaping collective 
movement and thought patterns in a society. These conventional ways of being—
including language, politics, religious beliefs, different social structures, and all manners 
of artistic expression—had become, especially since the beginning of World War I, 
politically suspect. This mass of everyday life constituted the German definition of 
Kultur; it was far more than fine arts. Rejecting this model entirely was certainly an 
option. However, this theory also offered a powerful model to those who were interested 
in making themselves other than and apart from the normative umbrella that hovered over 
this discourse.   
Wundt’s theories supported the deduction that consciousness could thus be altered 
through the experimental introduction of inhabitual movements. In a scenario of 
deliberate and repeated application, or in the guise of total chaos, the base causality of 
this overall model of nervous change could bloom into myriad different forms of 
experience through the different bodily motions that artists introduced into the sphere of 
cultural production. The basic logic of pathmaking and transference, when carried over 
into a sphere of experimental culture, would set forth changes that shook the foundations 
of normalcy by its very formative means. In the case of the avant-garde, however, these 
formative means became diverted and reshaped into the platforms for new consciousness 
and experience. It was no mere escapism, but an immersion within and reshaping of the 
most dominant psychological theories of the day. 
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Before turning to artists’ responses to Wundt, it is first necessary to consider his 
other main publication, the Völkerpsychologie, and its broad impact on fields including 
sociology, ethnography, philology, art history, and any other discipline that dealt with the 
mind as a socially tuned organism. Wundt’s motivation for investigating physiology had 
initially been social and cultural. In particular, he sought to expel cloudy techniques of 
reflection from the epistemological foundations of psychology. In his view, psychology 
could not be an a priori discipline substituting for pure logic, nor could it be purely a 
posteriori in its inspiration.   
For Wundt, the scope and authority of the laboratory had its limits. Throughout 
his long career, he was well aware that he was outlining strategies of mental function for 
a certain context that must have looked different in other times and places. No one lived 
in a lab, but one had to prove that premise in a rather contradictory fashion by starting in 
its hermetic spaces. Separating moments of experience allowed physiological psychology 
to be cultural as well as mechanistic or introspective. In this account, consciousness had 
at its core a physical structure that was the result of a specific context and the possible, 
habitual actions that one could perform in it. But Wundt recognized that these 
rudimentary movements and thought processes were also responsive to the specific 
cultures in which habitual techniques of everyday life were practiced. Both nature and 
culture in their ways constituted the specific format of how one’s mind as a physiological 
substance had a functional, effective relation to the formation of consciousness. Base 
causality was law, but space altered the nature of its ascendancy.  
The necessity of a relative cultural space to the formation of variant modes of 
selfhood formed the base of the Völkerpsychologie, which extended the question of 
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mental development to how culture affects the processing of experience. That text 
explores how the history of culture may be read as a history of collective response to 
varying conditions of nervous stimuli in space.  The lab showed how the brain changes 
depending on altered stimuli or means of processing categories of these stimuli and 
means, but these two categories of phenomena were also open to cultural-historical and 
sociological factors, not just to laws of nature.  The Völkerpsychologie explained what 
the lab could not. 
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and complex test results. Second, pathological observation may combine the first two 
methods of examination in its dual concerns with nerve disturbances and disruptions in 
anatomy.  For example, arresting function in a predetermined area allows one to examine 
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Grundzüge, sixth edition, 200. 
30 Ibid, 152. 
31 Ibid, 58. 
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Davis, and Merzbach, “Laboratory Instruments in the History of Psychology,” Journal of the 
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Crary, Suspensions of Perception, 302-316. For more on the general epistemological 
consequences of instrumentation, see Galison, Image and Logic: A Material Culture of 
Microphysics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). Galison treats a different science 
and period from my own chosen focus, but his initial framing of how instrumentation functions in 
and between separate branches of science is essential for comprehending how instruments played 
a major role in the foundations of authority in Wundt’s Leipzig lab. 
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a major role in the foundations of authority in Wundt’s Leipzig lab. 
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43 Wundt, Principles, Titchener trans., 100. I will have more to say about this notion below. 
44 Wundt, Ibid, 8-9. 
45 Ibid, 5. 
46 Wundt himself was very open about the problematic nature of elemental experiment: “Even in 
the most favorable instances, when the stimulation or transection has been entirely successful, we 
have established but one definite point upon a path of conduction; to ascertain its full extent, we 
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to the point of issue of the appropriate nerves.” Wundt, Principles, Titchener trans., 152. 
47 These outside conditionalities often became the subject of their own tests, as in, for example, 
the early work of Emil Kraepelin on the influence of drugs and alcohol on the various faculties. 
Kraepelin conducted this research while still in Leipzig, before working on his better known 
studies of mental pathology. 
48 As a result of the attraction among academics for studies of the politics of pathology, Leipzig 
has been largely ignored by other methodologies like trauma studies and feminism as well. See 
for example Foucault, Histoire de la folie à l’age classique (1966), ed. Jean Khalfa, trans. Khalfa 
and Jonathan Murphy as History of Madness, (London and New York: Routledge, 2006); In 
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Nervous Illness (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
49 Danziger, “Social Context and Investigative Practice in Early Twentieth Century Psychology,” 
in Psychology in Twentieth Century Thought and Society, ed. Mitchell Ash and William 
Woodward, (Cambridge, London, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 15.  Also by 
the same author “Wundt’s Psychological Experiment in the Light of His Philosophy of Science,” 
Psychological Research 42 (1980): 109-122. 
50 David K. Robinson, “Wilhelm Wundt and the Establishment of Experimental Psychology, 
1875-1914: the Context of a New Field of Scientific Research,” (Berkeley, PhD Dissertation, 
1987), 101-102, 111. Danziger has shown how these roles and titles were anything but 
systematic: “When one examines the published experimental reports from Wundt’s laboratory 
one finds that the social role system of the psychological experiment is so little developed that 
there is not even a general term that expresses the generalized role of the ‘experimental subject.’ 
The person acting in that role is usually referred to by his specific activity in a particular 
experimental context. He is ‘der Reagierende,’ ‘der Beobachter,’ ‘der Vergleicher,’ ‘der 
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Associrende,’ etc. The term ‘Versuchsperson’ (experimental subject) occurs too, but not in any 
systematic and predictable way as it would in a modern report.” Danziger, “Wundt as 
Methodologist,” in G. Eckardt and L. Sprung (Eds.), Advances in Historiography of Psychology. 
Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1983), 38-39. 
51 Woodward, “Wundt’s Program for the New Psychology: Vicissitudes of Experiment, Theory, 
and System,” in Woodward and Ash, eds., The Problematic Science: Psychology in Nineteenth 
Century Thought, (New York: Praeger, 1980), 167-197. Danziger Constructing the Subject, 34-
35. Particularly because when someone diverged from Wundt’s outline of the social dimension of 
experiment, this move away was in direct opposition to Wundt’s structure of testing, as when, for 
example, act psychologists interviewed subjects, but were never interviewed themselves, or when 
Ebbinghaus performed his memory tests on himself and no one else. See also Greenwood, The 
Disappearance of the Social from American Social Psychology, 54. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Danziger argues that this social dimension plays a major role in the continuous, but 
contextually variant “relationship between the form taken by psychological knowledge and the 
structure of the relationship between those who function as investigators and those who function 
as the source of data.” Danziger, op cit, 16.  Danziger treats these issues in more general and 
broad terms in “The Social Origins of Modern Psychology,” in Psychology in Social Context, ed. 
Allan R. Buss, (New York: Irvington, 1979), 27-46.  This notion of the social conditions framing 
the production of knowledge forms part of Foucault’s focus in his earlier work, but Danziger’s 
findings differ entirely from Foucault’s selected objects of focus, because the nature of their 
production was communal rather than singular and authoritarian.   
54 Titchener trans, 152.  Wundt refers specifically to the shortcomings of enhancement and 
interruption methods in the sixth edition: “Nur für zwei Fragen sind daher diese Methoden mit 
einigem Erfolg angewandt worden: für die Frage nach dem Verlauf der Leitungsbahnen in dem 
einfachsten der Zentralorgane, im Rückenmark, sowie in den nachsten Fortsetzungen der 
Rückenmarksstrange, den Hirnschenkeln; und für die Frage nach der Zuordnung bestimmter 
Gebiete der Hirnrinde zu bestimmten peripheren Organen des Körpers.”  Grundzüge, sixth 
edition, 198. According to Wundt, experiment could “determine the course of conduction in the 
simplest of the central organs, the myel, and in the direct continuations of the myelic columns, the 
crura.” Titchener trans., Ibid.  “Myel” is an old term for the spine, and “crura” are bundles of 
nerve fibers, generally in the cerebellum.  
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55 Cited in Robinson, PhD diss, 94. This tedious, exhaustive focus on sensory absorption of a 
stimulus and its appearance in consciousness was a philosophy of experiment and perspective on 
the mind that was, of course, open to furious debate that, like any other academic debate, drew on 
methodological differences, careerist alliances, and volatile, fragile egos. 
56 Given the continuing interest in critical studies of perception in the humanities, I shall here 
outline in more depth what brevity prevents in the body of my text; namely, Wundt’s 
understanding of how vision worked. Wundt’s descriptions painstakingly plot the senses as 
different manners of conduction. Base level nerves of hearing resemble cutaneous nerves, 
especially in the cochlea.  Within the cochlea, peripheral connections to the vestibular nerve 
provides one’s sense of balance, and a reflex path connects acoustic centers to muscular nerves, 
centers for articulation of the body, and movements of the eyes, all of which play a key role in 
one’s orientation in space (Titchener trans., 185). The cochlea is the easily recognizable spiral 
shaped cavity in the inner ear where nerves for hearing are stored.  This key trait of the bodily 
substrate of mental life results from connections between acoustic and vestibular nerves. 
 In the sense of taste, conducting fibers leave the central organ, pass near the center 
through bipolar cells, which are specialized sensory nerve cells like those in the spine, then 
branch into dendrites at the periphery of the tongue, which has two separate nerve trunks that 
process information from different areas on the organ.  Olfactory nerves are closest to cortical 
areas of the cerebrum, so the paths of these nerves and their space to transmit information are 
shorter.  The olfactory nerve is never a singular branch nerve; instead, it emerges immediately 
from the cortex as “numerous delicate threads” that issue from the olfactory bulb within the 
cortex.  Thus the olfactory organ (the nose) is actually a peripheral element of the cerebral cortex, 
and this proximity to the cortex causes olfactory nerve fibers to resemble central fibers.   
 Optic qualities are part of a larger overall project of revamped gestures that alter 
consciousness.  The central nervous system has displaced the “optic surface” to the periphery of 
the body.  It is still a portion of the central organ (Ibid).  Consequently, optic nerves that emerge 
from the retina are like olfactory nerves in the sense that both nerves resemble central nerve 
fibers.  Rods and cones are nervous elements or “sensory epithelia” whose role in the conductive 
process results solely from contact with terminal fibers of the nerve tissue.  In this trait of 
conductive process, rods and cones resemble gustatory cells.  Layers of the retina cover the 
terminal fibers of the nerve tissue with layers of cells that are points of departure for the 
centripetal path of optic conduction to the brain.  Distribution of optic fibers in the chiasma 
facilitates binocular vision. Chiasma is the crossing of optic nerves at the base of the brain.  
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Conduction of optic paths in either half of the brain consists of paths from the opposite retina.  
Standard accounts of vision present the sense as unidirectional: the fibers of the optic nerve 
conduct centripetally: nerve impulses are carried from the retina to the brain.  Wundt found the 
process more complex. 
 In his model, three broad areas of conduction occur in the optic nerve.  First, activities in 
the principle sensory path allow raw sensation to travel along the principal sensory path.  
Ganglion cells (retinal nerve cells) transmit excitation from the retina to the cortex by means of 
the “pregeniculum,” or a small node on the optic thalamus.  The thalamus is a mass of gray matter 
in the posterior part of the forebrain that relays sensory impulses to the cerebral cortex.  Second, 
the centripetal mesencephalic path carries charges to the pregemina, or mesencephalon (also 
known as the mid-brain).  The charge then travels from the mesencephalon by centrifugal paths to 
oculomotor nerves.  This second conduction forms the process of visual reflex.  One can see how 
these two uses of conductive paths relate when one catches sight of an object, and moves one’s 
eyes to look at it closer.  These two processes concern the intake of stimulus.  The third manner 
of conduction is entirely centrifugal, and has two modes.  First, main branch centrifuge sends 
charges from the optic cortex to the mesencephalon.  Second, peripheral centrifuge carries nerve 
irritation from the mesencephalon to the retina.  
57 Titchener, trans., 168. Full quotation in the sixth edition: “Für das Studium speziell der im 
Hinter- und Mittelherngebiet in Betracht kommenden Leitungsverhaltnisse kann nun aber 
zugleich die fur die allgemeine Orientierung der Leitungsbahnen im Rückenmark wertvolle 
physiologische Methode der Sonderung der Bahnen mittels der Trennung einzelner Faserzüge 
kaum mehr in Betracht kommen, da die in dieser Richtung namentlich in der älteren Physiologie 
ausgeführten Versuche wegen des verwickelten Verlaufs und des unsichern Urpsprungs der 
Bahnen ein unzweideutiges Ergebnis ummöglich liefern können. Vielmehr lassen sich auf solchem 
Wege höchstens einige Ahnhaltspunkte für die Beurteilung der Gesamtfunktion der Organe oder 
einzelner Teile derselben gewinnen.” Grundzüge, sixth edition, 214. 
58 For example, when Wundt describes conduction paths in the cerebellum, he writes that the 
concurrence of these paths is “extremely complicated” (Titchener trans., 173). The cerebellum is 
a large lobe of the hind brain in front and above the medulla.  He invites his reader to “consider 
these paths as branch conduction, interposed in the course of the direct conduction from myel to 
cerebrum as mediated by oblongata and pons” (Ibid.). The medulla oblongata is the hindmost part 
of the brain that controls breathing and circulation. The pons are a band of nerve fibers that link 
the medulla oblongata and the cerebellum with the upper portions of the brain.  The cerebellum 
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connects fibers of different function, especially sensory and motor.  The cerebellum has a large 
number of cells of Purkinje, which are “elementary centers of connection between different fiber 
elements” (Ibid, 175). Cells of Purkinje were certain pear-shaped nerve cells in the cerebellum. 
The dendrites or branch areas of these cells mediate centripetal charge, and the neuritis or axons 
(which conduct impulses away from the body of the nerve cell at the base of the dendritic arbor) 
manage centrifugal functions.   
59 Ibid, 178. The sixth edition of the Grundzüge is more emphatic: “Handelte es sich darum, einen 
Gehirnteil zu finden, der durch die in einen kleinen Raum zusammengefaßte Komplikation seines 
Baues die zusammengesetzte Ntur der physischen Substrate des Seelenlebens und damit die 
Absurdität jener Bemühungen um die Auffindung eines einfachen Seelensitzes veranscaulichen 
sollte, so wurde sich darum wohl kaum eine günstigere Wahl treffen lassen.” Grundzüge sixth 
edition, 225. 
60 Titchener trans., 218. For example, the visual center is not a simple repetition of the retinal 
surface within the cortex.  Wundt described the retina as a forward projection of the cortical 
region.  The visual center in the cortex, by contrast, contains connections to other conduction 
paths of a motor nature.  By these connections, the cortex “is able to connect retinal excitations 
with further functional areas” (Ibid.).   
61 Ibid., 224. 
62 Ibid, 223. 
63 Ibid, 224. Several layers of the cortex in different areas possess relative degrees of 
development. These differences depend on the morphologies of three different nerve cells: 
pyramidal or centromotor cells that facilitate centrifugal conduction; stellate or sensory cells that 
are terminal stations of centripetal function; and cells of vertical longitudinal form in the 
substrates or deeper structures of association paths.   
64 Ibid., 13. 
65 In this view, Wundt was drawing on earlier theories of unconscious inference offered by 
Helmholtz, in which sense data is combined in the brain prior to the subject’s becoming aware of 
the combination, but the nature of this new theory has become more directly attached to the 
mechanics of the nervous system that are manifested in different kinds of movement. 
66 Ibid., 228. The complex nature of manifold representation indicates that not all central 
representations cooperate in every discharge that results from sending nerve energy to the 
peripheral elements of the body.  A peripheral area may represent itself in several different 
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fashions, but these various means of central representation do not require simultaneous 
functioning in order for successful central representation. 
67 Ibid., 226. In the original German, ascending complication is aufsteigenden Komplikation der 
Leitungswege. Grundzüge, sixth edition, 276. Every cortical area is in itself knit with manifold 
representation.  The cortex constitutes new representations only in proportion to the possible 
necessity of more complicated coordination of functional units of nervous energy. 
68 Auditory sensations that become conscious ideas and bodily movements unfold in unison 
because of the large number of connections between the acoustic and motor centers in the cortex.   
69 Thus, an act of vision is not a centralized act as a mere sense of vision, but involves several 
motor functions and many other “partial functions concerned in the visual function” (Titchener 
trans., 229).  The centralized form of a sensory idea indicates that one never deals with one sense 
like vision in total isolation.  The nature of manifold representation and colligation in the cortex 
guarantees that any sense is already a manifold cluster of sensory ideas when it enters 
consciousness.  For example, vision or auditory ideas always involve motor ideas.  The 
representation of these different peripheral functions assures that any awareness of one function 
as supposedly distinct is in actuality already a manifold representation or the effect of manifold 
representation in the cortex. Vision is not a chain of images of separate points in the visual field 
that are projected upon the brain.  
Congruities of sensory and motor functions are key functional phenomena in the 
“decussation” or separation and rearrangement of paths carrying visual stimuli to opposite halves 
of the brain that enable the visual organs to assist in yielding spatial projection. The even divide 
between the eyes (median symmetry) allows for symmetrical convergence if motor release in 
response to light stimuli is symmetrical on the median plane of the visual cortical center.  This 
even synergy of decussation also appears in other sensory and motor functions, but is most clearly 
grasped in studies of perception.  The image in the visual center of the cortex corresponds to 
spatial properties of the object.  Binocular compensation for the asymmetry of the inverted image 
in the optic chiasm combines with compensation for vertical dimension in each separate eye. 
Decussation of the optic nerve shows the most obvious relations between decussation in general 
of nerve fibers with respect to manifold functional representation. With this crossing, the visual 
image in the cortex corresponds to spatial properties of the object by the decussational properties 
of the chiasm that compensate for the asymmetrical image.  One estimates the spatial relations of 
objects by the position and movement of fixation before this point of rotation rather than behind 
it.  Displacement of this rotational point in the interior of the eye directly compensates the 
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inversion of the image.  The retinal image has little to do with this operation.  As Wundt framed 
it, the hypothetical “image” in the visual center is more likely a system of excitations that 
corresponds to sensory, motor, and associative functions that simultaneously merge. Given this 
fact, his hypothetical structure of non-imagistic psychic causality is a superstructural, 
epiphenomenal projection of myriad nerve charges that exude from teeming centers. 
Visual organs from lower life forms like those of insects offer evidence of manifold 
representation in more rudimentary form.  The visual organs of insects are structured like tactile 
organs.  The retinal image is a “rough mosaic whose spatial arrangement – since every facet 
represents a relatively independent dioptrical structure – corresponds to that of the external 
object; what is above and below, right and left, in the object has precisely the same position in its 
image” (Ibid, 230).  The manifold representation of the human eye is the result of evolutionary 
changes in the organ itself, in which movement is a necessary and indivisible component of the 
visual organ itself, but the insect eye “is seated upon a movable stalk” that turns around a pivot 
point that lies behind the visual organ, and makes the peripheral means of insect vision more “like 
a tactual [tactile] organ” (Ibid.).  In the insect world, vision is like touch.  Vision also “looks like” 
touch.  The two senses have an equally strong connection of manifold representation in the 
cortex, but contain different physiological mechanics that allows for a closer association of two 
distinct peripheral senses. The facets of an insect eye are compartmentalized but nonetheless 
close enough to each other that the visual sense possesses a functional structure that is more akin 
to touch.  Seeing is touching.  When physiological structures of vision are more like touch, the 
paths of optic conduction do not have any readily identifiable decussation like one finds in the 
optic chiasm of the human subject as it transmits data to the higher regions of the cortex. 
70 Ibid, 241. 
71 Ibid, 251. 
72 Ibid, 60. 
73 Titchener trans., 70. “Der ganze Verlauf der Reizung ist dann von den in jedem Zeitmomente 
wechselnden Wirkungen der Erregung und Hemmung abhängig.“ Grundzüge, sixth edition, 105. 
74 Titchener trans., 70. 
75 I should like to stress here again that a body in space in the Wundtian sense, at least in my 
focus, is not a phenomenological body, but a twitching sponge of raw nerve charges and possible 
new paths to be made. 
76 Ibid, 75-76. Increased excitability that arises from rapid, repeated stimuli is the sole office of 
the nervous system.  Wundt does not think it has anything to do with muscle tissue, but that 
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greater excitation and irritation by repeated stimuli – although its effects change in the muscles – 
is due entirely to activities and processes in the nervous system.  Even if the muscle is paralyzed 
from fatigue, the nerves still become excited upon repeated stimulation. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid, 76-77. 
79 Ibid, 78. 
80 Ibid, 100. 
81 But unlike act psychology or behaviorism, Wundt’s work shows a focus on how the 
constituting elements of these higher functions require extensive study in order to establish how 
they actually work. 
82 Adapted from Robinson, PhD diss, 100. 
83 In the context, the development of this five-step program had reciprocal development, 
complication, and increasing openness to debate in correlation with the buildup of 
experimentation at Leipzig. Roughly half the experiments were focused studies of sensation and 
perception (the first two steps).David Robinson, “Wilhelm Wundt and the Establishment of 
Experimental Psychology, 1875-1914: The Context of a New Field of Scientific Research,” PhD 
diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1987), 94. Danziger has also confirmed these findings: 
“A detailed examination of the experimental reports published in the twenty volumes of the 
Philosophische Studien shows that in the great majority of the reported studies the essential data 
base consists of objective measurements, mainly time measurements and simple quantitative 
judgments of features of experimentally presented physical stimuli.” “Wundt as Methodologist,” 
in Eckardt and Sprung, eds., Advances in Historiography of Psychology, (Berlin, Deutscher 
Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1983), 36. This majority of practice reflected Wundt’s beliefs 
concerning the specific elements of mental function that were open to testing. He understood 
sensations as purely physiological phenomena, while perception, apperception, and acts of will 
were psychophysical combinations of physiological and psychic phenomena. 
84 Titchener trans., 100. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Adding to this difficulty was the fact that every muscle has its own intrinsic irritability that 
functions both as part of the organism and independently.  Thus when a muscle reacts in a certain 
way, it is not necessarily clear what stimulus dominated to cause that movement. 
87 Ibid. 
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88 The nervous system, in fact, appears stationary “simply for the reason that, on the average, 
there are as many processes of the one kind going on as of the other” -- it is in stable state, not a 
constant balance.  A nerve substance that is supposedly at rest is actually “a stationary condition 
of motion,” in which work produced by atoms cancel each other and prevents release of external 
work. These miniature battles within the molecule by its atoms constitute the potential work of a 
stable compound, no matter that nerve cells do not recombine as they process stimuli.  Ibid, 66 
(both quotations). 
89 Analyses of histological excisions indicate that variations of cell forms in the layers parallel 
differences in the arrangement of nerve fibers in the cortex . Ibid, 220. 
90 Ibid. 
91 “Verrät sich in der ersten dieser Erscheinungen eine zuhehmde Erleichterung der 
Erregungsvorgange infolge ihrer häufigen Wiederholung, so legt die zweite die Annahme nahe, 
daß unter geeigneten Bedingungen die Reizung innerhalb der zentralen Substanz neue Bahnen 
einschlagen kann. Diesen letzteren Übungserfolg kann man daher auch, um ihn von der direkten 
Übung durch Funktionswiederholung zu unterscheiden, als Bahnung bezeichen.” Grundzüge, 
sixth edition, 140-141. “Bahnen” literally means a carving or channeling out, but I have kept 
Titchener’s “pathmaking.” 
92 Titchener trans., 101. “”Die Leitungsvorgänge in der zentralen Substanz uberhaupt nicht in 
feste Grenzen eingeschlossen sind, und daß daher Elemente, in denen zuvor die Erregungen 
gegenüber den gleichzeitig stattfindenden Hemmungen verschwanden, unter den durch den 
Hinwegfall der seitherigen Leitungswege eintretenden neuen Übungsbedingungen neue 
funktionelle Verbindungen eingehen können.” Grundzüge, sixth edition, 141. 
93 Titchener trans., 101. 
94 Titchener, trans., 161. “Auf solche Neben- und Zweigbahnen weisen inbesondere auch noch 
diejenigen Erscheinungen hin, in denen sihc der Übergang von einer Leitungsbahn auf eine 
andere, also die Existenz einer Verbindungsbahn zwischen verschiedenen Leitungsbahnen zu 
erkennen gibt.” Grundzüge, sixth edition, 207. 
95 Ibid, 163. 
96 According to Wundt, simultaneous movement manifests itself in simplest forms like bilateral 
locomotion.  Transference in this case way go form one side of the myel to the other, and 
indicates that co-excitation within the motor path may become a functional connection, or part of 
habitual movement. Titchener, trans., 162. 
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97 Wundt, Titchener, trans., 4. Also, in the sixth edition, Wundt writes: “Indem dagegen das 
Wesen des Experimentes in der willkürlichen und, sobald es sich um die Gewinnung exakter 
Beziehungen handelt, in der quantitativ bestimmbaren Veränderung der Bedingungen des 
Geschehens besteht, wird schon bei den naturwissenschaftlichen Aufgaben die experimentelle 
Methode überall zu einem unentbehrlichen Hilfsmittel, wo es sich um die Analyse rasch 
verlaufender, vergänglicher Erscheinungen, nicht um die Beobachtung relative constant 




Theorizing the Psychology of Culture:  
Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie and its Role as Intellectual Source 
 
This chapter outlines what happens when nerves gain a history. From the time he 
began his career in experimental psychology, Wundt never tired of warning his reader 
that experimental methods and techniques could not uncover higher mental function. That 
subject matter was the office of Völkerpsychologie, a comparative method of cultural 
history that framed psychological development as resulting from distinct trajectories of 
adaptation to certain spatial conditions among a group.1 Wundt transferred theories of 
nervous formation to histories of culture to support his argument that shared thought 
processes in a group were culturally inculcated and arose out of shared patterns of 
nervous response to particular contexts.2 While Völkerpsychologie did not become a 
psychological method, its connection to the lab gave the outlook considerable authority 
that fostered its adoption by sociologists, anthropologists, ethnographers, and art 
historians.3 Scholarly representations of Wundt as a doyen of psychological normalcy 
omit the way in which the Völkerpsychologie challenged the notion of a single mental 
standard from within its institutional heart. 
Wundt did not invent Völkerpsychologie, but he contributed thousands of pages to 
its discursive presence in intellectual culture during the first two decades of the twentieth 
century. He had begun lecturing and publishing on the topic as early as 1859. These early 
forays preceded his massive final opus, in which he analyzed cultural forms such as 
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language or myth separately in particular segments of his ten-volume Völkerpsychologie 
(1900-1910), which he followed with a single volume synthesis of its findings, Elemente 
der Völkerpsychologie (1912, English translation 1916).4 Wundt’s different approaches to 
his own cultural studies made his Völkerpsychologie a dynamic method. If the ten-
volume Völkerpsychologie operated under a method of longitudinal analysis, by which 
one isolated and traced the development of a specific cultural form, such as language, 
“after the usual pattern of general psychology in its analysis of individual consciousness” 
and nervous development, then Wundt’s Elemente was a more transverse analysis of 
cultural practices.5 Wundt’s Elemente fulfilled his call for an integrated analysis of 
culture “in the total interconnection of its phenomena” that would posit synchronic cuts 
across the diachronic stream of development.6 Elemente was also a more popular read 
than his ten-volume juggernaut, which is plodding work even for the specialist.7 
Consequently, in order to clarify the key tenets of Völkerpsychologie as they may well 
have appeared in their original contexts, I will in what follows refer most often to the 
Elemente der Völkerpsychologie and include certain sections of the larger ten volume 
project in order to clarify particular points of Wundt’s overall cultural theory.  
Familiarity with this cultural turn of Wundt’s physiological psychology is 
necessary for understanding why manipulating the structural principles of his theories 
became such a potent method in radical art practice. Following initial discussion of the 
grounding concepts of this method, my outline Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie has three 
steps that will enable subsequent examinations of artistic approaches to it and his 
Grundzüge. First, I focus on how Wundt described the mentality of “primitive” peoples— 
their consciousness, language, and art, all of which became major sources of interest for 
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avant-garde artists. Second, in order to illustrate the breadth of Wundt’s ideas in the 
historical context, I briefly compare the different usages of his ideas in the very different 
theories of sociologist Emile Durkheim and ethnographer Franz Boas. Third, I return the 
Wundtian dimension of cultural theory to debates surrounding empathy, including 
Wilhelm Worringer’s groundbreaking Abstraktion und Einfühlung (1908). Worringer’s 
selective reliance on Wundtian theory exemplifies the reshaping of the psychologist’s 
ideas that form the subject of later chapters.  
 
Central Notions of the Völkerpsychologie 
Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie departed considerably from earlier versions of the 
method in German intellectual culture.8 He drew on early definitions of the term “Völk” 
which denote a cultural group that preserves experiences collectively.9 For Wundt, the 
cultural dimension of Völk was the “decisive factor underlying the fundamental creations 
of the community.”10 Kultur, then, concerned the ways in which a Völk preserves its 
collective experiences and includes not only art, but equal shares of language, religion, 
and custom.11 This sense of Völk entered philosophical discourse in the writings of 
philosopher and poet Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), who described the notion as 
a series of social conventions that arose out of interpersonal relations among a group, 
rather than from exercises of power over a community. Herder made language the 
essence of the Völk and wrote on the way it shaped the individual, who then felt that s/he 
was a partial manifestation of the overall Völksgeist, or collective idea of society and 
social values among a people.12 Another earlier figure who informed Wundt’s work on 
culture was the philosopher and diplomat Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), who 
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extended Herder’s notions by arguing that language was a gateway to other 
interconnected social phenomena. The psychologist Moritz Lazarus (1824-1903) coined 
the term Völkerpsychologie itself in 1851 and with the philologist Heymann Steinthal 
(1823-1899) began a journal dedicated to the concept (Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie 
und Sprachwissenschaft), which attracted many of the best minds in Germany, including 
Wundt and the sociologist Georg Simmel, both of whom studied with Lazarus.13 
Ultimately, Lazarus and Steinthal took a more positivist direction in arguing that the 
individual’s mind was the only objective reality, which in turn formed the keystone of 
socially shared ideas.14  
In contrast to this earlier favoritism of the individual, Wundt placed far more 
importance on the reciprocity between an individual mind and a shared system of 
customs or activities which fostered phenomena of cultural inculcation. Intending that his 
text would create a shift in focus, he introduced his VP by describing how it studies 
“mental products which are created by a community of human life and are, therefore, 
inexplicable in terms merely of individual consciousness, since they presuppose the 
reciprocal action of many.”15 Culture shaped a person’s nervous system so that it 
resembled the nervous systems of other people in the group. This shared shaping guided 
the group’s interactions with space and with each other. Physiological commonalities 
formed the basis of collective thought patterns. As Woodruff Smith has forcefully 
summarized, “Culture was no longer a consensus among individuals, an aggregation of 
ideas, words, and so on, that were passed on by persons of one generation to those of 
another. Instead, the mental structures of individuals were literally part of the larger 
culture.”16 Wundt’s understanding of the formation of these structures relied on the 
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mechanics of nervous change outlined in the Grundzüge. But in the Völkerpsychologie, 
nervous mechanics became the shared bases of collective thought and will 
(Gesamtwille).17 Wundt used his earlier work to frame the ways in which group 
expression relied on shared nervous reactions that were the basis for divergent ways of 
moving, experiencing, and knowing the world.   
In contrast to the Grundzüge, which presented a single model of nervous and 
mental development, Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie used this same base physiological 
causality and generated a prismatic view of cultures that adapted by the same means but 
to different ends. He described his intentions behind applying physiological psychology 
to a Völk in plain terms: “The basis of a philosophy of history should henceforth be a 
psychological history of development.” 18 In a study of psychological history, neural 
structures form as variant modes of base causality and upward structuration, but as the 
basis for higher mental function, these structures will grow as forms of specific reaction 
to the demands of a certain context.19 Wundt argued that all facets of human culture are 
“mental processes or the expression of psychical activities,” but different trajectories of 
nervous development provided the basis for the different modes of psychic function in 
various contexts.20  Wundt correlated contextual traits and base physiological causality as 
the basis for understanding the developmental relativity of the human race, cultural 
differences, and the stability of the human mind in a certain context. 
Wundt’s cultural history challenged mainstream social evolutionist theories of his 
time, but a brief survey of his overall sense of history shows that it nonetheless began 
with general evolution before giving way to myriad forms of specific evolution, or unique 
modalities of adaptation. He argued that every culture fit into one of four broad 
 82
developmental levels of world history: primitive, totemic, an age of heroes and gods, and 
a currently unfolding phase of advance toward humanity. Based on this general 
trajectory, he defined primitive culture as one that “approximates most nearly to the 
lowest mental achievements conceivable within the limits of universal human 
characteristics.”21 As Wundt construed the relation of historical experience and mind as a 
selective ordering out of the chaos of primitive experience, totemic cultures displayed a circle of 
ideas in which the animal rules man.  Souls of the dead dwelt within animal ancestors and were 
the organizing vehicle of society, tribal division, and forms of family. The age of heroes and gods 
arose from the presence of human rulers in totemic tribes.  Chieftains gained power in a 
community and assume military organization as a result of wider conflicts with other tribes.  
These conflicts led to developments of societies into states.  Battles or other tasks of state 
guidance caused some men to attain powerful stature, which made heroes take the place of the 
totemic clan elder, shaman, or tribal chieftain.  A political form of statehood gave rise to a change 
in art forms that exalt the hero.  In the Homeric age, forms of language became modified and 
enriched in order to fulfill this expressive need.   
Formative (bildende) and dramatic art follow changes in these epic forms. Wundt’s 
language in his description of art from mythic cultures offers an important distinction between art 
from these groups and earlier civilizations. Bildende Kunst generated an idea of artmaking as a 
person-oriented form of self-improvement or Bildung, with the artist as hero.  New customs 
emerged, however, when the state displaced tribal institutions.22  National heroes and religions 
came into being.  In this new mythic religious system, heroes and gods were idealized as 
personifications of natural events, and heaven became a more ideal version of earth.  The fourth 
period received a rather general discussion, because for Wundt, even the most advanced cultures 
were still in it.  This period described an advance toward humanity or an age that is emerging.  It 
began, as he understands it, with a fall of barriers that separate religious views, which led to a 
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more encompassing system of understanding.23 All three of these stages, then, reflect how limited 
human minds managed larger patterns of experience through shared images and concepts. 
The social Darwinism (or Hegelianism) that this series and definition may suggest 
was not, however, Wundt’s main focus in the text.24 Historian J.W. Berry has made the 
crucial point that “in principle, for Wundt, the differential valuing of each age was not a 
necessary defining characteristic.”25 He framed adaptation as local, rather than general, 
which was far more complex than any unilateral trajectory.26 Suspicion of social 
Darwinism is apparent in Wundt’s description of how “constructions of the character” of 
the “primitive” have always been ideals that indicate certain periods of Western history, 
so that “to an age that is satiated with culture and feels the traditional forms of life to be a 
burdensome constraint, the state of nature becomes an ideal once realized in a bygone 
world.”27 Despite his enlightened claims about constructions of “primitive” culture and 
his establishment of its diversity, Wundt looked at other cultures according to his own 
theories of physiological psychology, but he focused more heavily on the way in which 
physiology could explain the variability of group psychology. Regardless of this general 
teleology, he focused most heavily on the diversity of cultures by using his earlier studies 
of the nervous system as an enabler of physiologically based intellectual diversity.28  
This broad reliance on psychophysiological causality allowed Wundt to posit 
different kinds of possible relations among cultures. A historian began with exterior 
cultural manifestations—language, art, myth, and custom—and used this analysis to 
develop an inferred level of internal development in general physiology. Cultural 
advancement initially relied on the shared forms of nervous structures—i.e., the degree 
and kind of complexity with which nervous physiology has become habituated to operate. 
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Members of a community expressed, emphasized, and managed these experiences 
through cultural practice.   
Formation of communicative and expressive modes in world culture fascinated 
Wundt. He based these modes on the most rudimentary levels of physiological function 
that were gradually impressed in a person’s memory to the extent that communicative 
expression became automatic or non-volitional. As Kurt Danziger has argued, a central 
concern of the entire Völkerpsychologie was the plotting of how in different cultures, one 
finds entirely different manifestations of movement process and mental operation in the 
manner of ascending from a lower level of reactive expression or “drive movement” 
(Triebbewegung) to any volitional or discretionary process (Willkürbewegung) that 
eventually becomes automatic.29 According to Wundt, structures of nervous stimulation 
varied with each context, so that automatic (non-volitional) thoughts, behaviors, and 
reactions were based in rudimentary patterns of movement at the cultural level. 
Customary action formed the basis for experience of culture and its ideas or values, 
which then express higher end intellectual qualities among a group. Art and life were 
inextricably connected, but not at the level of an observable poetic. All cultures formed 
group practice, but according to particular standards that they themselves established, in 
order to reinforce values and placate anxieties. Wundt framed these groups as 
subcollectives, or segments of the overall world population that developed entirely 
different formats of collective thought processes.30 A subcollective’s cultural activity 
showed variation by degrees of base physiological function.  
The perceived limitations of experiment with regard to complexities of the mind 
motivated this cultural turn on Wundt’s part. He believed that psychophysical phenomena 
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– in short, any phenomena that depended on processes other than those that were 
immediately sensory – could only be estimated in the laboratory and for a German 
scientist, estimation was not calculation; it was a partial immunity to technicalities of 
inquiry. Decades of experiment had given the mind new, multiple boundaries. 
Interactions with a particular site of experience played a major role in psychic formation, 
but the hermetic laboratory could not provide the exigencies of this cultural space and the 
multifaceted affects it had on the processing of stimuli and the formation of mental 
platforms. Wundt fiercely defended his belief that higher psychic functions were subjects 
of Geisteswissenschaft. Thus, experimental physiology could foster an understanding of 
psychic operation, but could never fully uncover the nature of how the mind worked 
differently in particular societies.  
Wundt’s limitation on the scope of experiment led to his eclipse. In contrast to 
cultural studies, his successors debated the extent to which experiment could uncover 
higher psychic phenomena as subjects of Naturwissenschaft, which contributed to a 
model of the human sciences as deterministic.  For example, Wundt’s student Oswald 
Külpe’s act psychology practiced in his Würzburg lab set forth the tenet that testing and 
interviewing subjects about their thought processes could illuminate the entirety of 
consciousness. He relied on the positivist view that sense experience could provide the 
only true knowledge, in this case, the observations of the psychologist of higher mental 
function.31 Wundt lambasted this endeavor as a form of induction, especially their studies 
of cultural phenomena like language, which formed the first topic of his ten-volume 
Völkerpsychologie. 32 For him, it was epistemologically untenable for a scientist to 
describe higher mental functions in an observed individual, because the scientist’s use of 
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the same intellectual processes prevented the separateness that was necessary for an 
exterior description of phenomena. In his opinion, any communicative form was both an 
objective product of individual thought and a collective production requiring social-
historical analyses, rather than experiments on the individual. This belief challenged 
positivist psychology from within its boundaries. Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie created an 
intriguing twist in the history of physiological psychology, because he used the same 
basic causal structure of nerves that his colleagues were using as the base for more 
overtly positivist theories, but as the engine for a far more relativist venture.  
“Culture” for Wundt meant a pattern of gestural interactions or bodily reactions 
among members of a group who may or may not have recognized the significance of 
these various patterns. Thus, bodily movement gave rise to culture, which affected the 
mental functioning of each individual. Part of that community influence was to be found 
in the group's cultural memory and through it, experiences of early stages in history 
continued to act on and resonate within the group's consciousness in ways that it could 
neither access nor understand, but only express.    
Superficially, this outlook may seem to resemble traditional analyses of visual 
representation, but its basing of culture in bodies and nerves rather than in concepts gave 
the method an entirely different epistemological foundation. Comparing Wundt’s overall 
Völkerpsychologie to the better known analytical methods of the German art historian 
Erwin Panofsky (1892-1968) facilitates an understanding of the ways in which Wundt’s 
work differed from more familiar cultural discourses. Wundt and Panofsky diverge in 
terms of where each thinker placed the basis of his overall analytical method. Panofsky 
had a three-step process for interpreting visual representation: identification of objects, 
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description of subject matter (iconography), and establishment of social significance for 
the subject matter (iconology), which established the work as a manifestation of a 
culture’s values. In the first stage of his process, Panofsky relied on “familiarity with 
objects and events” as the necessary initial “equipment for interpretation” in his 
process.33 In comparing the graph from Panofsky’s 1939 essay “Iconography and 
Iconology: An Introduction to the Study of Renaissance Art” to the analytical structure of 
Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie, it becomes clear that Wundt would have required one more 
level prior to Panofsky’s first step of “pre-iconographical description,” a level that 
problematized the art historian’s assumption of cognitive transparency (fig. 6). For 
Wundt, familiarity depended entirely on prior experience, which meant that its equipment 
had to be built physiologically before it could enable Panofsky’s viewer to recognize, 
much less understand, anything in an object.  
As the psychologist might have it, recognizing that culture indicates a particular 
and communal nervous orientation as the basis of social values would initially distance 
an outsider from the basic essence of cultural production. That production was nerve-
based, rather than conceptual. In this alien situation, one’s nervous makeup gave him/her 
different “equipment for interpretation,” so that in the face of art from outside one’s own 
culture, the resulting forms would be, indeed had to be, relatively unrecognizable, if not 
patently bizarre. Being puzzled or shocked meant that one was before an exemplar of 
neurophysiological otherness based on alternative patterns of action and sense intake. The 
people who made it moved in another way and consequently thought differently.34 
Meaning in the visual arts did not necessarily have the transparency of sensory intake that 
Panofsky posited as the basis of his schema.35 
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Shifting points of contact with cultural products from cognitive transparency to 
acknowledgement of altered movement patterns triggers a focus on reading significance 
in the movement-based rhythms of a work’s production, rather than a focus on illustrated 
concepts. In the Wundtian view, rhythm—an ubiquitous term in the fin de siècle and most 
of the twentieth century— instanced the projection of certain shared nervous structures in 
a group. Wundt’s work made it a qualitative descriptor of creative regularities in modes 
of expression that were particular to certain cultures and a quantitative term of mutable 
physiological substance within oneself. At the level of culture, rhythms of action in one’s 
body as part of culture produced alternative expressive forms of language, plastic art, 
myth, and customs of all kinds as different but consecutive emanations from the shared 
nervous structures of a community. Rhythm did not equate all the arts in Wundt’s work, 
nor did it present the arts as immediately relatable.36 It was, however, the essential means 
by which a person absorbed physiologically the patterns of action in a group that 
gradually became impressed with thoughts and emotions.37 Rhythm was a pattern of 
impulses in space and the result of a certain conductive structure in a person’s nervous 
system. Rhythms in a culture connoted particular nexi of harmony between the formal 
movements in a cultural product and nervous structures of a group. 
Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie relied on a high degree of conjecture regarding the 
probable physiological nature of different cultures. He was unequivocal that probability 
was the “only guide,” for successful descriptions of culture that are not projections of 
aesthetic value from an outside observer.38 But, like any construct of probability, one 
could always establish dominant conventions of cultural forms or shared beliefs.  In 
Wundt’s case, the bases of these forms were phenomena of nervous change. He described 
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how the decidedly hypothetical claims of his VP were nonetheless “in greatest 
consonance with the sum total of the known facts of individual and folk psychology.”39 
This supporting foundation of Völkerpsychologie appears in Wundt’s focus on the 
different qualities of movement that indicate various collective structures of nervous 
operation. Following an ethnocentric trend of his moment, Wundt declared that 
“primitive” cultures (Naturvölker) were the most palpably in contact with the immediate 
rhythms of bodily movement and that this openness allowed for a more noticeable 
interconnection of their different art forms, because different media had not departed 
from one another according to abstract language that was above immediate experience. 
Wundt believed that interconnection came from the fact that so-called primitives lacked 
higher cognitive functions, which consequently kept their cultural productions closer to a 
more rudimentary platform of reactive movement. This premise became rich fodder for 
particular approaches to it by an entire regiment of different avant-garde artists over 
several decades, so it behooves one to spend some time outlining in detail how Wundt 
framed primitive culture. 
 
Representing the “Primitive” in the Völkerpsychologie 
 Omniscience of psychophysiology carried over to studies of culture, rather than 
aesthetic judgment, enabled Wundt to frame primitive culture as a diverse series of sets 
of cognitive reference points to ideas that grew up around them. In his work, physical 
determinism could not be of much assistance in recreating a historical past.  For example, 
measurements of the brain cavity or other anatomical data about prehistoric man “can 
give us no information concerning the psychological aspect of the question regarding the 
 90
nature of primitive man.”40  Thus, prehistoric primitive cultures were not psychologically 
lower than present-day primitive cultures, nor did one necessarily precede the other in a 
model of evolutionist causality.  The data itself, in the form of prehistoric objects, gave 
no sense of a comparatively lower psychological standing.   
Ultimately for Wundt, what remained from primitive culture to the present 
experience indicated a more surprising premise, which is “the great stability of primitive 
culture in general.”41  These cultures expressed relatively similar psychological states and 
were not communities that necessarily sought "something better" in development toward 
any other norm.  This correspondence of prehistoric cultural forms to primitive cultures 
that were contemporary to modern European cultures indicated “a high degree of 
permanence” in the category of primitive culture.”42  Resisting the historical route 
allowed Wundt to avoid a single trajectory of general human evolution and enabled him 
to see primitive culture as a worldwide psychological category.  
Thus, according to Wundt, no single culture is the most primitive, nor is there a 
region from which all human life sprang. Positing such an origin would obscure the more 
crucial matter of the way in which a culture manages its experience.  Thus, in the context 
of primitive culture, cultural productions were movements that indicated a certain neural 
level and particular psychological developmental disposition. More intriguingly still, the 
basic human physiology of the nervous system was generally similar for both primitive 
and modern man, which led Wundt to argue that “the intellectual endowment of primitive 
man is in itself approximately equal to that of civilized man . . . primitive man merely 
exercises his ability in a more restricted field; his horizon is essentially narrower because 
of his contentment under these limitations.”43 The relatively similar intellectual level of 
 91
different cultures results from a particular developmental structure of the nervous system 
that gains internal complexity out of reaction to different spaces. 
Wundt framed primitive culture as a general neurophysiological level manifested 
in particular nexi of movement patterns that did not disappear into the distant past.44  
Diverse groups seemed to show pockets of this general (not isolated to one culture) and 
specific (dictating a precise nervous schema in consciousness) organically fundamental 
state of mental history.45  Yet they were "primitive" not because they were living fossils 
of earlier states of humankind, but because they organized their experience in particular 
ways. Their culture was by no means static, but the developmental level was, because 
they were content with it. Given their state of nervous development, primitives were most 
open to introductions of change that happened most often by chance. One may not 
immediately think of primitivism in connection to chance, but in the context of Wundt’s 
work, and, I shall argue, for the avant-garde, the two notions were inseparable. 
 
Primitive Chance 
Wundt argued that no cultural form is invented on the spot and in the most 
primitive contexts, cultural products resulted from a process that began with a chance 
occurrence. The rudimentary neurophysiological level of primitives made it far easier for 
them to absorb chance encounters than it was for a modern subject, whose higher 
intellectual categories would inhibit the intake of such stimuli. In Wundtian theory, 
primitive man lacked the forethought for invention and the intellect for systematic 
calculation and planning:   
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The thinking of primitive man is almost exclusively associative. Image follows 
upon image in the order in which these appear to consciousness. Thus, the 
thinking of primitive man is almost exclusively associative. Of the more perfect 
form of combining concepts, the apperceptive, which unites thoughts into a 
systematic whole, there are as yet only traces, such as occur in the combination of 
separate memory images. 46 
Wundt was unequivocal in these lines that openness to chance occurred with greater 
frequency due to the dearth of apperception in primitive mental operation. As outlined in 
the previous chapter, apperception was a cognitive strategy that lends sequence to 
thought based on prior experience fostering a sensory fixation of attention. In contrast to 
the basic intake of sense impressions, it was a higher level cognitive act of isolation and 
constancy in sensory experience. It relies strongly on nervous habit. Apperception can be 
visual or aural, but above all it depends on how one relates to objects in space. In more 
advanced cultures, these higher cognitive levels were based on the inhibitory resistance to 
the surrounding flux of stimuli that was the office of habitual conduction paths. Without 
the developmentally ascendant faculty of apperception, primitives have less inhibiting 
intensities to new stimuli and a greater ability to alter collective mental function with 
haphazard sensory intake.  
Impressions collided in primitive mental operations of association, rather than fall 
into expected order. As it appears in the lines above, association in primitive cultures was 
not a rational act of conscious connecting based on perceived similarities, which is what 
the term means in earlier British philosophy. These associations were more the result of 
happenstance in a temporal or spatial. Wundt believed that primitives experienced the 
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sensory flux of the world solely through the physiological faculty of association in the 
cortex between different sensory areas.47 Without these faculties of apperceptive fixation, 
isolation, and duration, however, primitive cultures were far more open to chance 
experiences that they could incorporate into their practices of everyday life. The gradual 
discovery of beneficial consequences that began with chance would give rise to deliberate 
practices that fixed beneficial forms by means of repetition. But without the capacity for 
abstract thinking outside the phenomenal world, these habits could change more 
drastically in the face of new chance occurrences. Thus, the neurophysiological stability 
of primitive culture was of a sort that made it far more mutable than more “civilized” 
societies.  
That chance was easier for primitives to absorb into their regimen of cultural 
practices was one factor that contributed to the diversity of primitive culture, for without 
abstract thought, group thinking came to rely far more heavily on particular spatial 
conditions. According to Wundt, a quality that was revealed by chance or accident—for 
example, the functional asymmetry of the boomerang—encouraged the primitive to copy 
“as faithfully as possible those implements which most perfectly exhibited this 
characteristic.”48  According to tenets of habit formation, repeated contact with 
advantageous qualities enabled gradual fixing.  The boomerang began as a form found by 
chance when a native Australian threw a curved stick and received an interesting, albeit 
painful, surprise when the object returned.  Learning to use the tool was then a gradual 
process of becoming habituated to a new form in space involving construction of a style 
for the new object out of physiological coordination.49  
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Chance could also give habitual encounters novel experiential qualities. New 
awareness of pre-existent natural phenomena occurred by ascending complications in the 
nervous system. For example, walking through the forest led to the process of forming 
bows and arrows.  In this case, the initial responses were to observed natural phenomena: 
“Having first observed the powerful impulsive force which a rod gains through being 
bent, it was a simple matter to render this force permanently available by bending the rod 
back and binding its ends together.”50  The “common form” of the bow encapsulated a 
series of responsive practices to a repeatedly observed natural phenomenon.51  Gradual 
expansion on this general structure generated variations of a more advanced nature, such 
as increased function: “In order that such a bow may be bent back more easily, some 
people of a more advanced culture construct it out of several layers of wood, horn, sinew, 
or the like.”52  Complications to the form initiate the formation of new paths in the 
nervous system.  Reliance on the initial pattern of occurrence was obviously key.  
Without it, one would lose the anchor of memory and return to throwing rocks.  The 
arrow relied on a different system of observation that offered new dimensions on 
experiential patterns. 
In later cultures, these weapons yielded data concerning aerodynamics and 
physics, but primitive men knew nothing of these fields.  Feathers on the end of a bow 
guaranteed its accuracy as the “resultant effect” of this modification to the anchor shaft.53  
How did primitive man foresee an effect of modification when he had no knowledge of 
the mechanics that generated this resultant effect?  Without the continuity of 
apperception, an entirely different structure of thought would unfold based on 
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corresponding analogies between perceived movement qualities, rather than optics or 
logic.  
In Wundt’s view, the primitive mind made connections based on the different 
ways that he moved and thought.  Wundt argued that primitive man most likely attached 
feathers to the flying arrow so that it encapsulated observed qualities of “a flying bird that 
pierces the air by the movement of its feathers.”54  In making the arrow, primitive man 
copied “the mode of movement of the bird” with no knowledge about how “he was 
causing movement in a mechanical way.”55  Wundt’s example is quaint, but its 
consequences are explosive. This notion of the copy differs from a visual representation, 
because it is based on a perceived quality of movement, rather than a fixed, retinal image 
captured in apperceptive focus.  Capturing a quality of movement and associational 
material (feathers) was enough to create an image of the bird for the primitive, for whom 
“the image of a thing is in reality always equivalent to the thing itself.”56  The plastic 
object encapsulated an observed process of movement. It was a new enactment of a 
process, rather than a re-presentation of a fixed mental image. In this way, nature 
supplied primitive man with the “patterns” of his implements, weapons, and vessels.57   
The observed quality in nature was a pattern that connoted an experiential 
continuity of ambulatory phenomena, rather than an observed, concrete image like a 
checkerboard.  It described certain kinds of making based on linkages of movement and 
thought that corresponded only as sensations of movement. The availability and nature of 
these patterns would depend on what sort of neurophysiological level one had. Different 
structures revealed various sequences of experience as meaningful. Wundt’s notion of 
pattern in nature denoted the continuity of spatio-temporal experience of phenomena to 
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which one responded, if the phenomena were beneficial.58 Chance discoveries initiate 
new forms of practice, especially as it concerns relationships with objects. 59  
Wundt posited chance as a primary fixture of primitive experience and based this 
openness on contextually variant systems of rudimentary movement that enabled 
subsequent manners of experiential combination and mental sequencing that differed in 
style from trajectories of modern thought. Wundt found these qualities of distinct 
movements to be a palpable capacity of primitive language. 
 
Language as Movement Pattern 
Paralleling his work on the psyche and culture, Wundt rejected the notion of 
language as discourse—i.e., as a set of abstracts or concepts that one can apply from 
above over and apart from the dynamics of linguistic formation. Language was neither 
structural nor archetypal, but a form of emanatory bodily movement or gesture that 
expressed cultural inculcation in a manner that allowed subjects to change language 
through pursuit of new action patterns. In contrast to Durkheim or Freud, Wundt attached 
major importance to language as a cultural phenomenon.60 It should not surprise that 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) was a regular attendant at Wundt’s lectures on 
language, given before, during, and after composition of the VP.61 Yet this Wundtian 
dimension of language – so familiar to the avant-garde – has all but disappeared from the 
historical record. In contrast to Saussure, Wundt thought that language had to be 
understood as being totally reliant on spatial phenomena of bodily movement.62 Wundt 
argued that “language is bound up with thought,” but in a manner that enabled one to 
infer differences in its direction and form throughout cultures.63  
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Familiarity with Wundt’s overall theorization of language in the VP provides the 
necessary backdrop for understanding his specific thoughts on primitive language. 
Framing language as a collective, gestural process hinged on describing vocalization as a 
form of expressive gesture or motion known as articulatory movement 
(Artikulationsbewegung).64 Speaking was not just a selective exercising of a pre-existent 
structure. It relied on moving organs, so for Wundt, speech was always a bodily process 
of created sound (Laut) that was, in fact, a sound movement (Lautbewegung) made in 
reaction to an outside impression.65 As a process of moving sound, speech arose as a 
reaction to spatial phenomena and, at its most rudimentary level, was an attempt to 
replicate sounds heard in the environment (Lautnachahmung).66 Speech was, in fact, a 
movement of articulatory organs, which made it a kind of gesture that most often 
occurred in coordination with other kinds of movement. Based on these two factors, 
Wundt postulated that at its base, all language had connections to a rudimentary level of 
initial sound gesture (Lautgebärde) that formed the basis of all language in its beginnings 
as reactions to heard and felt sound.67 These movements of articulation depended on the 
nature of space and the relative level of nervous development in the collective, but all 
languages began at this basic level. Members of a community shaped utterance according 
to perceived necessities that were initially reflective of the context in which they lived. 
In the sphere of culture, language rose instinctively but entirely in accordance 
with the Wundtian notion of instinct as an expression of a culturally instilled pattern of 
action.68 As a form of movement, language had more conspicuous and immediate 
linkages to other socially shared patterns of expressive movement and emotion, like art or 
ritual. Framing language as a gesture that one learned made its nervous energies into 
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forms instilled by culture in space rather than mind. These characteristics allowed 
utterance to “reveal the exciting of subjective feelings through the impression” and 
simultaneously “reproduce the feeling of the excitational process (erregenden Vorgang) 
itself.”69 For Wundt, this push to mimic within rudimentary language exemplified the 
way in which all utterance was a culturally ingrained manner of movement-based coping 
and orientation in a collective, which created a structure for knowing and feeling a certain 
way about these experiences by reproducing exterior phenomena. 
Wundt assumed an educated reader who would have known to connect these 
theories to earlier formulations of language outlined in the Grundzüge. This sense of 
language as collective practices of movement had strong bases on laboratory 
experiments. He was able to base the social level of linguistic construction in the nervous 
system by supporting it with his earlier studies of how different conductions of sense data 
converge at a particularly high level in the speech centers. 70 The high level of manifold 
representation in the speech centers bolstered Wundt’s argument that utterance was a 
reactive gesture of articulatory organs made in reaction to sensations. 71 At the social 
level, communal life strengthened as it continuously reenacted these experiences in their 
ambulatory and linguistic forms, and was in turn strengthened by language that elevated 
the community above associations that concerned only momentary needs.72  
Nerves were the basis of language, and these fibers were never still. Speech 
centers could change with the introduction of any form of movement, because the speech 
center was open to functional disturbances that modified the conditions of conduction and 
with them the actual conduction paths. Cultural inculcation played a role in these 
formations, but that culture could change at rudimentary levels of sense intake in 
 99
accordance with specific adaptation. The mutability of the nervous system will alter how 
and to what formal ends the subject’s organs of articulation will take. Framing language 
as a form of bodily movement implicated the most essential factors of the nervous system 
and its modes of mutation. The nature of this mutability gave culture constancy. As 
neurophysiological practice (Übungsphanomene), language was readily open to small 
tweaks and manipulations, but its overall development progressed more slowly than other 
facets of culture. Consequently, primitive forms of thought could persist in forms of 
external culture even when the culture was very advanced.73 Understanding language as a 
movement allowed Wundt to associate it more readily to other modes of linguistic 
expression besides speech. 
Gesture language (Gebardesprache) involved the expressive movement of the 
limbs that a person makes in emphasizing ideas. Linguistic interactions among people in 
a culture displayed these two different forms of movement that are most closely linked in 
primitive language, because these groups did not have abstract language that was 
independent of immediate experience. In a connection that fostered his view of utterance 
as a form of movement, Wundt described how gesture language rose immediately in 
relation to spoken words as a dimension of emphasis. As forms of movement, both voice 
(articulatory movement) and gesture cooperated in conveying an emotional energy to 
meaning. Gesture language was an expressive means between individuals that occurred at 
the lowest and highest cultural levels.  These forms of communication consisted of 
expressive movements that were imitative or pantomimic in character and formed the 
means for communication of thought.  When this practice occurred in modern cultures, it 
“may nevertheless be regarded as primitive, since it is actually formed anew before our 
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very eyes.”74 Languages of gesture marked the legacy of more primitive cultural stages in 
more advanced cultural stages.  It was always an original, rudimentary, and thus primitive 
form of communication that in advanced cultures did not depend on primitive conditions, 
as was the case in gesture languages of primitive cultures.75  
Gesture language communicated and emphasized meaning contents by connecting 
to utterance a new form of energy that was often invented on the spot. In historical 
context, the general belief in Wundt’s time was that gesture languages arose from an 
impulse to communicate intellectual processes or voluntary reflections to other people.  
But for Wundt, observing gesture language at its origin yielded a set of entirely different 
motives.  Instead of intellect or reflection, original gesture languages were irrefutably the 
result of “emotion and the involuntary expressive movements that accompany 
emotion.”76  It was an instinctive form of emphasis, but here, as elsewhere, instinct 
implied the root causality of movement forms in cultural influence. Emotion came from 
immediacy of action in which communicative intention was absent, but it nonetheless 
triggered a response that forged “common thinking in which impulsive movements are 
more and more displaced by voluntary actions, and ideational contents, together with the 
corresponding gestures, enter into the foreground of attention.”77  At its root level, 
communion with another was straightforwardly a base nervous reaction that rose up in 
immediate relation to the nature of an emotional, instinctive, and inculcated reaction to 
space. At this higher end of communication, ideational content allowed emotional 
gestures to become volitional in expressing individual experience to others by an 
exchange of thought in language.  Gradual transition from emotional and impulsive 
movement (Triebbewegungen) into other, more voluntary (willkürlich) actions relied on 
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processes of practice, habit formation, and any development of higher mental functions 
out of reactive movement would correlate to shared structures of experience and 
expression. 
One would make instinctive gestures in a manner that was entirely reliant on the 
way in which one was accustomed to moving and within this range, the nature of 
denotative possibilities restricted gesture language to signs for ideas that were only 
“capable of perceptual representation,” or anything that the senses could immediately 
absorb.78 The referent would depend on the context of the ideas being communicated.  
For example, the denotative properties in a gesture for walking might indicate the action 
or the course that one takes.79  Complete availability of gesture language to perception—
it reflected nerve motion almost without reference to abstraction—allowed all of its 
elements to remain primitive (below high levels of mental function like intellect). Wundt 
deflated the social Darwinist belief of Western intellectual superiority with respect to the 
initial sources of its communicative means, which were not intellectual but sensory and 
above all ambulatory.  
Wundt’s lengthy description and analysis of gesture language shifted 
understanding of language formation and use in two ways. First, the grammatical rules of 
expression were not hidebound. These structures could change; not as a mere shift in 
discursive archetypes, but in nervous tissue. The second, more intriguing premise dictated 
that the nature of expressive communication changed most readily and noticeably 
through new forms of movement. The use of communicative gesture in any society did 
not rely on preexistent syntactic categories, but most often arose improvisationally, in 
direct relation to an utterance that was a movement reaction to sensory phenomena. 
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Wundt saw this duality of gesture and voice as a united form of movement, in which an 
invented gesture reinforced the meaning contents of language.  
Based on the immediate connection of utterance to gesture language, and the 
conjoined nature of gesture language and emotion, Wundt postulated that primitives 
never thought outside or above the emotions. Ultimately, documents of primitive 
language illustrated that the content of primitive thought had two major elements of 
composition.  First, direct perception of everyday life provided one category of ideas.  
The second category consisted of supersensuous ideas that “originate in feeling, in 
emotional processes which are projected outward into the environment.”80  This 
supersensuous content appeared in the form of sensible ideas, despite the unavailability 
of these supersensuous ideas within the seen world.81 Emotions were not felt, but seen. 
Primitive language effectively bolstered Wundt’s characterization of language as 
a nerve-based movement system, because the neurophysiological practices of these 
cultures did not have the capacity to think outside immediate sensory content, which gave 
their language a disjunctive quality in which different words were separate reactive 
gestures stacked on each other. In primitive languages, grammatical categories never 
synthesized above immediate phenomena, which made primitive utterance more closely 
resemble base reactive movement in its lack of continuity.  
Wundt’s description of primitive language leads the modern reader to imagine 
that the primitive experienced the world as a sort of collage: this was a disparate grouping 
of distinct sensory events that the subject combined but did not synthesize into a separate 
whole upon which one could then reflect. Instead, primitive utterance relied on the 
bricolage of raw sense data in a brain that had not yet developed the faculties of 
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apperception (attention) or theories of causality. It has the fewest “fixed combinations in 
which the individual component parts have lost their independence,” which meant that 
language was never detached from experience.82  One sign could denote objects, actions, 
particles, or qualities. Wundt had argued that, in contrast to a Western language that 
consists largely of abstract concepts, primitive utterance and gesture languages were 
“entirely reduced . . . to separate perceptual images” which indexed a different pattern of 
movement in space.83  In such movements, thought connects to separate objects in a 
reactive manner that was, to a modern Westerner, utterly non-sequential and discordant.  
Thus, while intellectual processes in the modern subject could occur above immediate 
sense data in a manner that gave to experience effects of filtering, convergence, and 
sequential unity, Wundt argued that primitive thought had no such faculties, because it 
only showed traces of apperception, which was the basis for development of higher ideas 
or abstract concepts. Perception and the recollection of these perceptual experiences 
governed the association of ideas that determined the habitual continuity that one 
perceives as the sequence of thought. Instead of the unity that abstract concepts gave to 
Western linguistic structure, then, in primitive thought, “image follows upon image in the 
order in which these appear to consciousness.”84 Particular nature of how a group brought 
distinctive sense images into discordant proximity was an exercise of articulatory 
movement would depend on how culture influenced a person to experience a particular 
space. He argued that the primitive “sees the image with its separate parts; and, as he sees 
it, so he reproduces it in his language.”85  Wundt described this form of thought as 
“concrete” in the sense that perceptual content far outweighs independent judgment or 
expressions of concepts. Thus primitive language would reflect the developmental level 
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of a socially shared bodily substrate that absorbed experience in a particular way. 
Without high-end faculties, the primitive cognitive event had no sequential continuity, 
but was instead a pile of disconnected sense data coupled with emotions that do not 
correspond logically to the manner in which a “civilized” subject can synthesize and 
focus on particular experiences of past and present.  
Based on this formula of nervous alterity, Wundt saw primitive language as being 
essentially a series of disconnected movements coupled with emotion that generates 
sound movements “of monosyllabic words which follow one another in direct succession 
without any intermediate inflectional elements to modify their meaning.”86 Instances of 
cultural syncretism displayed these features of primitive language in the most 
conspicuous fashion, for these events involve subjects seeing unfamiliar objects.  For 
example, in Togo, speakers of Ewe who had ever seen a pencil described it as a “stone-
scratch-something,” or a stone that one uses to scratch something.87  Likewise, a nail was 
an “iron-head-broad.”  For Wundt, each element of these compound neologisms “stands 
for a sensibly perceptual object,” and the primitive formed the concept “by arranging in 
sequence those perceptual ideas whose combined characteristics constitute the 
conception.”88  Devoid of grammatical distinction, such an apparently simplistic language 
revealed its true complexity as a simultaneous bricolage of  “sensibly perceptual images” 
that broke a single concept into numerous distinct elements.89  In its elasticity of 
denotation, primitive utterance was more akin to gesture language (Gebardesprache), in 
which, for example, a “gesture of striking may denote the verb ‘to strike’ and also the 
noun ‘blow.’”90  The component parts of these most primitive languages, in fact, were 
contrary to Latinate traditions of root words, because they developed by agglomeration 
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and agglutination, both of which were inherently spatial phenomena and connoted a 
gathering out of raw and impulsive movements.91 For example, in the Ewe language, 
Wundt argued, even concrete empirical concepts like the verb “to bring” became the 
transitory chain “take-go-give.”92 A concept like the cardinal direction west met with 
other complications.  A Togo person expresses this word by saying “sun-sit-place,” in 
which “there is required not only the sun and location which we must give it but also its 
act of seating itself.”93  All of these traits gave primitive spoken language, in its 
separateness of reactive articulations, a far stronger connection to gesture language. 
Indeed, for Wundt these two rudimentary forms of external culture were “absolutely at 
one” in the nature of movement experience that informed techniques of composition.94 
 
The Body as the Source of Art 
Consequently, Wundt made dance the beginning of all art and argued that 
primitives had brought this form to a high degree of perfection.95 Wundt believed that 
primitive man was best endowed for this form of cultural expression because of his 
unique physiology: “The life of the forest, the climbing of trees, and the capturing of 
game qualify him for performances that would prove difficult to a modern art-dancer.”96  
Dance was the most physical art form, and Wundt's primitive was best at it, because he 
was the most physical man, meaning that his nervous system had become habituated to 
more extreme, limber, and supple corporeal movements.  But within this gestural 
potentiality were major concepts concerning how the movements of dance were the basis 
of all other cultural forms. Dance had its origins in the basic bodily movements of 
everyday life, in the way that song had its origins in everyday speech. For Wundt, the 
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origins of dance were rhythmic bodily movements that were learned and thus (to a person 
in the culture) natural reactions to the feeling of one’s general atmosphere.97 Crucially, 
Wundt argued that dance was the place where the rhythms of culture were least 
sophisticated (reinsten) and at the lowest levels; that is, it had the closest proximity to the 
rhythmic practices of everyday life and the most potent indicator of psychological 
processes.98  
According to Wundt, in primitive dance, one often found very simple bodily 
movements that resembled basic gymnastic exercises (bloßen gymnastischen Spielen), 
but which had immediate connection to cultural ceremonies.99 Thus, the most basic 
rhythms, which were found in the dances of a culture and manifested in movements, were 
the strongest manifestations of group consciousness, because at this simplest cultural 
level, one found less of a disconnect between everyday life and cultural expression in the 
means by which the group transmitted content through gesture. This particular 
combination of the seen and, more crucially, of the communally felt as seen, was rooted 
in a particular neurophysiological level and exemplified mystical thinking in which 
objects and processes of perception “are supplemented by other realities that are of a non-
perceptible nature and therefore belong to an invisible realm back of the visible 
world.”100  Primitive art most clearly expresses these ideas. Ideas that form magical belief 
were projected into forms of external culture like art. Reciprocally, art “reacts upon 
magical ideas and brings about an enhancement of their motives.”101  As a gateway to 
psychological knowledge, dance provided the clearest manifestation through cultural 
expression of the mental life of a certain group, because it was the most inherently 
physiological form of expression. Rather than abstract thought, dance was a 
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manifestation of thought through seemingly abstract movements, which in fact held the 
essence of a group’s beliefs. The communal (gemeinsamen) nature of dance generated a 
shared subjective life of pleasure, and its direct sources were movements and the 
accompanying sensations of these movements.  This form of expression clearly benefited 
from group participation, which “enhances both the emotion and the ability of the 
individual.”102  Sensations of one’s own movements were brought into harmony with and 
by assistance of sensations of other people’s movements in the group.  Participation in 
this dance was thus a physiologically grounded form of collective thinking and habit 
formation.  Belief in magic became more intense when its quantitative generation by the 
group was systematized out of basic bodily movement that looked more like gymnastics 
to an outside viewer.103  
At the earliest stage of dance, only the body was the medium.  Neither masks nor 
music occurred.  For Wundt, the most dominant accompaniment for the most primitive 
dances was the primitive vocal dance song that had “grown up out of selected natural 
sounds,” or the raw material of sensory experience that one took up and selectively 
molded by repetition.104 The musical or rhythmic nature of the refrain in sung speech 
“exalts and supplements the dance; when all parts of the body are in motion the 
articulatory organs also tend to participate.”105  All of the body’s expressive faculties 
integrated to amplify expressive strength, and all people in the group performed this feat 
simultaneously, thus increasing the emotional attachment to certain movements.106  
As in dance, primitives develop formative art (bildende Kunst) in direct 
connection to ideas of magic, which indicated that for them, magical phenomena 
appeared as sense data. Elements of formative art proceeded from these forms of 
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rudimentary and rhythmic movements, which began with linear decoration, pattern, and 
abstract ornament.  The cutting or scratching that produced simple lines were the most 
rudimentary form of decoration.107 Uniform repetition was the universal characteristic of 
primitive ornament, as a visual correlate to nerve structures within the community.  
Repetition represented the most rudimentary form of illustrating exterior culture and it 
was also present in primitives’ habits of linguistic sequencing (image after image), the 
repetition of a word as the refrain in song, the unified movements in gesture (whether 
individual or group), and the phenomena of rudimentary repetition that generated pattern.  
The logic of these formative practices occurred as specific results of initial pathmaking 
that were communal and shared. 
For Wundt, pattern was like practice, in that it “later becomes more 
complicated.”108  Combinations of whole forms or parts of forms aided in giving rise to 
this complexity. In other cases from ethnology, he interpreted simple geometrical patterns 
on objects not as simple decorative shapes, “but as representations of objects.”109  
Arrangements of triangles or squares were, for the culture that made them, snakes or 
bees.110  The “psychical process of assimilation” allows for the ability of a primitive man 
to “read concrete objects of this kind into his simple ornamental lines.”111  Assimilation 
was more prominent in primitive cultures, due to their protection from outside influence 
that made psychical assimilation more open to exterior influence.  
This mode of abstraction relied on the physiological level upon which Wundt 
grounded all mind and experience. These arrangements instance a mental level within 
other basic forms of external culture and, subsequently, allowed viewers to “read into 
them, through imaginative association, the memory images of objects.”112 That this was 
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not deterministic is very clear in Wundt's expositions.  Primitives could often draw in a 
more (Western) representational manner, so the need for geometrical ornament did not 
arise from inability. Dance fed the need to compose repetitive decoration. Wundt’s 
Elements outlines this idea most clearly, positing, 
It was not inability to draw the objects themselves that gave rise to these primitive  
geometrical decorations. The decorations came first, and the memory images of 
 the objects of daily perception were then read into them . . . Because of the 
 character of his locomotor organs, primitive man repeats the movements of the 
 dance at regular intervals, and this rhythm gives him pleasure. Similarly, he 
 derives pleasure even from the regularly repeated movements involved in making 
 the straight lines of his drawings, and this pleasure is enhanced when he sees the 
 symmetrical figures that arise under his hand as a result of his movements. The 
 earliest aesthetic stimuli are symmetry and rhythm. We learn this even from the 
 most primitive of all arts, the dance. Just as one’s own movements in the dance 
 are an aesthetic expression of symmetry and rhythm, so also are these same 
 characteristics embodied in the earliest productions of pictorial art – in the 
 beginning, indeed, they alone are to be found.113 
Both modes of practice were elemental rhythms of spatial interaction.  Pleasure in the 
repeating of movements of the dance “at regular intervals” unfolded as the result of a 
habitually constituted “character of his locomotor organs.”114  As a direct corollary to the 
pleasure of repeated movement in dance, pleasure also came from creating rhythm and 
symmetry in formative art. The nature of the rhythm would instance a certain 
physiological structure and consequent psychological orientation, which could then 
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connect one to other perceived similarities regarding other cultural practices as 
consecutive dimensions of movement. These notions were topics of scholarly debate 
among ethnographers, sociologists, and anthropologists, and concerned the implications 
of this model for theories that addressed the mental and social lives of individuals and 
groups. Developing implications off Wundt’s theories depended on how a reader shaped 
and framed his imposing work. 
 
Variations of Collective Thought: Durkheim and Boas Read Wundt 
 Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie had an attractive rhetorical strength for sociologist 
and ethnographers, because its findings were based on laboratory practice. For example, 
the French sociologist Emile Durkheim’s theory of collective representation relied on the 
VP for his argument that group ideas existed only in the minds of those who had 
experienced a certain form of collectivist engagement or participation. In 1887, 
Durkheim visited Wundt’s laboratory on a grant from the French Ministry of Culture, in 
order to learn firsthand how one could combine a study of the nervous system with a 
more philosophical and historical undertaking of human history as psychological 
history.115  Shortly thereafter, he wrote a long essay on the overall workings of Wundt’s 
lab and incorporated these ideas into his own work, especially for his well-known notion 
of collective representation.116 Durkheim first addressed this concept in 1898, well after 
Wundt published on these ideas in his own journal, Philosophische Studien.117 Durkheim 
does not cite Wundt, but it is clear that he borrowed heavily from the German 
psychologist. For example, in his landmark Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912), 
he described the way in which collective representations “achieve their greatest intensity 
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when the individuals are assembled and in direct relations with one another, at the 
moment when everyone communes in the same idea or emotion.”118  One sees the basic 
philosophy of Wundt that ideas in culture are supra-personal. But Durkheim departed 
from Wundt when he argued that collective representations were by definition 
impersonal: “Whenever we are in the presence of a type of thought that presses uniformly 
on individual intellects or wills, that pressure on the individual reveals the intervention of 
the collectivity.”119  For Durkheim, intellect and, especially, volition were higher 
psychophysical phenomena; for Wundt, by contrast, the source of all supposed social 
facts was the continually fugitive nervous system.120 Group ideas were continually 
changing and also were not amenable to unilateral formations of laws like those that the 
French sociologist pursued.  
 Durkheim relied on the contemporaneous studies of psychic causality in the work 
of French psychologists like Alfred Binet, Théodule Ribot, or Pierre Janet when he 
argued that one could conceive laws for societal function based on comparisons of social 
facts, which allowed him to judge whether a society was healthy.121 Judgmental and 
especially pathological scrutiny became a major force in French sociology and appeared 
most prominently in the work of Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931). Both Le Bon and 
Durkheim saw the development of the individual as an inherently public process that 
depended entirely on a seemingly automatic and basically nativist absorption of social 
facts. The two thinkers also saw society as a metaphor of the individual mind, which 
implied both social unity and redefined the collective according to a standard of psychic 
health. Le Bon was particularly interested in how the masses had a common self-image, 
which then became attached to a charismatic leader as a sort of superego.122 The 
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omniscient place of the psychologist in French constructions of pathology contradicted 
the VP, which held to a model of reciprocity in its tenet that individuals could alter 
society through an application of new movement patterns. Social facts could never 
become laws, for they were built on conditionalities of mutating tissue. For Wundt, the 
only real laws were those of the basic determinism of the nervous system, which were 
merely outlines for the mechanics of change. Base physiological phenomena like 
pathmaking or concomitant irritation were a far cry from Durkheim’s top-down 
comparisons, for these processes were the basis for a multiplicity of adaptive schemas.  
 In contrast to Durkheim, who engineered Wundt’s ideas into a positivist structure, 
Franz Boas appreciated the subtleties of the German psychologist’s arguments. One sees 
his appreciation most predominantly in his fascination with the way in which cultures 
have different senses of what constitutes the quality of rhythm. Citing Wundt throughout 
his text, Boas expressed the views of the older psychologist when he wrote, “Rhythmical 
movements of the body or of objects, forms that appeal to the eye, sequences of tones and 
forms of speech which please the ear, produce artistic effects. Muscular, visual, and 
auditory sensations are the materials that give us esthetic pleasure and that are used in 
art.”123 As Boas expressed it, rhythm is not just a quality, but it depends on different 
quantitative structures of nervous orientation shared by makers of culture in a specific 
time and place. Rhythm was a particular quality of the body that Boas, like Wundt, 
connected to the symmetry of the human body: “Symmetrical notions of the arms and 
hands are physiologically determined. The right and left are apt to move symmetrically 
and the motions of the same arm or of both arms are often performed rhythmically and 
symmetrically from left to right.”124 Boas was fascinated by how many different forms of 
 113
rhythmic composition pervaded world culture, and for him this diversity was the result of 
different modes of specific, ambulatory adaptation and expression.  
 These rhythms of creation were in one’s nerves and thus affected the production 
of other cultural forms that rose out of the movements of the same bodies in a certain 
place. As Boas argued in an earlier text, The Mind of Primitive Man (1911; German 
translation 1914), “In all these cases the form of reaction may depend to a slight extent on 
hereditary individual and racial ability, but it will to a much greater extent be determined 
by the habitual reactions of the society to which the individual in question belongs.”125 
Thus, a key aspect of Boas’s ethnography involved interpreting culture as based on 
shared neurophysiological structures in a group that provided insights into the ways in 
which “there are certain stimuli to which all of us who live in the same society react in 
the same way without being able to express the reasons for our actions.”126  Boas then 
explained this viewpoint with a user-friendly summation of Wundt’s basic outlook 
toward the topic in his Völkerpsychologie—i.e., the basic functionality of physiological 
psychology being transferred to cultural history as an engine for appreciating relativism: 
In all these cases the custom is obeyed so often and so regularly that the habitual 
act becomes automatic; that is to say its performance is ordinarily not combined 
with any degree of consciousness. Consequently the emotional value of these 
actions is also very slight. It is remarkable, however, that the more automatic an 
action, the more difficult it is to perform the opposite action, that it requires a very 
strong effort to do so, and that ordinarily the opposite action is accompanied by 
strong feelings of displeasure. It may also be observed that to see the unusual 
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action performed by another person excites the strongest attention, and causes 
feelings of displeasure.127 
For Boas, obeying these customs involved the habitual associations of movement-based 
practices. He followed Wundt in positing that these everyday habits were the basis for the 
rhythmic nature of art forms throughout cultures and that one had to understand the 
psychophysical entirety of a community in order to understand the nature of its particular 
attitude toward rhythm. Boas shared Wundt’s belief that modern people had lost the sense 
of rhythm that primitive culture displayed in its consecutive practices of the arts. Emotion 
was included in cultural expression but not in a solely determinist sense of traditional 
expression. Analysis revealed the heterogeneity of associations within pattern that Wundt 
had discussed and showed Boas that, in primitive culture, “the impressions of the outer 
world are associated intimately with subjective impressions, which they call forth 
regularly, but which are determined by the social surroundings of the individual.”128 The 
nature of these more elemental associations of similar combinatory heterogeneity would 
vary greatly depending on the culture and space, which encouraged the interrelation of all 
bodily movement patterns called for by both Wundt and Boas.   
 For both thinkers, particular patterns of artmaking signified immediate, plastic 
encapsulations of particular nervous formats and were one facet of socially shared values. 
Rhythm denoted culturally specific patterns of movement and connoted different 
trajectories of nervous development that house emotional qualities within culturally 
specific regularities of movement. This regularity of movement relied on socially instilled 
patterns of nervous reactions among a group that gave rise to elemental ideas that are 
indistinguishable from gestures: 
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The relation between music, words, and dance are of a similar character. Primitive  
 literary expression is often, though not by any means always, accompanied by 
 some kind of motor activity; or certain kinds of motions may release articulations 
 that take the form of song or spoken words. Strong, but controlled emotion finds 
 utterance in movements of the body and in articulation, and emotional speech 
 releases similar movements.129 
 Likewise, in The Mind of Primitive Man, Boas cited Wundt as the foremost theorist on 
the physiological basis of the social nature of habit, which is not surprising, given that its 
entire conceptual weight rests on the nature of nervous function and reaction outlined in 
the Grundzüge:  
The problem of the origin of elementary ideas has, however, been discussed from 
a psychological point of view; and the elaborate attempt by Wundt to work out a 
theory of folk psychology, as well as the studies of psychological sociologists, 
indicate lines of attack of the problem. To illustrate this point, I may mention the 
general discussion of the function of association in the beliefs of primitive people, 
given by Wundt. 130  
For Boas, pattern indicated habitual corporeal orientations in society, but these habits 
were never rote automations. The nature of these more elemental associations of similar 
combinatory heterogeneity would vary greatly, which encouraged the interrelation of all 
bodily movement patterns called for by Boas as a way to facilitate the understanding of a 
particular culture’s nature as seen in the totality of its practices.  
 The differences between Durkheim and Boas illustrate the diverse ways in which 
Wundt’s work found application in the broad field of the human sciences. The fact that 
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these two thinkers both worked outside of Germany is a testament to the international 
appeal of the psychologist’s work, which only increased with the publication of the 
Völkerpsychologie. Readers found in this text a potent framework for understanding the 
individual’s relation to society and the relationships between members of society. These 
topics mattered a great deal to art historians, who had begun to shift from previous 
interests in connoisseurship of individual artists to broader inquiries of cultural history, 
coupled with parallel reflections on the nature of aesthetics. 
  
Anatomy and Empathy 
 
“with the right hand finger of empathy – Dada in, 
Dada out – but!! willi”   
 
- Max Ernst, “Worringer, Profetor Dadaisticus,” Die 
Schammade, April 1920131 
 
From the mid-nineteenth century to the 1930s, the most concentrated use of 
Wundt’s ideas in art history appeared in debates on empathy, the notion that the formal 
qualities of a work of art—be it painting, sculpture, ornament, music, or architecture—
manifested a person’s emotions to the extent that a viewer felt at one with internal 
rhythms of the object.132 Scholars at this time used Wundt’s work to establish 
physiological habit as the basis for the psychological pleasures associated to the 
constancy of aesthetic or empathetic experiences. As Gustav Jahoda has argued, in the 
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most general terms, the majority of these figures relied entirely on Wundt’s systematic 
terminology distinguishing sensation (Empfindung), feeling (Gefühl), and affect 
(Gemutsbewegung).133 This basic outlook was so prevalent in art history at the turn of the 
century that the word “empathy” (Einfühlung) did not necessarily have to appear in texts 
that treat the concept and use it as a fundamental support of a broader aesthetic theory.  
 In 1908, a young art historian named Wilhelm Worringer published a book titled 
Abstraktion und Einfühlung, which challenged the art historical assumption that empathy 
was an aesthetic standard with a decidedly hypothetical projection of how pre-modern 
civilizations developed art styles that met their emotional needs, which were often 
outside more conventional models of European aesthetic expectation. Young artists, art 
critics, poets, and philosophers of aesthetics leapt on the volume. Establishing Wundt’s 
work in the intellectual context of Worringer’s work allows one to perceive how the 
arguments in his book critiqued far more than the basic ideas of empathy and provided 
young artists with an intellectual source for constructing entirely alternative models of 
group action, creativity, and aesthetics in the sphere of cultural practice.  
 More than other scholars at this moment, Robert Vischer (1847-1933) and 
Heinrich Wölfflin (1864-1945) drew most considerably on Wundt’s work in their 
theories of empathetic reception. Vischer’s treatise On the Optical Sense of Form (1873) 
used Wundt’s theories of vision and physiological habit formation from the 
psychologist’s early text Vorlesungen über die Menschen- und Thierseele (1863) for his 
argument that habitually constituted structures in the eye give it a certain regularity of 
movement which provides the organic bases for “the rhythmic impression of form, which 
is nothing other than the pleasant overall sensation of a harmonic series of successful 
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self-motions.”134 Vischer’s emphasis on the eye appears rather partial, but his inclusion of 
overall “self-motion” (Selbstbewegung) implicates the overall body and its nervous 
physiology as the basis for aesthetic feelings. As Vischer had it, a work of art with forms 
and colors that facilitated the habitual movements of the eye in the viewer’s reception 
fostered the emotional effects of comfort within habitual bodily motion or practice. 
Engaging formal rhythm that reaffirmed pre-existent physiology also created an 
emotionally charged awareness of a deep correspondence between the individual and the 
work. Form became a veritable mirror for the motions of psychophysiological function. 
 Wölfflin was a close reader of Vischer’s earlier work, though he took a different 
subject as the focus of his 1886 dissertation Prolegomena to a Psychology of 
Architecture, which focused on the nature of “the relation between bodily habit and 
favored proportions” as the basis of a culture’s aesthetics of space.135 Wölfflin built on 
Vischer’s earlier correlation of aesthetic qualities of linear movement and habitual 
physiological structures in the eye by addressing the entirety of the moving body as it 
experienced emotional qualities of architectural space, according to an analogy between 
architectural qualities—symmetry, proportion, height, width, and vertical organization—
and physiological properties of bodily symmetry and integrated function in the human 
body. He is unequivocal in his belief that “Our own bodily organization is the form 
through which we apprehend everything physical.”136 In order to support this claim, 
Wölfflin related the reader to the work of both Wundt and the early physiologist Rudolf 
Virchow (1821-1902) in order to describe the physiological and psychological 
consequences of how the body’s various elements form its “unified community,” in 
which many different parts interact in the functioning of the whole.137 According to 
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Wolfflin, these elements operated in concert and gave the body its harmony, thus 
providing the physiological basis for the pleasure felt in an appreciation of interconnected 
spatial elements in architecture:  
Physical forms possess a character only because we ourselves possess a body. If 
we were purely visual beings, we would always be denied an aesthetic judgment 
of the physical world. But as human beings with a body that teaches us the nature 
of gravity, contraction, strength, and so on, we gather the experience that enables 
us to identify with the conditions of other forms.138  
Qualities of form like symmetry or proportion were aesthetically pleasing, because one’s 
own physiology has made him or her psychologically accustomed to these traits as 
harmonious form, due to the existence of analogical structures in one’s own body. 
Feeling pleasure while walking through architectural spaces relied on the fact that the 
integration of various elements in the building were akin to the physiological integrations 
of the organs and organic faculties within a person’s body. 
In making this connection, Wölfflin’s study extended Wundt’s earlier notion of 
analogies of sensation, or a person’s activity of connecting the emotional qualities of low 
notes and dark colors, based on the common between the sensory experiences. 
“Considered purely as sensations,” the historian argued, “they would have nothing in 
common; yet they seem to be related by the equal gravity of their emotional tone.”139 
Linear characteristics of architecture have the potential for a connection to these other 
sensations one may find in experiences of other art forms, so that a reception of painting 
or sculpture could help one in understanding the formal qualities of architecture, but 
Wölfflin was quick to indicate that these potential analogies of sensation could not 
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illuminate the spatial nature of architecture or its connected emotional phenomena. He 
sought to compose a theory of architectural reception that directly included bodily motion 
through space as a key element of the overall reception. His breakthrough was to posit 
that the basis of these analogies was not intrinsic to the objects perceived, but to the 
shared motions of nervous stimulation in the human body. Rather than posit analogical 
overlap in a space shared by two sensations, Wölfflin located this key meeting place in 
the human nervous system and its integration of functions in connection to habit and 
emotion.140 
 Wölfflin’s topic of investigation and his use of physiology and physiological 
psychology likely received guidance and encouragement from his dissertation advisor 
Theodor Lipps (1851-1914), who was a physiological psychologist and philosopher of 
aesthetics. Lipps had published the first edition of his Psychologische Studien in 1885, 
the year before Wölfflin finished his dissertation. This text likely served as a major 
source of interest for Wölfflin during the composition of his own work, especially the 
long excursus on the perception of space, which drew on both Wundt and Ernst Mach, 
and an equally long essay on the differences between musical consonance and dissonance 
according to analogies of sensation that likely encouraged Wölfflin’s use and subsequent 
complication of this concept in his study of architectural space.  
In his Psychologische Studien, Lipps constructed analogies of sensation between 
different art forms for his arguments on the exact nature of consonance, which follows a 
lengthy discussion of Wundt’s own theories on the topic. Lipps defined consonance like 
many other psychologists and philosophers at the time as a sequential continuity or 
affinity between two or more tonal masses or Klangen.141 As Wundt had described in his 
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Grundzuge, noises and sounds were all sensations, which meant that both forms of 
stimulus entered the nervous system in the same way. The only difference between the 
two forms of sensation concerned the measurability of sound. Wundt distinguished 
constancy of tone from abruptness of noise. He argued that sounds are periodic 
movements of air which the auditory organ absorbs and transforms into regular or 
irregular excitatory movements that it sends to the cortex.142  Periodic regularity of sound 
is the effect of an equal rest between vibrations, which gives a specific sound or tone a 
direct correspondence to vibratory regularity.143  The diverse, relative intensities of these 
different frequencies yield tones of determined pitch that one discerns as persisting in a 
particular sensation. Making this base vibration a quality of utterance reboots the entire 
structure of expression and consciousness. Drawing out a vowel sound places this 
musical quality within language and alters the nature of utterance and its absorption by 
the speech centers as a specific sensation.144  
Adding noise only increased the intensity of this interface between tissues and 
new vibrations. Wundt defined noise as a periodic irregularity that is more varied in 
duration and form.  Noise was a specific sensation too, but it arose from an irregular 
vibration of air; meaning that it was either too abrupt, or that its duration was too 
discordant.145  In all sensations of noise, simultaneous sensations are perceived 
indistinctly, due to the unique and discontinuous conditions of emergence that occur in 
diverse, jolting forms of short duration.146  A great number of sounds contain noise, but 
noises are not considered part of the structure of vibratory regularity that constitutes 
proper timbre. One cannot deconstruct noise into simpler tones.  It is the most elemental 
sonic phenomenon and the most infinitely varied. It can also trigger base reactive 
 122
movements, as when one flinches in surprise at a loud noise. Absorptive constancy of 
sound implied for a reader of Wundt that its stimuli fit within a prior structure of nerves 
and conduction paths. Describing the vibration of a sound as regular or irregular hinged 
on whether the nervous system transferred its stimuli as habitual or disjunctive. 
Aesthetics of tone relied on regular (habitual) vibrations that the nerves were used to 
absorbing. Intensities of noise were too abrupt or discordant for the compartmentalization 
of measurement.  
Lipps built on Wundt’s ideas by arguing that the psychologist treated consonance 
in too general terms, to the point that it was difficult for the reader to comprehend the 
essential reasons for why tonal affinity was aesthetically pleasing.147 For Lipps, clarifying 
the aesthetic nature of consonance relied on distinguishing between extrinsic and intrinsic 
connections in Klangen. He felt that it was not enough to notice a common tone in two 
tonal masses and posit this similarity as the basis of aesthetic experience, for this 
commonality was only an extrinsic connection. In order to convey an intrinsic connection 
between tones, the common partial tone had to represent the essential nature of the two 
Klangen. This partial similarity was not merely formal, for it encapsulated a higher level 
of emotional quality within its particular sequence. Knowing this essential nature marked 
a fundamentally higher psychic experience than a simpler awareness of tonal sequence. 
Based on this distinction, Lipps connected an awareness of musical consonance to 
pleasures of continuity in other art forms like drawing and architecture. These analyses of 
sensation likely made his work an attractive intellectual source for Wölfflin. 
Lipps took pains to explain how the aesthetic quality of consonance was not 
simply the result of noticing an empirical sequence. He used an analogy of sensation to 
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substantiate his tenet that awareness of fundamental unity in consonance necessitated a 
higher psychic level. Imagine, he told his reader, that one sees a single line passing 
through two separate drawings, as in two panels on an ornamental frieze. The line only 
achieves the phenomenon of intrinsic connection if “it has in it somehow, either in its 
form or in the manner in which it develops, something of the fundamental nature of the 
two drawings.”148 He used another analogy between the arts, this time of architecture, to 
emphasize the philosophical significance of the continuity. Lipps then asked his reader to 
imagine looking at pieces of Ionic columns scattered on the ground. According to the 
author, two separate modes of connecting took place in one’s mind. First, seeing 
fragments of column reminds one that certain bases and volutes connect to a basic Ionic 
style. Second, a higher form of connecting in one’s mind focuses on the ways in which 
these fragments show the “character of the Ionic style, especially the peculiar elasticity of 
movement that resides in it . . . I find in the two forms different embodiments of one and 
the same fundamental character or ‘fundamental rhythm.’”149 Perceiving this rhythm 
required that one connect bodily to the perceived regularities of movement as stylistically 
and emotionally pleasurable. As in music, the consonance of form had a certain rhythm 
or regularity of movement that a person connected to physiologically and 
psychologically, in the sense that the rhythm of the work and the viewer/listener drew on 
one another for emotive pungency. Seeing more of the same quality in an object gives 
one the “impression of unanimity” or a continuity of movement that increases the feeling 
of the form’s “peculiar rhythm.”150 Perceiving a particular quality of rhythm or 
movement was a higher experience than noting a purely empirical similarity. It was the 
difference between noticing similarities and being aware that one was experiencing the 
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fundamental nature of a certain style as one connected to it with body and mind in a more 
visceral sense than pure empiricism.  
For Lipps, empathy required harmonious interaction between the form of the 
work and the form of one’s own psychophysiological structures. One had to isolate and 
focus on this peculiar quality and know, based on prior experience, that one was 
experiencing this quality. One had to use apperception—the mental faculty of isolation, 
fixation, and sequence. The faculty of apperception formed the basis of Lipps’s theory of 
empathy in his Psychologische Studien and latter texts that Worringer cited specifically in 
his own critical study of the phenomenon. 
 In Worringer’s critique of empathy, Lipps’s usage of apperception as the keystone 
of empathetic engagement was a major point of critical inquiry. He focused most heavily 
on Lipps’s argument that “the presupposition of the act of empathy is the general 
apperceptive activity.”151 Focusing of this kind led to an “objectified self-enjoyment,” or 
the supposition that one’s emotions were outside the subject and encapsulated in the form 
of an object, as though formal elements were a concretization of one’s internal states. 
This interaction needed continuity to work and it thus hinged on the habitual use of 
apperception to expand upon a seen form until it has become fully encompassed by one’s 
cognitive hardware and connected to habitual feeling.  
The key element of apperception for Worringer is its feature of sequence or 
continuity in thought, coupled with the habitual nature of the act. Consequently, he 
argued, the aesthetic effect in empathy “can proceed only from that higher condition of 
matter which we call form and whose inner essence is regularity.”152  Continuously 
distinguishing an object in space provides a major contributing energy to the empathetic 
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engagement. Worringer was unequivocally critical of this mode of reception, which 
required “vigorous participation” and “habituation” which indicated the cultural partiality 
of this overall receptive mode.153 Interaction of the sense organs according to practiced 
modes of bodily inquiry activated emotional qualities associated to formal and corporeal 
modes of continuity that are associated to sequences of practiced action. Thus, the 
perception of three-dimensionality in non-abstract art signals that this same 
psychosensory platform informed the making of the object and dictated its reception, so 
that “perception of three-dimensionality calls for a succession of perceptual elements that 
have to be combined,” as in Lipps’s example of the Ionic column.154 Viewing a three-
dimensional object in its continuity was more likely to foster an empathetic engagement 
based on the apperceptive fusing of discrete perceptual segments. In short, it was looking 
in the way that Modern Europeans were supposed to look at things. 
Although he does not cite the Völkerpsychologie, Worringer’s text abounds with 
its basic philosophies, so it is likely that the young historian drew on Wundt’s work. At 
the very least, his ideas strongly paralleled arguments that the older psychologist had 
made in the years immediately preceding the publication of Worringer’s text.  Both 
thinkers argued that the foregrounding of apperception in an empathetic engagement was 
certainly partial to the modern European viewer. Other cultures used this technique of 
reception as well, but Wundt’s work on myth and religion had established that the general 
use of empathy in these contexts—in particular in contexts of mythic personification of 
natural phenomena—indicated that empathy required a certain neurophysiological level 
of development that primitive or totemic cultures simply did not have. In his second 
installment of the Völkerpsychologie, which appeared in 1905, Wundt outlined the 
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relationship between mythic spiritual systems and modern usages of empathy. The age of 
myth, as described above, witnessed personifications of natural elements, like wind, the 
ocean, or dawn. As Wundt argued, this projection of human qualities onto these 
occurrences marked an ascendance from totemic culture, for one no longer relied on the 
animal kingdom for deities, meaning that empathy only occurred at a particular stage of 
psychological development in culture. It had little, if anything, to do with individual 
imaginative projection: 
Mythological personification is only an agitated degree of that which by analysis 
of aesthetic processes has designated as “empathy.” Aesthetic empathy is nothing 
more than a reduced form of mythological personification, which is itself 
aesthetic empathy in its most extreme degree, in which the entire personality in its 
momentary understanding of consciousness, including earlier experience which 
goes into it, wanders over the object.155 
Wundt also echoed Lipps in arguing that apperception guided this receptive mode in all 
cases.156 But his relation of the concept to mythic religions suggests that modern interest 
in empathy is, in fact, a retrograde form of philosophical reflection that began in times of 
mythic consciousness. It had little to do with the immediate cultural moment of urban 
modernity, but it also was utterly absent from systems of perception and collective 
thought that appeared in earlier totemic or primitive cultures, which had made a great 
deal of the world’s art. 
Worringer wanted to think about art from non-European cultures in ways that did 
not necessarily rely on modern or mythic formulae of reception. In general terms, 
Worringer’s awareness of Völkerpsychologie came from his friend the sociologist Georg 
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Simmel (1858-1918), with whom Worringer had contact as a student. In an introduction 
to a latter edition of his work, the historian told a picturesque story of his encounter with 
the great man in the deserted halls of the Trocadéro museum for non-Western art in Paris. 
Worringer wrote that listening to the elder intellectual speak about the artifacts in the 
museum “produced in a sudden, explosive act of birth the world of ideas which then 
found its way into my thesis.”157 The world of ideas to which Worringer referred was 
likely the tradition of Völkerpsychologie, with which Simmel had been involved since his 
own student days at Berlin University in 1876, when he took courses with Moritz 
Lazarus.158  As mentioned above, Lazarus was a forerunner of these theories and Wundt 
had also studied with him for a time. But in contrast to Wundt’s psychological history of 
cultures, Simmel preferred the sociological, rather than psychological outlook that 
Lazarus and his colleague Heymann Steinthal took in their work, and Simmel himself 
published several early articles in their journal.159  
Whereas Wundt would attach his structure of individual psychology onto the 
collective subjectivity of a group as the basis of its social interaction, throughout the 
entirety of his work, Simmel focused more heavily on the interactions themselves and 
developed his theories of sociology based on the values associated to these practices. 
Individual human physiology had less of a focus in his work than did the gradual 
emergence of supra-individual phenomena out of interactions between people. During 
these early years of his career Simmel was friends with Paul Radestock, a psychologist 
who had taken his PhD with Wundt, and later began correspondence with Granville 
Stanley Hall (1844-1924), who received his PhD from William James and then went on 
to study with Wundt in Leipzig.160 Although Simmel did not draw inspiration from 
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Wundt’s ideas, he did draw from the general discourse of German Völkerpsychologie for 
many of his own sociological theories and certainly intended for his readers to consider 
his work on modern society in comparison to Wundt’s.161 Worringer, in turn, composed 
his own Völkerpsychologie by drawing on Simmel’s earlier work that shared with Wundt 
an interest in cultural production as a group endeavor.  
Worringer’s use of the notion of the Kunstwollen formulated by the Austrian art 
historian Alois Riegl (1858-1905) instanced a foray into territory that was well within the 
boundaries of Völkerpsychologie. In using this concept of Riegl’s, Worringer was able to 
argue for the partial nature of empathy as a barometer of artistic quality. As Riegl defined 
the term in his Spatromische Kunstindustrie, the Kunstwollen is a contextually specific 
social drive in a culture to create works displaying a communal experience and relies on a 
specific, shared physiological structure in the brain and nervous system that itself rests on 
the receptive modality of a historical stage in culture or a relatively smaller collective 
logic of a subgroup. Based on the fact that a Kunstwollen will never be the same from 
culture to culture, Worringer posits that, “What appears from our standpoint the greatest 
distortion must have been at the time, for its creator, the highest beauty and the 
fulfillment of his artistic vision.”162 The claim that each culture had its own model of 
aesthetic experience and formal quality had a basic anchor in the Völkerpsychologie and 
in the basic awareness Riegl had of Wundt’s work.   
 As scholars have noted, Wundt’s work was a major source for Riegl’s theories.163 
This topic deserves more investigation, but one may outline the basic points of contact. 
Riegl’s awareness of Wundt’s work has received documentation, but little in depth study. 
In 1934, Julius von Schlosser was the first to associate Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie to 
 129
Riegl’s intellectual outlook.164 Margaret Olin has gone deeper into Riegl’s work and 
described how the historian drew on the ideas of philosopher Conrad Fiedler, who was a 
close and critical reader of Wundt, especially the psychologist’s notion that expression 
develops from psychological processes, rather than illustrates psychological products.165 
As argued above, Riegl’s fellow art historians like Vischer and Wölfflin also dealt with 
Wundt’s work to varying degrees. In terms of theorizing collective creativity, one may 
consider Riegl’s use of Wundt in relation to similar references in the scholarship of Aby 
Warburg (1866-1929), who attended the lectures of Karl Lamprecht (1856-1915), a 
professor of history at Leipzig who was one of Wundt’s colleagues in debates concerning 
cultural psychology. Ernst Gombrich has written on how Warburg considered his work in 
relation to Wundt’s theories of cultural psychology.166 In addition to these institutional 
currents, Riegl also had access to popularized notions of Wundt’s Gesamtwille that had 
entered the popular press around the 1890s, while the psychologist was writing his 
massive tomes. For example, in 1891, Wundt published an essay in the Deutsche 
Rundschau, a monthly journal of literature and human sciences, that outlined in clear 
language how his notion of collective will enabled a historian to study modes of 
artmaking in which the psychological processes of a collective outweighed the emotional 
needs of the individual.167 These instances of connection provide the basis for a closer 
look at the way in which Riegl’s well-known notion of the Kunstwollen overlaps with 
basic notions of Wundt’s Gesamtwille. 
Riegl’s notion of the Kunstwollen is inherently Wundtian in its basic 
psychological premise that the most valid insights about shared thought patterns appear in 
cultural productions about which a culture appears to think the least, or those that it 
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makes most automatically. In a similar fashion, Riegl and Wundt were fascinated by the 
manner in which these seemingly automatic (intensely habitual) productions arise from 
customary movement patterns. While Wundt tried to synthesize all forms of cultural 
practice as manifesting a broad tenor of collective thought, Riegl was more focused than 
Wundt on comprehending the psychological nature of a culture or its relative 
developmental level solely through examining its visual art. 
Worringer’s interest in the relative nature of aesthetics has long been known, but 
scholars have generally omitted how Worringer implied the nature of neurophysiological 
relativism as the basis for cultural differences: the main tenet of the Völkerpsychologie. In 
addition to his basic tenet that “every spiritual attitude has its physical significance,” one 
finds this reliance most clearly in the historian’s stated reason of why a certain culture 
may lean toward a more abstract representational modality.168 According to Worringer,  
Each individual people is naturally, in consequence of its innate structure, 
predisposed more toward the one or the other side, and the observation of whether 
the urge to abstraction or the urge to empathy prevails in its art provides us, at the 
same time, with an important psychological characterization.169 
Worringer’s reference to culturally specific aesthetics based on a shared, innate structure 
that made a person in a group predisposed toward certain psychological orientations was 
entirely within the realm of Völkerpsychologie, of which Wundt’s was the most dominant 
in the moment. Worringer’s focus on apperception as a partial standard of aesthetic 
quality likely drew on Wundt’s belief that primitive cultures possessed only “traces” of 
this faculty. Worringer made empathy into an idea of individual experience in the 
reception of art that was anchored to a certain level of neurophysiological development. 
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Depending on context, these faculties will categorically differ with respect to the relative 
nature of habit, or the way in which one becomes cognizant of and responsive to exterior 
sensation. Thus the needs met by an object will not look or feel like empathy, because the 
needs are based on motives coming from bodies that had different wiring; that moved 
differently and therefore felt differently. For Worringer, Lipps had a good idea in relating 
apperception to aesthetics but he went counter to the physiologically relative notion of 
this faculty as outlined by Wundt and Riegl when he sought to apply it as a measure for 
aesthetic worth in an object made by any culture.  Lipps simply overplayed his hand.     
At least, that was what Worringer wanted his reader to think, but Lipps’s original 
theory differed from Worringer’s selective presentation of it as passive, which made it 
look far more like a mode of practice that unfolds without the active application of 
individual effort. For Lipps, empathy was just that: an activist venture, which meant that 
one deliberately utilized apperception in an engagement with the object. One built his/her 
experience. But in contrast to this theory, Worringer omitted the active dimension of 
Lipps’s empathetic engagement, which gave the experience a far stronger dimension of 
habit and cultural inculcation, because he made it look like empathy happened 
automatically. The apparent lack of deliberateness involved in Worringer’s selective 
quotations of Lipps serve the young historian’s motive of making empathy look like a 
culturally relative form of practice, because any effortless action was, on the cultural 
level, far more particular to a certain space and time. Worringer represents a modern 
European viewer as one who understood empathy to be natural in the way that walking at 
a “walk” signal would be to a modern subject. In attaching this automatist functionality to 
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the experience, he made its mental operation look far more like a cultural habit of higher 
thought, which Wundt and Riegl had made more relative to a particular group experience. 
Worringer followed this basic idea in stating that abstraction is the result of a 
developmental phase in which one was “not yet able to trust entirely to visual impression 
as a means of becoming familiar with a space extended before him, but was still 
dependent upon the assurances of his sense of touch.”170 As Wundt had argued in relation 
to his level of primitive culture, one’s physiological comportment relied more heavily on 
the development of cognition through repeated touch. Touch was also a more 
conspicuous exemplar of alternative movement patterns. Tactility thus formed the 
figurehead of an entirely separate nervous orientation (not yet topicalized by his 
predecessor) and resultant psycho-cognitive makeup based on shared movement patterns 
in space.  Fear of space is not a readymade, guiding force of cognition, but is built upon a 
base of alterior developmental and continually malleable nerves. In cultures where the 
nervous platform was elementary, only Riegl’s notion of the “tactile nexus” was capable 
of “forming a whole for the imagination and of affording the spectator the tranquilizing 
consciousness of enjoying the object in the irrefragable necessity of its closed material 
individuality.”171  In primitive art, touch made a world that appeared confusing suddenly 
fall into order. A person in this culture could capture form in the modality of touch, but 
this potentiality has since been lost, due to a heavier emphasis on perception and abstract 
thought patterns.172 In a hypothetical world that never fused, one had to remain at the 
level of closed, individual forms.  
By attacking the apperceptive standard placed by Lipps on all aesthetic 
experience, Worringer was also addressing a particular context of aesthetic philosophy 
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that used models of normative thought from experimental psychology as the basis of its 
theories on perceiving quality in art. An informed reader would know that Lipps was 
closely associated to the act psychology of Oswald Külpe and the philosophy of Franz 
Brentano (1838-1917). He was knowingly picking a side in the debate between the 
Wundtian school of Völkerpsychologie and the Würzburg school of act psychology. The 
lines were clearly drawn within the institution. Külpe, the major exponent of act 
psychology, would leave Würzburg for Bonn in 1909. Lipps had taught there from 1877-
1890 in the chair once occupied by Franz Brentano, who had argued earlier that mental 
phenomena were always unified, intentional, and distinct from physical phenomena, 
which Wundt would harshly criticize.  Worringer aligned himself with the school of 
Völkerpsychologie, which was seeking to establish the culturally relative nature of the 
higher mental functions that Külpe was seeking to establish as standard, normative, and 
measurable. Wundt’s notion that apperception could only be estimated in the laboratory, 
coupled with his belief that all higher mental functions required an analysis from the 
sphere of Geisteswissenschaft, gave the young historian a major anchor for his argument 
that one mode of apperception as exercised by a modern European viewer could never be 
the overarching standard for all cultural experience. 
Worringer grasped the subtleties and revolutionary promise of what physiological 
psychology held for the analysis of diverse objects, and thus his theories of expression 
became very popular. Tactile relation to the world also had its own essences that the 
Modern West had lost.173 His work showed that in contrast to the continuity of 
apperception and the sequential nature of modern aesthetic thought, primitive and 
abstract art had baser action patterns that were more like a need for activation, period.  As 
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a Kunstwollen, it yields a subject position but is at base far less person-oriented than 
empathy and occurs in a communal energy of movement that lacked, but did not seem to 
require, continuity and expansiveness, both formally and in the feelings it offered to the 
modern subject. Bizarre looking art forms suggested a bodily form of otherness, down to 
the structure of the nervous system. In short, a form that does not foster empathy among a 
Modern viewer is not the fault of the object; it was made in accordance with different 
physiological movements from a nervous system that enabled an entirely different 
emotive platform. The physical, pre-cognitive nature of Worringer’s terms for abstract 
artmaking never leaves the boundary of pure movement.  Objects are “wrested” and 
“rendered” or shaped beyond perceptual recognition. If empathy implied a need for self-
activation, then the Kunstwollen of primitive art was an impulse of collectivist activation. 
Amplifying the conditional and shared aspects of higher mental function allowed 
Worringer to scrutinize other modes of creation that show instances of alternative 
habituation and consciousness in a collective, rather than individual, level.   
Scholars who focus on the interest that young artists had in Worringer’s work 
generally omit that the young historian framed abstraction as a collective endeavor, rather 
than pre-existent, goal-oriented intellectual motivation in the minds of individual stylistic 
geniuses—that is, in terms that are generally used to describe the inventiveness of avant-
garde art. Instead of focusing on individual invention as the basis of abstraction, 
Worringer’s text suggested that the push to abstraction had to be a collective re-
inculcation of base instinctive movements: “The first possibility was to accomplish this 
closed material individuality by the exclusion of the representation of space and by the 
exclusion of all subjective alteration.”174  Worringer’s text implied that a new 
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Kunstwollen had to spring from a newly elementalized neurophysiological level in a 
group moving in new ways, groping for a new reality that it could not foresee, which was 
impossible for a habitually oriented modern individual, who had “become an individual 
and broken away from the mass. The dynamic force resting in an undifferentiated mass 
pressed together by a common instinct had alone been able to create from out of itself 
those forms of the highest abstract beauty. The individual on his own was too weak for 
such abstraction.”175 Worringer was specific about what abstract art needed to be: planar, 
tactile, and consisting of new movements.   
 Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie inspired artists to figure out ways to inhabit this 
otherness in art through new movements as the vehicle for psychic change. Revolutionary 
users of Wundt’s application of physiological theories to cultural studies cultivated a 
collision of elemental nervous change within cultural production in a manner that made 
culture a scene for mental mutation rather than reaffirmation. They redeployed these 
theories in a manner that fundamentally altered definitions of why art was significant in 
culture—art was now a process rather than a product. One could not change higher 
functions by changing higher functions, but by changing how one moved. The next 
chapter will consider these psychological and cultural concepts in the context of 
experimental dance and music pedagogy that involved calisthenics in work by figures 





                                                 
1 Translating the term as “folk psychology” does not capture basic connotations of the German 
term, which can only be defined. “Folk psychology” connotes something for the modern reader 
like folk art and its charming naïveté, but a Völkerpsychologie could analyze the most ostensibly 
“civilized” cultures. I have left the German term, because translating the word into a more 
appropriate “psychology of peoples” is a bit bulky. An exception to the dearth of studies on the 
VP  is Robert Farr, The Roots of Modern Social Psychology, (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 
1996). Farr’s study is the best tracing and comparative study of Wundt’s VP and subsequent 
sociological theory, but this text, like all other texts that treat the VP, only discuss the basic theory 
of social interaction that the text offers, rather than establish any substantial correlation between 
this work and Wundt’s lab practice. I shall undertake this correlation in the following chapters in 
which I discuss both lab practice and cultural theory in terms of variant forms of artistic practice. 
Other scholarly work on Wundt that mentions VP will also be cited at appropriate places. 
2  Wundt, Völkerpsychologie. Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythus 
und Sitte, 10 vols. (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1900-1909).  English summary in Wundt, Elements of 
Folk Psychology: Outlines of a Psychological History of the Development of Mankind, trans. 
Edward Leroy Schaub, (London: George Allen and Unwin and New New York: Macmillan, 
1921), hereafter referred to as Elements.  Wundt’s own summary and general introduction to the 
project may be found in his article, “Ueber Ziele und Wege der Völkerpsychologie,” 
Philosophische Studien 4 (1884): 1-27. Scholars generally overlook Wundt’s interest in cultural 
studies, which was the necessary second half of his entire methodology.  For example, Crary does 
not even list the text in his bibliography.  They also overlook how he differed considerably from 
latter psychologists who picked up and applied Wundt’s work in a more deeply positivist 
environment of experiment, especially in France.  Wundt’s work in the cultural sphere lent the 
objectivity of data to anthropological inquiry.  See for example a discussion of the importance of 
the Völkerpsychologie in Alexander Goldenweiser, Early Civilization: An Introduction to 
Anthropology (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1922). I would like to thank Laura McGuire for alerting 
me to this text.  Goldenweiser was a student of Boas. 
3 One could cite Freud’s Totem and Taboo as an exception, but neither Freud nor Wundt would 
see these two texts in the same category, because Freud bases his archetypes on affective 
orientations primarily, and did so as a riposte to Wundt. In this text, as he did in other texts like 
the Traumdeutung (1900), Freud cites Wundt repeatedly only to refute him. As mentioned before, 
a scholarly work on Freud’s overall use, abuse, and criticism of Wundtian ideas is sorely needed, 
given the consensus on his importance for the avant-garde all over the world. 
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4 Woodruff Smith, Politics and the Science of Culture in Germany, 1840-1920 (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 124. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Wundt, Elements, 7. 
7 This readability likely explains why Elemente was translated. 
8 My summary of this history as it relates to Wundt is by necessity a partial one. Scholarly 
analyses of the broader debates between history, sociology, the natural sciences, and philosophy 
in which psychology figured is far broader and includes critical gestures by figures whose work 
falls outside the scope of this project. Selected studies of this broad topic are many, but the best 
overall studies that touch on all the major figures are Arens, Structures of Knowing, and Jahoda, 
Crossroads Between Culture and Mind: Continuities and Change in Theories of Human Nature, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
9 At the outset, one must distinguish this notion of Völk consisting of mutable practices like 
language and custom from later discourses on Völk that connote race and a general social 
evolutionary stage. As Adrian Brock has brilliantly shown, the VP was actually a target of 
criticism during the upsurge of National Socialism during the 1930s. See “Was Wundt a ‘Nazi’? 
Theory and Psychology 2 (1992): 205-223. His history of the reception of the VP in Germany 
encouraged my further investigation of Boas below. 
10 Wundt, Elements, 5 
11 This differentiation is different from the English sense of the word “culture,” which can refer 
either to an entire group, or to the intellectual productions of that group. Germans at the turn of 
the century would likely have found these definitions confusing, for, as they might have it, the 
rhetorical effect of this imbrication is that it immediately connects certain practices to groups in a 
way that suffers a dearth of explanation in scientific terms. 
12 In a latter section of this chapter I shall make clear how Herder’s basic notion undergoes a split 
in the twentieth century and is defined, respectively, in terms either of language and custom, or 
race and biology. 
13 The journal was Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft, which ran from 
1860-1890, then changed its name to Zeitschrift des Vereins für Volkskunde. 
14 Summary of Lazarus and Steinthal may be found in Gustav Jahoda, “Wilhelm Wundt’s 
“Völkerpsychologie,” in A Pictorial History of Psychology, ed. Bringmann et al (Carol Stream, 
IL: Quintessence Publishing, 1997), 148-150. 
15 Wundt, Elements, 3. 
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16 Woodruff Smith, Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany, 1840-1920 (Oxofrd and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 125. 
17 For example, Wundt argues, “Der praktisch bedeutsamste Beweis scheint mir freilich darin zu 
liegen, dass die Normen des Rechts nur aus einem realen Gesamtwillen jene verpflichende Kraft 
schopfen konnen, vermoge deren sie ihre unbedingte Herrschaft uber den Einzelwillen 
behaupten.” Wundt, Uber das Verhaltnis des Einzelnen zur Gemeinschaft,” Deutsche Rundschau, 
1891, 203. I shall address this concept below in relation to the work of Alois Riegl. 
18 “The history of the development of the physical organism aims to understand not merely the 
genesis of the particular organs but primarily their cooperation and the correlation of their 
functions.” Ibid, xiii. These structures form as variant modes of the base causality of nervous 
change and upward structuration that had appeared in the Grundzüge, but transferred to an arena 
of comparative Kulturwissenschaft, elemental physiological causality enabled the relativism of 
higher mental function. His translator for Elements, a condensed single volume of the multi-
volume project, puts it plainly: “Wundt’s VP is the result of a conviction that that there are certain 
mental phenomena which may not be interpreted satisfactorily by any psychology with restricts 
itself to the standpoint of individual consciousness.  Fundamental to the conclusion of the present 
volume, therefore, is the assumption of the reality of collective minds.” Edward Leroy Schaub, 
Introduction to Wundt, Elements, vii. Wundt’s other works on logic and ethics played a role in his 
cultural studies as well, but the scope of my project prevents a fuller look at these ideas. 
19 One can draw on Marshall Sahlins’s notion of specific evolution in order to better comprehend 
the manner in which Wundt understood adaptation in his Völkerpsychologie: “Adaptive 
specialization of populations is an inevitable aspect of life’s evolution, and advance is a normal 
concomitant of adaptive specialization. In the context of specific evolution “advance” means that 
by adaptive modification the population is enabled to maintain or better itself in the face of a 
threat induced by changing environment or that it is enabled to exploit the same environment 
more effectively than before. In any case, in the specific perspective advance is characteristically 
relative – relative to the environmental circumstances.” Marshall Sahlins, “Evolution: Specific 
and General,” in Evolution and Culture, ed. Sahlins and Service, (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1960), 14. 
20 Wundt, Elements, vii.  Subsequent citations refer to this edition.  Brevity prevents establishing 
deeper connections between Wundt and the burgeoning field of ethnography; my connections are 
basic and facilitate my studies of artmaking in later chapters.  My approach here looks at theories 
of movement hatched in the VP and continued in later studies by figures like Durkheim and Boas, 
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alongside someone like Worringer.  Riegl is discussed not in his own right but only as Worringer 
used specific aspects of his overall theories. 
21 Wundt, Elements, 12. 
22 Ibid, 9. 
23 This transcendence of “a more restricted folk circle” or concentrated and ultimately contrasting 
spiritual structure “constitutes one of the most significant events of mental history” (Ibid, 10).  
The appearances of these national religions – Wundt’s examples are Christianity, Buddhism, and 
Islam – exemplify specific mental phenomena that parallel extensions of the state beyond the 
limits of the tribal unit.  These activities set forth “reciprocal influences” between external 
practices such as economic life, custom, art, and science “give to human society its composite 
character” and indicate the appearance of what Wundt calls “cultural peoples” who in each case 
offer combinations of particularly national and universal human elements (Ibid). 
24 See for example, Hegel’s dialectical vision of history in Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree 
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1991). 
25 Berry, “Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie and the Comparative Study of Human Behavior,” in 
Advances in Historiography of Psychology, Eckardt and Sprung, eds., (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag 
der Wissenschaften, 1983), 96-97. Emphasis is Berry’s. 
26 Ibid. Goldenweiser, as Berry correctly indicates, was another scholar who disputed the 
presumed evolutionary viewpoint of the VP. That view makes sense, because Goldenweiser 
studied under Boas, who used the VP to dispute the same idea. Local adaptability is an early 
version of what Marshall Sahlins would later call “specific evolution.” 
27 Wundt, Elements, 12. Wundt’s examples include Hobbes’s Wildman and Rousseau’s noble 
savage. These general structuring principles of emotional readings become modified with the 
general mood of a certain period. In relation to these ideals, any particular culture can evolve its 
world understanding that projects present values back into time.  This sense of the present 
constituting a lens through which a past is understood is an active process of historical-cultural 
understanding within a group.  If an ethnologist or other scientist uses structuring metaphors of 
this sort, then they will be guilty of the same misstep of presenting a particular cultural script as 
the necessary image of reality. It is thus intriguing and very ironic that the contemporaneous 
values of the lab and its authority, with all of its modern instruments, informed this particular 
insight, but it allowed Wundt to push for a more relativized vision of mental operation based on 
specific evolution. 
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28 Wundt viewed these sources as presenting psychological facts, which in the post-colonial age 
is, of course, problematic, because ethnographic study creates a representation of cultural 
otherness that corresponds to expectations of it among Western readers. 
29 Kurt Danziger, “Origins and Basic Principles of Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie,” British Journal 
of Social Psychology 22 (1983): 308-309. 
30 I use the term “subgroups” or “subcollectives” in order to emphasize how any study of shared 
cultural values in the VP addressed a segment of the world population, and never cast any 
collective idea as a standard that all other cultures worked to meet. 
31 The initiator of this view was Auguste Comte (1798-1857), the French philosopher and 
sociologist, whose work was also a major source for Durkheim. See his General View of 
Positivism, trans. J.H. Bridges (Cambridge University Press, 2009) and Mary Pickering, Auguste 
Comte: An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1993). 
32 See, for example, Wundt, “Über Ausfrage experimente und über die Methoden zur Psychologie 
des Denkens,” Psychologische Studien 3 (1907): 301-360. Wundt believed that trying to 
understand one’s means of comprehension by using that structure was inherently tautological.  
Objectivity relied on separateness and one could never be outside one’s own thought.  This 
position was unpopular in the age of positivism.  For more on the differences between Wundt and 
the circle which rose around Külpe, see Kurt Danziger, “The Positivist Repudiation of Wundt,” 
Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 15 (1979): 205-230, Mitchell G. Ash, “Wilhelm 
Wundt and Oswald Külpe on the Institutional Status of Psychology: An Academic Controversy in 
Historical Context,” in Wundt Studies, ed. Bringmann and Tweney (Toronto: C.J. Hogrefe, 1980): 
396-421.  For a basic description of Külpe and the foundations of act psychology see Katherine 
Arens, Structures of Knowing: Psychologies of the Nineteenth Century, (Dordrecht, Boston, and 
London: Kluwer Academic, 1989), 27-30 and Danziger, Constructing the Subject, 34-48. These 
positivist methods of diagnosis placed its inquiries outside or above culture. France and Britain 
soon followed suit. 
33 Panofsky, “Iconography and Iconology: An Introduction to the Study of Renaissance Art 
(1939),” Meaning in the Visual Arts, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 40-41.  
34 Panofsky always said that his system did not really work for Modern art and it is likely because 
he knew that this dimension of artmaking grew out of a response to Wundt’s VP , in which an 
altering of movement systems below a level of higher intellectual modes diverted communicative 
gesture from a sphere of immediate recognition and iconological reinforcement. It is likely that 
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Panofsky knew full well what he was doing, and what he was omitting. He was working within a 
humanist orientation, but certainly recognized that there could be other orientations. On Wundt’s 
side, the historical side of the Völkerpsychologie indicates its genetic nature -- how it is the study 
not only of mental being but also of becoming.  Thus it is critical to know the group's history, as it 
transitions from well-defined primitive conditions in a continuous series of stages to higher 
civilizations. 
35 Panofsky likely knew it, given his chosen focus on art that encapsulates the concepts of 
Western humanism, coupled with his extensive connections to the intellectual culture of his day. 
However, even his focus on the visual arts as an ascendant property of the rest of human culture 
would look too one-sided to a Wundtian, who would prefer a synthesis of all cultural forms as 
indicating alternative nervous energies as the basis for a certain frequency of collective 
consciousness. It is truly intriguing that Panofsky likely knew the basics of this theory well before 
the 1930s, because he studied philology at university during a time that overlapped almost exactly 
with the publication of Wundt’s first volumes of Völkerpsychologie which were dedicated to 
language and that sent a shockwave through the humanities. Specifically, during his time at the 
University of Berlin from 1910-1914. See Michael Ann Holly, Panofsky and the Foundations of 
Art History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). 
36 “Mit dem gleichen Rechte also, mit dem man behauptet, Tanz und Rhythmus und mit ihnen die 
Anfänge der Musik oder der Poesie seien fruher als die der bildenden Kunst, könnte man 
annehmen, die verschiedenen Sinne des Menschen entwickelten sich nicht gleichzeitig, sondern 
nacheinander.”  Wundt, Völkerpsychologie, vol. 3, Die Kunst, (Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm 
Engelmann, 1908), 104. 
37 “Dort nimmt man an, daß Lust und Schmerz die Lebensreise seien, die den Menschen zuerst zu 
ausdrucksvollen Lauten und dann, indem der Gedanke sich zum Laut gesellte, zum lyrischen 
Erguss seiner Gefühle geführt haben.” Wundt, Völkerpsychologie, vol. 3, Die Kunst, (Leipzig: 
Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann, 1908), 324. 
38 Ibid, xv. Durkheim in particular differed from Wundt concerning the place of judgment, as we 
will see below. 
39 Ibid. Kulturwissenschaft was truly that; it did not simply act like a science.  It was science, 
because it based its findings on physiological psychology.  Decades later, Anglo academics like 
C.P. Snow presented the “two cultures” debate as something that had accidentally unfolded as the 
accidental and unfortunate legacy of classical disciplinary divisions within academia, but Snow 
left out this substantial moment when the two fields were running on the same channel.39  
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Ethnology claimed to do a similar thing, and it makes sense that Wundt posits reciprocity 
between it and his field of VP .  In Snow’s time, the impact of National Socialism had caused the 
watering down of these theories into behaviorism in England and the US, but before and even 
during the rise of Hitler, manifold versions of these basic theories were entirely prominent all 
over Europe.  Culture was physiological before it was affective.  Wundt’s students like E.R. 
Jaensch and Friedrich Kiesow are generally attributed with developing the racial psychologies 
that informed the guided genocides of non-Aryan peoples, but Wundt’s VP is not selective in its 
descriptions of racial inferiority.  He looks at primitivism as a general level of relative 
psychological development, to which he associates different cultures from all over the world.  
While today this action is reprehensibly ethnocentric, it is a far cry from the better-known 
developments of the “Jewish mentality” and its resulting horrific experiments in the National 
Socialist state.  Wundt’s project is less simplistically unilateral; it is a more general application of 
physiological psychology to the development of world civilization.  In more radical circles, it 
informed the soft sociology of the pre-cybernetic global village before the hardcore eugenic 
cleansing by the Nazi Volk.  His cultural psychology depended more on the specific nexuses of 
psychological schemas of nerves, time period, materials, and region than on race, because it is 
based on patterns of historically relative spatio-temporal experience and the gradual buildup of 
practices out of nervous habit.  If anything, it presents humanity as a more unified organic entity, 
in which difference is simply the result of different wiring in the physiological nervous system.  
While clearly problematic, this factor clearly makes the proposed return to nature in the cultures 
of the Wandervogel or the embrace of primitivist aesthetics by avant-garde circles entirely more 
possible in a radically new fashion, because one changes style by changing physical movement, 
which consequently alters nerves and changes how one views time, materials (relationships of 
objects), and space. 
40 Wundt, Elements, 15. 
41 Ibid, 17. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid, 113. 
44 The details of how mental states correlate with historical eras are critical to defining this 
program.  Wundt does not need history to understand the psychological nature of primitive 
culture.  The art of caves looks too much like the primitive art of today to yield unique properties 
of an earlier period.  Measurements of the brain cavity or other anatomical data about prehistoric 
man “can give us no information concerning the psychological aspect of the question regarding 
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the nature of primitive man” (Wundt, Elements, 15).  It is thus largely misguided to think that 
prehistoric primitive cultures are psychologically lower than present-day primitive cultures.   
45 Wundt, Elements, pp. 20-21. 
46 Wundt, Elements, 73. I shall have more to say about this particular belief throughout this 
chapter. 
47 Discussed most clearly in Wundt, Principles, Tichtener trans., 25-216. 
48 Wundt, Elements, 28. 
49 Ibid, 33. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. For example, the bow and arrow began when “the man of nature, pressing his way 
through the dense underbrush of the forest and experiencing in person the hard blows of branches 
that he has bent back, gains a lively impression of the elastic power of bent wood” (Ibid, 28).  The 
simple movement of the body through the space of the forest gives rise to a chance discovery of 
effects as qualities that one experiences repeatedly by walking through dense underbrush.  
Attention and sequential cognizance begin to develop, for “the attention is forced to the 
observation that this effect increases when the wood is bent out of its natural shape” (Ibid).  
Getting slapped in the face with a branch literally knocks sense into the primitive man, especially 
those in Asia and the Asiatic Islands, who first constructed the reflexive bow in which the curve 
is contrary to the natural curve of the wood. 
53 Ibid, 29. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid, 30. Connecting observed qualities from one experience to another according to a shared 
resultant effect had mystical overtones 
58 For example, if a primitive is walking through the jungle after a rainstorm and happens upon 
coconut halves filled with water, then the formation of paths from the continued response to these 
observations will enable application of practice in the acquisition of these coconuts as vessels. 
Caves, then, also give rise to society (Ibid, 50).  More extensive social groups occur when 
families withdraw into caves.  Space matters more than some sort of human bond at this initial 
stage.  Wundt describes how “the larger caves are frequently occupied in common by a large 
number of families . . . yet the groups of co-dwellers are not so much determined by 
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considerations of kinship as by the size of places of refuge” (Ibid).  Spatial facilitation of this 
congruence of families within caves encourages formations into social groups.  Gradually 
different clans take hold of property that is customarily understood as communal, whether it is 
hunting grounds or fields.  These rudimentary forms of social organization “arise through the free 
association of individuals” and thus may freely dissolve. Ibid, 51. In these early forms of social 
organization, a chosen leader stays in power only for the duration of a communal undertaking like 
a hunt or expedition.  The temporary leader willingly surrenders dominance at the end of the 
group quest.  At this rudimentary level of society, no permanent chiefs exist. The similarity 
between this state of affairs and basic anarchist rule in communes from this same time is very 
close. 
59 But encapsulating qualities of a bird’s movement differed from using a coconut as a bowl, and 
the difference spotlights the diverse means by which primitives experience the natural world.  In 
this case of the arrow, the primitive copies a quality of movement; in the case of the coconut or 
boomerang it was a chance discovery of function. Mechanics do not matter in either case, so the 
primitive use of the natural world is outside the spectrum of Kantian science, in which mechanics 
and mechanical functions were the most perfect scientific form.  Instead, these chance discoveries 
and associations of objects based on resultant effect that occur at the most rudimentary stages of 
mental history indicate an absorptive mechanics of analogies between resultant effects that is 
devoid of apperceptive forethought.  It was a revelation. For example, “Man did not invent the art 
of kindling fire; it would be nearer the truth to say that he found it, inasmuch as he discovered it 
while making his utensils” (Ibid).  Like the boomerang that was found by chance, fire was the 
accidental result of friction made by rubbing wood.  After its accidental discovery, “it became 
possible to kindle it at will, and this developed into a skillful act” (Ibid, 31).  New paths were 
made in the nervous system that enabled the creation of this fire to be fashioned into habitual 
practice.   
60 Farr, op cit, 41, has made this crucial point. 
61 Farr, Ibid. Saussure received his PhD in philology at the University of Leipzig, where Wundt 
taught psychology. See Jonathan Culler, Saussure (Glasgow: Fontana Collins, 1976). 
62 This omission of Wundtian language theory has many causes, but in art history, the main 
culprit is the carryover of Saussure’s theories into French structuralism, which then became a 
crucial methodological tool for academics in the 1960s and afterwards who sought to think 
outside the neo-Kantian structures of formalism. These were bold moves to be sure, but far too 
one-sided. 
 145
                                                                                                                                                 
63 Wundt, Elements, 31. 
64 “Der Laut wurde nicht gebildet, weil er eine bestimmte Ähnlichkeit mit dem objectiven 
Eindruck besaß, sondern er wurde umgekehrt dem Eindruck ähnlich, weil die 
Artikulationsbewegung, aus der er hervorging, dies notwendig so mit sich führte.” Wundt, 
Völkerpsychologie; die Sprache, vol. 1 pt. 1, 343. 
65 “Hierdurch warden wir auf das hingewiesen, was den Laut selber erst erzeugt: auf die 
Lautbewegung der Sprachorgane. Unmittelbarsind es ja nicht die Laute, sondern die 
Lautbewegungen, die durch den äußeren Eindruck triebartig ausgelöst werden.” Wundt, 
Völkerpsychologie; die Sprache, vol. 1 pt. 1, 343. 
66 “Hier bieten aber offenbar alle Arten sogennanter ‘Lachnachahmung’ den den ausgezeichneten 
Fall dar, dass die Artikulation der Sprachorgane eine äußere Bewegung oder die Wirkung einrer 
solchen, die noch deutlich den Bewegungsmodus erkennen läßt, nachbildet.” Wundt, 
Völkerpsychologie; die Sprache, vol. 1 pt. 1, 343. 
67 Nach diesem Zusammenhange mit den sonstigen Gebärden können wir eine solche 
nachahmende oder nachbildende Bewegung der Artikulationsorgane am zutreffendsten al seine 
Lautgebärde bezeichnen.” Ibid, 343. 
68 “Dass dies willkürlich geschehe, ist wiederum durch die nature der ursprünglichen 
Triebbewegung ausgeschlossen.” Ibid, 343  
69 “Wie vielmehr jeder Lebhaft erregte Beobachter einen Bewegungsvorgang, den er sieht, mit 
Meinen und Gebarden begleitet, so und nicht anders haben wir uns jene Lautbewegungen zu 
denken: als Bewegungen, die, indem sie die durch den Eindruck erregten subjektiven Gefühle 
ausdrucken, unwillkürlich auch den das Gefühl erregenden Vorgang selbst nachbilden.” Ibid, 
343. 
70 That is, based on what he had found in the other sensory centers, which were nodal association 
centers, despite their ordinary interpretation as central projection surfaces. Wundt, Principles of 
Physiological Psychology, Titchener trans, 315. 
71 These manifold relations between the various speech centers were responsible for ideational 
and affective “meaning contents,” but this content arose from nerves stimulated in experience and 
are not merely imminent or archetypal ideas. Wundt, Grundzuge, 306. 
72 Wundt, Elements, 53. 
73 Wundt thought that one saw this carryover most readily in elemental linguistic constructs like 
mimicry of heard sounds (Lachnachahmung) and base forms of sound gesture. The majority of 
the most primitive languages have been lost, yet there is no doubt that they contain within them 
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the potential of mind to indicate experience.  The most primitive tribes largely remain secluded, 
but their language still displays dominant characteristics of more advanced neighboring cultures, 
which was the result of earlier syncretism, in which a competition of languages ended with the 
more dominant language determining vocabulary and grammar, while the more primitive version 
determined pronunciation.  One may read between the lines of this argument with reference to 
Wundt’s physiological psychology, for Wundt’s claim suggests that pronunciation is slower to 
change because it requires more physiological (read: nervous) alterations within the body, in 
contrast to manipulations in the nervous system by changes in the conceptual nature of 
grammatical structure.  The brain changes more quickly than the tongue.  One is a system of 
nerves, the other is pure muscle that nerves move but cannot shape as quickly as paths in the 
centers.  Regardless of which cultural level decides what characteristic, Wundt feels that the most 
primitive spoken languages have long since vanished from the earth.  One may still grasp 
considerable traces of these languages.  Wundt argued that African languages in the Sudan or 
Togo were among the most primitive, especially in properties that exist within but also in addition 
to structures of spoken language, which is only one form of communication. Specifically the 
language of Ewe in present-day Southeast Ghana, called Togoland in the period when the 
territory was a colony of Germany.  After WWI the territory was split between France and 
England. See Benjamin Lawrence, Locality, Mobility, and “Nation”: Periurban Colonialism in 
Togo’s Eweland, 1900-1960 (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2007). 
74 Wundt, Elements, 58. 
75 Ibid, 58-59. 
76 Ibid, 60. Ibid. One finds this property in mimetic movements of the face, which communicate 
emotions and ideas.  When ideas “strongly tinged with feeling” enter the course of emotion, 
direct mimetic expressions of the face receive supplementary movement from the arms and 
hands.  For example, in an “ideational process of an emotional nature,” one may make gestures of 
attack (striking the palm), or point to objects to which the ideas refer, “though there may be no 
indication of communicating the ideas” (Ibid, 60-61).   
77 Ibid, 61. 
78 Ibid, 64. 
79 The clearest example of direct representation occurs when the object is present and one can 
point to it.  If in a language of gestures the object is absent, one must employ “graphic” gestures 
that “represent an absent object by pictures outlined in the air” (Ibid, 62).  For example, the 
gesture language for “house” includes outlining the walls and roof in the air.  Sometimes, a whole 
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series of distinct gestures are required.  Pointing and graphic gestures ultimately comprise the two 
elements of gesture language. Ibid, 63. Within graphic gestures, a sub-group of significant 
gestures are representative of incidental characteristics, as when one expresses the word “man” by 
lifting the hat.  These signs are all directly perceptible.  The most important characteristic of 
gesture language is the total absence of abstract concepts.  Only perceptual representations exist 
in this form of communication.  Some representations express concepts that have acquired 
symbolical meaning as expressions of non-perceptual concepts.  For example, the Dakota culture 
expresses the word “truth” by moving the index finger directly forward from the lips, and express 
dishonesty by moving the finger to the right or left.  But these symbolical signs are rare “if the 
natural gesture language has not been artificially reconstructed” outside of perceptual reference, 
as one finds in the more primitive forms of gesture language that arise in more rudimentary 





83 Ibid, 72. 
84 Ibid, 73. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid.  
88 Ibid, 70. 
89 Ibid, 71. 
90 Ibid, 68-69. 
91 Ibid, 69. Agglomeration is the gathering of elements into a single mass, while agglutination is 
the formation of a mass in which one can still distinguish distinct pieces. 
92 Ibid, 70. Wundt is referring here to the Ewe language. 




97 Der nahe Zusammenhang der Ausdrucksbewegungen mit der Sprache, wie e runs augenfallig in 
der Gebardensprache begegnet ist, wiederholt sich gewissermassen auf einer hoheren Stufe in der 
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engen Verbindung, welche die zur Kunst erhobene Form der Ausdrucksbewegungen, der Tanz, 
mit der ursprunglichsten rhythmischen Kunstform der Sprache, mit dem Lied, eingeht. Wo immer 
wir beide bis zu einem Punkte zuruckverfolgen konnen, der ihnen Anfangen naheliegt, da pflegen 
sich zur rhythmisch bewegten Sprache des Liedes auch rhythmische Korperbewegungen zu 
gesellen, als ein naturlicher Ausdruck der gleichen Stimmungen und Gefuhle.” Wundt, 
Völkerpsychologie, vol. 3, die Kunst, 419. 
98 Hier geht man davon aus, dass das wesentliche Element, dasjenige zugleich, das Poesie und 
Musik verbinde, der Rhythmus sei: dieser aber finde seinen reinsten und darum ursprunglichen 
Ausdruck im Tanz . . . Und dass der Tanz die sinnenfalligste Form der den musischen Kunsten 
gemeinsamen rhythmischen Bewegung ist, auf sein Vorausgehen in der Zeit zu schliessen.” 
Wundt, Völkerpsychologie, vol. 3, 324. 
99 “Namentlich sind die Motiv alter Tanzsitten selbst bie manchen Naturvölkern nicht selten 
vergessen worden, und Tänze, die ihrem ganzen Charakter nach die Herkunft aus einstigen 
Kulturzeremonien verraten, sind ganz oder teilweise zu bloßen gymnastischen Spielen 
geworden.” Wundt, Völkerpsychologie vol. 3, 421. 
100 Ibid, 75. “Mystical” is not mythological. Wundt argued that the anthropomorphicization of 
natural phenomena did not occur in primitive cultures and was a feature of mythological cultures, 
like Greece and Rome. 
101 Ibid, 94. 
102 Elements, 94.  
103 “Noch in dieser rückläufigen Entwicklung erscheint aber der Tanz des Naturmenschen in der 
von allen Zuschauern gerühmten malerischen Gymnsatik der Körperbewegungen und in der 
bewunderswerten Präzision, mit der oft sehr verwickelte Figuren ausgeführt werden, schon darum 
al seine einzigartige Kunstform, weil ihr Höhepunkt einer Stufe der Kultur angehört, auf der alle 
andern Künste noch nicht über ihre dürftigsten Anfänge hinausgekommen sind.” Wundt, 
Völkerpsychologie vol. 3, 421. 
104 Elements, 94. Poetic forms of speech appear in the repeated refrain.  Wundt cites this song 
about a lemur or “kra” by the Semang culture of the Malay Peninsula in Southeast Asia to 
exemplify the repeated refrain: 
He runs along the branches, the kra, 
He carries the fruit with him, the kra, 
He runs to and fro, the kra; 
Over living bamboo, the kra, 
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Over the dead bamboo, the kra (Ibid). 
These simple descriptions of seeing a lemur resemble the concrete nature of language, which 
moves along image by image.  Repeating the word “kra” makes the song musical by giving it a 
coherent pattern that draws a relation between each different observational statement (Ibid, 97).  
105 Ibid. 
106 This relationship between different rhythms of dance gesture and sound gesture varied 
according to context. Modern dance (in this context, a form like classical ballet) utilized 
instruments that took over for the expressive instrument of the voice and, in Wundt’s opinion, 
“suppress the natural expression of emotions” (Ibid).  This “natural” expression was bodily, either 
in vocal form or movement of limbs.  Wundt believed that the only place that the emotions 
received active vocal expressions in Western culture were the folk dances in villages across 
Europe (Ibid). Primitive dance rhythm and the gestures made in its performance figure 
immediately into the formal nature of art.   
107 Ibid, 100. 
108 Ibid, 100-101. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid, 102-103. 
112 Ibid, 103. 
113 Ibid, 103-104. 
114 Ibid, 103 
115 Historian of psychology Robert M. Farr has shown that pillars of first generation ethnology, 
sociology, and anthropology, including Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942), Franz Boas (1858-
1942), W.I. Thomas (1863-1947), Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), and G.H. Mead (1863-1931) all 
visited Leipzig for varying lengths of time. This is not, of course, to claim these thinkers as 
entirely Wundtian; each one had a separate theory of mind that was often rather divergent from 
Wundt’s and more dependent on particular intellectual contexts. Robert M. Farr, “The Impact of 
Wundt on the Development of Social Psychoogy: A Critical Re-Appraisal,” in Advances in 
Historiography of Psychology, Eckardt and Sprung, eds., (Berlin, Deutscher Verlag der 
Wissenschaften, 1983), 86. For Malinowski, see Michael Young, Malinowski: Odyssey of an 
Anthropologist, 1884-1920, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); for Boas, see Volksgeist 
as Method and Ethic: Essays on Boasian Ethnology and German Anthropology, ed. George 
Stocking, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), and Douglas Cole, Franz Boas: The 
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Early Years, 1859-1906, (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre and Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1999); for Thomas, see Lewis Coser, Masters of Sociological Thought, (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1977); for Durkheim, see Steven Lukes, Emile 
Durkheim: His Life and Work; A Historical and Critical Study, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1975); for Mead, see David Miller, G.H. Mead: Self, Language, and the World, (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1973). 
116 Durkheim’s two-part essay on Wundt’s lab is “La philosophie dans les Universités 
allemands,” Revue Internationale de l’Enseignement 7 (April 15, 1887): 313-338 and (May 15, 
1887): 423-440. 
117 Wundt, “Über Ziele und Wege der Völkerpsychologie,” Philosophische Studien 4 (1884): 1-
27. Durkheim, “Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives,” Revue de 
Metaphysique et de Morale 6 (1898): 273-302. 
118 Emile Durkheim, Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Karen E. Fields, (New York and 
London: Free Press, 1995), 349. “Intensity” is Wundt’s term for the relative strength of a psychic 
or nervous charge. I shall have more to say about this term in the chapter on Dada. 
119 Durkheim, Elementary Forms, 436. 
120 For example: “Even the life of primitive peoples of nature is not entirely unaffected by 
individual personalities, whose influence may be more or less permanently operative even after 
they themselves have been forgotten . . . inasmuch as every particular volition is conditioned by 
motives inherent in the general constitution of individual consciousness, it is subject to the same 
psychical causality that dominates human consciousness in general.” Wundt, Elements, 514. Thus 
new collectivities can build their own version of psychic operation and variation on the socius. 
Wundt’s version of individual and collective is far more reciprocal. 
121 Wundt tended toward this direction in the VP when he wrote that the psychology of language 
can inform a study of art “from its beginnings among primitive races down to its early 
manifestations among cultural peoples, at which point its description is taken up by the history of 
art” (Ibid).   
122 See Le Bon, La Psychologie des foules (1895), trans. as The Crowd: A Study of the Popular 
Mind, (New York: Viking, 1960). Standard sources on Le Bon include Nye, The Origins of 
Crowd Psychology: Gustave Le Bon and the Crisis of Mass Democracy in the Third Republic, 
(London and Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975); Crime, Madness, and Politics in Modern 
France: The Medical Concept of National Decline, (Princeton University Press, 1984). 
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123 Boas, Primitive Art (1927), (New York: Dover, 1955), 10. Subsequent citations refer to this 
edition. 
124 Ibid, 33. 
125 Ibid, 197. German translation as Kultur und Rasse (Leipzig: Veit., 1914). See Brock for the 
reception of this text in pre-WWII Germany. 
126 Ibid, 211. 
127 Ibid, 218. 
128 Ibid, 238. 
129 Ibid, 303. 
130 Boas, The Mind of Primitive Man: A Course of Lectures Delivered Before the Lowell Institute, 
Boston, and the National University of Mexico, 1910-1911, (New York: Macmillan Company, 
1911), 173. 
131 Reprinted and trans. in Ades, ed, The Dada Reader, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2003), 241. 
132 In their compilation Empathy, Form, and Space: Problems in German Aesthetics, 1873-1893 
(Santa Monica: Getty Center for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1994), Harry Malgrave 
and Eleftherios Ikonomou argue that “Wundt’s lectures supplied artists and aestheticians with 
concise and readable textbooks on the workings of the human body and mind” (15). In the essays 
collected, the editors establish their claim that Wundt’s terminology “established the conceptual 
framework for much of the discussion of the last decades of the century” (15).  
133 Gustav Jahoda, “Theodor Lipps and the Shift from ‘Sympathy’ to ‘Empathy,’” Journal of the 
History of the Behavioral Sciences 41 (Spring 2005): 151-163, esp. 153. 
134 Robert Vischer, On the Optical Sense of Form (1873), in Mallgrave and Ikonomou, Ibid, 97. 
This earlier work on psychology by Wundt was translated into English in 1894 and went through 
four editions by 1907. For more on this text and Wundt’s other early works see Claudia 
Wassmann, “Physiological Optics, Cognition, and Emotion: A Novel Look at the Early Work of 
Wilhelm Wundt,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 64 (April 2009): 213-
249. 
135 Wölfflin, Prolegomena to a History of Architecture (1886), in Malgrave and Ikonomou, eds., 
171. Wölfflin is best known by art historians today for his Principles of Art History 
(Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe, 1915), in which he argued that appreciating linear or 
painterly qualities of artistic style can allow one to distinguish different national or regional 
characteristics of artistic creativity.  
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136 Wolfflin, Prolegomena, 157-158. 
137 Wölfflin , Prolegomena, Ibid, 165-166. For more on Virchow see Erwin Ackerknecht, Rudolf 
Virchow: Doctor, Statesman, Anthropologist (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1953). 
138 Wölfflin , Prolegomena, 151. 
139 Wölfflin , Prolegomena, 158. 
140 After establishing Wundt’s physiological psychology as the basis of his theory of architectural 
experience, Wölfflin  extended this basic theory into a more hypothetical historical model of 
stylistic diversity, but his case studies are rather heavy-handed. For example, he saw a crucial 
relationship between the slenderness of the figures in Persian miniatures (seen as literal 
representations) and the modest girth of minarets. 
141 In passing over theories that mention Klang, one cannot help but think of Kandinsky’s interest 
in this term, but one should remember that is was a common term for a tonal mass, and more 
writers used it than only Lipps and Wundt. 
142 Wundt, Éléments de psychologie physiologique, trans. Rouvier, vol. 2, 437. 
143 Closeness of several sounds that resound simultaneously creates a more complex sound Each 
sound is a composite of simple tones.  In this composite, the fundamental tone has the most 
energy and determines the pitch of the tone (Ibid, 441).  Some harmonic or weaker tones within 
the complex sound also correspond to a given number of vibrations.   
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid, 438. 
146 Ibid, 442. 
147 Wundt’s discussion of consonance and dissonance appears in chapter 12 of many different 
editions of his Grundzuge. 
148 Theodor Lipps, “The Nature of Musical Consonance and Dissonance,” in Psychological 
Studies, 2nd ed. (1905), trans. Herbert C. Sanborn (Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins 
Company, 1926), 215. 
149 Lipps, Ibid, 219-220. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Lipps, Aesthetik (1907), quoted by Worringer, op cit, 5. 
152 Wilhelm Worringer, Abstraction and Empathy, 32. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid, 21. 
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155 “So ist die mythologische Personifikation nur ein gesteigerter Grad aller jener Vorgänge, die 
man bei der Analyse der ästhetischen Wirkungen als ‘Einfühlung’ bezeichnet hat. Die ästhetische 
Einfühlung ist nichts anderes als eine ermäßigte Form mythologischen Personifikation, und diese 
selbst ist die asthetische Einfühlung in jenem äussersten Grade, wo die ganze Personlichkeit in 
ihrem momentanen Bewußtseinzustand samt den Nachwirkungen früherer Erlebnisse, die in 
diesen eingehen, in das Objekt hinüberwandert.” Wundt, Völkerpsychologie, part 2: Mythos und 
Religion, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Verlag Wilhelm Engelmann, 1905), 579. 
156 “Wie asthetische Einfuhlung und mythologische Personifikation nur dem Grade, nicht dem 
Wesen nach verschieden sind, so sind nun aber schließlich beide wiederum nur Modifikationen 
einer allgemeineren Funktion, ohne die das Objekt, das sowohl die asthetische wie die 
mythenbildende Phantasie voraussetzt, fur unser Bewußtsein nicht existieren wurde: der 
Apperzeption.” Wundt, Ibid, 580. 
157 Worringer, “Introduction to the 1948 Edition,” in Worringer, Ibid, xvii. 
158 See for example the two brilliant essays on this topic by Klaus Christian Köhnke, “Von der 
Völkerpsychologie zur Soziologie: Unbekannte Texte des jungen Georg Simmel,” in Heinz-
Jürgen Dahme and Otthein Rammstedt, eds., Georg Simmel und die Moderne: Neue 
Interpretationen und Materialen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984): 388-429; “Soziologie als 
Kulturwissenschaft: Georg Simmel und die Völkerpsychologie,” Archiv für Kulturwissenschaft 
72 (1990): 223-232. 
159 See for example Georg Simmel, “The Problem of Sociology,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political Science 6 (1895): 52-63, in which he gives credit to Lazarus for 
encouraging his own interests in collective psychology. 
160 David Frisby, Simmel and Since: Essays on Georg Simmel’s Social Theory (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1992), 22. For more on Hall see Boring, Ibid, 518-523. Hall, one might recall, 
invited Freud to give his first lectures in America at Clark University in 1909. 
161 According to Frisby, Simmel never made any reference to Wundt in his work. Simmel and 
Since, 181, n.66 
162 Worringer, Abstraction und Einfühlung: ein Beitrag zur Stilpsychologie (1908), trans. Michael 
Bullock as Abstraction and Empathy, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Publishers, 1997), 13. Subsequent 
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Chapter Three 
Physiologies of Modernism: Dalcroze, Steiner, and Laban Read Wundt 
 
“A true pedagogue should be at once psychologist, physiologist, and artist.” 
Emile Jaques-Dalcroze, 1915.1 
 
 The ways in which Wundt’s work informed debates on empathy is only one facet 
of usages that comprise what was easily the most diverse range of responses to any 
discourse of psychology during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The 
motives for these approaches were very different, but the key to all of them lay in the 
nature of Wundt’s theories. His voluminous writings on the fugitive nature of nerves at 
both the individual and social levels inspired cultural figures to approach his work as 
proof that one could shape these nerves into the bases of new experience and social 
forms. In the wake of Wundt’s work, certain artists began to focus more deeply on rawer, 
more elemental forms of bodily energy, such as vibrations, currents, and especially 
rhythm, and the work they produced as a result was understood as capable of generating 
waves of energy that could alter the subject. Different practices of rhythmic group 
movement that unfolded in Switzerland between 1890 and 1920 constituted the most 
extensively structured utilization of Wundt’s theories and establish the use of this 
psychology in the historical context of Zurich Dada, which is the subject of the next 
chapter.  
It is crucial to introduce study of this avant-garde group’s approach to Wundt’s 
psychology with focused analyses of three different figures who were also working in 
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Switzerland at the time (and who were far more established in their careers). Each figure 
argued in a particular way that new expressive movements could alter consciousness 
according to the basic dictates of physiological psychology. First, the Swiss theorist of 
pedagogy Émile Jaques-Dalcroze (1865-1950) introduced eurhythmic exercises as the 
means of instilling a new sense of harmony in people. Second, the philosopher and occult 
leader Rudolf Steiner’s (1861-1925) group exercises of Eurhythmie were intended to 
expose adherents to invisible realms of cosmic awareness. Steiner understood that these 
movements could then become the communicative means of higher truths in 
performances of non-verbal expression. Third, the dancer and theorist Rudolf von Laban 
(1879-1958) absorbed both Dalcrozean and occultist strains of ideas into his experimental 
choreography and worked extensively to shape Wundt’s theories of the nervous system 
into a program for expressive, intellectual, and social reform. Each of these figures 
contributed to a broad phenomenon of German culture known as Lebensreform, which 
was the belief that a more organic, unified, and harmonious culture could arise from 
shaping and building new sensory and ambulatory platforms in groups of people by 
leading them through varying series of rhythmic movement exercises.2 Lebensreform 
gave rise to many models of embodied community, or modes of social improvement in 
which people shared in movements that could lead to the development of similar nervous 
structure as the bases of common collective thought—especially in Switzerland in the 
years leading up to the arrival of nascent Dadaists in Zürich. 
   
Cultivating Rhythm: Dalcroze and the Physiology of Eurhythmics 
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 As one contributor to Lebensreform, Dalcroze is best known today for his 
development of eurhythmics that expanded on conventional methods of teaching rhythm. 
While working as professor of harmony at the Geneva Conservatory in the 1890s, he 
began to explore the ways in which knowledge of music involved more than just the ears 
and hands. In his seminal essay of 1909, “Rhythm as a Factor in Education,” Dalcroze 
declared his realization that there were “two physical agents by means of which we 
appreciate music. These two aspects are the ear as regards music, and the whole nervous 
system as regards rhythm.”3 He believed that this system needed shaping, so that a person 
would feel rhythm within him or herself as a biorhythmic quality that coursed through the 
conduction paths. Feeling that rhythm was physiological, psychological, and 
metaphysical in terms of its impact, he developed a callisthenic training program in 
which students responded to certain rhythmic sequences with specific types of gestures 
that, he argued, would change nervous physiology and develop a person’s sense of 
rhythm from innate qualities of his or her nervous structure. Various versions of 
Dalcroze’s theories were extremely popular in the spheres of music, dance, and theatre 
during the decades before WWII.4 
The most prominent stage of Dalcroze’s career began in 1910, when he received a 
request from German industrialist Wolf Dohrn to found an institute of rhythmic training 
outside of Dresden in the town of Hellerau, a planned industrial community organized by 
the Deutscher Werkbund.5 This broad consortium of architects, urban planners, and 
designers, heavily funded by Dohrn, sought to create a more harmonious relationship 
between the spaces and movements of work and those of leisure processes.6 From 1910 
to 1914, the Dalcroze Institute became a premier destination for many prominent 
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musicians, dancers, choreographers, theatre directors, and art aficionados (fig. 7). 
Dalcroze’s time at Hellerau was surprisingly short-lived. The outbreak of the First World 
War on June 28, 1914 forced many of his international students to leave Germany, and, 
as a Swiss citizen, his own credentials became suspect.7 He returned to Geneva in 
September of 1914, soon after which the German government turned the Institute at 
Hellerau into a quarantine hospital. Once Dalcroze was back in Geneva, he reopened his 
Institute apart from the Werkbund and increased publication of his ideas, which spread 
across Europe to Russia and to the United States well into the twentieth-century.  
For Dalcroze, rhythm was simultaneously physical and metaphysical. It came to 
the subject as regularities of felt impulses. For example, in a 1915 essay titled “Music, 
Joy, and the School,” he described rhythm as an essential source of life and 
consciousness: “Rhythm is the basis of all vital, scientific, and artistic phenomena. It 
produces alike the element of order and measure in movement and idiosyncrasies of 
execution.”8 Its strongest characteristic was constancy or sequence of movement as a 
bodily and psychological process—a metaphor for qualities of the most vital life forces 
and creative drives. Of utmost importance to Dalcroze was the belief that a person would 
eventually recognize and appreciate this quality of continuity above and beyond the mere 
physiological absorption of it. Representing rhythm as an all-encompassing force allowed 
him to construct its absorption possible for anyone, if he or she were trained correctly.  
Dalcroze’s description of rhythm as a spatial phenomenon also enabled this sense 
of availability, because rhythm traveled both in the spaces between people and through 
their bodies. He expanded on the dynamic qualities of rhythm by linking it analogically 
to other invisible phenomena that traveled in waves or currents and entered the body, like 
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electricity and radiation. For example, in a 1914 essay titled “Rhythm, Movement, 
Soflège, and Improvisation,” he defined rhythm as a “force analogous to electricity and 
the great chemical and physical elements—an energy, an agent—radio-active, radio-
creative—conducing to self-knowledge a consciousness not only of our powers, but of 
those of others, of humanity itself.”9 The tissue that received pulsations of rhythm 
responded with pulsations of its own and could mutate in order to meet the demands of 
new rhythmic stimuli. In his 1907 essay “The Initiation into Rhythm,” Dalcroze argued 
that in any culture, being “musical” was the result of an “ensemble of physical and 
spiritual resources and capacities, comprising, on the one hand, ear, voice, and 
consciousness of sound, and on the other, the whole body (bone, muscle, and nervous 
system) and the consciousness of bodily rhythm.”10 These lines make it clear that for 
Dalcroze, the nervous system was the absorptive and expressive mechanism for all 
rhythm. Rhythm had physiological and spatial dimensions, and it was the goal of 
Dalcroze to use rhythmic training as an interface between body and space that would 
unite musical form and life processes. He taught that a person’s capacity for rhythm 
depended on the extent to which his or her nervous system was attuned for the absorption 
of and reaction to pulsations. Specifically, nervous tissue and the processes of sending 
nerve charges throughout the body and to the brain became his main focus with respect to 
the physiological dimensions of his rhythm training.  
The majority of his descriptions of the nervous system call attention to its mutable 
capacities. For example, in his 1912 essay “Music and the Child,” Dalcroze presented the 
conductivity of the nervous system and its ability to be shaped as inextricable properties. 
He told his reader that he sought to “train” the nervous system “to extend and recuperate 
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its potentialities,” believing that the human nervous system was not simply the base of all 
expression and experience, but that it had a dizzying array of untold possibilities with 
respect to these two qualities.11 In his 1898 essay “The Place of Ear Training in Musical 
Education,” Dalcroze stated that his ultimate goal was to awaken “the multiple agents of 
vibration and resonance lying dormant in our bodies.”12 Processes of intake and 
expression in the nervous system had to change if the body was to become a proper 
vehicle for rhythmic expressions. A person’s capacity for rhythm depended on how 
attuned his or her nervous processes were for the absorption of and reaction to the 
regularity of its pulsations. In linking a person’s capacity for rhythm to how he or she 
embodied rhythm with gesture, Dalcroze sought to shape the strength and transmission 
quality of innervation—the processes by which the brain sends nervous impulses 
throughout the body. As he described it in his essay “Rhythm as a Factor in Education” 
(1909), Dalcroze sought to cultivate a “rapid and regular current of communication 
between mind and body.”13 Focusing on innervation made a person’s orientation to 
culture a question of his or her nervous physiology. This perspective underlay his 
curricula of repeated bodily movement as trained responses to rhythm that would, he 
believed, open new paths of nervous conduction in the body as the basis for an improved 
sense of rhythm.  
Dalcroze likely knew Wundt’s texts, but he also learned of Wundtian theory 
indirectly from his friendship with the Swiss psychologist Édouard Claparède (1873-
1940), a star student of the Swiss psychologist Théodore Flournoy (1854-1921), who had 
obtained his doctorate in Leipzig with Wundt.14 Claparède was particularly fascinated by 
cases of post-hemiplegic hemiataxia, in which a person is paralyzed on one side of the 
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body but nonetheless makes uncontrollable movements on that same side. This disorder 
formed the topic of his first major work, Du Sens Musculaire à propos de quelques cas 
d’Hémiataxie posthémiplegique (1897).15 Wundt’s basic theory of innervation provided 
Claparède with a comparative base of normalcy for understanding the ways in which 
uncontrollable movements instanced faulty innervation sensation 
(Innervationsempfindung), or the feeling that a person has of his or her own bodily 
movement, which varies in relation to the type of movement.16 Claparède credited the 
German psychologist as the “representative” of a four-step process of movement types—
instinctive, reflex, willed, and automatic—that unfolded in the formation of any motor 
practice (fig. 8). Wundt, Claparède argued, “has himself refined and made dominant this 
central theory. He thinks that these sensations of movement have as their seat motor 
nerve cells to which they are linked in motor innervation.”17 As the body became 
accustomed to moving in certain ways, the nature of innervation changed as the nerve 
paths shifted. Conduction gradually became uninhibited and habitual enough to make the 
movements automatic.  
This four-step structure became a key source for Dalcroze’s formulation of his 
pedagogical method, for it allowed him to conceive how the correlation of new 
movement patterns and certain sequences of rhythm would create within the subject a 
higher regularity of movement that would, with practice, eventually become automatic. 
Indeed, Claparède could be describing the basic characteristics of Dalcroze’s coursework 
when he wrote that the notion of automatic movement being the endpoint of the four-step 
trajectory “is justified by the fact that certain movements that are executed often 
(walking, playing the piano), although primitively voluntary, become automatic with 
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practice (l’éxercice).”18 Dalcroze understood that this process was something that an 
outside agent could shape, thereby strengthening qualities of innervation and creating a 
heightened sense of rhythm. As he wrote in “The Place of Ear Training in Musical 
Education” (1898), 
If, up to the present, muscular movements of hand and fingers alone have sufficed 
to create in the mind a distinct consciousness of rhythm, what far more intense 
impressions might we not convey were we to make use of the whole organism in 
producing the effects necessary for the evocation of motor-tactile 
consciousness?19 
The central idea of eurhythmics was that culture could alter the nervous system according 
to new systems of movement-based interaction. “Intense impressions” bespeak stronger 
impulses of nervous conduction or innervation sensation—a quality in direct proportion 
to the quantity of nervous conduction in the body. Creating new practices of automatic 
movement triggered manipulations to the structures of the body’s nervous fibers that had 
immediate connections to propriety of intellect in cultural expression.20 In drawing on 
Claparède’s work and its reliance on Wundt, Dalcroze gained a full awareness of the 
nervous mechanics involved in making certain movements become automatic.   
From Claparède, Dalcroze also found validation for his beliefs that the forms of 
group movement and rhythm were particular to culture. Claparède’s thoughts on 
movement forms presented in this direction as well, for the psychologist had made 
Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie into the framework for understanding how instinctive 
movements [Triebbewegungen] that appeared most natural to a person in a culture were, 
in fact, the most heavily inculcated. “To explain the possibility of instinctive movement,” 
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Claparède wrote, “Wundt must consider it as a mechanical consequence founded on 
hereditary organization and exterior excitants.”21 Claparede’s attention to heredity 
coupled with exteriority indicates his adherence to the Wundt’s theory from this text that 
space and culture determined formation of instinctive movements as the beginning of the 
continuously mutable four-step process Claparede had described. Following this line of 
thought, in his essay “Music, Joy, and the School” (1915), Dalcroze acknowledged the 
cultural diversity of rhythm in terms borrowed from Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie: “The 
study of rhythm conduces to the formation of an individuality for all purposes of life—
that is, a manner of expressing oneself according to the rhythm most natural and native 
for one’s being.”22  In other words, natural orientation to a rhythm had any number of 
native variants that resulted from cultural processes. These notions of the natural as 
native had appeared in his earlier essay, “The Place of Ear Training in Musical 
Education” (1898), in which Dalcroze was more specific concerning his belief that 
rhythmic form depended on certain arrangements of nerves that people in a group shared: 
 Style in music varies according to climate and latitude, and, by corollary, 
 according as temperaments are influenced and modified by social atmosphere and 
 conditions of life. The divergences of harmony and movement which characterize 
 the music of different peoples spring, then, from the nervous and muscular state 
 of their organisms.23 
These lines indicate the pedagogue’s understanding that rhythm was an expressive 
emanation of particular nervous structures that a society had in common. These rhythms 
yielded a probable projection of a group’s nervous formats and psychophysiological 
outlook.  
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But Dalcroze diverged from the basic tenets of Völkerpsychologie in a manner 
that spotlights the difference between institutional psychology’s analytic outlook and the 
ambitions of figures that used this psychology to inform their work of cultural and social 
reform. Dalcroze believed that the “nervous and muscular state” of the individual human 
organism as part of a culture could be deliberately modified in order to meet certain goals 
of culture, expression, and society. He did not, as Wundt did, stop at seeing culture as 
resulting from a probable group nerve structure. Rather, Wundt’s work provided 
Dalcroze’s point of departure. He took from physiological psychology the means for an 
entirely separate educational program that sought to shape bodies and reformed the 
senses of the group through processes of rhythmic movement. At a social level, he 
believed that ambulatory interactions with rhythm, a basic element of art, would alter the 
physiological bases of the expressive imagination, rather than stand as a product of pre-
established consciousness. Thus, Dalcroze knew full well the tenets of Völkerpsychologie 
but moved against its analytical trajectory by treating nerves as the bases of thought and 
feeling that a person could shape by means of culture. It is to the specific characteristics 
of these exercises in shaping that we must now turn. 
 
Characteristics of Dalcroze’s Exercises 
Dalcroze began work at a time long after Wundt’s lab had established the idea 
that one could test and observe processes and changes of nervous innervation. Dalcroze 
framed the development of his method in terms of observing and testing that were more 
proper for describing the practices of Wundt’s laboratory. For example, in 1909 in 
“Rhythm as a Factor in Education,” he declared that “experiments many times repeated” 
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supported his method of using the body as the means to train the mind’s awareness of 
rhythm.24 His ultimate goal in these experimental studies was to uncover the ways in 
which there existed “intimate relations . . . between movements in time and movements 
in space, between rhythms in sound and rhythms in the body.”25 Based on these 
discoveries, Dalcroze developed callisthenic exercises in which these relations were built 
through a regimen of developmental education. A systematic, ascending complexity of 
movement drills gave new significance to all gestures, in which the form of a gesture 
signified its varying degree of correlation to rhythmic sequences.  
Dalcroze outlined his overall method most succinctly in his 1914 “Rhythmic 
Movement, Soflège, and Improvisation,” in which he argued that cultivating more 
rhythmic practices relied on learning anew the movements that were necessary for 
breathing and those that were not. According to Dalcroze, the student lies down, 
relaxes his whole body and concentrates his attention on breathing, in all its 
processes; then on the contraction of a single limb. He is then taught to contract 
simultaneously two or more limbs, or to combine the contraction of one limb with 
the relaxation of another. This enables him to note its muscular resistances, and to 
eliminate those that serve no purpose.26 
At this rudimentary level and with no musical accompaniment, Dalcroze sought to make 
his students more aware of the most rudimentary innervation sensations. After teaching 
them how to breathe properly, Dalcroze taught his students how to walk again—that is, to 
march in time to basic rhythms by moving their arms and legs in place. Dalcroze was 
clear that these basic exercises, often repeated, were intended to reshape structures of 
innervation: “It is only by dint of repeated exercises that, eventually, distinct automatisms 
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are created.”27 This process triggered innervation impulses through their motor pathways 
and made for clearer transmissions of nerve energy.  
 Marching and moving arms to different time signatures gradually became more 
complex. For example, upon hearing a signal, students shifted action in time “to stamp 
suddenly or contract the arm on a different beat, or to substitute a leg movement for an 
arm movement.”28 Reacting with bodily motion to rhythm as stimuli introduced new 
nervous intensities and had immediate applicability to the reforming the expressive 
nature of a collective (fig. 9). Dalcroze sought to achieve these ends with exercises of 
group callisthenic movements he termed Turnen and defined in 1898 as “a new system of 
gymnastics applied to the nervous system.”29 This word was a direct reference to 
Friedrich Ludwig “Turnvater” Jahn (1778-1852), the nineteenth-century German pioneer 
of physical education, who introduced his Turnverien or group calisthenics as a way to 
revivify the race and military power of Germany.30 The Turnen exercises of Dalcroze 
gained ready absorption due to an fascination with physical culture across Europe and the 
United States, although the Swiss origins of the school and its international student 
population gave the Dalcroze method less of a nationalist overtone than the earlier model 
of Jahn. 
Like Jahn, however, Dalcroze used these callisthenic exercises to increase the 
amount of innervation that was at work in a student’s body and do so in a manner that 
immediately connected the reformed neurophysiology of the individual to a broader arena 
of group practice.31 Stretching and moving limbs as part of a group surrounded a student 
with plastic manifestations of movement in space that were harmonious, but not entirely 
indebted to him or her as an individual. When students had successfully developed this 
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new regimen of movements, Dalcroze gradually introduced more complicated exercises 
of dissociated movements or sets of simultaneous gestures that followed conflicting time 
signatures. He carefully structured these motions of dissociation in a manner that enabled 
the student to grasp the complexities of playing an instrument. For example, playing 
softly (piano) or strongly (forte) required different but simultaneous movement energies 
that a performer had to ultimately balance automatically: 
Just as, on the piano, one hand may play forte to the other’s piano, so the plastic 
expression of vitalized musical rhythms demands conflicting nuances of muscular 
innervation in different limbs. Special exercises enable the student to contract a 
certain muscle in one arm, while the same muscle in the other arm remains 
relaxed. Other exercises show him how time may be subdivided in one way by 
one limb, in another by a different one—e.g., by the execution in a given time of 
three equal movements with the feet and two, four, or five with the arms.32 
These routines of organized motion trained a student’s nervous system to regulate a 
harmonious association between different gestures, so that an individual’s movements 
literally embodied rhythm. Ultimately, these dissociated movements became harmonious 
and automatic, allowing a student to build on simple callisthenic exercises and weave 
together different harmonic or rhythmic sequences as automatic and simultaneous 
sequences of bodily ambulation. Initially, these more complex exercises in rhythm were 
gestural, which increased the intake of rhythm in direct proportion to the quantity of 
movement and innervation. These complexities gave way to exercises in polyrhythm, in 
which a student moved his or her limbs to different meters at the same time.33 
Performance of these coordinated movements signaled that the student had mastered 
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rhythm to the extent that he or she had internalized simultaneous plastic manifestations of 
rhythm that were gradually becoming automatic. 
 Discovering the connections between movements in time and movements in 
space, and between sound and the body, created an interface between body and space in 
which a student interacted in coordination with rhythm as perceived stimuli.34 An 
individual literally embodied the vibrations of the music, but had to undergo 
neurophysiological alteration as a result of training. In his heavily formalized public 
demonstrations, Dalcroze enacted his belief that meeting the demands of rhythm with 
concretized actions in space allowed the mind to connect more forcefully to rhythm 
through the body’s sensations and qualities of innervation that were far more expansive 
than previous methods of musical pedagogy (fig. 10). 
 
Implications of the Dalcroze Method  
The availability of Dalcroze’s method as an intellectual source transcended music 
pedagogy. In addition to the figures discussed below, others who were fascinated with 
eurhythmics ranged from the pioneering French stage director Jacques Copeau to the 
Russian director of the Ballets Russes, Sergei Diaghilev, and his principal dancer, Vaslav 
Nijinsky, the last of whom specifically incorporated eurhythmic methods into training his 
dancers for their performance in the legendary ballet of Igor Stravinsky’s Le Sacre du 
printemps (1913).35  
These theories had a broad impact on European cultural practice in its overall 
tenet that valid expression required physiological cultivation—the making of an entirely 
new body— prior to any aesthetic valuation or projection of emotional qualities onto a 
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work of art. It expanded potentials of what bodily movement could do to the body and 
mind. In focusing on nerves as the basis of expression, Dalcroze created a system in 
which gesture signified an orientation to culturally acceptable codes of harmony that 
correlated to structures of allegedly normal mental operation. It is not exaggeration to 
state that for Dalcroze, learning to exercise one’s ability as a performer of culture 
required that a person had to rebuild the most basic neurophysiological functions of his or 
her mind and body.  
What was normal in this context? Something that appeared natural to someone in 
a culture would, following Wundt’s dictates, result from conditioned motor response to 
exterior conditions and conceptual associations of that culture. But even in that broad 
sphere of embodied relativism, Dalcroze believed that the ostensibly natural manner of 
motion that unfolded in the making of culture, such as simple instinctive movements—
the most natural forms of movement and overall spatial orientation—were, for his 
purposes, insufficient for artmaking. Rather than understand culture as the projection of a 
group that composed ambulatory and intellectual practices in response to tradition and 
external conditions, Dalcroze believed that performing culture relied on being other than 
the immediately natural. Thus, one finds a strange duality in the relationship between 
normalcy and improvement in this context that does not appear in other instances of 
Körperkultur, because rather than simply becoming stronger in body and morals, 
Dalcroze’s students intended to reshape themselves so that they performed culture in a 
way that no one else could, because no one else was built the same way internally.  
Making this sort of metamorphosis a necessity for the performance of culture was 
far more extreme than the level of change one generally associates with contexts of 
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education [Bildung], in which one builds on pre-existent formats. Dalcroze, by contrast, 
was unequivocal that his method was a kind of “scorched earth” policy from beginning to 
end. As he declared in his 1909 essay “Rhythm as a Factor in Education”: “Let us 
therefore assume the responsibility which nature puts upon us, and consider it our duty to 
regenerate ourselves; thus shall we help the growth of more beautiful humanity.”36 He 
sought neither a “return” to a more harmonious orientation of mind and body, nor 
mastery of a pre-existent structure, but an outright remaking of a person’s 
neurophysiological foundations. For Dalcroze, people did not make art. It was the other 
way round.  
At the Dalcroze Institute, the body would be restructured, but the rhythms used in 
the lessons and exercises remained the same. However that sameness, that normalcy—
which for Dalcroze formed the essence of rational and valid artistic production—was, for 
all interested parties, a property that underwent a major shift in terms of its 
comprehension, so that it was the same only in the most superficial sense. The formal 
patterns of culture—the beats, meters, notes, and time signatures—did not change as 
marks on the page, but these patterns now lived within the self and a person moved in a 
manner that emphasized this internalization. But the physiological bases of social 
consensus among people trained in the Dalcroze method had made them literally other 
than the broader society that appreciated and sanctioned cultural practice that had 
rhythm.37 People were rebuilt to make art in a better way, but as a result became 
physiologically separate; a band apart at the level of the tissues.  
More critical readers of Dalcroze caught this explosive contradiction within the 
eurhythmic method and used it to their advantage as the means to deviate bodily, 
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mentally, and spiritually from the norm. Scholars have established the socio-political 
implications of Dalcroze’s theories, but augmentation of their work allows for 
comprehension of the reasons that so many radical figures were fascinated by such an 
allegedly conservative figure.38 Users of eurhythmics who deviated from Dalcroze were 
more interested in making culture actively manifest real psychological diversion from the 
norm, rather than conveying a newly heightened sensitivity to pre-existent cultural forms. 
 
Rudolf Steiner and the Occultism of Nerves 
Occult philosopher Rudolf Steiner incorporated eurhythmic methods and the 
physiological psychology attached to these practices into the philosophy and practice he 
developed in the context of Theosophy. In contrast to the pedagogical ambitions of 
Dalcroze, which never left the boundaries of musical acumen, Steiner used movement 
exercises in his occult teachings as a way for students to gradually learn to encapsulate 
the energies of their souls in physical space. Wundt’s works on physiological psychology 
and culture provided a key source for Steiner’s application of rhythmic group movement 
to his ambitions to tap into cosmic rhythms and ancient wisdom of the occult tradition. 
Born in an area in the Austro-Hungarian Empire that is in present day Croatia, 
Steiner studied in Vienna at the Technische Hochschule from 1879 to 1883 and from 
1888 to 1896 worked at the Goethe archives in Weimar.39 From 1899 to 1901, Steiner 
quickly rose in prominence among members of the Theosophist circle and became head 
of the German chapter of the International Theosophical Society in 1901.40  Theosophy 
was a philosophy and occult practice that arose to prominence through the writing of 
Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831-1891), who claimed that she was a chosen prophetess 
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who represented a timeless brotherhood of Adepts or sages known as the Mahatmas, who 
transmitted secret esoteric wisdom to her.41 After Blavatsky’s death, Annie Besant and 
Charles W. Leadbeater continued the group and moved its headquarters to India.42 
Generally, Theosophists opposed positivism, but embraced developments in science that 
undercut materialism, arguing that this new knowledge affirmed the existence of higher 
truths within forms of ancient wisdom.43 Steiner eventually broke with theosophy at the 
end of 1912 and formed his own doctrine of Anthroposophy, which nonetheless drew 
extensively on his earlier involvement with Theosophy.44 
In his approach to science, Steiner followed the general interest among occultists 
in new forms of science.45 As Perry Myers has argued, Steiner saw science as the 
necessary second half of an overall Bildungsideal or philosophy of educational reform 
that, coupled with guided exercises of concentration and meditation, would lead 
humanity into an evolution of consciousness beyond the world of mere empirical data to 
higher spheres of existence.46 Steiner cultivated a particular combination of science and 
occultism in a manner that would, he believed, build new organs within the body and 
mind that were geared toward the reception of supersensory data of higher cosmic 
realities. His newly enlightened adherents would then communicate these higher truths to 
others in public performances with routines of rhythmic movement known as 
Eurhythmie. Steiner drew on Dalcroze eurhythmics, but departed entirely from his 
method in terms of what the movements encapsulated and the physiological changes that 
Steiner believed took place during a student’s training in these exercises. Contrary to 
simply plasticizing rhythm, Steiner thought these movements could communicate an 
awareness of eternal wisdom that was beyond the senses of an untrained person.47 In 
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contrast to the trances, hypnosis, or mediumistic activities of other spiritist or occult 
pursuits, he sought a mode of higher consciousness that was a lucid realization of an 
active search.  
 Steiner’s clearest use of science for this reform was the work of the figure that he 
had rejected most strongly. Steiner carefully utilized Wundt’s ideas of nervous change 
and collective thought as the basis for his program of social reform. In his 1909 text, The 
Spiritual Hierarchies and the Physical World: Reality and Illusion, Steiner placed the 
blame squarely on Wundt for the problems in modern thought that he sought to remedy. 
A full quotation gives the reader a sense of its vitriol: 
 I have drawn attention to the fact that, in nineteenth-century German psychology,  
the expression “soul theory without soul” gradually came into use. The world-
famous school of Wilhelm Wundt, which is influential not just in German 
speaking countries, but is greatly respected wherever psychology is discussed, 
made this “soul theory without soul” fashionable. This “soul theory without soul” 
describes soul qualities without presupposing an independent soul entity. Instead, 
all qualities of the soul first come together in a kind of focal point, that is, gather 
themselves in the I. That is the greatest absurdity that has ever been linked to a 
theory about the soul. Yet psychology today stands completely under its 
influence; today, this notion is celebrated throughout the world. Cultural 
historians studying our era in the future will have their work cut out for them if 
they wish to explain plausibly how such a theory could ever have been regarded 
as the greatest achievement in the field of psychology in the nineteenth century 
and well into the twentieth.48 
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These words testify to both the prominence of Wundt’s work and the need to think 
otherwise among more radical figures in culture. Steiner described Wundt’s notion of the 
soul as that which forms from a processes of innervation outside any possible connection 
to a metaphysical realm. But rather than reject Wundt’s psychology entirely, Steiner saw 
his doctrine as the necessary next step in developing a higher mode of knowledge that 
brought the newly understood physiological mind into balance with the metaphysical 
world of the soul. This dialectical “occult science” would attempt to uncover the spiritual 
realm in the newly understood material world, which would then allow one to reflect 
back on the supposed empiricism of observed things and recognize the higher realities of 
the world and one’s own consciousness. 
 Steiner lauded Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie in a manner that made the 
psychologist’s theories of collective thought and ritual into a major support for his overall 
program of Anthroposophy and its performative dimension of Eurhythmie. 
Comprehending how Steiner saw Wundt’s work on culture as an inspiration can help 
illuminate the physiological nature of his occultism. Shortly after he established his new 
doctrine of Anthroposophy, Steiner gave a lecture in Berlin on November 27, 1914, 
which was published the same year as a pamphlet titled The Soul of the People 
Considered in the Light of Spiritual Sciences. In proposing a turn toward a more spiritual 
dimension of science, or a scientific pursuit of higher realities, Steiner called attention to 
the recent publication of Wundt’s tomes on culture as providing the best way to 
understand the manner in which pursuit of higher knowledge could unfold most 
successfully as a collective effort: 
 Thus Wundt, the Leipzig philosopher, who is so highly esteemed, and who  
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certainly cannot be accused of any inclination towards the spiritual-scientific view 
of things, cannot avoid seeing in the group spirit something real, something to 
which he attributes an organism and even a personality.49 
Then, a bit later in the talk, he returns to the psychologist’s work to define what he meant 
by “group spirit,” or the collective mentality and the nature of its formation: “Wundt sees 
in the language, customs, and religious views, as lived by a whole people, a certain 
organism; he even says that this life expresses a certain personality.”50 Steiner saw great 
potential in the notion that each group was a different sort of organism that undertook its 
own specific practices in pursuing what Steiner called “the membering of the soul,” or 
the encapsulation of inner feelings of higher, non-empirical awareness with movements 
in the immediate world of the senses.51  
Steiner believed these higher forms of knowledge came from actual physiological 
growth that occurred as a result of his different regimens of eurhythmic exercises. During 
their studies, he argued, they would develop organs of perception that untrained 
individuals did not have. As he outlined in his 1909 text, Outlines of Arcane Sciences 
[Die Geheimwissenschaft im Umriss], Steiner’s exercises in consciousness, 
concentration, meditation, and collective group movement were meant to cultivate new or 
higher cognitive or perceptual organs [höheren Wahrnemunsorgane] that allowed one to 
glimpse higher reality resulting from spiritual practices [geistige Übungen]. Steiner 
distinguished these organs from better-known sense organs: 
These new organs of perception are first of all to be distinguished from those of  
the physical sense-world by being active organs. Whereas the eye and ear are 
passive, allowing light and sound to work upon them, it may be said of these 
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perceptive organs of the soul and spirit that, while functioning they are in a 
perpetual state of activity, and that they seize hold of their objects and facts, as it 
were, in full consciousness. This gives rise to the feeling that psycho-spiritual 
cognition is a union with—a “dwelling within”—the corresponding facts.52 
One cannot miss the correlation in terms between these new sense organs and their social 
manifestation in a collective, for in the 1914 essay cited above, “organism” was the term 
Steiner applied to the Wundtian notion of collective group thought that interested him so 
deeply, which, as any reader of Wundt knew, had to arise from new forms of group 
practice. Übung is a loaded term as well, due to its prevalence in Wundt’s works as the 
end result of any repeated action; however, in Steiner’s hands, it becomes the process by 
which an individual physiologically develops an organ that senses metaphysical 
experience. As he asserted in this same text, “A regular course of training arranges and 
orders the separate exercises to be practiced by the occult student, so that these organs 
may either simultaneously or consecutively attain their suitable development.”53 In 
combination with meditation and concentration exercises, Steiner’s Eurhythmie routines 
would foster the growth of these organs of higher perception arising from new practices 
that altered consciousness. 
 Steiner believed that through his practices of Eurhythmie would enable an 
evolution to a higher mode of consciousness through new forms of collective group 
movement. These movements were collective performances that unfolded before an 
audience at the Goetheanum, a large theatre complex and teaching center that Steiner 
opened in 1919 in Dornach, Switzerland, the same year that he opened his first Waldorf 
School in Stuttgart, which also had Eurhythmie on its curriculum. Steiner’s approach to 
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organized group movement was more ritualistic and yet more in line with visualizing 
spiritual impulses and dynamic forces of the soul that one feels alongside others in the 
group as higher forms of active cognition. 
It helps to remember that this process of change was also the basic logic of 
Dalcroze eurhythmics, but Steiner departed drastically from Dalcroze’s use of bodily 
exercises to foster a greater awareness of rhythm. Steiner’s goal, by contrast, was to use 
expressive movement in a manner that allowed devotees of both Theosophy, and later of 
Anthroposophy, to develop and then publicly express their new forms of collective 
knowledge that were apart from the immediacy of the empirical world. Steiner was 
training prophets, rather than musicians or dancers. However, artists still served a key 
role in the project of awakening people to forms of higher reality. As he outlined in his 
1923 “Lecture on Eurhythmy,” artists exemplified the ways in which, at any given 
moment, certain figures in a culture possessed the power to create works of art in any 
medium that made inner feelings of non-sensory reality visible: 
In each art, certain spiritual impulses were poured into humanity from higher 
worlds. These impulses were taken up by certain individuals specially fitted to 
receive them, and in this way, through human activity, pictures of the higher 
worlds were reflected in the physical world; and the various arts came into 
being.54 
The human activity that Steiner focused on in these lines was not visual art, but a certain 
system of movement that allowed for plastic encapsulation of higher realities beyond the 
senses in a context of artmaking. Steiner’s goal for Eurhythmie was to have a similar 
system of choreographed movements that activated this mode of higher awareness in 
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society. Thus, the forces of form in a work of art communicated a person’s soul content, 
what he or she felt individually and could then communicate to others through certain 
forms of movement that were comprehensible to the group.  
Nowhere is this particular connection of motor movement—ostensibly the 
simplest form of sensation—and higher forms of consciousness or soul-awareness more 
apparent than in Steiner’s particular applications of physiological psychology to the 
broader Theosophical notion of the “etheric body,” which had connections to both ether 
physics and theories of the spatial fourth dimension as an enabler of higher 
consciousness.55 As Steiner described it, this entity was a double of the physical body, 
equal to it in size and form, which served as an intermediate between the soul (or astral 
body) and the physical body. The etheric was one of the four bodies Steiner believed that 
each person had and which connected him or her to both the sensory and cosmic world. 
They were, in order of importance: the physical, etheric, astral, and the I-body. Only the 
first was visible, but through careful study one could contact and balance the harmonies 
of the other bodies in relation to the rhythms of the Universe.56 In his 1904 text, 
Knowledge of the Higher Worlds and Its Attainment, Steiner described the etheric body 
as such: 
The etheric body has approximately the size and form of the physical body, so 
that it practically fills the same space. It is an extremely delicate and finely 
organized structure. (I beg the physicist not to be disturbed at the expression 
‘etheric body.’ The word ether here is meant to suggest the fineness of the body in 
question, and need not in any way be connected with the hypothetical ether of 
physics).57 
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Despite this qualification, Steiner described the substantive nature of the etheric body in a 
manner that drew directly on ether physics: “the particles of the etheric body are in 
continual motion. Countless currents stream through it in every direction . . . at a certain 
stage, development consists precisely in adding to the unconscious currents and 
movements of the etheric body others that are consciously produced and controlled.”58 
Steiner followed the central Theosophical tenet that a close study of doctrine could lead 
to an evolution in consciousness or a clearer seeing into reality (clairvoyance).59 For 
Steiner, the soul’s energy existed in this field around the self that an adept could detect 
with organs of higher perception and then tap into and encapsulate in the seen world with 
the movements of Eurhythmie, which he used as his form of collective, non-verbal 
communication of higher truths.  
 Within Steiner’s reformation of bodily gesture as a concept of expression, plastic 
art was another key context in which he argued that the energies of the etheric body were 
encapsulated within the rhythms of physical movement. According to Steiner, 
expressions from an etheric body relied for their power on the relationship between the 
nature of movement and the subject’s connection to the energies of the body as it related 
to the soul. He asserted that when an artist (in this case, Greek) positioned the limbs of a 
sculpted figure into a certain attitude, 
the position and arrangement of muscles were an actual experience to him. He had 
an inner understanding of the possibilities of movement in the arm and hand, of 
the possibilities of muscular expansion and contortion. And he was able to bring 
this inner experience to physical expression, making use of physical materials.60 
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For Steiner, being in contact with the higher truths of the etheric body enabled a 
connection between the world of the soul and the world of the senses, which the artist 
could then transmit in plastic form. Thus, artmaking overlapped with Eurhythmie in the 
sense that the metaphysical dimensions of movement energies in each context arose from 
particular physiological arrangements of innervation that, Steiner believed, came from a 
connection to the etheric body and its cosmic energies of higher harmony. The organs of 
higher perception that a person worked to develop would form in accordance with these 
basic laws of neurophysiological change, but the changes to consciousness were far 
beyond any boundary of empiricism.  
In his Knowledge of Higher Worlds and its Attainment, Steiner merged the 
neurophysiological and the metaphysical when he described this new organ of higher 
perception as a kind of metaphysical cortex that sent and received currents and vibrations 
in correspondence with the etheric body. Through extensive training, the student’s body 
and mind would begin to undergo physiological changes: “Thus a preliminary center is 
formed for the currents of the etheric body. This center is not yet in the region of the 
heart but in the head, and it appears to the clairvoyant as the point of departure for 
movements and currents.”61 This notion of a center for currents and movements follows 
Wundt’s notions of cortical development to the letter—only now, the center in the body 
is a meeting place for all the impulses and vibrations from the etheric body. In crafting 
Wundt’s empirical science into the enabling structure of cosmic awareness, Steiner 
offered an intriguing solution to the positivist and taxonomic orientations he perceived in 
the psychologist’s work: he used those very theories as the basis for developing 
techniques that fomented an evolution of consciousness.62  
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In addition to his rather unique take on the possible range of physiological 
growth, Steiner’s belief that his Eurhythmie embodied and communicated a spiritual 
impulse with plastic movement relied heavily on Wundt’s arguments from the 
Völkerpsychologie that primitive consciousness and ritual practice were group ideas 
based on shared movement patterns. Steiner understood this notion as a sign that properly 
modified collective action could create a new form of knowledge. In this tenet, he 
paralleled Dalcroze, but the nature of what constituted this knowledge for Steiner 
separated him from the music pedagogue. Steiner drew on Wundt to understand his 
pursuit of creating for modern Europeans the ways in which earlier cultures had 
experienced occultist phenomena in the world of the senses. In his lecture of 1922, “The 
Imaginative, Inspirative, and Intuitive Method of Cognition,” Steiner outlined the 
importance of primitive consciousness as a nexus of soul content and sense data that 
relied on a certain physiological arrangement. In experiencing this fusion of the spiritual 
and physical in the world of the senses, 
primeval man could also experience the physical and soul elements of the outer 
world nearly as intensely as, if I may put it this way, he experienced himself in his 
lungs, his heart, the processes in his stomach, liver, and so on.63 
Steiner borrowed Wundt’s ideas but shaped them to fit his needs, arguing that in contrast 
to Wundt’s theory that primtive religion relied solely on collective physiological 
structure, the primitive in fact had contact with the eternal harmonies of the soul on the 
same level as physiological properties like innervation sensations.  
Primitive society exemplified Steiner’s idea of reaching once again this particular 
state of correlated body and cosmic processes, not as a return to some lower form of 
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civilization or “primitivism,” but as a return to a mode of society that was more 
inherently connected to higher realities of the universe, to the extent that one perceived 
everyday life in direct connection to it. Eurhythmie allowed students to use their own 
bodies as an abstract (non-empirical) spatial language that could forge before them in 
space the formal nature of these cosmic harmonies. One had to build the physiological 
bases of this group practice that could boast these cosmic connections, thus taking 
Wundt’s notion of collective physiology and grafting onto it what Steiner perceived as 
evidence that primitive cultures were in immediate contact with a group soul in the realm 
of the senses. 
 In this vein of developing rhythmic movements of non-verbal communication, 
Steiner drew extensively on Wundt’s notions of gesture language in primitive cultures 
that appeared in the Völkerpsychologie as proof that one could express higher realities 
with bodily movements. In his 1922 lectures at the Goetheanum, Steiner described the 
ways in which spoken utterance in primitive language was always “enhanced by 
accompanying movements of the legs and arms, so that a kind of dancing was added. 
Especially was this the case when a dignified form of expression was sought, the form of 
some ritual or cult.”64 Like the Greek artist, the primitive individual concretized an inner 
experience in plastic form. In this claim, Steiner echoed Wundt’s theory that primitive 
language was more conspicuously based on tactile movement energies than concepts 
based on, but separated from, empiricism.  
That basis, Steiner believed, brought primitive language into closer contact with 
the rhythms of shared soul content in a group. Based on the idea that primitives’ spoken 
and gesture language expressed their supersensory orientation, Steiner argued that in 
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order to create anew this mode of heightened consciousness, one had to see these gestures 
from earlier societies for what they were: 
 It is only possible to gain a true understanding of what lies behind these things,  
when one realizes that what otherwise appears only as gesture accompanying 
speech can gain for itself independent life. It will then become apparent that 
movements which are carried out by the arms and hands, from the artistic point of 
view, can not merely be equally expressive, but much more expressive than 
speech itself.65 
Steiner’s description of the metaphysical potential within arcane gesture language 
suggests that he sought an evolution of consciousness that active cognition exercises like 
meditation and concentration would initiate and that plastic movements of Eurhythmie 
would embody in plastic form. In Eurhythmie, this non-empirical gesture language, built 
gradually in accordance with physiological psychology’s notions of nervous change, 
developed organs of higher cognition and movements that expressed the truths that these 
organs had perceived.  
Embodiment of these truths had nothing to do with notions of “representational” 
or “abstract” gestures, both of which relied on the barometer of empiricism, but rather 
concerned the nature of an artist’s connection to the broader soul life of his or her 
community. It was for this reason that Steiner connected so strongly to the cultural nature 
of gesture language—the notion of “observational” varied with each culture, and only the 
eternal truths of higher consciousness as expressed with bodily motion superseded these 
more local concerns, which allowed the gestural manifestations of higher truth to avoid a 
tired dichotomy and connect to an eternal truth beyond the world of the senses.  
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Thus, a work of art that contained ostensibly representational depictions could 
still suggest cosmic realities in the nature of its gestural energies. What mattered for 
Steiner was whether the soul’s energy had been communicated into the work. It was a 
quality of movement, a perceived energy of gesture, rather than a difference in the image 
or object. Steiner felt that the Greeks, arguably the paragons of representational art as it 
appears in Western art discourse, were like primitive cultures in their skill at 
communicating the soul energies of the etheric body. Following this line of thinking, 
Steiner encouraged his followers to look past resemblance and understand how the 
energies of gesture encapsulated the movements of the soul: 
Thus the Greek sculptor incorporated into matter a real, inward experience, not 
merely the external impression of the eye. He did not say to himself: the lines go 
in this or that direction, and then proceed to embody in plastic form the 
perceptions of his physical senses; but for him it was indeed an actual inward 
experience which he recreated out of the creative forces of nature, and entrusted 
to external physical matter.66 
Steiner sought to focus on whether the artist encapsulated in his or her plastic movements 
the metaphysical content of inner feeling, which could appear in either representational or 
abstract art. For him, the crucial property of expression concerned whether the 
movements conveyed the sense of a world beyond the senses. These forms of higher 
reality required deliberate exercises for realization—a reshaping of the body and a growth 
of new organs geared toward the cognition of higher realities beyond the world of the 
physical body. From his contacts with the ideas of both Dalcroze and Wundt, Steiner 
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truly believed that the proper exercises could connect one to rhythms of the soul and its 
cosmic harmonies through the paths of newly altered nerves. 
 
Laban and the Expansion of Expression  
The dancer and choreographer Rudolf von Laban was another figure involved in 
exploring how new expressive motions could alter the minds of a group. His writings 
contain the most extensive foray into the physiological and cultural theory of Wundt ever 
to appear in the context of rhythmic group movement during the 1910s and 1920s. In 
contrast to Steiner, Laban was more interested in repurposing the ideas of Dalcroze to 
modify the expressive nature of dance, and although he was connected to occultism, he 
did not dedicate his productive output to expressing the values of this doctrine.67  
Laban had met Dalcroze as early as 1910 and conversed actively with him both 
before and after WWI.68 Laban had no formal musical training, so his development of 
choreographic theory and his overall ways of thinking about dance and expression drew 
heavily on his contact with the pianist and dancer Suzanne Perrottet (1889-1983) and the 
dancer Mary Wigman (1886-1973), both of whom were former Dalcroze students who 
had not yet achieved the prominence they have today.69 In the summer of 1912, Laban 
met Perrottet at a sanatorium after suffering exhaustion in Munich from trying to 
establish himself as a dancer.70 These hardships convinced him to leave Germany for 
Switzerland in May 1913, where he began teaching courses at a commune called Monte 
Verità.71 Both Perrottet and Wigman joined him in July of that year, and the three began 
work on founding a new dance school in the commune.  
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During WWI, Monte Verità became a refuge for groups of conscientious 
objectors of all stripes who practiced anarchism, feminism, polygamy, shared cultivation 
of agricultural self-sufficiency, nudism, Naturphilosophie, and vegetarianism.72  Several 
forms of cultural production were rife in the commune and many were geared toward the 
production of so-called “craft” objects like woodworking or textile production that the 
commune members could use in everyday life. In addition to their coursework, all 
activities of Laban’s students were communal and interconnected according to an 
anarchist concept known as “the integrated day,” in which sharing in the interrelated 
action patterns of labor and culture fostered a more harmonious and organic wholeness of 
existence apart from modern society.73 These communal undertakings included 
gardening, cooking, and shoemaking alongside expressive pursuits in more traditional 
media like painting, sculpture, and textile.  Writers such as Hermann Hesse, James Joyce, 
Rilke, and D.H. Lawrence stayed there.  
Laban’s art school at Ascona reflected his philosophical-experimental paradigm 
of Lebensreform with four courses of study that each student pursued simultaneously: 
formal, acoustic, verbal, and movement. Anarchism offered Laban opportunities to 
rethink the relationship between art and labor that could never have succeeded in 
Hellerau, such as the careful balance of shared labor and expressive exercises that 
allowed his students to become a more closely knit group in the midst of broader 
productive means that they controlled and maintained. Laban incorporated into his 
overall program the broader anarchist practices of Ascona’s overall philosophy of the 
integrated day as the best means to alter entirely one’s cultural practices. He personally 
taught verbal art, which consisted of language instruction, vocal technique, and the 
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projection skills of theatrical oration, along with a separate course on movement art, 
which included dance and gymnastics [Turnen]. Conducting his courses on group 
expression in a commune fostered these efforts considerably.  
This Leftist context also informed Laban’s radical utilization of Wundt’s 
physiological psychology, which anchored many of the dancer’s theories of expression. 
As Laban biographer Evelyn Dörr has recently suggested that both the Grundzüge and 
the Völkerpsychologie gave Laban a full sense of “the psychophysiological unity of 
movement and of the ‘healing power’ of the focused application of movement 
techniques.”74  This healing power was, in fact, Laban’s means to remold the subject’s 
expressive and experiential nervous physiology by actively changing how his students 
moved as a group in space, which fomented the establishment of an anarchist 
Völksgemeinschaft—one that was modern, but more centered on human needs than the 
nationalist and capitalist models of Europe.75 As the first press release of his school 
declared in 1913: 
The muscles, nerves, and brain are the three centers where desires, feelings, and 
knowledge manifest themselves. The great rhythmic laws that we clearly see in 
our emotions, movements, and thoughts, govern all these areas. Conscious 
observation of these processes allows ANYONE in his own time to recognize the 
rhythm of his life and to strengthen and command it.76 
Overall, Laban sought to extend the individual’s neurophysiological and ultimately his or 
her psychological capacities by molding the expressive motions of dance as one element 
of an overall reformatted practice pattern of everyday life. In a manner that connects him 
to Steiner’s contemporaneous practices, Laban understood that the body was an 
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instrument that one had to modify neurally and then use expressively in coordination with 
others in a manner that would ultimately make culture into a site of social 
metamorphosis. 
In his first major theoretical statement, Die Welt des Tänzers (1920), Laban 
synthesized over a decade of teaching experience. In its pages, he outlined the ways in 
which the supposed intellectual content of expression was initially a particular 
conglomeration of physiological movement processes that one could alter more directly 
through unconventional forms of ambulation. The ultimate consequences of this 
alteration would not be immediately clear, but Laban’s reading of Wundt had convinced 
him that his pursuits were sound: 
In common parlance we situate “thinking” as equal with brain work and 
cerebration. But has not the origin and terminus of a given concatenation of 
exploration and closure been established in the physiological role of thought 
processes as clearly recorded movement processes in the nervous system and 
other organs in the body?77   
Clearly fascinated with Wundt’s ideas concerning the relationship between innervation 
and consciousness at both the individual and social levels, Laban reasoned that if the 
source of thought and expression was the nervous system, then one could change the 
nature of a group’s intellectual outlook and their social practices by altering the body’s 
nervous structure. For the dancer, all forms of expression were types of movement that 
had the nervous system as a common source of origin. In arguing that all forms of 
expression were movements, Laban used his knowledge of Wundt’s theories to 
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drastically expand on Dalcroze’s eurhythmics and modify Wundt’s theories into an 
enabling structure of social reform.78  
Every mode of expression was one facet of an overall movement art 
[Bewegungskunst], but a group had to work toward understanding how these modes could 
become interconnected in ways that could communicate particular ideas about essential 
truths of life and experience.  In an anarchist context, a small group or subcollective of 
dancers would experience alterations of consciousness and patterns of expression if they 
initially became reoriented to basic movement patterns in space.  Laban intended that his 
dancers would become the vanguard of a new social group that, like the 
Anthroposophists, performed heavily choreographed routines that he called “purpose 
plays,” which communicated an idea by means of highly coordinated expressive gestures 
that would, he hoped, enlighten wartime society in a manner that would lead to social 
reform.79  These highly orchestrated works have received substantial scholarly analysis, 
but the painstakingly contrived nature of these finished dance pieces began with 
preparatory endeavors known as free dances, which consisted of pure improvisation and 
cultivated discord. These exercises, which have not received a great deal of attention, 
indicate Laban’s most extreme modifications of the Dalcroze method and Wundt’s 
system of physiological psychology. 
 
The Free Dance: Improvisation as Nervous Alteration 
In Laban’s free dance [Freitanz] practices, he used chance occurrences with an 
understanding that reactions to these experiences would alter the nervous platforms of 
thought by dissolving prior habits. Utilizing chance in this manner would, Laban 
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believed, awaken new senses of space in addition to new awareness of rhythms in space 
and the body. In her memoir, Mary Wigman recalled Laban’s fascination with 
improvisation:  
In invoking our imagination by his own vivid fantasy, his instruction always  
turned into a lesson in improvisation, and as a final result into dance.   
Undoubtedly one of his strongest talents was his gift for improvisation.  He was  
able to fashion a fascinating event out of a completely insignificant happening.80 
These beginner lessons were deliberate cultivations of sensory and ambulatory discord. 
Students had to react, often in the nude, to a spontaneous cacophony of drums, gongs, 
tambourines, shouts, and flailing limbs in the open air. Every student also had the 
opportunity to perform both the instrumentalist and dancer roles in this collective 
experience/expression.  In these exercises, Laban pushed his students to focus on 
discovering and interacting with sensations of spatial rhythm [Raumrhythmisches 
Empfinden] that appeared unexpectedly during their Freitanz exercises. A student could 
draw these new sensations from the vibratory energies of a space, other dancers, and him 
or herself (figs. 11-12). Laban’s goal in his free dances was to build the capacity of his 
students to sense all the different kinds of rhythms within space and themselves.  
Unlike Dalcroze’s eurhythmics, Laban’s goals of expression could not rely on 
previous formative techniques or rhythms. These constructions were traditional forms of 
body education and could not, he believed, necessarily transform individuals and 
collectives into vehicles of new expressive fullness, since pre-existent rhythm functioned 
within pre-ordained, bodily conventions. Realizing new experience required total sensory 
rearrangement, and Laban clearly approached chance, improvisation, and spontaneity in 
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these terms of immediate, but ultimately unknown, processes of nervous disruption and 
rearrangement.  
Considering several quotations from Die Welt des Tänzers provides insight into 
the importance Laban placed on exercises and actions that, to an outsider, appear purely 
chaotic. Rather than immediately set his students to learning choreography, his 
reschooling was far more extensive and entirely within the catholic embrace of 
Lebensreform as a total modification of the body’s habits. His students spent warm 
summer days on the hillsides of the commune relearning how to move their hands along 
with a whole regimen of other movements that reacquainted them with spatial bearing. 
As Laban described it, 
The most important and meaningful element of bodily movement is certainly 
spatial orientation [awareness of space and oneself in it].  Through the alteration 
of spatial orientation, the energy that bestows shape allows the body to appear 
sometime expanded, exalted, and then again bent, compressed. Countless forms 
attest the [existence of] countless levels of irritation, which the body follows in its 
gestures.81 
Spatial orientation was a person’s sense of becoming one element in motion with others 
in space as forms of energy. Laban taught his students that space had a rhythm and one 
had to learn the ways in which one’s own rhythms of motion and expression were 
inextricable from these spatial conditions. No true artist could be a closed being. 
Embracing spontaneous forms of spatial bearing expanded upon the student’s sense of the 
body in space, which directly increased his or her approach to the energies of the 
expressive body: 
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The human body follows specific laws of spatial moderation in its movements. 
Every movement consists of multiple directional tensions, which hold each other 
in reciprocal balance. The spatial tendencies of these directionalities are related, 
as they more or less continuously run into each other.82 
Beginning at this rudimentary level of total openness to new sensory and spatial stimuli 
increased the student’s overall awareness of all the different neurophysiological building 
blocks of expressive rhythm and gave him or her a sense of the ways in which the body 
was connected to the rhythms of space.  
Laban was unequivocal that the sources of all these new movements and 
expressive forms came from new processes of innervation: 
In simple terms, a tension represented in the central organ [cortex] of our nervous 
system, in the cerebrum, or, even more likely, still in the entire body, gives birth 
to a thought. Anatomical, physiological, and pathological studies have 
enlightened us about how certain parts of the cerebrum correspond to specific 
sense organs and thought complexes.83 
 Rhythms of space connected to the body and mind through the nervous system. Learning 
new energies of expression relied on exercises that altered the structures of innervation in 
a student’s body. For a student of Laban, then, a gesture in a certain space was not simply 
a readymade thing absorbed from pre-existent cultural traditions as meaningful. Studying 
gesture, voice, and sound as interconnected neural processes enabled one to uncover “the 
wide range of textures and movement qualities hidden within the movement.”84   
Subsequent repetition of the movement over several hours in Laban’s classes was 
instead meant to give one a layered sense of the complexities involved in the coordination 
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of subtle, heretofore unnoticed impulses and connections between the parts of the body 
and mind. In his free dance, Laban intended that his students would explore different 
ways in which body gestures changed interactions with environments in the dimension 
these gestures had as new nervous pulsations: 
The pulsations follow the spatial laws of eurhythmy. They thus do not pulsate 
randomly from one arbitrary ambit point to another, but instead follow laws of 
combination and sequence, which also determine the interwoven mental 
movements of spatial play. The attempt to regulate through eurhythmy the 
relationship between gravity lightness by means of ever-more intensified life 
appears as one of the most essential laws of gestural energy.85 
The goal of the Freitanz was thus to awaken in the bodies and minds of the dancers new 
sensations of spatial rhythm, which would expand the bodily capacities of expressive 
strength in the movement arts of dance and performance. But for Laban, gesture included 
more than movements of the arms and legs. Following Wundt, he understood language as 
a form of gesture or bodily movement that nervous processes ultimately controlled—
processes that could undergo modification. 
 
Language as Bodily Movement 
Language had a major place in these initial lessons. In addition to movement, 
language and vocalization was the only other course Laban taught continuously at 
Ascona. When Laban’s students were participating in a Freitanz, they tried to encapsulate 
the emotional tonality of these raw movements with corresponding guttural yells 
individually, with a partner, and as a collective that moved in reaction to sudden gong 
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strikes by Laban.  Dörr has described how Laban had his students “improvise with 
sounds and movements and carry out studies of subjects such as which movements 
produce which tones.”86  Rather than make movements in correspondence to pre-existent 
rhythm, or recite vocal exercises like soflège, students discovered how new movements 
instantaneously produced new tones, rhythm, and harmonies. Once again reversing the 
Dalcroze method, Laban encouraged his students to explore the ways in which new 
bodily movements could generate new tones and rhythm that they made with their own 
voices. This elemental trait did give the utterance a musical quality, but it was music of 
the body rather than for it. Laban understood language as one dimension of the body’s 
nervous emanations, which meant that it contributed to new sensations of spatial rhythm.  
Laban orchestrated his Freitanz in a manner that enabled students to incorporate a 
new sense of the potentials of language as a process connected to nervous conduction. 
Wundt’s work had shown Laban that utterance was a bodily movement that was 
inextricable from other forms of motion that were initially more noticeable as ambulatory 
expressions, like the movements of arms and legs. In Die Welt des Tänzers, Laban’s 
description of language as a sound gesture relied entirely on Wundt’s theories of 
language as based in currents of neurophysiological conduction. In considering the 
harmonies of language, Laban was unequivocal in his belief that in any culture,  
the lips, tongue, and oral cavity ceaselessly form new gestures (Gebärden) – 
perform a dance. Breath creates a vibration of the surrounding air, which in our 
ear absorbs the image of the movement of the speaking organs as represented 
waves. Likewise the light waves of repeated movements of the entire body appear 
to our eyes.87 
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In approaching language as one element of expression, Laban conformed to both the 
notion of articulation as a gesture and the notion from the Völkerpsychologie that the 
perceived rhythms of language provided an overall sensibility for the psychophysical 
orientation of a group’s mental life and expressive forms. 
For Laban, linguistic expression, whether speaking or singing, was clearly a 
process of bodily motion controlled by the nervous system: 
The physiological act of forward and backward movements of the tongue, the 
broad and narrow movements of the lips, and all other forms of sound image 
movements like those of the thorax, the throat, and the mouth organs are 
themselves gestures, which means they are a harmony of muscle movements with 
an excitation of feeling and an impulse to understand.88 
Laban’s description of language as a pulsating dance of vocal organs is a poetic variation 
on Wundt’s theory that language was a habitual system of articulatory movements 
[Artikulationsbewegung] that a certain group built out of sound gestures [Lautgebärde] in 
reaction to particular conditions of space, which consequently made it a system of 
nervous practices or habits.89   
Wundt’s theories of language and his overall structure of neurophysiological 
change provide significant clues for interpreting Laban’s seemingly chaotic and diverse                  
Freitanz exercises. In this spirit of exploring new potentialities for language, Laban often 
made up words or had students perform improvisational dances to formal language that 
contained a great number of vowels and vowel sounds.  Dörr has argued that Laban felt 
the vowel was the most bodily of all linguistic vocalization, because prolonged utterance 
of it was the most tonal form of sound gesture [Lautgebärde] in space.90 Yelling or 
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projecting vowel sounds into space were not the only forms of linguistic expression that a 
student had to correlate to movement. They also had to react to newly composed 
poetry—another kind of immediate action rather than response to traditional forms.  
Laban’s students explored methods of bodily response to phrases or poems that he would 
conceive and recite on the spot during a lesson.  Students often collaborated on this 
exercise and composed their own poems that they set to interpretive or responsive 
movements—i.e., systems of gestures that they had conceived by improvisation.  Laban’s 
students also took choral training, but these vocal exercises also differed considerably 
from a more traditional curriculum.  Once his students had learned tonal scales, they then 
experimented with discovering which movements seemed to fit best with certain tones in 
relation to the feeling one sought to convey. At the level of the Freitanz, Laban’s intent in 
having his students probe the nature of language had a particular goal of revitalizing the 
human body’s long-forgotten openness to rhythm and the full expressive potential of 
collective bodily movement in space.  
Laban’s vocal experiments in his Freitanz exercises enabled students to focus on 
modifying the nervous tissues of expression by treating all expression as interrelated 
facets of bodily motion governed by processes of innervation. In these exercises, his 
students would come to learn how improvising with utterance altered the physiological 
bases of language as an articulatory movement and shifted its overall cultural value as a 
conveyer of meaning. Laban believed that true art could only come from a person whose 
sense of the body’s potential as an expressive instrument was at its fullest possible level 
and the best way to achieve this knowledge was a cultivated discord in the Freitanz, 
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which dissolved prior practices and opened the student’s senses to new forms of spatial 
knowledge. 
 
A New Collective Built on Chance 
 Laban’s Freitanz contained an extensive treatment of chance, improvisation, and 
spontaneity as modes of embodied stimuli—new currents and impulses that gradually 
wore away a student’s habitually construed neurophysiological structures of experience, 
awareness, and expression. In this context, improvisation was a spatial form of chance 
that altered the body’s action patterns and collective biorhythms.  Rather than deskilling, 
chance provoked a heretofore-unrealized form of elemental neurophysiology as the basis 
of new expressive gesture. Laban used chance in a manner that isolated and amplified 
Wundt’s techniques of arbitrary modification as practiced in his Leipzig lab—that is, the 
intent within Wundt’s use of this practice to sow discord in a person’s nervous substrate 
and probe thresholds of intensity in relation to responsive movements. Only in Laban’s 
hands, in the form of chance or spontaneous occurrences in the Freitanz, arbitrary 
modification was the means to alter, rather than observe, habitual nervous processes. It 
was the means to build a new expressive body. The Freitanz exercises confirmed his 
belief that one had to first wear down practices before new formats of elemental action 
could prepare one for more complex alterations of consciousness that resulted from 
additional and more highly choreographed forms of movement.  
In addition to generating a new feeling that the body and collective expression 
were intimately connected to the rhythms of space, these new experiences harkened back 
to an imagined moment of primal unity in which the body and the collective were more 
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intimately connected to the spatial rhythms of nature, which was a major value of the 
commune in which Laban worked. After the Freitanz had generated a newly composed 
but comparatively rudimentary nervous system that lacked complex reasoning apparatus, 
which would quickly rule out chance as a desired platform for the absorption of concepts, 
then the locus of art and feeling could grow from a zone that was far below the 
conceptual superstructure of reason as a guide for process.     
Laban’s awareness of Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie strongly suggests that he used 
chance in a manner that drew on the psychologist’s treatment of the notion as the main 
element of primitive habit formation. However, he altered its theoretical place from a 
naturally occurring stimulus into broad category of expressive forms that an artist could 
deliberately and repeatedly apply in a manner that would alter habitual nervous 
processes. Wundt made several connections between primitive culture and chance and 
presented the primitive subject as both more open to chance, due to his lack of pre-
existent and comparatively higher cognitive forms like apperception. That lack made 
him/her more attuned to mobilizing the seeming illogicality of chance occurrence as 
instances of conjoined utility and supernatural causality. Chance sowed discord in the 
nervous substrate, but it was a very particular mode of discord that, based on Laban’s 
awareness of Wundt’s work, had an immediate connection to theorizations of what 
consciousness was like in primitive societies. 
In the Freitanz, wearing down the habitual structures of innervation disrupted the 
continuities of higher experience and cognition. Contrary to Wundt’s theory of chance, 
but in a manner that drew on it, Laban understood chance as the most conspicuous 
stimulus in the worldview of primitive consciousness, but utilized techniques of 
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improvisation in a manner that cultivated an associated primitive sensibility as a platform 
of consciousness and nervous structure that a group could build for itself out of new 
conductive processes of innervation. Spontaneous reactive motions in the Freitanz 
unfolded with an understanding that, at least at this rudimentary stage of preparation, 
chance could become a new sort of practice that cultivated a more primal form of group 
consciousness that was more palpably connected to the spatial rhythms of nature. 
Introducing exercises that relied heavily on chance shaped the nervous system into a 
more elemental structure, which Laban felt was essential to grasping the inherent 
qualities of spatial rhythm.  
In order to better describe the harmonious relation between expressive motion and 
spatial rhythms he sought, Laban described the ways in which primitive drum language 
inspired his experimental studies of movement. Wundt’s work had shown Laban the 
ways in which primitive societies experienced these various movement patterns of sound 
or gesture as interrelated. As he wrote in Ein Leben fur den Tanz, he was particularly 
fascinated by Wundt’s argument that “primitive man can make himself understood 
equally well with audible or with visible gestures.”91  Laban described drum language in 
a manner that recalls Steiner’s interest in Wundt’s description of primitive gesture 
language as exemplifying non-verbal communication. For Laban, it was a form of 
expression that unified rhythms of the body and space as a nexus of word, tone, and 
internal conductive processes of the nerves. As he understood it, “to primitive man the 
language of the drum seems nothing other than the rhythm of his body made audible.”92  
Drum language was a more overtly gestural or tactile form of language that spatialized 
the life rhythms of the group. It confirmed Laban’s belief that all expression was a 
 201
nervous emanation, to the extent that it broke the hidebound distinction between self, 
other, and space, and immediately connected the life rhythms of these three entities in a 
more palpable way. As he had written earlier in Die Welt des Tänzers, primitive art also 
exemplified this social and spatial capacity: 
What strikes us about the forms of early handmade art and the artifacts of people 
and races living simply? One says it is primitive. This is incorrect. It is the 
humanity, the expressive richness of the artifacts. One sees: this object is used in a 
sense natural to life. We desire to see and sense rhythm.93  
This form of social harmony in expression and communicative knowing relied on a 
certain common structure of innervation that Laban worked to cultivate in his dance 
troupe and new practices of “living simply” in the commune at Ascona. Rather than 
being inspired by primitive dance, Laban sought to develop a program of expressive 
gestures of body and voice that would exude the same rhythmic-spatial quality of drum 
language: “To be able to perceive the pathway of a gesture and in its flow the gift of vital 
tension” became his pedagogical and expressive goal.94  Creating a spatial harmony 
through expressive gestures required forming one’s nervous pathways in a manner that 
engendered a more intense overall sensation of rhythmic space and one’s place within it 
as part of a group. 
To be sure, Laban’s interest in drum language and primitive society as a whole 
was a metaphor of a harmonious anarchist community living apart from modern urban 
society. “Primitive” for Laban meant a group that was more sensitive to the rhythms of 
space and the needs of each other. For him, primitives were not less developed, but had 
developed differently than those in urban society, to the extent that communicative 
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expression effaced common distinctions (and corresponding, compartmentalized action 
patterns) between language, sound, perception, and movement through space. What 
Wundt had understood as a lack of individuality, Laban understood as an ideal form of 
social harmony between people and nature. These allegedly normal boundaries between 
self, other, and space were, in primitive society, fused as subtle variants of the same 
structure of biorhythmic vibrations, which the innervation processes of expressive 
movement encapsulated. As inspiration for a reformist model, primitive culture showed 
Laban that one had to develop a format of action platforms that displayed a more unified 
coordination between members of the group and with respect to the space in which the 
group lived.  
Laban’s goal was not to reenact this drum language, but to live through expressive 
motion in an analogical fashion and as part of a broader system of life practices that 
comprised the integrated day, which was an overall attempt to reharmonize a social 
collective outside the models of modern Europe.  He lauded primitive society as 
indicating potential sensory platforms that could offer heightened experience by 
becoming more unified and polyvalent. He sought a similar neurophysiological level of 
heightened expressive capacity. Coordination of bodily movement rhythms was the key 
enabling factor.  In order to expedite this process of reformation, one had to modify the 
structure of the nervous system.     
 Laban sought for his Freitanz to trigger the initial stages of this process of sensory 
and social reformation. “Primitive” could be appreciation of things African, but it did not 
have to look or sound African. A deeper sense of primitivism simply connotes a more 
rudimentary physiological platform in which rhythmic patterns of the senses overlapped 
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more clearly with each other and with the biorhythms of a certain space, as in Laban’s 
example of drum language.  This mode of primitivism was a goal that a group had to 
reach through new movements that created a greater sense of spatial bearing as the basis 
of heightened expressive capacity: 
Spatial Arrangement in the work of movement art: Today the course of 
development is already sketched clearly. There are at least some dances, scenes, 
and first starts, both on the stage as well as in photographs, which are spiritually 
gripping because of their language of forms.  . In this, the concept of space, and 
thus also spatial arrangement play a meaningful role. The more simply, clearly, 
and more meaningfully they frame and support the actual play of forms, the 
conflict of tension of representational movements, the more insistently we will be 
gripped by them.   Famous artists are taking up the task of shaping this frame as 
poets of form.95   
Laban’s ambition was to forge this elementalism of primal, multisensory communicative 
rhythm by moving within the creation of the work as part of a collective.   
Overall, then, Laban sought to refashion an elemental Kunstwollen far below the 
sequential continuity of the rational cognitive and emotive process fuelled by normative 
functions of higher intellectual structure—by reacquainting one with the rawest levels of 
its bodily substrate.  He was not trying to recreate earlier oneness with nature (real or 
imagined facts of primitive lives), but rather to compel groups, in the present, to reforge 
their psychophysical relationships to space through movements that they invented or 
recovered from other times and places.     
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 The subject would not project selfhood, but would connect to new biorhythmic 
frequencies of a group, like beads of mercury forming a pool. This refashioned group 
would then communicate its new rhythms of expressive energy to the audience with the 
expressed intention of communicating new forms of bodily and mental awareness to the 
spectators that would awaken them to higher forms of consciousness. This awakening 
would, Laban believed, be based on newly shared rhythms that indicated the beginnings 
of common nervous conductions as foundaitons of the newly constituted Volksgeist. His 
ambition was to create an ever-expanding community apart from the Modern state, which 
experienced new forms of collective experience and consciousness. Artist and audience 
would come together by living through new rhythms that the dancers conveyed. 
 In a manner that recalls the contradiction previously located within Dalcroze’s 
two separate notions of normalcy—one flawed, the other refashioned—one finds a 
contradiction between two different modes of neurophysiological refashioning in Laban’s 
overall pedagogical method. On the one hand, his students were awash in new spatial 
rhythms during the free dance, which relied on a continual use of chance to disrupt and 
soften previously constituted conductive structures. On the other hand, as the end product 
of this process, the group performed a finished purpose play that was heavily 
orchestrated, obsessively rehearsed, and very formalized (fig. 13). The dance group had 
reshaped their nervous systems outside the space of performance and had created new 
practices and habits of expressive conveyance that Laban tightly controlled. The group’s 
expression unfolded in service of a particular, pre-conceived goal idea that formed the 
conceptual heart of the purpose play. What began as baseline disruption became the 
initial means of gradual, ascendant reconstitution. The nature of this reconstitution was 
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more involved, because Laban embraced the entirety of physical expression as 
movement, but also worked diligently to shape all modes of this entirety into the 
foundations of an expressive genre that was metaphysically liberating in tone but 
ultimately restrictive in its intentions. Thus both Laban and Dalcroze embraced the notion 
that conduction paths in the nervous system were not fixed, but they went counter to the 
notion in their attempts to formalize expressive techniques that they had gradually built 
from a perceived chaos of psychosocial orientation. 
In his own way, each of these figures expressed a general notion that the 
physiological bases of thought were mutable and that one changed these bases by 
undertaking new forms of movement involving gestures of limbs, voice, instrumentation, 
or percussion. Laban was most expansive in his framing of the body’s expressive 
capacities as different forms of neurophysiologically connected gestures. This approach 
to the body encouraged artists to consider a deeper coordination between different forms 
of expression by viewing these forms as consecutive dimensions of nervous energy.   In 
contrast to his finished pieces and considered in isolation, Laban’s free dance couched an 
essence of amplified neurophysiological change that one may consider apart from his 
more finished works and overall philosophy of decidedly conservative Lebensreform. 
While Laban inhabited and then departed from this context of dynamism, Dadaists in 
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posthemiplegique (Geneva: Charles Eggimann and Co., 1897), 29. 
17 “Arrivons sans plus tarder à Wundt qui est la représentant actuel de la théorie centrale qu’il a 
lui-même précisée et mise en vogue. Il pense que ces sensations du mouvement ont pour siège les 
cellules nerveuses motrices, qu’elles sont liées a l’innervation motrice. Il les appelle donc 
<<sensations d’innervation>> [Innervationsempfindungen].” (Claparède, Ibid., 29-30). 
18 “La place du quatrieme schème comme dernier stade de l’évolution est justifée par ce fait que 
certains mouvements exécutés souvent (la marche, le piano, etc.) bien que primitivement 
volontaires, deviennent automatiques avec l’exercice.” (Claparède, Ibid, 61). It helps to recall at 
this juncture that Dalcroze relied on Wundt’s notion that positive emotions attached to 
movements and gestures that were habitual. In line with the conservation of energy in the nervous 
system, any practice that did not involve a conspicuous exertion of effort became pleasurable. As 
automatic, one could become detached form it and look upon the exertion of motion as positive. 
19 Dalcroze, “The Place of Ear Training in Musical Education” in Rhythm, Music, and Education, 
4. 
20 The practice of bodily movements awakens images in the mind. The stronger the muscular 
sensations, the clearer and more precise the images, and thereby the more metrical and rhythmic 
feeling is developed; for feeling is born of sensation . . . The precision and regulated dynamic 
force of muscular automatisms are a guarantee of the precision of thought automatisms, and the 
regular development of imaginative faculties.” Ibid, 125. Realizing these potentials required 
training the nervous system according to a new pedagogy that could foster the desired growth and 
intensification of nerves in the manner Dalcroze believed was appropriate to proper musical 
expression. As early as his 1898 essay on “The Place of Ear Training in Musical Education,” 
Dalcroze declared that his Turnen exercises were dedicated entirely to altering the nervous 
system and opening up clearer channels of innervation: would, according to Dalcroze, “open up 
between brain, ear, and larynx the necessary channels to form of the entire organism what one 
might call the inner ear.” Dalcroze, “The Place of Ear Training in Musical Education” in Rhythm, 
Music, and Education, 2. Rhythm would live in the self, but the physiological bases of that self 
had to change in the process of this absorption. At a lecture in London that he gave on February 
25, 1916, Dalcroze argued that only in this way could the body “become an instrument of art, and 
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this it will only do by means of special training, having as its object the suppression of 
resistances, both intellectual and physical, which prevent the individual from expressing himself 
according to his personal rhythm.”Dalcroze, from lecture given in London, February 25, 1916, 
repr. and trans. in The Eurhythmics of Jaques-Dalcroze, 34. As Dalcroze stressed in “The 
Initiation into Rhythm,” “Consciousness of sound can only be acquired by reiterated experiences 
of the ear and voice; consciousness of rhythm by reiterated experiences of movements of the 
whole body.” Dalcroze, “The Initiation into Rhythm,” in Rhythm, Music, and Education, 37. In 
these statements, Dalcroze was unequivocal in his tenet that training students in rhythm worked 
better if they increased the quantity of innervation in their training exercises. 
21 Claparède, Ibid, 61. 
22 Dalcroze, “Music, Joy, and the School,” Rhythm, Music, and Education (1967), 95-96. 
23 Dalcroze, “The Place of Ear Training in Musical Education” in Rhythm, Music, and Education, 
3 
24 Dalcroze, “Rhythm as a Factor in Education,” in The Eurhyhmics of Jaques-Dalcroze, 16. 
Likewise, from the same essay, he felt that he had formed his method “naturally and gradually as 
the result of observation and experiment.” Ibid, 34. 
25 Ibid., 16. 
26 Dalcroze, “Rhythmic Movement, Soflege, Improvisation,” in Rhythm, Music, and Education 
trans. Harold F. Rubinstein (New York and London: G.P. Putnam’s Sons and Knickerbocker 
Press, 1921), 122. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Dalcroze, “Rhythmic Movement, Soflege, Improvisation,” in Rhythm, Music, and Education 
trans. Harold F. Rubinstein (New York and London: G.P. Putnam’s Sons and Knickerbocker 
Press, 1921), 122. 
29 Dalcroze, “The Place of Ear Training in Musical Education” in Rhythm, Music, and Education, 
2. 
30 Jahn inspired variations on the model throughout Europe and the United States that couched 
similar motivations of nationalism and hygiene. For a useful summary of Jahn in English see 
Harold B. Segel, Body Ascendant: Modernism and the Physical Imperative (Baltimore and 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 209-213. Segel is absolutely correct to associate 
the Boy Scouts movement of Baden-Powell in England to this overall trend. Standard source in 
English for a basic biography of Jahn is Horst Überhorst, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn and His Time, 
1778-1852, trans. Timothy Nevill (Munich and Baltimore: Moos, 1982). For the rampant 
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popularity of physical culture in Europe, see the excellent volume Art, Sex, and Eugenics: Corpus 
Delecti, ed. Fae Brauer and Anthea Callen (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2008). Other 
sources on physical culture in Germany include Cowan, Cult of the Will; Karl Toepfer, Empire of 
Ecstasy: Nudity and Movement in German Body Culture, 1910-1935 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997); Bernd Wedemeyer-Kolwe, “Der neue Mensch”: Korperkultur im 
Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik (Wurzburg: Konighausen and Neumann, 2004); Chad 
Ross, “Building a Better Body: Nudism, Society, and the German Nation” (PhD Dissertation, 
University of Missouri Columbia, 2003). Brauer is the best of these scholars at distinguishing the 
particularly French attraction to calisthenics as part of a movement in fostering the rational 
procreation of the French people.  
31 Dalcroze argued that “a whole series of graduated exercises” built gradually increasing 
complexities in the tissues. The student trained in patterns of action in order to “adapt different 
muscular processes for short and long durations respectively, to estimate durations according to 
the sensations of tension and extension of muscles, of opening and closing of limbs in space, to 
coordinate the different dynamic forces of the body, and to apply the measure of space to the 
control of the duration and intensity of muscular contractions.” Dalcroze, “Rhythmic Movement, 
Soflege, Improvisation,” in Rhythm, Music, and Education trans. Harold F. Rubinstein (New 
York and London: G.P. Putnam’s Sons and Knickerbocker Press, 1921), 123-124. 
32 Dalcroze, “Rhythmic Movement, Soflege, Improvisation,” in Rhythm, Music, and Education 
trans. Harold F. Rubinstein (New York and London: G.P. Putnam’s Sons and Knickerbocker 
Press, 1921), 128 
33 Dalcroze believed were “facilitated by the cultivation of automatisms . . . An arm will execute a 
rhythm automatically, while the mind regulates the execution of a second rhythm by another 
limb.” Ibid, 129. 
34 Dalcroze, “Rhythm as a Factor in Education,” in The Eurhythmics of Jaques-Dalcroze, 20. This 
aesthetics of regularity appeared in the context of physical culture, but it did not have the level of 
immediate applicability to the nature of gestures a person made in contexts of artmaking that it 
did in the eurhythmics of Dalcroze. Collapsing his work entirely into physical culture effaces this 
crucial distinction. 
35 The primary focus of this dissertation prevents a fuller discussion of these figures, but ongoing 
research apart from it has established usages of Dalcroze in France. One of the most radical 
applications of Dalcroze eurhythmics occurred in the works of the Ballets Russes from 1912-
1914. Sergei Diaghilev, the troupe’s legendary director, first witnessed a demonstration of the 
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Dalcroze method in St. Petersburg in January 1911.  In February and December of 1912, 
Diaghilev took his principal dancer Vaslav Nijinski and his sister Bronislava to Hellerau. Richard 
Buckle, Diaghilev, (New York: Atheneum, 1979), 216, 238. Dalcroze was courteous to their 
interests, but he had no interest himself in teaching dancers. Bronislava Nijinska, Early Memoirs, 
454. Buckle, Diaghilev (New York: Atheneum, 1979), 238-239. He offered to send one of his 
best instructors, the former ballet dancer Maria Rambert, with Diaghilev and Nijinski as an 
assistant choreographer for upcoming performances of Claude Debussy’s Le Jeux and the ballet 
to Igor Stravinsky’s Le Sacre du Printemps.  
Nijinsky strongly believed that eurhythmics could foster a more potent expressive 
orientation to Stravinsky’s raucous score, but his troupe was suspicious of the method and his 
overall ambition of altering the appearance of ballet choreography. He and Rambert began work 
on the routine during December 1912 and Nijinsky’s obsession with altering the nature of dance 
led to over 120 rehearsals. Boris Kochno, Diaghilev and the Ballets Russes, trans. Arienne 
Foulke, (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1970), 88. Rambert was at his side for the 
majority of these exercises and often worked with individual dancers as a way to better acquaint 
them with the specific requirements of the overall routine “Every day, after the general rehearsal, 
I had to stay for an hour or two and listen with Nijinsky to the score of Sacre. He then sketched 
out the movements for the next rehearsal. The rhythms were very diffcult, and I had to study the 
rhythm with each artist individually. They soon nicknamed me ‘Rhythmichka.’ There was no 
melody to hold on to—so the only way to learn it was to count the bars all the time. The 
movements in themselves were simple, and so was the floor pattern. But the basic position was 
difficult to sustain in movement, and the mastering of that rhythm almost impossible.” Marie 
Rambert, Quicksilver: The Autobiography of Marie Rambert, (London: Macmillan, 1972), 56-57. 
Stravinsky’s appearance at the rehearsal made things more difficult still: “When Stravinsky first 
came to one of our rehearsals and heard the way his music was being played, he blazed up, 
pushed aside the fat German pianist, nicknamed ‘Kolossal’ by Diaghilev, and proceeded to play 
twice as fast as we had been doing it, and twice as fast as we could possibly dance. He stamped 
his feet on the floor and banged his fists on the piano and sang and shouted, all to give us an 
impression of the rhythms of the music and the colour of the orchestra.” Ibid, 58-59. 
36 Dalcroze, “Rhythm as a Factor in Education,” in The Eurhythmics of Jaques-Dalcroze, 32. 
37 Equally important was developing an economy of innervation through an elimination of 
unnecessary inhibiting psychological factors that had become constituted in a person’s nervous 
system as a result of habits in everyday life. Organic refashioning brought laws of 
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thermodynamics, such as the conservation of work or energy, to bear on the production of culture. 
Given the context of Dalcroze’s Institute at Hellerau, scholars have established a Taylorist subtext 
to eurhythmics as it occurred while Dalcroze was in Germany. 
38 For example, Michael Cowan has argued that eurhythmics had the overarching intention to 
“provide an education of the will through music and dance” and cogently argues that Dalcroze 
sought to essentially rebuild the thinking, moving, and expressive body by gradually recomposing 
a relationship between Wundt’s concepts of automatic instinctual acts [Triebhandlung] and 
complex acts of decision [Wahlhandlung]. Cowan, Cult of the Will, 180.Cowan is also correct to 
connect Dalcroze’s overall project to the Helmholtzian law of conserved energy that also appears 
in Wundt’s theories, “whereby complex decisions repeatedly performed revert to second degree 
instincts so as to reduce the expenditure of attention and psychic energy and make room for other 
conscious acts of will” (Ibid.) This model of efficiency had immediate social applicability. In the 
broader context of physical culture, group calisthenics at this moment were one means of 
increasing a person’s productive efficiency in contexts of industry. Ibid, 184. Echoing the earlier 
arguments of dance scholar Susan Manning, Cowan has emphasized the fact that Dalcroze 
embraced the Deutscher Werkbund’s hope to improve production by reforming spatial conditions 
of formal rhythm in a way that facilitated efficiency. In this context, manipulating the human 
nervous system could increase production.  The Werkbund believed that Dalcroze’s methods 
reintroduced students to rhythm that thus made them feel less alienated from machine age 
production, which returned a sense of control to interaction with mechanized production, thus 
raising output. These assessments cannot explain the popularity of eurhythmics with people who 
used his theories apart from his belief structure. Comprehending this separate dimension of 
usability requires an altered view of physiological psychology that is outside the positivist French 
model and its unilateral model of volition on which Cowan has focused his critical reading of 
Dalcroze. Cowan connects Dalcroze methods to Ribot’s studies on the will, which established 
supposedly standardized models of higher mental function. Ribot’s work relied on the earlier 
theories of habit and practice that Wundt had first developed. Cowan stresses that Dalcroze’s 
knowledge of psychology motivated his efforts to train students to master their will through 
psychomotor training, or exercises of movement that would help regulate higher mental operation 
in the context of expression. For example, Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie—known to both Dalcroze 
and Claparède—shattered any singular transition from instinct to will in its outline of how certain 
models of higher intellect like volition and its bases in the movement patterns of a group rely far 
more heavily on specific contextual conditions and a shared neurophysiological level that vary 
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drastically from place to place. Dalcroze’s work is itself a push in that direction toward using the 
science of shifting nerves as the bases for varying ascendant models of group consciousness. 
Other figures who knew Wundt’s work on culture saw a space for alternative models. Thus, in 
contrast to Dalcroze’s particular shaping of Triebhandlung into Wahlhandlung, other users of 
eurhythmics embraced the Völkerpsychologie as proof that other trajectories could exist. 
39 The most substantial intellectual biography of Steiner that makes the rare avoidance of falling 
into encomia is Perry Myers, “The Double Edged Sword: The Cult of Bildung, its Downfall and 
Reconsitution in fin-de-siècle Germany,” (PhD Dissertation, University of Texas, Austin, 2002). 
Myers examines Steiner’s broader historical and political context in relationship to the German 
cultural phenomenon of Bildungsideal, in which Lebensreform was one dimension. 
40 Steiner was originally a devotee of Theosophy, having first made contact with the overall 
doctrine in the 1880s and 1890s in the circle of the feminist Marie Lang. Corinna Treitel, A 
Science for the Soul: Occultism and the German Modern, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2004), 98-99. Steiner became known for his strong intellect and ability to synthesize occult 
ideas into other discourses, which was a major value of these esoteric circles.  
41 For more on Blavatsky and her Theosophical Society in general see Alex Owen, The Place of 
Enchantment: British Occultism and the Culture of the Modern, (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004), 30-37. For Blavatsky’s relation to the interests of the 
European artistic avant-garde, see Maurice Tuchman et al, The Spiritual in Art: Abstract Painting 
1890-1985, exh. cat (Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 1986), esp. 388-389. She first outlined 
this supposed wisdom in Isis Unveiled (1877). Blavatsky essentially argued within a synthetic, 
comparative religious framework that most major religions fell within a developmental trajectory 
of world consciousness and within this development, each person or “monad” evolved through 
seven different “root races” and thus lived through seven different bodies. 
42 Their 1901 book Thought Forms became a standard text on visualizing higher knowledge, 
clairvoyance, and thought transference, which continued the occult interest in combining science 
and metaphysics into philosophical programs underlying the search for higher forms of 
consciousness. 
43 Heiner Ullrich, Rudolf Steiner, trans. Janet Duke and David Balestrini, (London and New York: 
Continuum, 2008), 20-23. Along with Myers’ work, Ullrich’s book is one of the rare studies of 
Steiner’s life and thought that does not fall into hagiography. A broader study of the ways in 
which occultist figures drew on science in general is sorely needed. Henderson’s work on the 
usages of ether physics by occultist figures is a paragon of a genre of study—i.e., the 
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interrelationships of science and occultism in the context of Modernism—that needs attention. 
For more on these matters see in particular The Fourth Dimension and Non-Euclidean Geometry 
in Modern Art (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983; forthcoming re-edition, 2010); 
Henderson, “Vibratory Modernism: Boccioni, Kupka, and the Ether of Space,” From Energy to 
Information: Representation in Science and Technology, Art, and Literature, ed. Henderson and 
Hunt (Stanford: Stanford Universty Press, 2002), 126-149. For more on the place of the ether in 
the broader context of the history of science, see Bruce Hunt’s essay in the same volume, “Lines 
of Force, Swirls of Ether,” Ibid., 99-113. 
44 Steiner rejected the claim from Besant that a fifteen-year-old Indian boy, Jidda Krishnamurti, 
was a reincarnation of Christ and the future world savior. When Besant founded a new order of 
adherents dedicated to the boy, known as the Star of the East, Steiner refused to admit these 
members entry to the Theosophical chapter in Berlin. This move caused Besant to expel Germany 
from the International Theosophical Society. Ullrich, Ibid, 26-27.  
45 While Wundt tried to explain different forms of mystical or occultist practice as arising from a 
collective physiology in a group, many branches of occultism and mysticism saw a continuity 
rather than a diversity in these different practices. They believed a synthesis of shared truths 
between these separate outlooks could be reached if one followed varying series of meditation or 
concentration exercises in newly forged ritual contexts and consciousness centers. As Alex Owen 
has forcefully argued, all of these branches saw their investigations into the mysteries of nature as 
a form of scientific inquiry that was not separate from metaphysical forays focused on the 
evolution of consciousness and the experience of supersensory phenomena. As Owen states, “For 
Victorian occultists, science and metaphysics were one and the same and found expression in the 
ancient wisdom. They used phrases like ‘occult philosophy’ and ‘occult science’ conterminously, 
and when they spoke of the latter they were referring not only to a science dedicated to 
knowledge of natural law but also the ‘true’ constitution of the human entity and the Absolute” 
(Ibid, 37). No one rejected science outright, merely its underlying positivist philosophy, because 
occult figures saw this rejection as merely being the other side of a narrow-minded rejection of 
epistemological alterity that the scientific rejection of possible occult or spiritualist endeavors 
exemplified. As has been well documented, many figures on both the occult and scientific sides 
of the debate studied each other, sometimes in collaboration, throughout Europe during the fin-
de-siècle and well into the twentieth-century. 
46 According to Myers, “Steiner believed that there is an accommodative unity between the 
spiritual and physical worlds. The failure of modern science was not in the science; it lay only in 
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its rejection of spiritual ‘reality,’ not in its methods or discoveries as they pertained to the 
physical world.” Myers, Ibid, 168-169. See also Robert Sumser, “Rational Occultism in fin-de-
siecle Germany: Rudolf Steiner’s Modernism,” History of European Ideas 18 (1994): 479-511. 
47 Given the fact that Steiner composed well over 300 volumes during his lifetime, this discussion 
will limit itself to the ways in which he incorporated Wundt’s ideas into his work in order to meet 
several broader goals. First, he wanted to make occult knowledge a collective undertaking for all 
members of society, in contrast to viewing the doctrine as a secret form of knowledge. Second, he 
sought to localize a notion of the occult as something particularly cognitivist as a higher form of 
knowledge, in line with Robert Galbreath’s definition of occultism as having to do with “matters 
that are said to be intrinsically hidden from ordinary cognition and understanding, but that are 
none the less knowable through the awakening of latent cognitive faculties of appropriate 
sensibility.” (Galbreath, “Occult,” in Tuchman et al, Spiritual in Art, 380. See also Galbreath, 
“The History of Modern Occultism: A Bibliographical Survey,” in Galbreath, The Occult: Studies 
and Evaluations (Bowling Green: Bowling Green Popular Press, 1972), 98-126. 
48 Rudolf Steiner, The Spiritual Hierarchies and the Physical World: Reality and Illusion (1909), 
trans. R.M. Querido, (Hudson, NY: Anthroposophic Press, 1996), 171. 
49 Steiner, The Soul of the People Considered in the Light of Spiritual Sciences (1914), trans. 
unknown, (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 1998), 4. Emphasis is mine. 
50 Steiner, Ibid, 5. 
51 This phrase occurs as part of a lengthy quote, again addressing Wundt, from 1919: 
“Psychologists of today are puzzled to know whether to keep the principles of the soul 
completely apart or let them intermingle. Some psychologists are haunted by the old, strict 
differentiation between will, feeling, and thought; in others, e.g. in the more Herbartian 
psychologists, everything is directed more to the side of the mental picture, while in the followers 
of Wundt it goes more to the side of the will. They have no true conception of how to deal with 
the membering of the soul. This is because in actual practical life the ego really permeates all 
capacities of the soul.”  Steiner, “Lecture Three,” in Study of Man: General Education Course 
(1919), trans. Daphne Harwood and Helen Fox (London: Rudolf Steiner Press, 2004), 62. 
52 Steiner, An Outline of Occult Science (1909), 4th ed., trans. Maud and Henry Monges (Chicago: 
Anthroposophical Literature Concern, 1922), 323. 
53 Steiner, Ibid, 323-324. 
54 Steiner, “A Lecture on Eurhythmy (1923)” in Eurhythmy: An Introductory Reader, ed. Bethany 
Usher (London: Sophia Books, 2007), 63 
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55 The notion of the etheric body was most extensively outlined by C.W. Leadbeater in his 1899 
text Clairvoyance. “We know,” Leadbeater wrote, “that each man possesses an astral and a 
mental body, each of which can in process of time be aroused into activity, and will respond in 
turn to the vibrations of the matter of its own plane, thus opening up before the Ego, as he learns 
to function through these vehicles, two entirely new and far wider worlds of knowledge and 
power.” (Leadbeater, Clairvoyance (1899), 1918 edition (London: Theosophical Publishing 
Society, 1918), 12). These new worlds were not unconnected, but, rather, were “subdivided so 
very much more finely and vibrating so very much more rapidly as to introduce us to wha tare 
practically entirely new conditions and qualities” (Ibid).  
56 For a nice summary see Ullrich, Rudolf Steiner, 253. 
57 Rudolf Steiner, Knowledge of the Higher Worlds and Its Attainment (1904), (Forgotten Books, 
2008), 79, http://forgottenbooks.org/ info/9781605064864 (accessed November 11, 2009). 
58 Steiner, Ibid. 
59 In Clairvoyance, Leadbeater had outlined this notion as well: “It is not then difficult for us to 
grasp the possibility of a steady and progressive extension of our senses, so that both by sight and 
by hearing we may be able to appreciate vibrations far higher and far lower than those which are 
ordinarily recognized. A large section of these additional vibrations will still belong to the 
physical plane, and will merely enable us to obtain impressions from the etheric part of that plane, 
which is at present as a closed book to us. Such impressions will still be received through the 
retina of the eye; of course they will affect its etheric rather than its solid matter, but we may 
nevertheless regard them as still appealing only to an organ specialized to receive them, and not 
to the whole surface of the etheric body.” (Leadbeater, Clairvoyance, 12-13). 
60 Steiner, “Lecture on Eurhythmy,” 64. 
61 Steiner, Knowledge of the Higher Worlds, 81. 
62 Leadbeater was also interested in making the nervous system and its structures of change into 
the bases of an evolution in consciousness. As he described (rather verbosely) in his 1902 text 
Man Visible and Invisible, “We must think of the man as creating these vehicles for himself in 
the course of his future evolution, for every man possesses them from the beginning, though he is 
by no means conscious of their existence. We are constantly using to a certain extent this higher 
matter within ourselves, even though it be unconsciously. Every time that we think, we set in 
motion the mental matter within us, and a thought is clearly visible to a clairvoyant as a vibration 
in that matter, set up first of all within the man, and then affecting matter of the same degree of 
intensity in the world around him. But before this thought can be effective on that physical plane 
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it has to be transferred from that mental matter into astral matter; and when it has excited similar 
vibrations in that, the astral matter in its turn affects the etheric matter, creating sympathetic 
vibrations in it, and that in turn acts upon the denser physical matter, the grey matter of the brain. 
 “So every time we think, we go through a much larger process than we know; just as 
every time we feel anything we go through a process of which we are quite unconscious. We 
touch some substance and feel that it is too hot, and snatch our hand away from it 
instantaneously, as we think. But science teaches us that this process is not instantaneous, and that 
it is not the hand which feels, but the brain; that the nerves communicate the idea of intense heat 
to the brain, which at once telegraphs back along the nerve threads the instruction to withdraw the 
hand; and it is only as a result of all this that the withdrawl takes place, which seems to us to be 
immediate. The process has a definite duration, which can be measured by sufficiently fine 
instruments; the rate of its motion is perfectly well-defined and known to physiologists. Just in 
the same way thought appears to be an instantaneous process; but it is not, for every thought has 
to go through the stages which I have described. Every impression which we receive in the brain 
through the senses has to pass up through these various grades of matter before it reaches the real 
man, the ego, the soul within. 
 “We have a kind of system of telegraphy between the physical plane and the soul; and it 
is important to realize that this telegraph line has intermediate stations. It is not only from the 
physical plane that impressions can be received; the astral matter within a man, for example, is 
not only capable of receiving impressions from the surrounding matter of its own plane, and 
transmitting those through the mental body to the real man within. So the man may use his astral 
body as a means for receiving impressions from and observing the astral world which surrounds 
him; and in exactly the same way through his mental body he may observe and obtain 
information from the mental world. But in order to do either of these things, he must first learn 
how they are done; that is to say, he must learn to focus his consciousness in his astral body or his 
mental body, just as it is now focused in his physical brain.” Leadbeater, Man Visible and 
Invisible (New York: John Lane, The Bodley Head, 1903), 14-16. 
63 Steiner, “The Imaginative, Inspirative, and Intuitive Method of Cognition (1922),” in 
Philosophy, Cosmology, and Religion: Ten Lectures Given at the Goetheanum in Dornach, 
Switzerland, September 6-15, 1922, trans. Lisa Monges and Doris Bugbey (Spring Valley, NY: 
Anthroposophic Press, 1984), 49-50. 
64 Steiner, “A Lecture on Eurhythmy (1923),” 67. 
65 Ibid. 
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66 Ibid, 64. 
67 Different forms of Theosophy and mysticism, including Anthroposophy, were present at Monte 
Verità. There was also a major concentration of Steiner adherents in nearby Locarno. Laban 
occasionally collaborated with different figures from these groups and was both a Freemason and 
a member of an occult group, the Ordo Templi Orientis, although Steiner was his clearest 
inspiration for developing his own method of reformist pedagogy. The O.T.O. is best known 
today as being the proving ground for the notorious occult figure Aleister Crowley, who also had 
deep connections to other occult groups. For the O.T.O. in particular see Francis King, Secret 
Rituals of the O.T.O. (Samuel Weiser, 1973). 
68 Dalcroze himself had no interest in teaching dancers, but was welcome to discuss and 
demonstrate his theories to dancers and theorists of stagecraft, and readily encouraged his 
students to work on the theatrical productions of his friend Adolphe Appia. 
69 Wigman’s fame as an independent artist came toward the tail end of the 1910s when she left 
Laban’s circle and began performing on her own. 
70 Dörr, Ibid, 24. 
71 These courses began in 1913 but proceeded in earnest after the beginning of World War I, once 
likeminded pacifists and radicals flocked to Zürich. An exhibit on Monte Verità  that Laban saw 
in 1912 while he was in Vienna convinced him and Perrotet that they should move to 
Switzerland.    
72 The essential source for Monté Verità is still Harald Szeemann, Monté Verità: Berg der 
Wahrheit, exh. cat. (Milan: Electra Editrice, 1978); see also Martin Green, Mountain of Truth; the 
Counterculture Begins, Ascona 1900-1920, (Hanover, University Press of New England, 1986). 
73 Hodgson and Preston-Dunlap, op cit, 35.  The Laban Center in London is still a very active 
institution.  http://www.laban.org/. 
74 Evelyn Doerr, Rudolf Laban: The Dancer of the Crystal (Lanham, Toronto, and Plymouth: 
Scarecrow Press, 2008), 43.  Doerr is currently compiling a collection of Laban’s letters. Wundt’s 
notions of mind and body were part of Laban’s early studies of anatomy while he lived in Paris 
and studied art and architecture from 1900-1910.  He had also pursued more pathological variants 
of movement by investigating the relationship between insanity and expressive gesture during 
frequent visits to an asylum at St. Maurice. 
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 “Art needs an operation.” – Tristan Tzara1 
  
This chapter outlines Zürich Dada artistic practice as varying manifestations of 
critical address to Wundt’s theories of the functional interaction between nerves and 
thought as it appeared in manifestations of Lebensreform. First, I outline Hugo Ball’s pre-
Dada experiences in Munich, which provided awareness of both the Dalcroze method and 
more radical uses of it in the German theatre. From this general framing, I consider 
particular instances of artistic practice in Zürich within three separate categories of 
performance, art, and language. Based on this initial analysis, I return to the broader 
practices of chance and spontaneity in the practices of Zürich Dada to the historical 
context in which these phenomena triggered nervous change. I focus on Ball’s 
performances of sound poems as taking Laban’s ideas and practices of the Freitanz and 
carrying these methods to the stage space. In the collaborative art of Sophie Taeuber and 
Hans Arp, they applied notions of improvised movement from Laban’s free dance as the 
means of artistic creation. The chapter concludes with an extensive examination of the 
ways in which Tristan Tzara’s extensive theories of language drew on and modified 




In order to place a semblance of organization over what is arguably the most disorganized 
group in the history of art, I have divided forms of expression that Dadaists understood as 
inseparable. Thus, my ultimate goal is to establish the critical approach to physiological 
psychology and Lebensreform that enabled Zürich Dadaists to approach every kind of art 
as a movement art (Bewegungskunst) or a chance to rearrange space (Raumgestaltung) in 
a polyrhythmic or (more often) arrhythmic fashion.  
 
Ball in Munich 
While living in Munich before WWI, Hugo Ball learned about many applications 
of physiological psychology in culture. He first learned of Wundt’s theories during his 
university study in Munich from 1906-1910, where he attended the lectures of Theodor 
Lipps, who incorporated the Leipzig psychologist’s theories into his lectures on aesthetics 
to such an extent that for the young Hugo Ball, artistic expression and physiological 
psychology were facets of a single inquiry.2 Lipps provided him with the groundwork for 
encounters with more radical approaches to Wundt’s work by artists whom he would 
soon meet. 
Ball’s extensive involvement with avant-garde theatre in Munich gave him 
contact with people who utilized techniques of modifying human neurophysiology as the 
bases of expressive and social reform. Certain of them had adopted elements of the 
Dalcroze method into either their tutelage of young actors or their own independent 
artistic practices. Against the protests of his family, Ball had abandoned his university 
studies in 1910 and enrolled in courses on acting and stage design at the Deutsches 




Reinhardt’s school is cloudy in terms of specifics, but it is extremely likely that it 
included a study of the Dalcroze method, which was a central element of the director’s 
curriculum.4  
While in Munich, Ball also encountered the actor Frank Wedekind (1864-1918), 
who had met Dalcroze during a visit to Hellerau that same year and had incorporated 
eurhythmic gestures into his stage performances, which caused a great deal of 
controversy in his audience.5 That Wedekind was a major inspiration for Ball cannot be 
doubted. He read portions of the actor’s works as part of two literary readings at the 
Cabaret Voltaire on February 5 and 6, 1916. Wedekind or Reinhardt may also have 
encouraged Ball’s trip to the Dalcroze Institute at Hellerau toward the end of 1913.6  
At Hellerau, Ball was unimpressed by the polished attempt at synthetic expression 
in stage productions, but did take to the pedagogical exercises of the Turnen as shown to 
him by Dalcroze’s patron Wolf Dohrn. He wrote to his sister that of all the performers he 
saw during his trip, students of eurhythmics were the most modern.7 As outlined in the 
previous chapter, Dalcroze’s intentions for culture and expression were rather 
conservative in comparison to the stridency of the German Expressionist stage. However, 
his methods of reorienting an individual to culture through neural modification inspired 
many different applications of Dalcroze’s basic theories to divergent ends by figures in 
German-speaking culture.8  
Another artist Ball met in Munich was Wassily Kandinsky (1866-1944), whose 
uncle translated Wundt’s Grundzüge into Russian in 1912, the same year that the two 
men became friends. The Russian artist encouraged his embrace of the new philosophy of 




extremely disappointed when the outbreak of WWI dashed his hopes for collaborating 
with Kandinsky on a new form of theatre and an associated publication akin to the Blaue 
Reiter Almanach.10 Kandinsky’s theories offered Ball some of the most profound 
approaches to physiological psychology as the means to reform expression. For example, 
Kandinsky’s 1911 text On the Spiritual in Art outlined the painter’s belief that an artist 
had to approach all forms of artistic expression as different facets of bodily motion that 
one had to merge in order to achieve more potent expression: 
The achievement of the dance-art of the future will make possible the first 
ebullition of the art of spiritual harmony—the true stage composition. The 
composition for the new theatre will consist of these three elements: 
(1) Musical movement 
(2) Pictorial movement 
(3) Physical movement 
And these three, properly combined, make up the spiritual movement, which is 
the working of the inner harmony. They will be interwoven in harmony and 
discord as are the two chief elements of painting, form and color.11  
Ball’s friendship with Kandinsky allowed him to consider Wundt’s ideas in intellectual 
contexts that fell entirely outside the classroom of Lipps and adoptions of eurhythmics in 
theatre.12   
Kandinsky believed that an artist’s integration of body, mind, and spirit could 
engender a new harmony and make art the gateway to higher planes of existence and 




vibrations with the formal nature of his or her work in a manner that opened the body’s 
neural paths to the rhythms of the soul:  
It is because of the elementary stage reached by our painting that we are so little 
able to grasp the inner harmony of true color and form composition. The nerve 
vibrations are there, certainly, but they get no further than the nerves, because the 
corresponding vibrations of the spirit which they call forth are too weak. When 
we remember, however, that spiritual experience is quickening, that positive 
science, the firmest basis of human thought, is tottering, that dissolution of matter 
is imminent, we have reason to hope that the hour of pure composition is not far 
away. 13  
As Steiner, whom Kandinsky cited in this text, had sought to do, the artist believed that 
new art could draw on Wundt’s science of the senses in cultivating neural change as the 
basis of an evolution toward higher realms of consciousness, thereby achieving a 
connection between the vibrating nerves of the sensory world and the vibrations of the 
soul. Art could be the stimulus for neural development that cultivated a person’s soul and 
redeemed the spiritual health of modern society.14  
Ball’s friendship with Kandinsky allowed him to learn of radical new approaches 
to Wundt’s theories that had begun to unfold in the context of the Blaue Reiter group. 
Along with familiarizing Ball with the work of the Russian Futurist poets, who shared 
Laban’s fascination with Wundt’s theories of language, Kandinsky introduced Ball to the 
composer Thomas von Hartmann (1885-1956) before the war, who so impressed Ball that 
he sought to include an essay by Hartmann in his ill-fated work on the theatre.15 As a 




theatre, Ball likely read with great interest Hartmann’s notion from his essay “Anarchy in 
Music” in the Blaue Reiter almanac, which argued for social reform that began with the 
senses. According to Hartmann, “the germ of the ideal future function of hearing is 
already present in the ears we now have, and the law of an ideal hearing will basically be 
related to the laws of our present hearing, despite its great distance from our time.”16 In a 
manner that resembles Kandinsky’s goal to use art in processes of mental evolution, 
Hartmann’s essay typifies the manner in which the Blaue Reiter approached the senses 
and neural connections to the brain as raw material that art could restructure in a manner 
that triggered a physiological evolution in the shared thought patterns of society.  
As a musician, Ball surely read another essay in the Almanach by Nikolai Kulbin 
(1868-1917) entitled “Free Music,” in which he called for “new dissonances with new 
resolutions,” or the use of new sounds to induce nervous change in the listener.17 As 
Charlotte Douglas has shown, Kulbin had studied Wundt’s work extensively and 
introduced or popularized his ideas for Russian artists, and it is likely that Wundt’s ideas 
on noise and dissonance, which Ball likely knew from his study with Lipps, were sources 
for Kulbin’s theories of free music.18 These diverse and idealist usages of Wundt’s 
psychology differed entirely from the more traditionalist models of Lipps that Ball had 
encountered at university. As a young man, Ball embraced the Blaue Reiter’s different 
uses of physiological psychology to reform society through culture. These connections 
indicate that by the time he arrived in Zürich, Ball knew many diverse usages of 
physiological psychology as the foundation for various programs of artistic and social 
reform. In general, his friends in Munich believed that valid expression had to alter the 




supposedly dissonant experiences, but would question the evolutionary trajectory that 
Kandinsky plotted as a necessity and subsequently fashion the neural body as an 
expressive instrument to far more critical and jarring ends. 
 
Dada in the Space of Pedagogy: Connections to Pestalozzi 
They would do so in spaces connected to major philosophies of Lebensreform. 
Despite the truisms of Dada’s utter radicality and break with traditions of all kinds, it is 
surprising to encounter the extent of its connections to more conventional reformist 
movements in Zürich—connections that they used to their advantage as a foil for their 
more critical endeavors. For example, Hans Coray (1880-1974) was the director of the 
Pestalozzi school in Zürich and came as close as anyone to being a patron of Zürich 
Dada.19 His connections to Dada during the early years of its tenure in Zürich, 
particularly when Ball was still connected to the group, allows one to comprehend the 
nature of divergence in Dada’s approach to the grounding ideas of physiological 
psychology and Lebensreform. Coray was the owner of the gallery which Ball and 
Tristan Tzara ran for eleven weeks beginning in March 1917 and eventually renamed the 
Galerie Dada. This space became the central site of many key Dada events following the 
abandonment of the Cabaret Voltaire in July 1916. Placing Dada back in comparative 
proximity with the more idealist outlooks of Lebensreform against which the group 
reacted requires familiarity with Pestalozzi’s reformist pedagogy and its reliance on 
physiological psychology.  
Coray’s Pestalozzischule was named after the early nineteenth-century Swiss 




extremely popular during the First World War.20 This seems an odd, even anachronistic 
connection to consider in the historical context of a radical movement like Dada, but the 
relationship could not be more prescient with respect to Dada’s radical engagement of the 
neural body as the means to change life and society. Many figures in Lebensreform 
embraced the Pestalozzian notion that education—for them, an evolution in 
consciousness—had to cultivate a person’s latent, inner powers. Coray’s affiliation with 
the Pestalozzischule and Dada gains significance upon learning of Pestalozzi’s basic 
concepts of pedagogy, which shed further light on the nature of Dada’s tactical approach 
to discourses of physiological psychology and social reform.  
 Pestalozzi was inspired by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Émile (1762), his lengthy 
treatise on the education of young children, and by the French Revolution, which 
Pestalozzi saw as an event that placed power in the hands of those who were too poor 
(and thus too poorly educated) to self-govern in a rational manner.21 Despite the 
immediate shortcomings of le peuple, Pestalozzi believed that the sources of social well-
being lay within the individual and needed to be gradually cultivated in the proper 
manner. Based on this tenet, he developed his overall theoretical system of elementary 
school, and directed several experimental institutes throughout Switzerland, all of which 
eventually failed due to his lack of budgetary acumen.22 Although he was an adherent of 
Rousseau, Pestalozzi did not share the French writer’s knack for delivering well-
organized statements on his pedagogical systems. Thus, twentieth-century readers had no 
Émile from the Swiss teacher, but instead drew on the many works of secondary literature 




In this secondary literature, the theories of Pestalozzi became more strongly 
connected to physiological psychology than in his original texts. Most studies of 
Pestalozzi that appeared during the fin-de-siècle and early twentieth century played up 
considerably the connections of his ideas to the dominant field of physiological 
psychology and often focused on his indebtedness to the early psychologist and 
philosopher Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), whose 1824 text Psychologie als 
Wissenschaft informed many of Pestalozzi’s pedagogical ideas and had, by the end of the 
nineteenth-century, acquired status as an early masterwork of psychology.23 Herbart 
argued that psychology should rely on observation of direct experience, in which one 
considered interactions of different mental capacities like representation [Vorstellung] 
and sensation [Fühlen], but without resorting to experiment.24 Herbart did not test 
phenomena of nervous physiology as Wundt did, but he nonetheless recognized the role 
physiology played in the formation of intellect and summarized the connections with 
three basic postulates. First, he argued that bodily conditions can hinder the arousal of an 
idea. Second, and in contrast to the first point, bodily conditions may facilitate an idea’s 
appearance. Third, Herbart also believed that gesture expressed the relative strength of an 
idea and instanced cooperation between the soul and the body. These conditions were 
ultimately metaphysical, because Herbart argued that every idea ultimately contained the 
determining energy [Kraft] of its appearance, rather than the bodily conditions that 
formed the focus of Wundt’s experiments. Herbart argued that the strength of an idea 
determined its clearness and would decide whether it would surpass a threshold of 
awareness or limen of consciousness and arise in a person’s mind. While Herbart argued 




strengths into a more modern context of experiment and testing by establishing the 
dependence of Kraft on varying levels of innervation in the conductive structure of the 
nervous system, which formed in direct relation to experience. In this way, Wundt 
believed that his method avoided the epistemological pitfalls of using the intellect to 
consider intellect. 
 Pestalozzi’s popularity in Zürich during the time of Dada was due to the 
connections his twentieth century readers made between the gestural nature of his 
learning exercises and the neural bases of Kraft that Wundt had established as 
determining the quality of ideas. Pestalozzi encouraged cultivation of the young child’s 
inner potentialities of head, hand, and heart, which required training the student in 
forming three different kinds of Kraft, or particular energies of creative bodily skill sets: 
intellectual [Geisteskraft], practical [Kunstkraft], and moral [Herzenskraft].25 He argued 
that if the senses were the bases of all experience and intellectual function, then one had 
to train these senses to clearly distinguish objects as the basis for knowledge training in 
different fields. 26   
Pestalozzi’s methods emphasized a high level of physical interaction in the 
learning processes, so that as students handled objects and gestured with them, they came 
to know the interaction of sense data, bodily motion, language, and ideas in a social 
environment. Lessons that were inherently tactile or based on bodily movement were 
intended to strengthen the most basic peripheral channels of innervation and cultivated 
techniques of sensory focus on objects from everyday life. This was Bildung of the 
body—cultivation was a gradually ascending process of complexity. Thus, for 




pebbles, sticks, or buttons in a manner that allowed for a progressive understanding of 
number, size, and name as inextricable elements of a single idea. As a student counted, he 
or she would count not only numbers but particular objects (“one stone,” “one button,” 
etc.) and immediately absorb language as a sensory property in direct relationship to 
tactile encounters. The group nature of these exercises and the attention given to language 
(which Pestalozzi, like Wundt, drew from Herder) created a structure that cultivated 
intellectual development according to the intake of distinct sense data in immediate 
connection to social values of language and concept.27 Following the belief among 
physiological psychologists that touch was the most rudimentary of the senses, Pestalozzi 
argued that these tactile exercises formed the bases of intuitive sense perceptions or 
Anschauungen, in which sensory and moral qualities appeared as inextricably attached to 
particular objects in the sensory world. Small children counting buttons seems a far cry 
from the uproar of Dada, but other methods of Pestalozzi’s curriculum illuminate the 
activist nature of Dada performances that occurred in coordination with exhibitions in 
spaces owned by a figure whose school included this pedagogy.  
Tactility and movement had appeared in the counting exercises, but in the domain 
of Kunstkraft, students undertook different movement exercises that allowed them to give 
external expression to impulses of the mind in the world of the senses. Pestalozzi argued 
that drawing and rhythmic group calisthenics best facilitated the development of 
Kunstkraft. By drawing, the young child learned a manner of concrete reaction to direct 
sense perception that fostered his or her spatial awareness. Drawing was a way in which 
the head, hand, and heart all interacted with space. The finished work mattered little—the 




relation between his or her mind and surroundings by having him or her move graphically 
in immediate reaction to sense data.28 The works instanced sensory structures that were in 
the process of working toward a more harmonious sense of space and a person’s place 
within it. The child’s drawing was a move toward more sanctioned forms of knowledge. 
In this vein of building Kraft out of new gestural interactions with space, rhythmic group 
movement was a more complex means to foster this harmonious relationship between 
body, mind, and space. As Pestalozzi wrote in an 1807 essay titled “On the Training of 
the Body: An Introduction to Elementary Gymnastics,” students benefitted exponentially 
from “a series of exercises for every part of the body arranged in a continuous order and 
designed to comprise the whole range of articulated movements which the child will 
eventually have to perform.”29 Pestalozzi reasoned that if elementary bodily movements 
were the basis of all practical skills, then movement drills allowed for further enrichment 
of bodily and mental powers. These gymnastic exercises showed students the ways in 
which properly applied physical strength enabled a more efficient knowledge of both 
intellectual and moral faculties. Pestalozzi thought that a sound mind was the result of a 
sound body, which his later interpreters understood as entailing a rhythmically 
functioning nervous system. 
 For readers during the time of Dada, Pestalozzi’s methods appeared as a 
pioneering effort of Lebensreform. This new context of readers saw his work in a more 
materialist light, in which the innervation structures of young children underwent a 
concerted building through sensory and ambulatory exercises. Within this new context, 
the potentialities of psychophysiological alteration promised by drawing and new 




the graphic and gymnastic dimensions of Kunstkraft, the goal was to develop by 
graduated instances of practical skill [Fertigkeit] a high degree of what Pestalozzi’s early 
twentieth-century readers called “nerve tact,” a decidedly non-scientific term that they 
defined as improved innervation in motor movements that strengthened the relationship 
between intellectual and executive actions of the thinking and moving body in space.31  
Figures in the Lebensreform movement were quick to make the connections 
between Pestalozzi’s ideas and their own practices. Dalcroze, for example, in an essay 
from 1905 titled “Music Teaching in Schools,” bemoaned the fact that “The theories of 
Pestalozzi . . . on the musical training of young children have been adopted only by 
private schools.”32 In a 1924 lecture on karmic relationships, Steiner reminded his 
adherents that the supposedly radical ideas Pestalozzi had toward education—particularly 
the training of the mind through exercises of the body—triggered energies in a student’s 
etheric or astral bodies and indicated why “children received infinite benefit from his 
educational principles.”33 In the early twentieth-century, these ideas fit neatly into the 
Swiss Lebensreform movement and its approach to shaping the neural body into 
triggering social reform of artistic, anarchist, or mystical orientations.34 These 
recognitions were conceived as reciprocal, as well.  
The context of Dada in Zürich included immediate connections between the 
Pestalozzi school and the eurhythmics of Dalcroze. In 1915, Coray hired Marie Elisabeth 
Scheiblauer (1891-1968) to teach eurhythmics at the Pestalozzischule in Zürich.35 She 
had studied with Dalcroze from 1908-1911 and worked for Coray in developing rhythmic 
group movements under the basic philosophies of both Dalcroze and Pestalozzi, which 




Correspondence between Scheiblauer and Ball exists and it is likely that she witnessed 
some of the Dada events in Zürich, given her connections to Coray and her likely 
familiarity with Perrottet and Wigman, who studied with Dalcroze at the same time she 
did.36 Coray also commissioned Hans Arp and Otto van Rees to decorate the walls of his 
school with murals, which were painted over in 1919, once Dada events in Zürich 
became more abrasive and made the association to his school appear negative.37  
Ball understood the ideological dimensions of Germany’s connections to 
Pestalozzi, which makes the association of the movement to the school appear to 
undercut the hopes for a teleological reformation of the self promoted by supporters of 
Pestalozzi and the broader optimism of Lebensreform. Writing on the expulsion of Fichte 
from Jena over the philosopher’s Wissenschaftslehre and the controversy associated to it, 
which led to the philosopher being accused of atheism and nihilism, Ball wrote that 
Fichte nonetheless “urged the young people . . . to cleave to the state, and he urged the 
state to follow Pestalozzi’s methods to produce Pestalozzian teachers for the education of 
these youth. A purely Fichtean formula for freedom, dictated by poor memory and 
inexhaustible optimism.”38 Ball saw this moment in history as a time in which physical 
culture was closely tied to state obedience and seems to imply that it can only ever be a 
tool of authoritarianism, whether of politics or creativity. 
It is impossible, I would argue, to understand the appearance of Dada in Zürich 
without comprehending the extensive readings of physiological psychology in spheres of 
cultural practice and social reform with which the group had extensive contact. Thus, in 




up and follow one of these different models. It was, instead, based on a selective 
consumption informed by more critical underlying motives. 
Ball and World War I 
When Ball moved to Zürich in May 1915, his approach to these ideas of 
psychology and expression had undergone an irreversible metamorphosis based on his 
experience of the war. His weak health kept him out of the military, but it did not dampen 
his curiosity for seeing the fighting firsthand. After two weeks of seeing row upon row of 
soldiers’ graves and bombed out rubble in Northeastern France, the exasperated young 
man wrote in his diary: “You know, I would really like to understand, to comprehend. It 
is the total mass of machinery and the devil himself that has broken loose now.”39 It must 
have appeared to Ball that the dreams of Kandinsky for an evolution of consciousness 
gained by a coordination of movement arts—which at its base was a manipulation of 
collective, neural capacities—was tinged by the militaristic applications of Körperkultur 
in Germany before and during WWI. In his 1920 essay “En Avant Dada,” for example, 
Ball’s colleague Richard Huelsenbeck was explicit concerning the prominence of 
rhythmic group movement in the lead up to war: “Germany was seized with the mood 
that always precedes a so-called idealistic resurrection, an orgy à la Turnvater-Jahn, a 
Schenkendorf period.”40 In his condemnation of the war, Huelsenbeck called attention to 
the enabling of collective thought in the reformist dimension of group motion in 
Lebensreform, onto which various state figures had grafted a nationalist military spirit. 
When he arrived in Zürich, Ball was against the notion that a single physiologically 
constructed modality of ascending complexity in the realm of consciousness could 




Considering certain of Ball’s diary entries in relationship to one another 
illuminates his sense of the ways in which one could work with physiological psychology 
in order to undermine its stated theories, the social reformist models that relied on it, and 
construct a model of expression that would avoid being co-opted by its developmental 
assumptions. He expressed his general suspicion of the objectivity within this science a 
few months before the Cabaret opened, writing that “psychology is only an explanation 
of intellectual and cultural phenomena by biological hypotheses; it is a destructive trend 
with which all psychology will cease rather than receive fresh impetus.”41 Ball’s 
suspicion of this psychology motivated his revolutionary use of it in the sphere of radical 
artistic expression. He soon began describing his goal as cultivating the body’s potential 
energies in order to create new forms of expression and thought: “The question is only if 
we can break through to this spark without tearing down the walls that confine and stifle 
it. From a sociological point of view, man is a crust formation. If the crust is destroyed, 
perhaps the core is too.”42 Ball’s suspicion of physiological psychology and 
Lebensreform was the first step toward his critical refashioning of its basic theories into 
revolutionary forms of culture.  
For Ball, the “spark,” or interior energy of potential nervous structures, had to be 
triggered by abrasive sorts of vibrations in the sphere of culture that would go through the 
body’s periphery or “crust” into the neural tissue, thereby altering it. Ball described this 
idea in a diary entry, in which he has reworked Hartmann’s earlier emphases on inner 
potentials of the sensory organs as the site of mental change, but has effaced entirely the 
evolutionist aims of the composer to reform the life of culture by cultivating pre-existent 




himself.”43 Ball’s experience of the war and the general ill view of society brought on by 
exile and poverty fueled his suspicion of Expressionism, but he retained an interest in 
altering the nervous bases of consciousness by introducing new forms of bodily 
movement in a manner that used the discourse of Lebensreform against itself.44 
Like Wundt’s physiological psychology, the discourses of Lebensreform that used 
these theories in the search to alter the collective mind through the bodies of its subjects 
were themselves open for uses that deviated from the redemptive ambitions of the 
movement. Ball’s diary clearly shows his awareness of the need to take the means of 
these different reformist methods and divert the formative trajectories toward more 
intense and heterogeneous experiences and expression. These lines from his diary are the 
clearest statement on this overall critical project: 
 People will not see that a revolution cannot be “made” except by an accelerated  
relearning. The reversal in Germany will presumably come from the disorder and 
defenselessness. That cannot be made; it makes itself. One can try to do justice to 
the facts and to the intrinsic style of the times. If things rumble, let them rumble. 
A new basis will emerge.45 
Ball’s hopes for an accelerated relearning came from a cultivating of discordant gestures 
within this context of reformist groups that pursued various connections between the 
neurophysiological body and reformed social harmony. But they did not reject the notion 






Comprehending the ways in which Zürich Dada used the neural body and its 
place as the basis of group expression lies in the different usages by its proponents of 
chance, improvisation, and spontaneity in the sense these terms had in the context as key 
means to alter neurophysiologial phenomena. These concepts were mainstays in Dada. 
For example, as the artist Marcel Janco acknowledged, “All our sketches were of an 
improvised nature, full of fantasy, freshness, and the unexpected. There were few 
costumes, little direction, and few sets.”46 Even in scripted works, chance occurrence was 
always welcome. In a lecture on Dada from 1922, Tzara declared, “What we want now is 
spontaneity. Not because it is better or more beautiful than anything else. But because 
everything that issues freely from ourselves without the intervention of speculative ideas, 
represents us.”47 Chance was a mainstay in Dada artmaking, but the notion generally 
appears in literature on the movement as undefined, save for its hermeneutic 
consequences—namely, deskilling, criticism of the creative individual, or the generation 
of a more process-based creative orientation, all of which are ahistorical notions that one 
can apply to any use of the technique in the twentieth-century.48 Chance has certain 
meanings in particular contexts and the bodily, neural consequences of chance in the 
historical context of Zürich Dada illuminate the reasons for its use. 
Laban’s Freitanz exercises most likely inspired the Dadaist interest in spontaneity 
and chance as experiences that changed the nerves in unexpected ways. Numerous 
collaborations of Laban’s students with the Dadaists make any separation of their artistic 
activities a false division.49 Scholars have acknowledged the importance of the 
relationships between Dadaists in Zürich and students of Laban’s school, but it has been 




groups drew equally from physiological psychology and its outline of nervous and mental 
change, as did other groups in Switzerland.50 Laban’s notion that chance was a means of 
nervous change and his use of Wundt’s theory that language was a form of gesture 
became major intellectual sources for Dada, which the group used in new ways.   
Dada artists offered various praises of Laban, his school, and his students.51 Hans 
Richter reminisced that, “If the Café Odéon was our terrestrial base, our celestial 
headquarters was Laban’s ballet school.”52  Ball’s fascination with these exercises is 
apparent in a short essay on Laban that appeared in the November 15, 1917 issue of the 
Berner Intelligenzblatt. Laban, Ball argued, had taken pedagogy beyond a mere 
development of abilities and had created a way to educate artists: 
Since Herr von Laban moved his dance school from Munich to Zürich in 1913, 
that Institute has grown in its self consciousness and the scope of its curriculum. 
Today, the Laban school has, in the necessary evolution of its basic concept, far 
outgrown what a dance school of traditional type can offer its students. It has 
developed into an institute that allows not only for the development of abilities, 
but also the education of an artist. As education of the whole person, it spans the 
entire breadth of eurhythmy. It is a matter not only of technique; it is especially an 
art pedagogy, of which dance, tone, and word are only the practical domains of 
the culture of expression. Aside from the nurturing of his spiritual and physical 
talents, the student shall also have the opportunity to learn/grasp how his art 
relates to the rhythmic and cultural whole. 53 
For Ball, Laban took full advantage of the potential breadth of eurhythmics and expanded 




increased the Kraft of expression in the group. Previously distinct categories of 
expression like speech and gesture became dimensions of neural energy and the means to 
cultivate within the body a new expressive form.  
A student in Laban’s school who received an education in dance, sound, and word 
was able to cultivate mental and physical talents, in order to connect his/her particular 
techniques of expression to a collective awareness of rhythmic, cultural wholeness.54 
Dadaists also became attached to Laban’s dancers. In addition to Arp and Tzara 
becoming romantically involved with, respectively, Sophie Taeuber and Maya Chrusecz, 
many Dada publications contain laudatory reactions to dance and performance. For 
example, a poem by Tzara called “Carnage Abracadabraut” published in the last Dada 
journal from Zürich called Der Zeltweg (November 1919), appeared below a photograph 
of Laban’s colleague Mary Wigman:  
 l’antenne tremble sous l’abat-jour, cuisine de sabbats meteorologiques, baggage,  
soupe / stellaire dans l’ouragan lueur solonnelle / strident éclairage DO majeur 
projections d’hélices et poudre blanche dans la bouteille clé / de 1er ordre 
garantie pour toutes les malles / je m’amuse dans le triangle de fer.55 
The title of Tzara’s poem captured not only the power of Wigman’s art, but it also 
lionized the corporeal mutation triggered in the body by new movements, which is the 
basic concept that informed the overlap between the Labanschule and the Dada circle. 
Tzara’s lines on Wigman may have been inspired by participating in and witnessing a 
notorious soiree in May 1919 that involved what is perhaps the most coordinated 
intermingling of Dada artists and Laban students.  This evening featured Sophie 




other Laban students wearing masks and costumes designed by Marcel Janco and dancing 
before a large painted screen designed by Richter and Arp.  According to Tzara’s 
“Chronique Zürichois,” Arp also helped design the costumes.  Laban’s students also 
performed dances that Ball and Tzara had separately choreographed.  Another key 
performance was Tzara’s simultaneous poem for seven voices, Sous les ponts de Paris, 
so-called for the intermittent invasion of the popular tune over the voices of his seven 
performers, all of whom were Laban’s students.  
Their radical use of chance as a technique of neurophysiological change informed 
their reframing of cultural expression as producing discordant, base vibrations and 
currents that altered the mind. This practice had two consequences. First, it diverted 
techniques of Wundtian inquiry away from taxonomy toward uncharted territories of 
elemental group experience and expressive ways of knowing. In probing this 
consequence, Dada was no different than the Labanschule, but on this point, the 
similarities end. Second, in their use of chance, improvisation, and spontaneity in the 
spaces of performance, Dadaists approached performance, poetry, and plastic art as a site 
in which elemental nervous impulses could continually change in a manner that created 
an inherently fugitive and elemental sense of selfhood and community. 
Chance was a mode of laboratory practice, but in that scientific context it sprang 
from a pre-established structure. Upon establishing a mean threshold of intensity, 
psychologists would then arbitrarily modify the nature or intensity of the stimulus 
(generally an electric current or vibration) as a way to test the subject’s experience 
thresholds. Laban’s familiarity with Wundt’s work allowed him to adopt the bodily 




initial means to wear down the body’s previously constituted practices and habits—the 
very structures Wundt and his students were trying to study and map. Laban gave a 
considerable dimension of neural consequence to any spontaneous form of movement, 
whether of the limbs or the organs of articulation in improvised vocalization—in short, 
anything that would increase a person’s sensations of new spatial rhythm. In Laban’s 
courses, this initial modification of the body’s ambulatory systems of expression 
provided the basis for an ascendant construction of rhythmic expressive movements that 
would eventually communicate ideas of higher reality through non-verbal means in his 
purpose plays. In this context, then, chance was the most elemental trigger of 
neurophysiological alteration. 
 Dadaists avoided the graduated buildup of wholeness in Laban’s courses, but 
embraced the dynamism and unpredictability of spontaneity and chance that were 
features of the Freitanz. For example, before a performance by some of Laban’s students 
at the Cabaret on May 30, 1916, Ball and his friends had gathered to prepare the space for 
the event. Marcel Janco had constructed some masks for the dancers to wear (fig. 14). 
When he arrived, the Dadaists participated in a collective and improvisational exercise 
that followed very closely the general characteristics of Laban’s Freitanz. As Ball 
recounted in his diary: 
 We were all there when Janco arrived with his masks, and everyone immediately 
 put one on. Then something strange happened. Not only did the mask 
 immediately call for a costume; it also demanded a quite definite, passionate 
 gesture, bordering on madness. Although we could not have imagined it five 




 festooned and draped with impossible objects, each one of us trying to outdo the 
 other in inventiveness.56 
These lines suggest the ways in which the artists investigated the unpredictability of the 
Freitanz and its consequences of spontaneous nervous mutation. Janco’s masks created a 
new sensation of spatial rhythm that encouraged an improvisational exploration of chance 
compositions in space consisting of movement, voice, objects, costumes, and music, 
which Ball improvised on the piano. The decidedly chaotic nature of these actions had an 
underlying philosophy of expressive movement that the Dadaists had gleaned from 
Laban. 
In his diary, Ball described the event exactly like a Freitanz: one sensation of 
spatial rhythm gave rise to other spontaneous forms of motion, vocalization, and 
expression. Considered as a Freitanz, these investigations of spontaneous expression 
were significant in the sense that each mode of expression contributed new forms of felt 
vibrations in the bodies of the performers, who reacted accordingly with spontaneous 
motion, each encouraging the others to invent more extreme gestures. Consequent neural 
change that arose from spontaneous action had a value in itself, one that Dadaists pursued 
far more extensively than Laban. Ball was careful to indicate that the actions taken could 
not have been imagined prior to their undertaking, which emphasized their improvised, 
spontaneous nature. A few weeks later, he took the crucial step of bringing this scenario 
of spontaneous gesture onto the stage. 
Witnessing dances by Laban students at the Cabaret partially inspired his now 
legendary sound poems or Lautgedichten. These works included Gadji beri bimba, 




known as Karawane), which were first performed at the Cabaret Voltaire on June 23, 
1916 to an audience that included Laban and Mary Wigman, along with the expected 
retinue of Dadaists.57 The next day, when Ball recounted his performance, he focused on 
the radical new phenomena of interaction that occurred between his bodily movements 
and semi-improvisational recitation of poetic script. If Ball had a plan for this 
performance before it began, then he did not follow it.  
The famous photograph of Ball in his painted cardboard costume does little to 
suggest the artist’s spontaneous filling of space with new nervous energies of motion (fig. 
15). He recalled that his friends had to carry him onto the stage, because he could not 
walk in his elaborate costume.58  Restricting prior capacities of the body created new 
sensations of spatial rhythm and gave way to improvised gestures and vocal intonations. 
Before the audience, he moved back and forth between three easels that surrounded him 
on the stage, “flapping my wings energetically.”59  At a certain point in the proceedings, 
Ball realized that “if I wanted to remain serious (and I wanted to at all costs), my method 
of expression would not be equal to the pomp of my staging.”60 Intonation had to change 
immediately. His vocalizations became less like language and more like musical tones, 
and in true improvisational spirit, he acknowledged, “I do not know what gave me the 
idea of this music.”61 The extended intonations of his script did not have a defined meter 
or tempo, which guaranteed that any performance would be unique.  
Ball’s subsequent performances of his sound poems indicate his attempt to make 
each recitation differ from previous instances. One way Ball achieved this quality for his 
work relied on ideas of the Freitanz in his pursuit of chance as a collective experience. 




improvisational dance routine by the artist and dancer Sophie Taeuber, which she 
performed in coordination with Ball’s recitation of his Lautgedichten (fig. 16).62  Ball’s 
diary entry that recounts the evening extolled the neurophysiological alteration that an 
improvisational combination of movement could create within an artist as he or she 
experienced new sensations of spatial rhythm. His language is indebted almost entirely to 
the basic tropes of physiological psychology. In this case, it did not progress past base 
intensities and those intensities always changed:  
 Abstract dances: a gong beat is enough to stimulate the dancer’s body to make the  
 most fantastic movements.  The dance has become an end in itself.  The nervous 
system exhausts all the vibrations of the sound, and perhaps all the hidden 
emotion of the gong beater too, and turns them into an image.  Here, in this 
special case, a poetic sequence of sounds was enough to make each of the 
individual word particles produce the strangest visible effect on the hundred-
jointed body of the dancer . . . a dance full of flashes and edges, full of dazzling 
light and penetrating intensity.63 
The improvised and experimental coordination of these different expressive types of 
movement art—consisting of articulatory movements and more palpable bodily 
gestures—marked a carryover of Laban’s Freitanz into the spaces of performance. Ball 
has outlined how the vibrations of utterance and gong beats were chance stimuli that 
triggered Taeuber’s improvised dance and initiated neurophysiological alteration, thus 
making her dance valid as “an end in itself,” because any experimental treatment of 
movement was an exercise in nervous alteration. His description of the “hundred-jointed” 




speech clarify the need among Dadaists to increase feelings of “penetrating intensity,” or 
new phenomena of neural change that physically alter consciousness. Reacting to sudden 
modifications of sensory and spatial conditions became an essential aspect of 
experiencing culture for both artists and audience. It was not just a new form of 
aesthetics.  
Based on these characteristics of his work, one may surmise that when Ball 
stripped tonalities of utterance from cultural convention as new forms of sound gestures 
[Lautgebärden], one of his possible ambitions was to fashion the voice into an instrument 
that sent new vibrations of utterance into the tissues of himself and his audience. His 
experimental poetry contained a dimension of spontaneous embodiment, in which new 
forms of vibratory speech altered the neural body and its overall connection to space.64 
He returned the voice to a more elementary level of a moving organ. Examining later 
performances of his sound poems enables a reading of Ball’s poetry as a pursuit of 
continual nervous change at base levels of vibrating tissues.  
In contrast to Laban’s uses of improvisation as preparatory means, Ball 
improvised on the stage space itself. His work was a newly forged coordination of 
gestures and words that one may consider as a corporeal collage—that is, a spontaneous 
heterogeneity of bodily movements involving myriad nervous reactions to chance 
occurrences as the work of art. Ball’s work revealed the artist as one who underwent 
neural changes on stage, rather than a figure who projected ideas as an individual creative 
personality with an entirely pre-established intellect. In this reading of Ball’s intellectual 
and artistic endeavors, the historian confronts a shifting persona, in which the neural 




Artistic production has become an elemental, neural dynamism. The poet himself 
was decidedly graphic in declaring that this experimental approach to culture involved a 
forced and improvisational shaping of one’s own tissues: “The desperado as the 
experimental type. He has nothing to make allowances for, nothing to risk. He has his 
whole person at his disposal. He can be his own guinea pig and must submit to his own 
vivisection. Nobody can prevent him. What strange things one encounters here!”65 These 
explosive lines and other writing on the group by its artists that appear below strongly 
suggest that seemingly nonsensical or pathological activities in Zürich Dada were 
neurophysiological activations of unconventional and elemental neural intensities that 
sprang from spontaneous bodily reactions. In their hands, culture became deliberately 
experimental alterations of the nervous system. 
Ball described the spontaneity in Dada gesture as a form of social criticism. 
Becoming one’s own vivisectionist had an immediate political subtext: 
Our cabaret is a gesture [Gebärde]. Every word that is spoken and sung here says  
at least this one thing: that this humiliating age has not succeeded in winning our 
respect. What could be respectable and impressive about it? Its cannons? Our big 
drum drowns them. Its idealism? That has long been a laughingstock, in its 
popular and its academic edition. The grandiose slaughters and cannibalistic 
exploits? Our spontaneous foolishness and our enthusiasm for illusion will 
destroy them.66 
Gestures of spontaneous foolishness were, in fact, deadly serious, in that the performance 
of improvisational works of dance, poetry, and song were like the drum that often 




Every impulsive or unplanned action set forth elemental forms of nervous 
vibration that ate away at the conventional neural structures of higher thought. 
Continually refreshing these forms of disruption by repeatedly using chance exploded the 
teleology of body and mind in the materialist psychology that they used so strongly 
against itself. Reading the Dada use of chance as drawing on Laban’s critical use of 
physiological psychology in his Freitanz suggests two particular consequences for the 
nature of Dada art in relationship to what it built in place of this mechanized butchery 
described by Ball.  
First, the bodily dimension of chance gave their work a certain psychological 
quality that relied heavily on a particularly raw level of neural elementalism, or the basest 
conductive means that occurred in motion far below levels of volition or conscious 
thought. The continuous use of chance—that which dissolves habit—as a form of 
practice, or repeatedly employed creative technique—generated a potent and constructive 
contradiction in artistic method that turned artmaking into a continuously reactivated 
scenario of elemental neurophysiology. Dadaists wholeheartedly embraced the notion 
that chance could reactivate the basest neural impulses within the creation of their art. 
The gradual buildup of shared practices, habits, and thought patterns within the 
conventional social structures of Lebensreform never appeared. Ball described the social 
consequences of this focus on neural elementalism: 
One can almost say that when a belief in an object or a cause comes to an end, 
this object or cause returns to chaos and becomes common property. But perhaps 




withdrawl of faith before an entirely new edifice can be built up on a changed 
basis of belief.67 
Dada actions withheld the immediate summation of mental building through bodily 
motion that appeared in other contexts of embodied expression during this moment. 
Continual pursuit of this level short-circuited the physiological processes required for the 
gradual building of higher collective thought in and through the sphere of culture, as it 
appeared in any number of programs dedicated to Lebensreform. But Dadaists in Zürich 
did not reject the notion of community outright.  
Second, and in response to these graduated, collective bodily processes of social 
reform that appeared in places like Hellerau or the Labanschule, a notion of community 
based on shared experiences of comparatively elemental and inherently mutable nervous 
energies rose out of their collaborative works. Theirs was a community of base neural 
currents, rather than a superstructural variant of an entirely reformed society. In 
repeatedly undertaking impulsive and spontaneous artistic practices, Dada artists retained 
the usage of base neurophysiological stimuli that triggered the initial changes within 
revisionist modalities of Lebensreform, but they avoided the teleological nature of social 
rejuvenation that lay at the heart of these ostensibly forward-thinking pedagogical 
models. The most potent way to achieve this experience was to use the science on which 
these ideals were based. 
Basing community on shared experiences of elemental intensities of nervous 
change was a stark departure from the overall context of progressivist models of 
Lebensreform.68  For example, Tzara’s brief “Note 18 on Art,” which appeared in the first 




together with the same rudimentary neural structure that arose from coordinating 
movement arts:  
We want to make men better, make them understand that the only brotherhood  
lies in a moment of intensity in which the beautiful is life concentrated on the tip 
of a wire rising up to the bursting point, a blue trembling bound to the earth by 
our loving gaze which covers the peak with snow. A miracle.69   
Improvement was a shared experience of elemental neural intensities, which shifted 
creative focus to using the body as a system of movement energies that altered the neural 
foundations of thought. As Tzara stated in his subsequent “Chronique Zürichois” (1920) 
about the collective reaction to the ninth Dada soiree, “nerves liquefy muscles jump.”70 
The intensity of spontaneity was this and nothing more, but building this elemental 
community had a redemptive dimension for the group. For example, the day after the 
“hundred-jointed” Sophie Taeuber danced to recitations of Ball’s Lautgedichten, he 
wrote in his diary that the new art, whatever its medium, needed to be “sympathetic 
because in an age of total disruption it has conserved the will-to-the-image; because it is 
inclined to force the image, even though the means and parts be antagonistic . . . It drives 
toward the in-dwelling, all-connecting life nerve; it is indifferent to external resistance.”71 
Ball and Tzara were unequivocal in their declarations that creating a collective based on 
shared experiences of elemental nervous discord—competing vibrations, currents, 
rhythms, noise, gestures, or expressive movements that filled the performance spaces of 
their public demonstrations—relied on tactical modifications and critical redeployments 
of both physiological psychology and the idealist usages of it within reformist 




Body Languages   
Tzara’s closeness to Ball allowed him to absorb the rich ideas Ball had 
encountered in Munich before the war. His writings on Dada language and the visual arts 
contain the most extensive and diverse critical modifications of physiological psychology 
and Lebensreform of any Dadaist in Zürich. As he sarcastically wrote in his “Note on 
Poetry” that appeared in Dada no. 4-5 in May 1919, “The poet can go in for Swedish 
gymnastics. But for abundance and explosion he knows how to kindle hope TODAY.”72 
The gymnastics to which Tzara referred could be any one of the models previously 
discussed, but his suspicion of all these different systems of gradual development and 
improvement could not be clearer. He followed this statement in this text by declaring 
that “the poet’s desire is for enthusiasm, that fecund form of intensity.”73 Tzara’s broad 
swipe at “Swedish gymnastics” testified to his belief in the impossibility of a 
developmental modality of communal experience. But the brilliance of his interventions 
came from working with the very discourses of this body theory that informed different 
dimensions of social reform in order to undercut its developmental ambitions. Like Ball, 
Tzara recognized that the best way to destroy the Lebensreform that pervaded their daily 
life was to beat its masters at their own game. That meant using physiological psychology 
in a manner that preserved a highly intense level of unpredictable and spontaneous 
experience in the sphere of culture, thus collapsing the teleological models of neural 
Bildung that had arisen in contexts of collective movement. In his writing, Tzara focused 
on creating these new intensities or qualities of experience that arose from a continual 




Tzara’s contact with dance inspired him to develop multiple modes of poetic 
expression that stand as attempts to shape the physiological bases and embodied or 
gestural dimensions of language into more elemental and vibratory emanations that 
flooded the nerves of the listener or reader. In the first issue of Dada (July 1917), he 
described Laban’s school and performances by Wigman, Taeuber, and other students, 
indicating the potency of the expressive movement he learned from the dancers: 
L’école de danse Laban: montra dernièrement son activité multiple et équilibrée.   
Mary Wiegmann [sic]: finesse grandléger créatrice d’abstraites notions 
d’expression sans musique – pures.  Vase pour les vibrations du silence.  Mme. S. 
Perrottet fait chanter les pauses d’une infinie et sage sensibilité.  Calme fiévrieux 
du blanc le plus intérieur.  K. Wulff, H. Langwara montrent de l’entendement 
pour la ligne large puissante.  Mlle. S. Taeuber: bizarrerie délirante dans 
l’araigné de la main vibre rythme rapidement ascendant vers le paroxysme d’une 
démence goguenarde capriceuse belle.  Costume de H. Arp.  Dans un autre genre 
– enfantin aigu et trop harmonieux, giratoire – et avec plus de liberté gracieuse la 
première – se releverent Mlles C. Walther et Macciachini.  Les costumes que 
Mlle. Chrusecz fait pour l’école: forme et coleur dans la pureté du rythme: sévère 
nécessité ligne droite clarté chaude simple.74 
Tzara’s clear fascination with Laban’s students encouraged his interest in exploring how 
expression could enact psychological change by means of different rhythmic vibrations.  
He applied the bodily production of culture to language and described utterance as 
different frequencies of nervous movement arising from the same centers of action that 




As Ball did in his written considerations of expression, Tzara used key terms and 
concepts from physiological psychology in a social-critical manner. For example, the 
notion of intensity, which appears frequently in Tzara’s writings, is the categorical term 
of strength that physiological psychologists applied to the level of irritation [Erregung] in 
nerve charges.76 In short, the word was akin to terms like velocity for other moving 
objects. Wundt used the term Intensität to refer to both the strengths of sensations and 
correlative neural charges and generally used the term Geschwindigkeit [velocity] to refer 
to speeds of both innervations and thought, as in tests on reaction time or experience 
thresholds.77 Tzara was entirely aware of this terminology. A simultaneous poem called 
Cacadoufarbige performed by Arp, Serner, and Tzara at one of their soirees, which was 
subsequently published in Dada 4-5, directly addressed these notions of bodily and 
mental energy:  
Toréadore de la verte cravatte sous les gâteaux empaillés au bout des fils 
 névralgiques pette pette dit le poete la tribune de coeur et de Genève par 
 excellance pâques. Es ist nicht leicht, Geschwindigkeiten ein gutes Gewissen zu 
 besorgen.78  
 In this short piece, the three artists plotted an ironic trajectory leading from the initial 
stages of constructing a social collective on neural bases, the fils névralgiques, to the 
termination point, which is a socially sanctioned mode of morality or conscience. The 
artists’ stated difficulty in finding a conscience was their reaction to the aftermath of 
nationalist fervor that had left millions dead.  
These concepts of nervous energy and psychophysical alteration strengthened the 




the Salle Meise on July 23, 1918 and subsequently published in Dada no. 3 (December 
1918).79 His metaphors are couched in the discourse of physiological psychology—
specifically, of how the brain forms itself out of repeated, raw sensation:  “Logic is 
always false.  It draws the superficial fibers [fils] of concepts and words towards illusory 
conclusions and centers.”80  Tzara’s critical view of the mind frames a conventional 
structure of conductive fibers leading to organic centers in the cortex. Logic was merely a 
hollow projection of an eternally mutable mass of intertwined tissues. Its authority was a 
physiological coincidence.  
In order to work outside this false projection, modes of linguistic expression with 
conspicuous proximity to their bodily, neural origins would need to be created. One of 
Tzara’s best known declarations called attention to the particularly linguistic dimension 
of these theories. In his “Dada Manifesto on Feeble Love and Bitter Love,” he declared, 
“Thought is made in the mouth.”81 The preceding lines of the manifesto posit the source 
of language in the articulatory movements of the vocal organs—organs that, he believed, 
were untapped resources of new and more intense artistic expression: “Must we no longer 
believe in words? Since when do they express the contrary of what the organ that utters 
them thinks and wants?”82 The failure to change language was not a question of language 
itself, but that language’s point of origin. As an intellectual mode of expression, language 
came from the cortex, what Tzara had described as “illusory conclusions and centers,” 
because these structures were conditioned in their formation by a certain space of 
experience. Placing thought in the mouth returned linguistic expression to its point of 




would consequently reshape the vocal instrument into means of creating more intense 
vibratory emanations of utterance.  
In his diary, Ball expressed similar ideas when he considered his Lautgedichten, 
writing: 
The “simultaneous poem” has to do with the value of the voice. The human organ  
represents the soul, the individuality in its wanderings with its demonic  
companions. The noises represent the background—the inarticulate, the  
disastrous, the decisive. The poem tries to elucidate the fact that man is  
swallowed up in the mechanistic process. In a typically compressed way it shows  
the conflict of the vox humana with a world that threatens, ensnares, and destroys  
it, a world whose rhythm and noise are ineluctable.83 
Ball’s thoughts suggest that the work was a realization of the subject’s immersion in the 
chaos of newly perceived space in a manner that compiled spontaneous reactions to 
elemental rhythms and forces and presented the artist as a continuously mutable element 
among others, rather than remaining above the fray with an independent creative will. 
The “wandering” organ was Ball’s way of describing spontaneous speech that occurred 
outside structures of rational language and thought.  
In a similar manner as Ball’s Lautgedichten, a great deal of Tzara’s performed 
poetry was heavily improvisational and involved what he referred to in his 
“Unpretentious Proclamation” (1919) as “spontaneous acrobatics,” in which one affirmed 
“the vitality of every instant.”84 Affirming each instant with spontaneous movement 
withholds the formation of individual style. In the light of collective vocal recitation, 




speech can bring to an experience of culture as a way to create a new form of group 
thought that was dynamic and non-developmental. In his famous statement that thought 
was made in the mouth, he unequivocally invoked the bodily process of inventing new 
words that took place in the Freitanz of Laban and his speech exercises that were 
constructed to alter the organs of articulation. Tzara’s attack on language as a false form 
of expression and social control thus has an unacknowledged dimension in his focus on 
the organs of speech, and in this focus his goals overlap with the psychophysiological 
interests of Laban and the other Dadaists who worked with him in Zürich. But unlike 
Laban and like Ball, Tzara brought these improvisational acrobatics of organic alteration 
to the stage space.  
Tzara himself addressed these issues long before he penned his lengthy praise of 
the Labanschule quoted earlier. For example, at the first Dada soiree on July 14, 1916, he 
presented a new form of simultaneist poetry that he called poèsie mouvementiste, for 
which recitation of a text included improvisational movements of the body.  Although 
Tzara surely knew of earlier endeavors by French poets or the Italian Futurists, in 
focusing on gesture, he drew most heavily on Laban’s experimental exercises of 
coordinating body and voice movements from the Freitanz.85  As an unpublished 
manuscript indicates, Tzara had an entire program planned for the performance, in which 
he began by describing in humorous fashion the simplistic, habitual conveyance of poetic 
expression, in which “one recited poems by raising the voice and the arms.”86 In contrast 
to the more habitual gestures of expression that occurred during such readings, he 
declared that “the poems that we write now are no longer adapted to this conventional 




as types of exterior expression, adapted in a sense from poetry.”87  New or deliberately 
improvised coordination of bodily movement, he believed, would “accentuate and place 
in evidence the sense of words by primitive movements.”88  In other words, Tzara’s 
poetic form contained the same ambition as Ball’s Lautgedichten: use of elemental and/or 
improvised gestures of limbs in combination with sound gestures to create an immediate 
space of reactive stimuli that fell outside prior experiences of poetry for both the poet and 
his or her audience.  
Tzara outlined reference points in his envisioning of this elemental mode of 
related movements that his performance would enact: 
We want to represent intensity. It is why we return toward the primary elements.  
Children recite verse in chants and to each sound corresponds a special and  
defined movement of direction and sonority. The most primitive movement is the  
gymnastics which corresponds to the monotony and idea of rhythm.89 
If intensity is the relative property of any nervous irritation, then how does an artist 
represent such a thing? Intensity is a new experience for the neural body prior to thought 
and one therefore must convey it with new forms of motion. Tzara believed that these 
new intensities of nervous irritation arose from modes of coordination between 
movements of vocal articulation and gestures of limbs, or sound gestures of voice and 
forms of non-verbal communication—i.e., what Wundt had defined as gesture language 
[Gebärdesprache]. In his later Chronique Zürichois (1920), Tzara went so far as to call 
his new poetic form a poème gymnastique, which further attests to his interest in 
exploring the relationships between voice and other forms of bodily motion.90 




performers, possibly students of Laban, performed improvisational movement routines to 
these works as he recited, in a manner that was akin to Taeuber’s improvised 
performance in combination with Ball’s Lautgedichten. It is unclear exactly who did 
what on the stage that night, but Tzara undoubtedly saw movementist poetry as a way for 
artists to probe new energies of relationships between the movements of limbs and those 
of the articulatory organs. 
These neural energies had an elemental level that Tzara and other Dadaists 
associated to the physiological nature of primitive societies in addition to the affectivist 
outlooks these groups possessed, for in this context, physiology was the zone in which 
change could most readily occur. The Dadaist use of culture to shape mental experience 
through the nerves took full advantage of the congruent mechanics of disruption that 
existed between combining the discordant vibrations of noise or inhabitual movements 
and the abrupt, unexpected currents of stimuli applied to tissues in the lab. On the stage, 
these different Raumgestaltungen of tones and noise were all forms of arbitrary 
modification that flooded the manifold tissues of the cortex. Potent realizations of these 
two modes of modification erupted throughout activities in Zürich, as in, for example, the 
recitation of Ball’s Lautgedichte combined with gong blasts and Taeuber’s reactive 
movements. This motive had also appeared in Laban’s improvisational Turnen sessions, 
in which the body was a multimedia instrument of dance, tone, and word. Tzara’s work 
exemplifies how, once again, Dada brought the corporeal mutations of the Turnen to the 
stage space and raised the stakes of how culture could change minds through bodily 
absorption of new vibrations. Intensities of inhabitual vibrations created higher level 




Repeated stimuli of this kind would shift nerve paths through pathbreaking or 
transference in a fashion that altered the psyche in unpredictable ways during the 
unfolding of the recital. As a model of community, this mode of artmaking suggests that 
artists in Zürich sought to reform a group through non-ascendant means by connecting its 
members through new, felt vibrations of elemental rhythm and shared experiences of 
continual reformation. Its absorptive mechanics were indescribable, below the projective 
capacities of conventional selfhood, and continually altering in the nature of its 
intensities. Dada was a separatism based on a shared and continual dynamism of bodies 
knit together with base vibrations of elemental action patterns. When culture was a 
Freitanz, it never became a social fact. 
Sharing in an intensity of new movement languages through improvised 
performance encouraged similar metaphors from artists in Zürich concerning how 
groupthink grew from communal mutation of the psyche’s nervous substrate. Forcing 
these discordant sensations into consciousness presents the mental image as an explosive 
diversity of chaotic, reactive energies that prevents any mode of habitual focusing or 
reaction. Also, sympathy is not empathy; flooding did not allow for a projection of 
selfhood and ego, but instead sent new vibrations through everyone’s tissues and shifted 
structures into new basic formats. Doing so as part of a group allows for a shared 
experience of new rhythm that knits the group to a base constellation of movement 
languages that can then shift with new patterns of action and shared creation. 
Refashioning language in a cosmic manner sprung from this intent to alter the 
subject’s physiological roots, which prevents the formation of any representational logic 




platform that was elemental like primitive subjectivity, but was not African. As Laban 
expressed in his memoir, drum language was an essential inspiration for these exercises; 
particularly its use by a person in a culture “to communicate with another over 
unbelievable distances, in a so-to-speak telegraphic manner.” 91 These more remedial 
forms of gesture in the Dada context connect to the value of more rudimentary forms of 
gesture language in establishing new forms of collective experience based in bodies 
rather than concepts.   
Framing the arts as improvisational movement arts collapsed the habitual 
orientations required for schemes of visual representation that are generally associated to 
the appropriationist procedures of the primitivist moment and promised new conceptual 
platforms of the relationships between gesture and consciousness.  No one was copying, 
but this factor is rather confusing, given the continual referrals to “poèmes et danses 
negres,” “Negro” rhythms, occasional transcriptions of actual African poetry in Dada 
periodicals, or well-known referrals to supposedly “primitivist” artistic practice, as in this 
oft-quoted passage from Ball’s diary: “Huelsenbeck has arrived.  He pleads for stronger 
rhythm (Negro rhythm).  He would prefer to drum literature into the ground.”92  
Drumming literature into the ground required a refashioning of language into more 
elemental, pulsing rhythm that sent new vibrations into the body. The seeming formalism 
of this focus was a direct assault on conventional materialism of the corpus. A small 
group with newly oriented bases of physiology may act primitive, but would not be 
African. The only thing this group would share with the Other was a perceived similarity 




The primitivism of Zürich Dada was not an escapist return to nature, but a 
cultivation of urbanist and elementalist space patterns. Interpreting one medium of 
cultural expression in terms of another – language in terms of percussion – illustrates that 
neither Laban nor Dada were necessarily interested in the direct carryover of another 
group’s cultural forms; rather, they drew inspiration from the so-called “primitive” 
neurophysiological level of interrelated movement languages that a Western artist could 
create within him/herself through an alteration of elemental gesture. That creation would 
not be like any other primitive culture that had existed before; it would look like an 
elemental mode of European urbanism that conceived experience in entirely different 
space patterns. This push for neurophysiological alteration was entirely outside any 
motive to copy primitive art or return to a primeval affective experience of ritual. Neither 
representational mode was valid, because the space pattern of the Cabaret was different 
than an African village. No alteration of neural practices could be replicative outside the 
culture and readers of Wundt knew it. Thus, “primitive” connoted a certain 
neurophysiological orientation, rather than a fine art style, in which elemental 
coordination among previously distinct movement languages came together in a space of 
new intensities. These cultures exemplified a certain body logic one had to pursue in 
his/her own terms. Bringing African rhythms and poetry into the Cabaret sent forth its 
appropriated rhythms and vibrations into a new integration of movements in a 
refashioned space pattern. African culture was one aspect of a broader tactical 
repositioning of communal inquiries of new vibratory creative rhythms, rather than the 
compartmentalized appropriationist or colonialist encapsulation in which scholars often 




Probing the nature of language as non-syntactic vibrations which connect 
movement, sound, and word into a single, communicative current made the drum into a 
metaphor for the sonic nature of language when a speaker divorced from it the denotative 
signification and retained only the sonic qualities of vocal tonality. This focus on 
utterance as a non-representational wave of elemental vibration turned language into a 
primal form of rhythm that, like a drum beat, coursed through the body’s most elemental 
nervous structures. Combining this mixture of tone poems and music with ambulatory 
gesture intensified the overall neurophysiological mutation promised by a return of 
cultural expression to a level at which its discordant, raw expressions were more likely to 
alter the tissues of consciousness in unpredictable but shared fashion. Crucial was the 
proximity of these expressive modes to movement. In these lights, Dadaist primitivism is 
more indebted to physiology than negritude. Appropriation changed nothing. 
Exemplifying this focus on creating a culture centered on base vibrations, another 
mode of poetic expression outlined in the manuscript and delivered at this soiree was the 
poème de voyelles, which “reproduces sonorities by several vowels linked 
simultaneously.”93  Tzara, Ball, and Laban all shared an obsession with vowels and the 
coordination of different tonalities, extended utterance, and linkages of these vowel 
sounds into tone poems of variant sonorities.  Tzara’s poème de voyelles were a form of 
linguistic expression that drew heavily on Laban’s uses of vowel exercises in the 
Freitanzen at Ascona, but posited improvisation as the foundational logic of performance 
itself.  The neural levels of primitive techniques were more elemental than traditional 
bodily orientations to language.94 Vowel poems were new currents of fixed vibrations in 




These vibratory frequencies of oral gesture were outside structural archetypes of 
linguistic denotation.  Tonality of vowels made these experiments less abrasive than 
forays into bruitism.  Improvisation on the stage made the rewiring of movement 
languages entirely more dramatic and drastic.  The audience would witness a human 
subject being remade before its eyes through linkages of vibratory utterance that were the 
writer’s way to “relink primitive technique and modern sensibility.”95 These currents of 
language, when absorbed as vibrations by the nervous system, were intended to 
experimentally alter the nature of mental experience. 
Another inspiration for Tzara’s theories of movementist and vowel poems was his 
participation in Ball’s Simultan Krippenspiel, Ball’s Simultan Krippenspiel, a bruitist 
nativity play performed by Ball, Tzara, Arp, Janco, Huelsenbeck, and Hennings at the 
Cabaret on May 31, 1916.96 Ball’s composition of this work likely occurred along the 
lines of improvisation and experiment and ultimately preserved a great deal of 
unpredictability outside what was ostensibly a very German presentation of a religious 
drama. Performance of the work took place entirely behind a backlit, opaque scrim, 
which playfully turned the performers into living shadow puppets. More importantly, the 
scrim downplayed any one performer’s identity and placed focus on the rhythmic 
coordination of the group’s movements in coordination with spoken language, extended 
vowel sounds, and noise. The script for Ball’s libretto overflows with extended vowel 
intonations. For example, in scene four, an angel laments, “doooooooo” after the entire 
ensemble dances to a whistled tune. Also, in scene seven, the character playing Mary 
(likely Hemmings) unleashes a series of drawn out lamentations: 




trumpet sounds simulated by voice of drawn out intonations: “Taaaaaaaa!” Vocalizations 
of this sort encapsulated not a synthesis of arts, but a retooling of language into a more 
elemental current of bodily movement. Dadaists shaped this expressive mode into a baser 
form of absorptive stimulus. The bodily instrument modified its neural foundations and, 
ideally, those of the audience.   
Ball’s Lautgedichten contain similar uses of extended vowel sounds. For example, 
the ninth line of Karawane consists of nothing but a drawn out “ü.” In like fashion, 
consider the concluding extended vowels of lines five and seven from Gadji Beri Bimba 
that utilize vowel tones as elemental currents of vibratory energy: 
o katalominai rhinozerossola hopsamen laulitalomini hoooo 
gadjama rhinozerossola hopsamen 
bluku terullala blaulala loooo97 
Before reciting his poems, Ball had read a brief program note that resembles Tzara’s 
dismissal of conventional poetic delivery in its expressed need to “give up writing 
secondhand: that is, accepting words (to say nothing of sentences) that are not newly 
invented for our own use.”98 The vibratory, tonal simplicity of vowels and their 
combination into sonorous exercises of the voice became a way to alter nerves with more 
elemental stimuli and reaction. Ball had thoughts similar to Tzara’s on the need for a new 
language of the body, as expressed in the Dada manifesto that he read on July 14, 1916, 
declaring, “All words are other people’s inventions. I want my own stuff, my own 
rhythm, and vowels and consonants too, matching the rhythm and all my own.”99 Ball 
himself described his linguistic experiments as causing bodily change: “I let the vowels 




shoulders of words, legs, arms, hands of words.”100 Ball’s recitations of Lautgedichten 
parallel Tzara’s stated intentions for creating new connections of movement between the 
organs of articulation and those of the limbs. They exhibit a new compositional logic for 
arranging vowel tones, which he “weighed and distributed solely according to the values 
of the beginning sequence.”101 Arrangements of these vibratory tones in Ball’s work were 
his experimental endeavor in forging new forms of Raumgestaltung and new harmonies 
of sound gesture. 
These forms of poetic expression could also be group endeavors. Tzara’s various 
poetic forms became the raw material for his more complex simultaneous poems. For 
example, a heavy use of mixed vowel tones appears in his composition “La fièvre du 
mâle,” which the group first performed at the eighth Dada soiree in Zürich on April 9, 
1919 (fig. 17). Adding noise to poetry was not just an assault or shock tactic. The nature 
of noise and tone as currents and pulsations of unconventional nerve energy are framed in 
Dada writing as embodied experiences, which were meant to directly affect the 
morphology of nervous tissues and conductive paths. In this fashion, performance 
sculpted the mind according to a continually changing technique of arbitrary 
modification.  
In this spirit of changing minds through changing nerves, Tzara’s pieces for 
multiple performers often have one or several of the readers disrupting their own 
recitation with outbursts of percussive noise. For example, the rhythmic intermezzo from 
Tzara’s well-known simultaneous poem “L’amiral cherche une maison à louer” (fig. 18), 
which was first read in the Cabaret on March 30,1916, included accompaniment by drum 




include noise in his score for the Simultan Krippenspiel, which included the use of 
homemade bells, noisemakers, and rattles, along with onomatopoeiatic intonations of 
sound effects by his performers that connected bodily movement to raw sounds in a 
manner that was immediately linked to the noises of sound poetry. Tzara’s participation 
in these performances informed his multifaceted forays into simultaneous poetry. These 
diverse forms of vocal performance allowed performers to explore the full scope of 
language as oral gestures that transmit rhythms.102  
During his time in Zürich, Tzara continued to investigate the bodily and gestural 
dimensions of language with a notion of expression he called “cosmic.” He expanded on 
these theories most extensively in his review of Le Voleur de Talan by French writer 
Pierre Reverdy (1889-1960) that appeared in the second issue of Dada (December 
1917).103 The cosmic is a particularly intense concentration of multiple and diverse 
elements in a work which generates the rhythms of its nerve altering creative energy. He 
defined the concept as a compositional technique in which “multiple, diverse, and distant 
elements are, more or less intensely, concentrated in the work; the artist gathers 
[recueille] them, chooses them, arranges [range] them, makes them into a construction or 
composition.”104 The notion of the “cosmic” that appears in this text was Tzara’s way to 
frame language as base vibrations through space that would enter the body and shape the 
nerves. 
Tzara was a polyglot, meaning that he likely knew the connotations of an act of 
arrangement [Gestaltung] in the German-speaking arena of Zürich, in which the term 
connoted a system of new movements in space or Raumgestaltung, as in the 




forms of gesture and noise. These types of arrangements filled the performance space 
with new vibratory energies that rippled through the listener’s tissues. In addition to this 
performative dimension of language as a neural emanation, Tzara sought in this essay to 
create an overarching notion of Raumgestaltung that could incorporate typography, or the 
arrangement of text on a page, which was itself a major interest of many different avant-
garde groups.105 Tzara believed that in a text, the appearance of the printed word and the 
polyrhythmic or arrhythmic nature of its syntax could offer its reader a new system of 
creative movement energies and nervous stimuli. Tzara shared the Dadaist belief that 
language was an embodied property and that it was organic, a quality that the group saw 
as connoting an inherent mutability. For him, the cosmic text succeeded when it 
contained a particularly strong level of arrhythmic or polyrhythmic meter, which would 
increase the intensity of nervous irritation that a text offered and thereby exude the means 
of nervous change.  
Two general compositional principles constitute the cosmic and the writer must 
strike a balance between the two in order to avoid the risk of moralizing.  First, he or she 
established equal importance for each object, being, material, and organism in the 
universe (or in a text).  Second, a writer had to stress the human being’s importance by 
grouping around him or her beings and objects, so that s/he may subordinate them to him 
or herself. Tzara argues that truly cosmic productions contain the first principle as a 
corrective to the second, which, if gone unchecked, would convey the intention to correct 
the actions of humans and control them by restrictive pedagogy, as in the Renaissance 
fascination with anecdotes and moral lessons in art that show humans “trying to go one 




an illusion of superiority, thus linking traditional humanism to the restrictiveness of 
Bildung. 
Tzara’s notion of language as an embodied property of nervous emanation came 
to the fore in his description of Reverdy’s text as a generator that floods all corners of the 
mind with vibrations: 
 Le Voleur de Talan est surtout un radiateur de vibrations et les images qui se  
déchargent dans tous les coins (effet presque électrique à son passage) se 
réunissent autour de lui.107 
There is a similarity to Tzara’s description of Mary Wigman as a vessel of silent 
vibrations, but in carrying these notions of neural emanation to uses of language, Tzara 
altered the potentialities of this expressive mode into a phenomenon that could alter the 
nerves of the reader. Tzara’s encounters with dance allowed his review to encompass not 
only the disjunctive vibrations of language, but also the radical rhythms of typographic 
arrangement in Reverdy’s text itself (fig. 19). Thus, a text becomes a generator of 
vibrations through its language and the composition of that language on the page, 
because, as a form of absorptive sensory motion, it had a particular frequency or 
vibratory rhythm in the nature of its composition or Raumgestaltung. These formal 
qualities offered the possibilities for psychological alteration: reading or simply seeing 
the arrangement of text on the page triggers absorption of new rhythms through the 
nerves.108  Tzara framed both poetry and typography as movement arts, so that the text 
was meant to physiologically alter the nature of one’s own movements and action 




Tzara’s philosophy of social reform relied on creating a new state of 
neurophysiological elementalism, which “places men beside the other elements, just as 
they are, [in order] to make men BETTER.”110 Succeeding in the creation of a cosmic 
work relied on connecting the subject to all other elements and subjects in a balanced 
fashion, so that newly composed non-hierarchical subcollective could “work together, 
anonymously, on the great cathedral of life we are preparing, to level man’s instincts.”111 
This decided acknowledgement of the need to improve the quality of human life 
according to a shared formation of elemental movement pattern had appeared previously 
in Tzara’s “Note 18 on Art,” which had opened the first issue of Dada. There, Tzara had 
lauded art that connected humans as though their bodies were all part of a single, pulsing 
wire. Sharing in new and elemental neural experiences would, he believed, reconnect 
people below higher levels of intellect and rationalism. Reverdy’s text exemplified the 
social project that Tzara and his friends were seeking, for the rhythm of its prose 
contained a balanced diversity of discharged vibrations that preserves the distinctiveness 
of separate discharges creating an intensity of discordant currents that could dissolve 
prior sensitivity. As Tzara explained, “its episodes are carefully muffled up in a substance 
with which we are unfamiliar.  The collision of its elements is particularly brutal.”112  But 
for Tzara, this supposed collision was a new form of non-hierarchical balance in 
experience. He thus connected Reverdy’s text to the first, preferred principle of the 
cosmic and its promise to reforge a subcollective by creating a universe of elementary 
correspondence between all things. 
 Tzara closed his review by carefully plotting the tension between an 




Reverdy’s text as the means to distinguish the older writer’s Cubist practice from his 
own. For him, the essential difference between the French writer and Dada was the 
relative position of the subject in relation to the entirety of lived experience: 
 [Reverdy] comes close to the first principle in that he does not moralize, because  
he allows all the elements, except man, to appear simultaneously.  To art for art’s 
sake, Reverdy opposed art for life’s sake.  To which we oppose life for the sake of 
cosmic diversity, for totality, for the universal, and we want to see as innate in the 
latter the slow life which exists, and even sleeps, in what is usually called 
death.113 
These lines suggest two things. First, they offer criticism of French simultaneity as a 
duplicitous embrace of the supposed flux of life that continues its politically suspect 
mission of foregrounding the individual artist or poet, who witnesses but does not 
participate in simultaneously occurring events. Art changed so that life could remain the 
same. Second, Tzara’s alternative of embracing cosmic diversity indicates that practices 
in the Cabaret Voltaire and Galerie Dada had shown him that realizing truly vital 
collaborative activity required an initial elementalization of experience, in which 
previously distinct means of human expression became connected at a raw level as neural 
processes of movement arts.114    
 
How to Make a Constellation 
 Tzara expanded on the notion of the cosmic in his descriptions of the 
constellation, or a work of art that has a compositional acumen that exemplifies the 




Dada 4-5 (May 1919), he described a constellation as a work that gave “each element its 
identity, its autonomy, the necessary condition for the creation of new constellations, 
since each has its own place in the group.  The drive of the Word: upright, an image, a 
unique event, passionate, of dense color, of intensity, in communion with life.”115 
“Constellation” is an inherently spatial metaphor. Tzara’s continued use of it indicates his 
interest in the potential of the arts to draw on a common source of mutating nerves that 
can reconnect a subcollective through a shared experience of elemental energy. For 
Tzara, a constellation exemplified the cosmic.  
The rhythm that arose from this technique was not a progression or a sequence but 
a continuous tension between movements of addition and association—the form that 
poetic intensity took when it arose from the grouping of diverse, autonomous, and 
elemental sound gestures—a live wire of connected gestures and myriad vitalities. The 
key goal for Tzara was the alteration of one’s biorhythmic frequencies of response and 
intake through a nexus of discordant movement languages. In his above cited “Note on 
Poetry,” he was unequivocal in connecting language to this schema of action:  “Rhythm 
is the gait of the intonations we hear, but there is a rhythm that we neither see nor hear: 
the radius of an internal grouping that leads toward a constellation of order.”116  
Composition appears in these lines in the literal way in which Dada artists understood it 
at this moment—that is, as a bodily action pattern that has arisen in reaction to the 
dynamic conditions of a certain space. These concepts of composition from Tzara’s 
nominal note on poetry are properties that can apply to any mode of artmaking that its 




For Tzara, the mechanics of linguistic reorientation generate consequences far 
beyond the composition of poetry:  
 A poem is no longer a formal act: subject, rhythm, rhyme, sonority.  When 
 projected onto everyday life, these can become means, whose use is neither 
 regulated nor recorded, to which I can attach the same weight as I do to the 
 crocodile, to burning metals, to grass.117   
This flurry of disconnected images reminds one of either a Dada collage or text and the 
equivocation is deliberate. Tzara believed that no work should rely on arrangements of 
iconographic messages, but rather on the ways in which one moved away from 
frameworks of bodily practice or style in creating associations of these elements. 
Considering the work as a system of new movements rather than an iconographic 
message is a shift in focus toward the nervous qualities of altered energy and innervation 
that came directly from his contacts with dance--especially the Freitanz, in which the 
motions one made altered the mind, rather than illustrated its pre-existent makeup. Tzara 
proposed a mode of artistic practice in which the qualities of a movement art drew from 
the heterodox vibrations of everyday life and generate newly expanded space patterns. 
Images would still appear, but in a non-heirarchical model of suspension or constellation 
that shifted focus to composition as a quality of innervations and new coordination of 
conduction in the brain and body.  
Considered as a new nexus of bodily motions, the notion of a constellation could 
be visual or textual. Its energies of composition, considered as nervous vibrations, would 
place in suspension a series of new movements that would fill the reader or viewer with 




biorhythmic frequencies of response and intake through a nexus of discordant movement 
languages. In his above-cited “Note on Poetry,” Tzara could not be clearer as to how 
language ties into this schema of action:  “Rhythm is the gait of the intonations we hear, 
but there is a rhythm that we neither see nor hear: the radius of an internal grouping that 
leads toward a constellation of order.”118  Composition appears in these lines in the literal 
way in which Dada artists understood it at this moment; that is, as a bodily action pattern 
that has arisen in reaction to the dynamic conditions of a certain space. This notion of 
composition as an expulsion of nervous energy allows the production or reception of the 
work to enter the body as a current of vibrations.   
 Tzara’s explosive outlines of language as a rhythmic, internal grouping of 
elements into a constellation of suspended, undifferentiated discord became a guiding 
logic for activities of artmaking that carried an intention to alter the nerves of artist and 
viewer. Conceiving these notions in the realm of plastic art was no great departure, for in 
Dada, every art was a form of movement art. Criticism from one Dadaist about another 
often lauded how different frequencies of movement language altered nerves in 
unpredictable fashion that for painters or sculptors occurred in the process of making an 
object. For example, in a poem about Janco, both neurophysiology and cosmic harmony 
are issues for consideration: “nerfs zigzagués en harmonica cosmique tire tire la ligne à 
travers feuillage et pauses.”119 Tzara also tapped into the transparency between the 
change in artistic practice and the chance in the artist’s corpus when he wrote that in 
Janco’s reliefs (fig. 20), “His images live by marvelously dense transparencies and 
constellations in cut frameworks of surfaces.”120 Likewise, in his essay “Un Art 




the trajectory from Impressionism to Cubism as undergoing a journey of greater 
proximity toward the cosmic: “The work moves more and more away from the reality of 
the world, its level [niveau] is always higher, more differentiated, more cosmic.”121 
Constellations in a cosmic work of art could be composed of gestures involving plastic 
media or sound gestures of language.  
In any case, and in any media, one loses his/her sense of superiority among all 
elements—in short, a breakdown between self and space, or self and other.  The notion of 
the text or art object as an elemental constellation that brought one into closer contact 
with the world as one element among others—i.e., as one mutative circulatory system of 
dynamic energies among others – rather than a dominating figure, makes any creative act 
into “a radiator of vibrations” that discharges images in streams of suspended discord. As 
he described in his “Note on Poetry,” work, artist, and viewer would all become new 
beings:  
To be demanding and cruel, pure and honest towards the work one is preparing 
and which one will be situating amongst men, new organisms, creations that live 
in the very bones of light and in the imaginative focus that action will take – 
(REALITY).122  
As a more elemental arrangement of oral gesture, language takes on more rudimentary 
vitality and intensity. It was a practice geared more toward increasing one’s feeling of 
vibrations wrought by gestures in concert with one another, and less about inquiries of 
signs and symbols. Dada performances were most often collective endeavors, but the 
nature of group creation that they offered was entirely unlike the ascendant complexities 




Their artistic practice was neither seamless group formation nor distinct displays of 
individual talent. Reception of objects, language, or performance was inherently 
participatory. The criticism and manifestoes would become hymns to these points of 
contact and alteration.  
 
Collaborating in the Commune: Arp and Taeuber 
The notion that chance or improvisation could trigger unforeseen forms of 
nervous alteration sheds a different light on the importance of chance to Hans Arp, whose 
collaborative artmaking with Sophie Taeuber drew on awareness of these physiological 
consequences she knew firsthand from studying with Laban.123 Arp first met Taeuber at 
the Galerie Tanner in November 1915, where he had an exhibition with Otto van Rees 
and Adya van Rees-Duthil. All three artists were staying at Ascona. That Arp regarded 
the need for a communal, anarchist form of creation is clear in his brief catalogue essay 
for the show: “No one denies that there are tightrope walkers of different ability. But art 
is truth and collective truth must become audible above individual truth.”124 Their works 
plot a new form of embodied community based on shared creation with elemental shapes, 
forms, and as he described in his memoir Jours effeuillés, “new materials unburdened by 
tradition.”125 In the commune, their works were one element of a newly defined 
integrated day, in which the shared movement patterns of improvisation altered the nature 
of everyday life. After all, that was what communes were for: to propagate new forms of 
moving/being. In this vein, Ball wrote that Arp “assumes here that the images of the 
imagination are already composites,” meaning that the spaces of urban society have 




conjoined reacquaintance with social collectivity while refreshing or regenerating the 
foundational means of experience and thought.127  
In association with developing a group out of new and rudimentary sensory and 
neural experiences, Arp and Taeuber read with great interest the work of Karl Bücher 
titled Arbeit und Rhythmus (1897). They connected to the author’s thesis that primitive 
collectives were based on alternative neurophysiological platforms that gave their culture 
different means to express rhythm in culture and labor.128 In positing this notion, Bücher 
drew directly on Wundt, whom he cited in his text, and whose Völkerpsychologie 
informed Bücher’s overall project of connecting labor practice to culturally specific 
rhythms of vital motion. Bücher’s ideas informed pre- and postwar efforts to reform labor 
throughout Germany, but in an anarchist commune, his work underwent a decidedly 
alternative reading.129 Artists in this context understood that a new mode of collective 
biorhythms could alter the nature of group experience by changing the rhythmic nature of 
group practice, be it labor or art. This intellectual source enabled the belief that by 
working to alter the labor and life rhythms of their community, artists could organically 
create a new form of group experience—their own newly composed Völkerpsychologie. 
In altering the rhythms of labor and other life practices, of which art was one, the group 
believed it could recompose shared processes of innervation outside of structures they 
had inherited from spaces of urban modernity that had created the first mechanized war, 
killed their friends, and pushed them all into exile. However, Arp and Taeuber did more 
than simply work in the commune while they lived there intermittently. Their Dada 
activities indicate a far more intense exploration of the mind-altering potentials of new 




the commune. Their interest in the potentials of new and shared forms of motion came 
from dance.     
When Arp and Taeuber learned of Laban’s theories, all movements—not just 
artmaking or dance—gained an inter-relatedness in connection to everyday life and 
immediate space.  Group dance gave Arp and Taeuber a particular set of critical tools 
with which they approached expressive gesture in a manner akin to the techniques of 
Laban’s Freitanz, in which new movements of the group alter the consciousness of all 
involved. In the historical context, this cooperation was connected to a particular 
anarchist philosophy that motivated an approach to physiological psychology as 
containing within its discourse the methods of altering the individual consciousness and 
society in a way that gave individuals a deeper connection to life rhythms. These 
movements gained intensity in group practice. Thus, Arp and Taeuber applied this model 
of collaborative, improvisational gesture to the making of objects.  
Arp and Taeuber worked together in so many different media that their full range 
could be the subject of several separate studies.130 One of the most prominent projects 
that the two artists worked on together was a group of works known as the Duo Collages, 
produced between 1916 and 1918 (fig. 21). In discussing these works, scholars have 
described Arp and Taeuber’s collaborations as drawing on the desubjectifying capacities 
of the machine. For example, the artists used a paper cutter in making the squares of 
paper that they arranged.131 Yet one could also interpret the Duo Collages as a case in 
point for an alternative reading of Arp and Taeuber’s works as a shared experience of 
improvised gestures. The sharp edges and regularity of the shapes belies the exploratory 




construction. Human hands did not cut the paper, but as the artists moved the colored 
shapes around the surface in concert with one another, they engendered new sequences of 
motion and coordination, thus creating an improvised series of collaborative gestures that 
incorporated the body-altering potentials of new movements that Laban’s students, 
including Taeuber, explored repeatedly in their Freitanz exercises. The movements were 
more modest, perhaps, but the goal in both contexts was the same. Cutting the paper with 
a machine simply made the forms of the shapes more concrete. Arp and Taeuber drew on 
their awareness of Laban’s notions of the psychophysically rejuvenating nature of the 
movements one undertook in the making of an object, the shaping of its corresponding 
forms in concert with another artist, and the promise of newly forged movement 
capacities to alter one’s experience of other bodies, sensed forms, and felt space. 
Working in this manner of experimental movement in the making of plastic objects 
preserved a certain elemental mode of shared experience that began anew with each 
collage.  
Arp also explored these ideas of creation in work he made on his own. In Hans 
Richter’s oft-quoted description of Arp’s “discovery” of chance phenomena, his language 
connects the event to intentions and qualities of experience that are closely associated to 
the Freitanz:  
Dissatisfied with a drawing he had been working on for some time, Arp finally 
tore it up, and let the pieces flutter to the floor of the studio on the Zeltweg. Some 
time later he happened to notice these same scraps of paper as they lay on the 




Scholars have questioned whether these works are actually the products of chance, since 
many of the shapes appear to have fallen together too perfectly (fig. 22).133 But in the 
context of dance, a new “pattern” was a new rhythm of motion in spatial configuration 
that, by definition, required subsequent improvised gestural reaction which brought out 
its antecedent properties of sensory and spatial arrangement as new neural experiences. In 
adopting the spontaneous formation of sensations created by a random arrangement of 
shapes, Arp subsequently improvised within this structure. In doing so, he explored a 
belief that also appeared in the Freitanz—namely, a discovery of a new spatial rhythm or 
pattern, with which he subsequently interacted. However, making this process into the 
creative modality of ostensibly finished objects undercut more deliberately progressive 
models that relied on more concerted programs of nervous rebuilding. 
Framing Arp’s use of chance as an artistic practice that drew on the promises of 
neurophysiological alteration also encourages reconsideration of his ink drawings that he 
made beginning in 1916 (fig. 23).134 Scholars have taken these works as some of the first 
examples of abstract or “automatic” art, but considered in the context of a critical 
approach to physiological psychology as it appeared in dance or reformist movements, 
neither notion remains compelling.  
In relation to this practice, the notion that these drawings are “automatic” is 
somewhat of a misnomer, for in the context, “automatic” connoted a system of 
movements that had been developed through repetition into volitionless practices, as one 
sees the term in the final place of Claparède’s diagram outlining the evolution of 
movement. At the time, automatic movements were far more likely to instance practices 




and so-called automatic writing or painting in the art of French Surrealists.135 In order to 
avoid these misguided projections, it is crucial to consider the notions attached to new 
forms of improvised movement that existed in the historical context in which Arp made 
his first ink drawings. He made this mode of spontaneous gesture into a system of artistic 
practice that he pursued for his entire life; a biomorphism of self and object that operated 
in accordance with Ball and Taeuber’s efforts to make the formal changes of an artwork 
connect to the neurophysiological changes in the artist produced in the making of that 
work. One should never forget that Arp made his work in a context where dancers were 
learning to reuse their hands. 
Considered as explorations of ideas surrounding Laban’s Freitanz, the working 
method suggests that in his ink drawings, Arp used the embodied sense of chance to 
continually refresh consciousness through elemental movement patterns. These ink 
drawings are the graphic manifestations of an improvisational reaction to new sensations 
of spatial rhythm in a manner that adopted a sense of spontaneous motion as the initiator 
of nervous alteration from Laban’s Freitanz exercises into the sphere of drawing. Tzara 
could not have been clearer in a manuscript on Arp’s work that he wrote in collaboration 
with him. He asserted that in Arp’s work, a major grounding concept in the artist’s use of 
chance is “the motor idea in the creation of a work of art is: the search for a level—
difference.”136 The motor idea, or mental picture of movements, was a composite of 
innervation sensations that appeared in the creation of the work, which in this case were 
spontaneous reactions to spatial sensation in which every work reforged the neural bases 




In his collection of writings published in English as On My Way (1948), Arp was 
more strident, but no less specific, writing: “These pictures are realities in themselves, 
without meaning or cerebral intention.  We rejected everything that was copy or 
description, and allowed the Elementary and Spontaneous to react in full freedom.”137  
The artist’s location of volition in the cerebrum instances his assumption that modalities 
of habitual volition, in which one’s actions read as meaningful in relation to habit, have a 
physiological basis.  
In a later text that he included in On My Way, Arp described the movements made 
during the work’s creation in terms that drew on concepts of improvised movement in 
Laban’s Freitanz, writing, “I draw and dance at once, twisting and winding, twining soft, 
white flowing round.”138 He poetically described the new rhythms of altered innervation 
within chance gestures that unfolded during the process of drawing:  
All one has to do is lower one’s eyelids, and inner rhythm will pass through the  
hand. In a dark room the flow of inner motion is easier to control . . . The drawing  
thus loses all its opacity and thus the harmonics, the pulsations, the repetitions,  
and the metaphor of the melody become the rhythm of a deep breath.139 
The ostensibly abstract nature of Arp’s drawings belie the artist’s interest in forging new 
modes of consonant experience out of discordant, graphic reaction to the irregularities of 
nature, which had a lawlessness that bespoke a higher reality of freedom.140 He saw 
poetry of nature as residing in shapes and forms that occurred outside pre-existent 
structures of rational thought and creativity. Recalling Ball’s statement from his diary 
that “the notion of law is contradictory to nature,” Arp described how improvisational 




mutability guaranteed continuous new forms: “We do not want to copy nature.  We do 
not want to reproduce, we want to produce.  We want to produce like a plant that 
produces a fruit and not to reproduce.” 141 These movements were the least considered, 
which made them closest to nature. Chance allowed a return to nature, which enabled the 
neurophysiological body to create for itself new platforms of movement and expression 
in a more harmonious relationship to other people.142 Improvised movement thus became 
a tool to dissolve the rational outlook toward art as an ascendant projection of normative 
cultural beliefs and make it the sign of a continually shifting relationship between self 
and nature, which was a major value of the commune in which Arp lived intermittently 
during his time in Zürich.  
Beginning in 1917, Arp used these ink drawings as models for large relief pieces 
of cut wood that he painted in vibrant colors (fig. 24). These works were his attempts to 
make objects that projected spontaneous forms and shapes into new arrangements of 
spatial rhythm in a manner that altered the interactive nature of the viewer’s relationship 
to the object. Huelsenbeck described Arp’s work in terms of these interactions in an essay 
for the German edition of Dada no. 3 (December 1918). He wrote that Arp had “found a 
dogma where all difficulties are resolved, thus relaxing cramps and spasms.”143 
Huelsenbeck’s words suggest an outlook toward artistic process that takes full advantage 
of the increased flexibility promised by improvisation; a sensibility lifted directly from 
dance. In this text Huelsenbeck framed Arp’s work as a movement art, describing how 
“the painting, with all its colors and forms, goes beyond its stretcher bars [Keilrahmen]. It 
grows arms and hands.”144 Huelsenbeck directly addressed the viewer’s absorption of 




the reliefs to relax cramps and spasms. The work has become a fuller expression of the 
artist’s anatomical movements, but the notion that each work has arms and legs suggests 
that making each work included new and spontaneous movements that altered the artist’s 
neural body. As in Ball’s Lautgedichten, neurophysiological change in consciousness 
became a major contributing factor to the ostensibly formal nature of the object. So 
strong was Arp’s practice of chance that his work took on the strengths of an improvised, 
expressive gesture in space and grew limbs, in a manner that recalls the changes 
experienced by the “hundred-jointed” Taeuber that occurred during her dancing to Ball’s 
Lautgedichten. Arp’s work might be understood as a continual reactivation of basic 
movement energies.  
The idea that Arp’s work sent rhythms into space was also an interest for the artist 
himself. When he collaborated with Tzara and Walter Serner on the essay “Dada Art” for 
the 1920 Dada Almanach (edited by Huelsenbeck), the three wrote of Arp, “He wanted 
imaginative qualities that are not to be found in any museum. As the three describe, Arp 
was interested in creating “a type of animal-like formation with all its wild intensity and 
diversities. The creation of a new body outside of us that lives as we do.”145 This notion 
of biomorphism went both ways.  
The neurophysiological consequences of improvised movement in the historical 
context of Arp’s work gave his artistic practice the capacity to contain a notion of gesture 
that repeatedly triggered change in neural. Chance correlations of movement in artistic 
practice, described by the artist as drawing and dancing, gave rise to objects that 
conveyed a tenuous and shifting position for the artist’s self, which had undergone neural 




massive survival portrait of Tzara” the artist described in a letter to its alleged sitter, was 
an attempt to capture a dynamic essence of creativity, rather than cement a persona (fig. 
24).146 The form of the work allows the viewer to absorb new intensities of rhythm and 
neural sequence as heretofore unperceived harmonies that enable a freer range of bodily 
interaction with the formal rhythms of the piece.147 Interaction with the object hcnaged 
the body and made the viewer into one element of a non-hierarchical flow of spatial 
rhythm. Indeed, this was the intent of the Freitanz and of Tzara’s notion of cosmic 
composition. In making plastic objects that conveyed this philosophy of creativity, Arp 
followed Tzara in making the embodied nature of chance into a program for cultural 
production.148  
 
Tzara’s Difficulties in Paris and the Escape to the Alps 
 Tzara’s own hopes for cultural production that he gained from his experiences of 
physiological tactic in Zürich were certainly powerful, but he would soon have to 
compete, rather than cooperate, with many more young intellectuals and artists. After 
Ball’s break with Dada in July 1917, he had increased the devotion of the movement to 
publication, and was likely inspired to do so by the flood of little journals that had 
appeared in the context of the Paris avant-garde since the nineteenth-century. Dada 4-5 
signaled increased contact between Tzara and Francis Picabia and began what would 
briefly become a triumvirate of Paris Dada, consisting of Tzara, Picabia, and Breton’s 
circle around Littérature. That relationship was, of course, short lived, but led to Tzara’s 




 Considering the French context is a project for another time, but briefly 
considering Tzara’s practices and frustrations in Paris can help frame his departure from 
the city for the Austrian Alps, where he and Chrusecz spent the summer of 1921 with 
Hans Arp, Max Ernst, and French Dadaists like André Breton and Paul Eluard, all of 
whom brought their wives. This reconnection to Arp and meeting Ernst after lengthy 
correspondence of over two years must have been revivifying for Tzara, especially after 
his frustrations with the cultural scene in Paris. When Tzara arrived in the city, he found 
artists whose motives differed categorically from artists like Ball and Arp. Initially, 
Tzara’s activities appeared to fall in line with his demonstrations in Zürich. For example, 
on May 26, 1920, an audience was treated to Vaseline symphonique, a simultaneous 
poem for twenty voices, which was akin to his poetic demonstrations in the Cabaret 
Voltaire and the numerous Dada soirees. But for all their fierce demonstrations, Breton 
and his circle quickly became interested in establishing a countermovement of radical 
French literature that was decidedly indigenous. Tzara was no longer in a community of 
exiles.  
Tzara’s performance at the first public Dada demonstration in Paris signaled his 
attempt to align himself with this critical outlook toward French culture. He read texts 
written by French reactionary Léon Daudet that were accompanied by intermittent 
invasions of noise. This deliberate slap to the face of nationalist politics was Tzara’s first 
attempt to fit into the French avant-garde’s attacks on national culture. He was savvy, but 
his attempts at ingratiation also contained some major missteps. For example, his and 
Francis Picabia’s disruption of the Dadaists’ mock trial of Maurice Barres infuriated 




journalistic fervor had initially inspired Breton to begin the journal Littérature, but 
Breton did not suffer rivalries tactfully. 
 Tzara’s next move was antithetical to the performative spirit of immediacy that he 
had helped establish in Zürich. In June 1921, he launched a large exhibition of Dada 
artworks from every major city that had hosted Dada events. While an evening of 
performances connected to the exhibition on June 10 was a major event, the evening did 
not bode well for Tzara personally. The night was to culminate with his new play Le 
Coeur à gaz, but its performance only prompted the audience to leave the theatre, rather 
than riot, as they had done at earlier manifestations of Dada in Paris. Tzara was likely 
stung by the fact that the only bad publicity was an absence of it. He had arrived in the 
city a veritable avant-garde celebrity, but within eighteen months, his star was quickly on 
the decline. In true Parisian fashion, Tzara left Paris in August for a vacation. 
 Tzara’s destination that summer was Imst, a small shepherd village in the 
Tyrolean Alps. He arrived with Maya Chrusecz and met up with his old friends Hans Arp 
and Sophie Taeuber. He was also delighted to finally meet Max Ernst, with whom he had 
exchanged letters, publications, and artworks since November 1919. Ernst’s previous 
experiences that had brought him to Imst were somewhat similar to Tzara’s adventures in 
the international avant-garde in terms of basic disappointments. By the spring of 1920, 
Dada in Cologne had experienced an entirely upward trajectory of notoriety, but with the 
closing and brief reopening of the Dada Vorführung exhibition throughout April and May 
of 1920, the main figures associated to Dada in Cologne including Johannes Baargeld, 
Heinrich Hoerle, and his wife Angelika had all distanced themselves from Dada activities 




to Tzara. His contact with Hans Arp was an essential source of strength during these 
tempestuous months of shattered alliances. Indeed, it was Arp who had first energized 
Ernst’s efforts to initiate Dada activities in Cologne during the fall of 1919. These 
contacts with figures from Zürich and the role they played in the complexities of Ernst’s 
intellectual and artistic formation have never achieved proper scholarly attention. These 
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and Foebel prior to his involvement with the Bauhaus. See Eva Forgacs, The Bauhaus Idea and 
Bauhaus Politics (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), 48-49. See also Ellen 
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NJ: Princeton University Architectural Press, 2000), 4-10. People in the Pestalozzi camp 
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combine and to dissect. Therefore he enriches their memory with simple explanations of sensible 




                                                                                                                                                 
give an account of his presentations, and attain a mastery over them, in now first attaining a clear 
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43 Ball, diary entry for August 8, 1916, Ibid, 75. 
44 This war experience likely made Zürich Dadaists wary of the Futurist modes of expression, 
which were inspired by the aesthetic of machines and modern warfare. 
45 Ball, diary entry for September 18, 1916, in Flight out of Time, 78. 
46 Marcel Janco, quoted in Annabelle Melzer, Latest Rage the Big Drum: Dada and Surrealist 
Performance (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1980), 60. 
47 Tzara, “Lecture on Dada (1922),” in Motherwell, ed. Dada Painters and Poets, quoted in 
Melzer, Ibid, 68. 
48 For example, the use of chance appears in the work of Duchamp, about whom artists outside 
France knew little, save what had appeared in Apollinaire’s Les Peintres Cubistes, or the later and 
very similar arguments that scholars often make in connection to the work of postwar artists like 
Claes Oldenburg or Allan Kaprow. 
49 Art historians have generally omitted studying what Laban’s courses were like, what they 
contained, and what concepts informed the approach to the body that appeared within these 
courses. One may also consider the manner in which these two groups appeared in the press, 
which constituted the public face of Dada. When the press reported on events that included 
Laban’s students as Dada artists, the two groups appeared as a single artistic manifestation called 
“Dada.” Tristan Tzara’s own collection of press clippings made him fully aware of this fact, as 
did the other artists reading about their performances in papers published in Zürich. Laban likely 
paled at this sort of reportage, but Dada clearly did not. The clippings from 1919 are now housed 
in the Fonds Tzara at the Bibliothèque littéraire Jacques Doucet in Paris. In order to develop this 
association, I also drew on the collection of clippings amassed by Francis Picabia, which are also 
stored at the BLJD. I would like to thank Yves Gaonach for his assistance with these materials. 
Tzara’s awareness of how Zürich activities appeared in the press puts to rest any possibility that 
dance did not matter, or that anyone other than Laban viewed it as separate from Dada: “ferner 
wird ein Tanz mit dem vielversprechenden Titel “Noir Cacadou” von funf Personen vorgefuhrt . . 
. Kathe Wulff Gedichte von Huelsenbeck und W. Kandinsky vortragen.” Holzarbeiter Zeitung, 
April 4, 1919; “Unter Leitung der Tanzerin Kathe Wulff wird ein dadaistischen Tanz in Masten 
vorgefuhrt mit bruitistischen Musik.” Neue Zurcher Zeitung, April 4, 1919; “Auch die 
abschliesende Tanzauffuhrung – eine Orgie fantastischer Berfleidungen – war ein Beweis dafur, 
das dass anfangs originell Scheinend einer Manie auf der Dauer unertraglich wird.” Berner 
Tagblatt (April 12, 1919); “Brachtig und ungeheuer waren da gegen schwarze Tanzerinnen in 




                                                                                                                                                 
frastlose Tone uben. Ihre Hande und Arme bewegen sich edel und still, und sie wendete das haupt 
ab.” “Zurcher Spaziergange,” Le Savoyarde de Paris (April 12, 1919).  
The first press release from the Cabaret Voltaire welcomed anyone with new ideas, and 
staged everything from cabaret singers to Russian folk dances. They often got more than they 
bargained for, as when a bunch of drunken Dutch students showed up with banjos and demanded 
some time in the limelight. If the Dada artists were loathe to seeing Laban dancers as fellow 
Dadaists, then finding them labeled as such in newspaper accounts of the performances would 
certainly have motivated their exclusion, especially in the case of Tzara, who was obsessed with 
the public face of Dada. In fact, one only sees increased communication between Dadaists and 
Laban’s students in Zürich. Clearly, this collaborative venture of performance art was not only 
acceptable, but entirely welcome, and the only separation of these two camps has been the result 
of a retroactive pairing down of the artistic context in Zürich positions Dada in a vacuum, due to 
its historical importance in histories of radical art. 
50 Gathering all appearances of Laban dancers in the manifestations of Zürich Dada from 1916-
1919 documents the presence this art form had in the midst of an artists’ group that was so 
fascinated with the new potentialities of the rhythmic body and reinforces the presence of dance 
as providing an intellectual sources for Dada theories of linguistic expression and artistic gesture 
that they carried into other mediaThe dates that follow are taken from the chronology composed 
by Raimund Meyer in Bollinger, ed., Dada in Zürich, exh. cat. (Zürich: Kunsthaus and Arche 
Verlag, 1985), which is to my mind the most comprehensive chronology of Zürich Dada in 
particular that has appeared to date. A more general chronology of Dada as an international 
phenomenon, with a useful organization that facilitates cross-referencing, may be found in 
Dickerman, et al Dada, exh. cat. (Washington: National Gallery of Art and New York: DAP, 
2006), 417-458.  
Although Dadaists like Arp knew of Laban from his arrival in Zürich, connections 
between Laban’s students and the Dada group grew more intense in February of 1916 when 
Laban opened a space in the city of Zürich itself that was right across the Limmet river from the 
Cabaret Voltaire, which itself had also recently been given over to performances by Ball and his 
friends. Laban’s students participated in nearly every Dada performance that featured dance. 
Shortly thereafter, an evening of dance took place at the Cabaret on March 30, 1916. Another 
evening on May 31 also featured dancing, as did the first Dada soiree held on July 6. That 
summer, dance was also part of the program on Ball’s ill-fated venture to take his Dada activities 




                                                                                                                                                 
Zunfthaus zur Waag, which featured ostensibly Cubist dances. September 29, Sophie Taeuber 
held a party for her two groups of friends that included social dancing and discussions of 
literature. The year ended with the foundation of a formal gallery space for Dada art and 
performance when the Galerie Coray opened its doors.  
1917 witnessed a more formal approach to Dada as an art movement with its own gallery 
and publication, although dance only increased its presence, now that the Galerie Coray provided 
the group with a larger space for its exhibitions, which increased the notoriety of the group and its 
famous soirees. But friendly socializing was still important to both groups. On March 18, Mary 
Wigman followed Taeuber in creating a scene where both Laban’s students and Dada artists 
could mingle by having a costume party, which Lucien Neitzel disrupted in playful fashion by 
reciting poems written by his friend Hans Arp. On March 29, Sophie Taeuber performed an 
improvised dance to Ball’s sound poems and Suzanne Perrottet played modern piano works by 
musicians like Satie and Schonberg. On April 14, there was more dancing at the “Sturm Soiree,” 
held to celebrate the opening of a new show at the Galerie Coray, recently renamed the Galerie 
Dada, of artists associated to the German Expressionist circle Der Sturm, which was organized 
around the gallery and publication of the same name run by Herwarth Walden. Ball worked 
directly with Laban students for a performance at the Galerie Dada on April 14, 1917. A soiree on 
May 12 featured Arabic dancing, quickly followed by a soiree dedicated to the composer Hans 
Heusser, which featured dancing by Laban’s student Kathe Wulff. Ball’s break with Dada began 
a shift in the sensibility of the movement away from multifaceted performances and more toward 
abrasive public demonstrations and readings of manifestos by central figures like Tzara. 
51 See, e.g., Melzer, Latest Rage the Big Drum, Schall, “Rhythm and Art in Germany,” PhD 
Dissertation (University of Texas, Austin, 1989); Hemus, Women in Dada, and Bollinger et al, 
Dada in Zürich . Others who have acknowledged the importance of the relationship between 
Laban’s students and the Dadaists are Dickerman et al Dada, 36; Verkauf, Dada: Monograph of 
a Movement (London: Alec Tivanti, 1957), 92; Dorr, Dancer of the Crystal, 83; Green, Mountain 
of Truth, 169; Meyer et al, Dada Global, 283; and Manning, Ecstasy and the Demon, 69. 
52 Hans Richter, quoted in Timothy O. Benson, “Abstraction, Autonomy, and Contradiction in the 
Politicizatin of the Art of Hans Richter,” in Foster, ed., Hans Richter: Activism, Modernism, and 
the Avant-Garde (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1998), 27. He was not exaggerating; the 
Cabaret was only open from early February 1916 to late June of that same year.  Aside from the 
well-known soirees at the Galerie Coray (after March 1917, known as the Galerie Dada) and 




                                                                                                                                                 
53 “Seit Herr von Laban seine Tanzschule von München 1913 nach Zürich verlegt hat, hat sein 
Institut an Bewußtsein und Umfang des Studienplans sehr zugenommen. Die Laban-Schule ist 
heute in notwendiger Ausgestaltung ihres Grundgedankes weit über das hinausgewachse, was 
eine Tanzschule herkommlicher Art dem jungen Eleven zu bieten hat. Sie hat sich einem Institut 
entwickelt, das sich nicht nur die Ausbildung des Könnens, sondern schon die Erziehung zum 
Künstler angelegen sein läßt. Mit der Erziehung zur Persönalichkeit umfaßt sie das ganze Geibiet 
der Eurhythmie. Es handelt sich nicht mehr um die Technik allein, sondern um die 
Kunstpädagogik, von der die Ausdruckskultur, in Tanz, Ton und Wort nur de praktische Teil ist. 
Der Eleve soll neben der Pflege seiner geistigen und physischen Talente auch Gelegenheit 
erhalten, die Zusammenhange seiner Kunst im rhythmischen und kulturellen Ganzen zu 
erfassen.” Ball, Über Okkultismus, Hieratik und andere seltsam schöne Dinge,” Berner 
Intelligenzblatt, (November 15, 1917), in Hugo Ball: Der Künstler und die Zeitkrankheit, ed. 
Schlichting, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983), 54-55. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Tzara, “Carnage Abracadabraut,” Der Zeltweg (November 1919), unpaginated, reprinted in 
Cabaret Voltaire ; Der Zeltweg ; Dada ; Le coeur à barbe, 1916-1922, trans. Sabine Wolf and 
Michael Gluck, (Paris: Éditions Jean-Michel Place, 1981), 78-79. Although it did not come from 
Zürich , the modest publication Dada Au Grand Air is generally considered to be the last 
publication by Zürich  Dadaists. 
56 Ball, diary entry for May 24, 1916, in Flight out of Time, 64. 
57 White, Magic Bishop, 131. 
58 Ball, diary entry for June 23, 1916, in Flight out of Time, 70. 
59 Ibid, 71. 
60 Ibid, 70. 
61 Ibid, 71. 
62 White, Ibid, 131. Hemus mistakenly dates this event to 1916. 
63 Ball, diary entry for March 30, 1917, in Flight out of Time, 102. Arp later claimed that Ball 
wrote these lines in reaction to Taeuber’s performance. When he looked back on Dada, Arp 
recalled what Hugo Ball, in an unpublished essay “Occultism and Other Things Rare and 
Beautiful,” wrote on Sophie Tauber-Arp’s dancing at the Cabaret Voltaire.  It is a nexus of 
physiological gesture processes, mystical overtones, and joyous transgression:  “It was a dance 
full of flashes and fishbones, of dazzling lights, a dance of penetrating intensity.  The lines of her 




                                                                                                                                                 
buffoonery of perspective, lighting and atmosphere is for her hypersensitive nervous system the 
pretext for drollery full of irony and wit.” Ball,”Occultism and Other Things Rare and Beautiful,” 
unpublished essay quoted by Hans Arp in Arp et al, On My Way, (New York: Wittenborn and 
Schultz, 1948), 40. The essay was posthumously published as “Über Okkultismus, Hieratik und 
andere seltsam schöne Dinge,” in Ball, Der Künstler und die Zeitkrankheit, ed. By Hans 
Burkhard Schlichting, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984): 54-57.  
64 He did not structure the ritualistic tonalities in a manner that presented it as a pre-existent, 
higher end cognitive orientation. It falls outside the scope of this dissertation, but during his time 
in the Cabaret, Ball seemed to want a form of ritual practice that did not coincide with any prior 
structure of practice, either spiritually or in terms of gestural custom. Considering how Ball tried 
to build ritual practice from the gestural ground up, his ultimate perceived failure of this attempt, 
and his return to Catholicism is a topic for another project. This project could help the art 
historical conundrum in which scholars are only able to discuss spiritualism when an artist is 
interested in a pre-existent discursive doctrine, whatever its stripe. 
65 Ball, diary entry for August 13, 1916, in Flight out of Time, 76. 
66 Ball, diary entry for April 14, 1916,in Flight out of Time, 61. 
67 Ball, diary entry for April 8, 1916, in Flight out of Time, 60. 
68 Ball’s direct involvement with these notions was short lived. His break with Dada in late May 
1917 enabled Tzara to emerge as the key force in promotion and diffusion of the movement and 
its ideas in printed form. Leah Dickerman is correct in her assessment that Ball was likely 
resistant to the less immediate notion of Dada as an international, i.e. paper-based movement. 
These intents to forge communal feeling out of a common physiological platform of nerves come 
to the fore in the subsequent publications of Dada that came out of Zürich.  The first issue 
appeared on July 17, right on the heels of an evening of “musique et danse nègre” by Laban’s 
students at the Galerie Dada held on April 14, 1917. This evening which preceded Sophie 
Taeuber’s return to Ascona to continue her study of dance with Laban and his troupe during that 
summer. Arp visited her frequently during this time, and would eventually spend the entire winter 
of 1917-1918 on the slopes of Monte Verita.   
69 Tzara, Note 18 on Art, May 1917, Dada no. 1 (May 1917), unpaginated, quoted in Dachy, op 
cit, 40. 
70 Tzara, “Chronique Zürich oise,” in Dada Almanac (1920), Huelsenbeck, ed., repr. and trans. in 




                                                                                                                                                 
71 Hugo Ball, diary entry dated March 30, 1917, in Flucht aus der Zeit (1927), 102.  The event in 
question was a Dada soiree at the Galerie Dada, which had recently celebrated its first exhibition 
that had opened on March 17.  It is very likely that Mary Wigman’s costume ball, at which Arp 
read poems and at which Sophie danced in a costume by Arp, was scheduled in coordination with 
the opening as a celebration of the new symbolic home base for Dada events that included 
Laban’s students. 
72 Tzara, “Note on Poetry,” Dada nos. 4-5 (1919), repr. and trans in Tzara, Seven Dada 
Manifestos and Lampisteries, trans. Barbara Wright (London, Paris, New York: Calder 
Publications and Riverrun Press, 1992), 75. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Tzara, “École de danse Laban,” Dada no. 1 (July 1917), unpaginated, reprinted in Béhar, ed., 
Tzara: Oeuvres complètes, vol. 1 (Paris: Flammarion, 1975), 558-559. 
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Tzara at the BLJD, Paris, contain scores of letters from Chrusecz to Tzara, though none of them 
put forth any thoughts on art, dance, or expression of any kind. The content is purely personal. 
76 The term has generally received very vague definition. See for example Jeffrey Schnapp, “Bad 
Dada (Evola),” in The Dada Seminars ed. Dickerman and Witkovsky (New York: Distributed Art 
Publishers and Washingon, DC: National Gallery of Art, 2005), 32-33. Curiously, the ease with 
which the term can be defined retroactively has fed neglect of the historical context in which the 
term meant something very specific. 
77 For example, Wundt described the varying speeds of movement in relationship to practice and 
affirmation of concept: “Die Wiederholung, die grossere oder geringer Geschwindigkeit einer 
Bewegung, deutet nun ohne weiteres jene Modifikation des begriffs an.” “Die Sprache und das 
Denken,” in Essays, 2nd ed., (Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann, 1906), 300. 
78 French grammatical rules are non-existent in this passage, but a provisional translation could 
be: “Green necktied toreador under stuffed cakes at the endings of neurological fibers snapping 
snapping says the poet the stage of heart and Geneva par excellance Easter. It is not easy to find 
velocities of good consciences.” Arp, Serner, and Tzara, “Cacadoufarbige,” in Dada nos. 4-5 
(1919), repr. in Behar, ed, Tzara O.C., vol. 1, 495. 
79 In this manifesto, Tzara declares that he “destroys the compartments (tiroirs) of the brain.”  




                                                                                                                                                 
operation has its place. Tzara, “Dada Manifesto 1918,” Dada no. 3 (December 1918), 
unpaginated, reprinted and trans in Wright, ed., op cit, 8. 
80 Ibid, 11. 
81 Tzara, “Dada Manifesto on Feeble Love and Bitter Love,” first read at Galerie Povolovsky, 
Paris, on December 12, 1920, repr. and trans. in Tzara, Seven Dada Manifestos and Lampisteries, 
35. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ball, diary entry dated March 30, 1916, in Flight out of Time, 57. 
84 Tzara, “Unpretentious Proclamation,” first read at 8th Dada soiree in Zürich , published in 
Anthologie Dada (1920), repr. and trans. in Wright, Tzara: Seven Dada Manifestos, 16. 
85 Laban’s work became a source for Tzara and immediately expanded his sense of what free 
verse could do in a manner that is far more complex than standard arguments ascribing Tzara’s 
innovations to his dependence on French models like Apollinaire or Cendrars, or the parole in 
liberta of Italian Futurism. 
86 Tzara,  untitled, unpublished mss., in Fonds Tzara, Bibliothèque Littéraire Jacques Doucet, 
Paris, reprinted in Tzara, Oeuvres complètes, vol. 1, ed. Henri Béhar, (Paris: Flammarion, 1975), 
552.  According to Béhar, this manuscript is the outline for a lecture introducing the events of the 
first soirée.  Subsequent citations are to this edition, hereafter referred to as Tzara, “Le poème 
bruitiste.” 
87 Ibid. 
88 Tzara, “Le poème bruitiste,” 551. 
89 Tzara, “Le poème bruitiste,” 551-552. In the lights of his interest in physiological tactic, 
Tzara’s statement that Dada sought to represent intensity was a very knowing contradiction in 
terms. Focusing on the dynamism of intensity necessitated a continual change in one’s 
physiological platforms that ran utterly counter to any habitually deployed movement pattern of 
representation. Intensity in its highest levels was a continual re-realization of new nerve paths 
through improvised movements made during the recitation, rather than a quality that one could 
retain by static means. Disjunctive combinations of movement languages set forth new rhythms 
that would alter one’s experience by way of the nervous system, in which the absorption of 
inhabitual intensities would shift nerves to more elementary levels.  In contrast to Laban’s more 
focused purpose plays, Tzara’s purpose was to whip the audience into a frenzy brought on by 




                                                                                                                                                 
emphasized new rhythms of seemingly discordant movement languages. Improvisational gestures 
of voice and limbs would heighten intensity.  
90 Tzara, “Chronique Zürich oise,” expanded version first published in Dada Almanach (1920), 
ed. Richard Huelsenbeck, repr. and trans. in Green et al, Dada Almanach (London: Atlas, 1990), 
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91 Laban, Life for Dance, 87. 
92 Ball, Flight out of Time, 51. 
93 Tzara, “Le poème bruitiste,” 552. 
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habits that are associated to particular cultural values. See for example, Marcel Mauss, 
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95Ibid. 
96 I have relied on White’s essential translation based on Ball’s original manuscript (in the 
archives of the Kunsthaus, Zürich), in White, The Magic Bishop, 223-227 
97 Ball, Gadji Beri Bimba, in White, Magic Bishop, 219. 
98 Ball, diary entry for June 23, 1916, in Flight out of Time, 71. 
99 Ball, Dada Manifesto (June 1916), in Flight out of Time, 221. 
100 Ibid. Emphasis is mine. 
101 Ball, Flight out of Time, 70. 
102 In addition to this overall use of vibrations to alter the nervous substrates in collective fashion, 
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rhythms and expression that do not rely on a singular usage of conventional communication.   
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1917. Gordon Frederick Browning, Tristan Tzara: The Genesis of the Dada Poem or from Dada 
to Aa (Stuttgart: Akademischer Verlag Hans-Dieter Heinz, 1979), 148. For biographical and 
critical interpretation of Reverdy, see Jean Schroeder, Pierre Reverdy, (Boston: Twayne, 1981). 
104 Tzara, “Le Voleur de Talan de Pierre Reverdy,” Dada no. 2 (December 1917), unpaginated, 
repr. in Tzara, O.C. Béhar, ed., vol. 1, 399 and Wright, ed. and trans., 64.   
105 Of course, this is not to say that all avant-garde experiments in typographic manipulation had 
this same goal, but the notion of language as embodied certainly encourages further study in this 
direction of examining language as a corporeal property that is inherently mutable, rather than 
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Dadamax: Process in Motion 
 
The German artist Max Ernst’s diverse works contain a critical reaction to 
physiological psychology with complexities that are unique to his oeuvre. In particular, 
his contact with Zürich Dadaists that began before the war and continued in earnest 
during the years of its aftermath introduced him to the ways in which new motions of 
gesture and association in artistic composition could initiate radical modifications of the 
body and culture. But unlike Zürich Dada, Ernst’s pursuit of these ideas concerning 
motion contained a far more extensive usage of appropriated visual representations from 
science texts and pedagogical aids that, once altered and composed into new entities, 
showed new bodies under mutation. I will argue that his collages from this time have two 
interconnected techniques of critical approach to physiological psychology and its 
cultural presence: one that consisted of representation involving found images and one 
that suggested self-directed pursuit of neurophysiological change with new movements of 
arrangement involving those images. 
 
Ernst’s Contacts with Physiological Psychology and Radical Approaches to It 
While Ernst attended college at Bonn from 1910 to 1914, he took courses in 
psychology, read Wundt’s Grundzüge, portions of his Völkerpsychologie, and learned of 
general practices in physiological psychology from Wundt’s student Oswald Külpe.1 As 
outlined in the second chapter, Külpe’s work had fallen prey to Wundt’s criticism, 
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founded on the older psychologist’s belief that one could not test higher mental functions. 
Ernst’s time in college was very much like the experience of Hugo Ball, who learned of 
both Wundt and second generation theories of physiological psychology. Also like Ball, 
Ernst had contact with the Blaue Reiter group. In the summer of 1912, he became a good 
friend of the Expressionist painter August Macke (1887-1914), who introduced the young 
artist to the theories of Kandinsky, whom he would eventually meet in 1914. The Russian 
artist’s lengthy treatises outlining the ability of new forms to awaken the mind with new 
nervous vibrations of sense intake would surely have appealed to Ernst, given his 
awareness of the physiological psychology that comprised a partial source of 
Kandinsky’s intriguing theories. As a young artist, then, Ernst encountered both the 
orthodox theories of physiological psychology and varying radical receptions and 
repurposing of it by artists. 
Ernst served in the military for nearly the entirety of WWI, suffered minor 
wounds, and witnessed four years of brutal conflict and bombardments. As part of an 
artillery division, he was closer than most to the brain rattling explosions of large caliber 
weaponry. Based on the undeniable trauma of these experiences, Ernst never again 
embraced the redemptive philosophies of Kandinsky. In his 1942 text, “Some Data on the 
Youth of Max Ernst,” published in the April 1942 issue of View, the artist described his 
time in the military as a sort of waking death, stating that “Max Ernst died the 1st of 
August 1914. He resuscitated the 11th of November 1918 as a young man aspiring to 
become a magician and find the myth of his time.” The artist was never the same after the 
war.  
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Ernst first mobilized Wundt’s theories in an ironic fashion during the war in an 
article from the literary supplement of the Kölner Tageblatt that appeared in the paper on 
January 7, 1917, Ernst presented the entire history of Modernism from Impressionism to 
Futurism as a series of ultimately misguided forms of embodied experience and 
expression. He framed styles as changing psycho-sensory platforms or differing modes of 
Völkerpsychologie, writing that any style was “achieved by practice, training the eyes and 
the motor nerves of the hand, strict exclusion of all memory and association, and above 
all – technique, training in the craft.”2 For example, Ernst described the ways in which 
Impressionist technique required that “art and technical adeptness had to become one.  
Artists became technicians.”3  Impressionism was a fiction that “had to demonstrate and 
substantiate for the happy moment the momentary stasis of the moving world . . . to grasp 
it and give it to troubled man.  For he does not know the salutary effect of the 
memoryless opening up of a view, he cannot hold onto what passes away.”4  Grasping 
this movement in a fashion that fixed it required that Impressionist artists become 
“sensitively reacting, thoroughly adept cameras.”5  In training the motor nerves of the 
hand, artists became automatic in the manner of a camera, but like a camera, this 
embodied mode of practice ultimately generated a fictitious view of the world.  
Sensitive reactions and adeptness connote one’s gradual adoption of habits that 
presented a world in a way that downplayed the chaotic nature of everyday life.  
Impressionism, like photography, was for Ernst an escape from the chaotic flux of the 
world. Ernst’s outline of art movements in this fashion involved critical mobilization of 
gesture theory and cultural formation from physiological psychology. After the war, he 
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met artists who had constructed tactical variations on Wundtian theory as the means to 
shake the foundations of reality itself. 
After the armistice, Ernst returned to Cologne, abandoned his university studies, 
and began to frequent socialist and avant-garde circles. Sometime during the second half 
of 1918, he met a young law student named Alfred Grunewald, who soon began to 
publish extremist pronouncements under the pseudonym Johannes Baargeld. The two 
became fast friends and began working on ways to bring new art to Cologne. In the fall of 
1919, they traveled to Munich, met with the artist Paul Klee, and succeeded in borrowing 
almost three dozen of his works for an exhibition they staged in Cologne. This project is 
telling, for it shows that although Ernst had a more cynical outlook as a result of his war 
experience, he did not abandon particular facets of his earlier intellectual life in its 
aftermath. As a Blaue Reiter artist and veteran himself, Klee’s work fell within spheres of 
interest that were almost entirely outside the boundaries of Dadaist efforts that Ernst and 
Baargeld began to undertake simultaneously. 
Arp was a major inspiration for the forays into Dada by artists in Cologne. Ernst 
had met him right before the war in 1914 in Cologne. The exact place of their meeting 
has been the subject of conflicting stories, some provided by the artists themselves. In 
one version, Arp is attempting to explain Cubism to a combative gallery visitor. In 
another version, he is simply trying to explain modern art to this person. William 
Camfield has also raised the likelihood that the two became friends and then visited the 
large exhibition of the Deutscher Werkbund exhibition together, perhaps following Arp’s 
impromptu lesson on modern art. 6 The Werkbund exposition in Cologne was arguably 
the summation of the group’s pre-war ambitions of social reform that extended to 
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branches of the arts like Dalcroze’s school in Hellerau and filled Cologne itself with new 
investigations of architectural space by architects and designers like Henry van de Velde 
and Bruno Taut (figs. 25-26).7 During the war, the Werkbund philosophy of 
Lebensreform, in which the subject’s mental constitution and social place underwent 
alteration to its neural core, numbered among the discourses that Arp and his friends in 
Zürich had critically rearranged. These friendships provided Ernst with knowledge of 
physiological psychology that had a depth akin to Ball’s pre-war intellectual context.8 
Klee himself was apparently the first one to tell Ernst that Arp had been involved 
in Dada practices, although it is likely that he knew of this fact beforehand, because his 
wife (at that time, his fiancé) Louise had sent him Dada publications while he was 
stationed at the front. Throughout the fall of 1919, he met Ball and Hennings while in 
Munich visiting Klee, began an extensive correspondence with Tzara, and reestablished 
contact with his old friend Arp. 9 Immediately after the war, Ernst appears suspended 
between pre-war orientations to art like that of Klee and to more recent and radical 
experiments in performance and plastic art by the artists of Zürich Dada, and of Arp in 
particular, who was a frequent visitor to Cologne during 1919.  
In reference to the previous study of Zürich Dada, one commonality between 
these divergent strains of cultural practice concerns the partial reliance of both the Blaue 
Reiter and the Zürich Dadaists on a critical reaction to physiological psychology, which 
Ernst had known for nearly a decade by the close of the teens. In fact, this earlier 
knowledge provided him with a considerable amount of intellectual tools for considering 
the radical approach to the nervous system that had become a key aspect of Zürich Dada. 
Ernst’s extensive contacts with Zürich take on a new dimension of importance, given the 
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connections between the artist and this group in terms of a shared critical refashioning of 
Wundt’s physiological psychology. 
Despite this common thread of approach to science, other artists found the work 
of Ernst and Baargeld to be too abrasive for their tastes. The artists’ guild in Cologne 
resisted their attempts to exhibit work within the large autumn salon at the Kölnischer 
Kunstverein in November of 1919, which resulted in Ernst, Baargeld, and several other 
artists breaking with the guild to form their own “Gruppe D,” which put on an exhibition 
down the hall from the guild’s larger show at the Kunstverein. The proximity of their 
exhibition emphasized the outsider status that the group sought to convey, which they 
emphasized with a modest yet polished exhibition catalog titled Bulletin D, which 
testified to their interests in making both radical art and critical gestures against the broad 
discourses of physiological psychology and Lebensreform. 
As discussed below, Ernst’s work from this period certainly contains numerous 
gestures in this direction, but in the Bulletin D catalog, it was Baargeld who took center 
stage in addressing a critical outlook toward reformist movements and the nerve 
psychology that formed one of its lynchpins. For example, a text that appeared in the 
catalog by Baargeld, titled “…knocks the warm egg out of the hand,” contains jabs at 
many important artists, including Cezanne, Picasso, and Kokoschka, but another brief 
reference aligned Gruppe D to the critical approach of Zürich Dada. In the text, Baargeld 
claimed, “Dr. Rudolf Steiner’s coroners joined the international DADA Association.”10 
Casting Steiner as an ally of Dada was clearly an ironic move, but for the period reader in 
the wake of WWI, the connections of Lebensreform to the fomenting of prewar 
nationalism could have appeared to take on a particular sting, given Baargeld’s reference 
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to Steiner’s “coroners,” a fanciful profession that nonetheless calls to mind the war dead, 
who appear, albeit obliquely, as victims of some nationalist mass murder. To be sure, this 
was an insider reference, but familiarity with the prevalence of Lebensreform movements 
like Steiner’s gave the period reader a full awareness of Gruppe D’s various targets that 
arise in this text. 
Baargeld contributed a visual statement of a similar kind to the large Dada 
Vorfrühling exhibition held in Cologne in April 1920, which resulted in an impressive 
publication titled die schammade.11 The ink drawing, called Men/Be Careful Dear Heinz, 
immediately recalls a head seen in profile. Moreover, it resembles a physiological median 
cross-section of the inner cranium, which was generally used to illustrate the arrangement 
of the brain’s different sections and its areas of connection to the spinal cord (fig. 27). 
Instead of a neatly arranged landscape of cranial organs, however, Baargeld has filled the 
skull fit to bursting with strident and contradictory machine-like forms and spiraling, 
wavy lines that resemble springs or waves of energy. The work is a chaotic metaphor of 
rearranged cerebral anatomy that is strongly connected to Ernst’s contemporaneous 
works in this direction, which are more numerous and far more graphic. Despite these 
achievements of radical artistic gesture, Baargeld began to distance himself from Dada 
undertakings after the Vorfrühling exhibition, while Ernst began to expand his contacts 
with Dada artists outside Cologne and Germany itself. 
   
Playing with Blocks 
During 1919, Ernst took an odd job at a local Druckerei and began to use printer’s 
blocks from the shop in his graphic works, albeit in a collage-like manner. In utilizing 
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image and text as concrete shapes with independent formal values, he investigated 
collage on his own terms in pictures such as Don’t Smile from 1919 (fig. 28). Only 
instead of found paper, Ernst’s blocks produced visual images onto the picture space that 
the artist often masked and drew over with pencil and pen, which makes the work look 
like a visual representation of a collage. But Ernst did more than use printed forms as 
found, simply because that notion—explored by many different artists at this moment—
does not encompass the entirety of his process, which featured both found and 
painstakingly hand-drawn elements.12  
Ernst’s works of combined drawing and block prints that he made throughout 
1919 offer some of the most confusing arrangements of materials and markmaking that 
would appear in the entire Dada movement. Very little in Ernst’s work looks like what it 
actually is: block prints look like pencil lines and vice versa, pencil or pen lines connect 
seamlessly to printed lines, block prints are masked so that certain contours coincide with 
others, and so on.13 Assumed continuity of process in Don’t Smile is a lure.14 For 
example, a shape in the lower left hand corner of the work is a complex orchestration of 
several different techniques, all of which work to create the appearance of a unified form 
composed of entirely different processes.  The overall contour of the shape is a 
combination of two different blocks: a U-shaped piece and a Roman numeral I (fig. 29).  
Ernst merged these forms by masking and coordinating where the contour lines of each 
shape connect.  Thus, letters and other forms made with inked and printed blocks appear 
at first glance to be the result of hand-drawn marks.  This newly created shape appears to 
have a continuous dimension that unifies its overall form.  After finishing this 
coordinated feat of printmaking, Ernst went back over the printed texture and shaded 
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portions of the overall shape with pencil in a manner that gave the form a unified cast 
shadow. 
Floor planes and cast shadows suggest light sources and depth.  But not all objects 
in Ernst’s drawing have these optical qualities of representation.  For example, the 
horizontal lower case “o” has a cast shadow, but the vertical “o” directly above it has no 
shadow (fig. 30).  This “o” with no shadow does, however, have a form that overlaps.  If 
one follows this tubular structure down to the immediate left of the horizontal “o” with a 
shadow, then one encounters the tube casting a shadow as well.  Ernst’s collages often 
have these disruptions of basic continuity. 
These ruses create a game of looking and trickery that is certainly playful, but that 
also contains a deeper consequence. The detailed nature of Ernst’s cultivation of 
receptive discord does not culminate in a unified reception, but only becomes entangled 
in visual traps. In the historical context, the focused reception of a drawn line as a 
sequential, even rhythmic experience, especially in German aesthetics, unfolded in a 
unified scenario of empathetic engagement. In this conventional scene of reception, the 
viewer could project ostensibly natural rhythms of his or her life into the formal nature of 
the work in a manner that allowed him or her to feel that the work concretized the inner 
life rhythms of the viewer.  
These conditions of sensory cognition and emotive fulfillment—tropes like 
sequence, continuity, or rhythm, which, of course, are also qualities of rational, habitual 
bodily motion—appear nowhere in the work, but appear to on first glance. In Don’t 
Smile, Ernst treated distinct techniques of printing or drawing as though these 
conventional processes were found objects. Apparent seamlessness of form is, in fact, a 
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heterodox mixture of media and techniques that the artist combined like collaged 
fragments.  
Development of techniques by which the artist conveyed false modes of 
continuous gesture quickly gave way to new complexities of motion in process. One 
work, titled Canalization of Refrigerated Gas (1919-1920), contains forms that appear 
printed, but that contain additions in pen and ink that reinforce the contrast of stamped 
contour lines (fig. 31). For example, Ernst used a drafter’s compass to reinforce the 
circular outlines of the four stamped impressions of the roulette wheel in the upper right 
of the piece and masked the block so that its inner spokes did not appear, which altered 
the form of this conventional readymade image. In addition to these alterations, the 
spring in the lower right corner of the work that sprouts from the bicycle wheel is a 
carefully drawn line with the same width and appearance as the printed lines of the 
bicycle spokes. Canalization continued Ernst’s experiments in conjoining different types 
of media. In creating nearly indiscernible collisions of different media, he made form an 
exercise in subtle contradiction.  
This work also marked the beginning of what became an important dimension of 
the artist’s critical approach to physiological psychology. Ernst began to draw subtle 
additions of miniature organs and nerve cells in his work that introduced a representation 
of bodily change in addition to the pursuit of new experiences through cultivating 
discordant action patterns. In this work, he carefully drew miniscule organs within the 
masked centers of the roulette wheel. A heart with its main arterial veins appears in the 
masked central region of the wheel that is second from the bottom on the left (fig. 32).  In 
drawing these small organs, Ernst retained the conventional color-coding from anatomy 
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textbooks and charts. The red pulmonary vein, which carries oxygenated blood from the 
heart, is nestled against the blue pulmonary artery that transports deoxygenated blood to 
the lungs, which Ernst drew next to an esophagus in the middle of another wheel on the 
left edge of the picture (fig. 33). Between these wheels that contain heart and lungs, the 
artist drew dendritic nerve endings, thus giving these tissues conductive structure (fig. 
34). Ernst drew other branch-like tubes close to the heart, suggesting some form of 
circulatory system that connects to the disc in the lower left corner of the piece. These 
hand-drawn additions give the work a new depth with respect to the artist’s reworking of 
physiology. 
Ernst clearly delighted in the punning associations between these images. 
Arteries, conduction paths, and bicycle wheels are all hollow tubes through which 
another material circulates. Also, Ernst may have known the categorization of these 
circulatory organs in medical terminology as transport mechanisms, which is a perfect 
(though, in this context, very punning) description of a bicycle. In conjoining organs and 
nerves as physiological transport mechanisms, the functional mobility of the bicycle, and 
the spinning motion of the roulette wheel, Ernst’s analogies spotlighted the basic 
relationships between humans and machines. However, he has also created a macabre 
representation in which organs, nerves, and machines are fused into a new entity. In a 
short time, representation became more complex.  During the autumn of 1919, he began 
to create works that included collaged images of anatomy and physiology, which he often 
carefully cropped, arranged, and overpainted, resulting in jarring configurations of 




Ernst’s collages of anatomical imagery can certainly be read as orchestrations of 
shock that condemn the physical and psychological traumas of WWI.16 For example, the 
work Stratified Rocks (1920) suggests the common sight of partially buried and mutilated 
human remains and chunks of machinery that appeared in the blasted stretches of “no 
man’s land” between two opposing regiments on a pockmarked battlefield (fig. 35). 
Experiencing this form of battle caused a newly classified form of psychic pathology 
known as shell shock. Psychologists and doctors believed that the irrepressible bodily 
motions of so-called “neurasthenic” subjects conveyed diagnosable manifestations of 
various psychic pathologies. In scholarship on this period, “pathology” generally 
connotes an ideology of normativity based on the perception, diagnosis, and confinement 
of people as subjects who displayed a purported psychic otherness. Within this 
burgeoning theory of irregular gesture, psychoanalysts argued that the repeated reliving 
of traumatic experiences and uncontrollable movements among sufferers of shell shock 
were connected to the same behaviors in patients who suffered from hysteria. These 
notions of psychic pathology contain the tacit belief that movement always manifested a 
pre-existent psychic state of an individual.17 
While Ernst’s collages may manifest some such content, a far more prevalent 
meaning of pathology at this moment concerned investigatory dissections of muscular or 
nervous tissue as part of experimental, psychological inquiry. A large segment of 
laboratory practice involved cutting through flesh in order to discern how nerves worked. 
In this context, “pathology” meant a concerted disruption of tissue in modes of inquiry 
that were not oriented toward the individual, but that centered on establishing neural 
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phenomena of the species as an experimental method. These pathological methods 
formed the more extreme end of testing in the laboratories and were part of the same 
system of practices that included the experiments outlined in the first chapter.  
In many different ways, slicing bodies produced knowledge in Wundt’s 
laboratory. Forays into the body and its tissues involved macroscopic dissection of the 
brain, other organs, or muscle tissue. Any physiological process could provide evidence 
of possible psychic processes. More experimental than diagnostic, such cutting involved 
the deliberate introduction of functional disturbance into otherwise healthy tissue as a 
way to cultivate observable deviation from a pre-existent and normative structural 
condition. Akin to the dissections of physicians and medical students, these investigatory 
practices, however, had a deeper significance.  
In his Grundzüge, Wundt described in no uncertain terms the necessity of such 
experiments as crucial means of psychological inquiry. Slicing into these organs at the 
macroscopic level provided “a valuable means of orientation with regard to certain of the 
wider roads of brain travel.”18 Thought was understood to be based on intraindividual 
physiological structures that needed mapping. Macroscopic incisions could not uncover 
the nature of manifold tissues which included “numerous groups of fibers, possessing 
each a different functional significance,” so microscopic dissections sliced the specimen 
into a series of very thin cross sections, which allowed for closer study of conductive 
paths and differentiation of function (fig. 36).19 The majority of illustrations in Wundt’s 
text detailing neural structures or segments of brain tissue were based on repeated 
practices of dissection and testing.  
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Physiological psychologists undertook severer modes of pathological inquiry on 
animal tissue that involved severance of connective tissue or the removal of organs, both 
of which introduced intense “functional derangement” into the system, allowing for 
observation of secondary degeneration within areas perceived to have functional 
relations.20 One disrupted the system in order to see how tissues ameliorated the trauma. 
Severance of function in either tissues or organs created two types of observable 
disruptions in psychological function. First, severing continuity in central or peripheral 
nerves enabled one to plot subsequent debilitation by observing how nerve fibers display 
successive stages of degeneration, which were neither cultural nor racial but organic and 
produced.21 Second, excising peripheral organs triggered consequent changes in the 
central nervous organs, which worked to deal with this alteration to its overall structure. 
Ultimately, any deliberate introduction of pathology to the body allowed psychologists to 
observe what Wundt called “progressive transformations” in the different tissue systems. 
These studies became part of a strategy that allowed a researcher to partially uncover the 
deeper nature of conduction beyond its visible manifestations in movement tests.22   
Imagery of the body thus had immediate connection to possible psychological 
meanings with respect to the role body processes played in the processing of immediate 
experience and the functioning of consciousness. In this context of dominant laboratory 
techniques, Ernst’s selective cutting, shaping, and rearranging anatomical elements was 
more than just a Frankensteinian game; it actually had a literal side to its connotations 
that paralleled the practices of physiological psychologists, who used similar techniques 
on actual tissues as the gateways to higher knowledge of psychological function.23 In 
ironically enacting this practice with analogous modes of slicing and excising of Ernst’s 
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images, Ernst’s collage practice may be read as a deviant repurposing of pathological 
anatomy as practiced by physiological psychologists. Ernst located an avenue for the 
construction of deviant pathologies within pathological anatomy. In amplifying the 
pathological anatomy of physiological psychology and its deliberately engineered 
manipulations of the body, Ernst created visual representations of sculpted subjects 
outside modes of taxonomy. 
The previous techniques of cropping, retouching, and masking Ernst utilized in 
his earlier collages, such as Don’t Smile and Canalization of Refrigerated Gas, provided 
an established set of artistic practices for visual representations of retooled anatomy, to 
the extent that these new entities became characters within ambiguous settings and 
suggested narratives. He became a pathological anatomist of found imagery.  Ernst went 
beyond the basic man/machine metaphors that are such common parlance at this moment, 
even in his own work.  For example, in jeune homme chargé d’un fagot fleurissant 
(1920), the body has become the total object of focus (fig. 37). Flayed and dismembered 
flesh abounds in the two figures that populate this work on either side of a tree-like form 
or fagot that has begun to sprout tubular organs. After cropping and overpainting the 
figure on the left, Ernst went back with pen and ink and drew nerve cells that dangle out 
the figure’s neck and arms like a beaded curtain. The artist utilized in graphic form the 
practices of pathological anatomy in creating representations of neural (and, by 
consequence, mental) change. In a more famous work, The Punching Ball ou 
l’immortalité de buonarroti (1920), he combined a photograph of himself with a flayed 
figure from an anatomical chart, which suggests the neuromuscular bases of selfhood and 
connotes that these tissues of movement were the preferred site of alteration (fig. 38).  
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Returning to Stratified Rocks (1920), the work stands as a demonstration of the 
increasing complexity in Ernst’s restaging of pathological dissections (fig. 36). To create 
this piece, the artist harvested organs from a diagram of equine physiology and shaped 
several pieces into new shapes that are sometimes combined with other selected tidbits of 
flesh.24 Ernst then drew new structural connections, such as the round U-shaped pipe in 
the center of the work that connects a colon to a portion of rib cage, or the pulmonary 
artery and vein that jut off a congealed mass of tissue the artist has carved with a razor 
into a shape resembling a rosebud. Similar vein forms are present in the slightly earlier 
Canalization of Refrigerated Gas, but Stratified Rocks is a more concerted sculpting of 
anatomy into an entirely new being. For example, he trimmed an image of a small 
intestine into a shape that closely resembles a brain, then increased the believability of 
this newly altered organ by placing it next to an image of a spinal column. Ernst 
subsequently provided instances of progressive transformation by drawing dendritic 
fronds of neurons in pen sprouting from the brain like feelers on some horrid anemone. 
The spinal column has begun to undergo its own transformations. It trails a tattered 
banner of flesh behind its coccyx, out of which new nerve endings have sprouted.25 In 
contrast to the buildup of learning in the laboratory use of pathological anatomy, Ernst 
has taken the introduction of progressive transformation as the sole raison d’être of the 
entire method. He used analogical means in his process to push the transformation 
beyond any availability for knowledge. 
The connotations these cutting exercises had in laboratories made Ernst’s venture 
deeply ironic but decidedly graphic in its pursuit of new mental potentials. In Sitzender 
Buddha, he constructed a mass of cerebral tissue out of heterogeneous representations of 
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cerebral matter (fig. 39). Ernst took a Coronal plane representation of the frontal brain 
showing its outer layer of grey matter and its inner ventricles of basal nuclei.26 The lower 
left of the work features cross sections of two organs that look like the left and right 
median Sagittal representations of a cerebellum (healthy humans only have one of these). 
The hemispherical symmetry of these two shapes contradicts the actual appearance of this 
organ in the brain, which has neither the symmetry of the cerebral hemispheres, nor the 
same size as these other tissues. Recently cloned cerebella have sprouted conduction 
paths leading to a diagram of an elbow joint on the right that has lost its radius.27  
These confusing games of “name that organ” are, however, made more difficult 
by the fact that Ernst clearly selected images of cerebral hemispheres and cerebella from 
diagrams of different scales. When placed together in a new context, these different 
organs are of relatively similar size as forms. Sitzender Buddha is an explosive 
reconfiguration of psychological function based on a rearrangement of images that 
provided the foundation of scientific epistemology. Ernst has treated these diagrams like 
an old-fashioned switchboard and rearranged or added many new paths of conduction. 
These two different dimensions of tactic merge in an intriguing fashion in a work 
that alludes to the body in a manner that is less immediately recognizable than in those 
previously discussed. Ernst’s now iconic work The Hat Makes the Man (1920) gives one 
insight into how complex his critical techniques had become (fig. 40). Imagery in this 
work is not immediately of the body. Hats and pipes are not body parts like ribcages, 
brains, and small intestines, yet these forms are anthropomorphic.  
Ernst cut a page from a clothing catalogue featuring men’s hats along a traced 
pencil line and pasted it onto a more even sheet. 28 The colored pipe forms were first 
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drawn in pencil, then painted in gouache, and finally inked around their contours. After 
pasting the catalogue page, he added four more hats to the bottom stack on the left. Each 
of these hats is a separate segment of cut-and-pasted paper. Ernst then went back into the 
image with an eraser and lightly lifted the printing ink from the bowl of each hat, which 
gave these shapes a unified highlight. He then added a swath of deep black gouache to 
cover over the cut edge of the catalogue page that runs between the bottom four hats and 
the top three on the left stack.  
Other elements of composition involve the masking of images or parts of images. 
For example, Ernst carefully painted over and around hat images on the original 
catalogue page with opaque gesso after he had colored in the pipe forms connecting the 
hats. Four hats – two in the top left and two to the immediate right of the center stack – 
are covered with white. This white paint did not serve as a ground for the colored areas of 
gouache. It soaked into the fibers of the catalogue page, which reduced the intensity of 
the reflective capacity and gave each pipe form a very similar quality of saturation and 
refraction. Ernst likely planned the location of the pipe forms. Small dashes of gesso lie 
under the colored gouache additions and read as highlights on the rounded pipe forms. 
These different additions to cut-and-pasted imagery engender new modes of visual 
continuity. The artist may allude to pathmaking in this work according to more abstruse 
means of punning. 
An inscription in the lower right of the collage (fig. 41) locates the viewer 
squarely within a context, albeit carnivalesque, of physiological psychology:  
bedecktsamiger stapel / mensch nachtsamiger wasserformer / («edelformer»)  
kleidsame nervatur / auch / !umpressnerven! / (c’est le chapeau qui fait l’homme)  
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/  (le style c’est le tailleur). 
Seed-covered, stacked up man, seedless water former (‘nobleformer’) well-fitting  
venation also tightly fitted nerves! (the hat makes the man, style is the tailor)  
Considering this short text in relation to Wundt’s psychology opens a rich dimension of 
meaning in this work and others from the same period.29 Ernst’s punning use of the 
German word “nervatur,” the common term describing venation in any natural form or 
organism, generally describes root systems or leaf veins, but in this work, the term 
signifies the branching of the pipe forms in analogical proximity to the venation of nerves 
as represented in texts like Wundt’s Grundzüge (fig. 42).30 Wundt’s focus on branch 
paths and pathmaking were a potent metaphor of unpredictable bodily and mental change 
that Ernst likely absorbed from his contact with Zürich Dada. For example, in his “Note 
on Art,” published in Dada no. 2 (December 1917), Tzara had also tapped into the 
transparency between the change in artistic practice and the artist’s corpus when he wrote 
that in Arp’s work, “L’organisme est complet dans l’intelligence muette d’une nervure et 
/ dans son apparence.”31 Ernst’s works pursue a similar ambition of creating objects that 
trigger organic growth through the new movements of composition. Ernst did stop there, 
however, for his adroit constructions of visual analogy throughout contemporaneous and 
subsequent collage imagery indicate the resonance of this pun and the layers of meaning 
quickly developed.  
Ernst used a visual analogy to encode this work with reference to pulses or 
currents of a different sort appear in the top right of the work, where dot and dash 
patterns within the colored forms between the hats (fig. 43) closely resemble the graphic 
ciphers of Morse code (fig. 44). These thin lines of transmission may well signify 
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atmospheric pulsations that travel through space and are metaphors for the vibratory 
currents that enter the nervatur of nerves in the body. Analogical relationships of 
venation and Morse code to pulsations of nervous energy yield a construct of twitching 
energy in the work.  
Based on the pun between nerve endings and other dendriform structures, leaf or 
plant formations in Ernst’s collages can double as representations of miniature nervous 
systems or bare, vibrating synapses. The repeated use of images of plant venation in 
Ernst’s collages strongly suggests they were metaphors for the body’s unpredictable 
nervous mutation. For example, connotations of nervatur open a new dimension of 
meaning for the playfully anthropomorphic Leaf Landscape of 1920 (fig. 45). Dendritic 
venation of leaves operates as an analogy of the human nervous system in plant forms 
that stand oddly erect in a hand drawn landscape. An embroidered bodice covered in 
leaves emphasizes the transmissibility between seemingly non-anatomical imagery and 
actual pictures of organs, body parts, and human figures.32 Ernst delighted in the ability 
of puns to lampoon the inherent meaning of newly paired terms and ideas. His use of this 
pun is most apparent in The Word (1921), a notorious object that led to Ernst’s being 
charged with public obscenity (fig. 46). Charges were lifted once the artist proved that the 
nude woman came from a print by national hero Albrecht Dürer. In this collage, Ernst has 
peeled away the flesh on the figure’s right thigh and revealed the nervatur beneath of an 
unknown leafy plant.  
Most often, pathological anatomy investigated microscopic regions of nervatur. 
The most extensive changes occurred at a scale beyond the range of human observation 
within the tissues and nerve cells of the body. In addition to these human phenomena, 
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many microscopic investigations in physiological psychology concerned studying the 
movements of microorganisms, which were thought to have immediate connection to the 
general evolutionary trajectory of consciousness that culminated in humans. Ernst’s 
collages containing images of cells from the same period drew on a separate discursive 
branch of experimental psychology in a manner that immediately connected these works 
to his broad critical refashioning of physiological psychology. A large number of the 
artist’s works produced during his time in the Dada movement contain oblique but 
knowing references to theories of established relations between cell behavior and 
rudimentary psychic function. As he did in collages that deployed games of pathological 
anatomy, Ernst created punning titles in connection with altered imagery that infect his 
artistic production with potent irony. 
 
Cellular Consciousness 
Visual representations of cells do not have the immediate psychological 
connotations as human figures, but these microscopic entities formed a crucial dimension 
of physiological psychology. In his Grundzüge, Wundt made cells the keystone of his 
entire structure of nervous development among life forms. In the rudimentary reactive 
movements of protoplasmic reaction, Wundt found what he believed was evidence for the 
tenet that consciousness “is a universal possession of living organisms, from man down 
to the protozoa.”33 Reflex movements occured in a subject’s chance reactions to 
unexpected stimuli, and these movements also appeared in the behavior of organisms that 
were ostensibly far less developed, like amoeba and protozoa (fig. 47). The latter 
produced forms of motion in protoplasm that Wundt believed were “the results of forces 
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resident in the contractile substance itself.”34 Whether these base movements of cell fluid 
or protoplasm were volitional was, however, “beyond the reach of demonstration.”35 
Amoeba and protozoa did appear, however, to have demonstrable manifestations of 
mental activity that were “confined within extremely narrow limits . . . determined by the 
universal organic impulses only in the very simplest way.”36 Nonetheless, Wundt 
believed these cells moved in reaction to spatial conditions. Physical conditions to which 
“the movement of elementary organisms may be referred, is by no means incompatible 
with the hypothesis of concomitant psychical processes.”37 In short, cell reaction to 
spatial conditions was the base of all mental function on earth. 
Wundt argued that these basic functions deserved consideration by physiologists 
who studied human subjects, for people “derive processes in our own nervous system 
from general physical forces, without considering whether these processes are or are not 
accompanied by processes of consciousness.”38 For Wundt, human minds shared basic 
movement qualities with all organic life, so that mental processes were based in particular 
developmental levels of movement systems. Thus, any imagery of cells at this moment 
immediately connoted a general relationship to this evolutionary trajectory of psychic 
levels of operation based on the nature of movement the organism manifested.  
The contractile nature of protozoa allowed Wundt to posit a complex theory of 
degrees of consciousness built up over time through an ascendant complexity of 
movements in the body that triggered the upward complication and growth of the nervous 
system. Linking psychic activity to movement gave rise to myriad forms of 
consciousness that were implicated in different “bodily substrates” or nervatur of varying 
complexity. When it came to movement as an indicator of psychic function, Wundt 
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believed humans had lost total possession of this faculty: they were at the top, but 
understanding the summit required focusing on the basest life forms. Perceiving 
consciousness as a possession of all living things led Wundt to posit psychic causality as 
intersubjective and specific to species.39 Phylogenies of mental operation based on 
movement systems made volition (if it even appeared) and the forms of its physical 
manifestations dependent on a certain developmental level of innervation. Thus, the 
nature of conscious movement and psychic content relied on the structure of the nervous 
system and what level of “serial differentiation of function” had been achieved.40 
Placing the basis of mental activity in protoplasm solved one problem by creating 
another. Amoeba and protozoa contained protoplasm, but it was also in many different 
kinds of plant cells.41 The contractile nature of plant protoplasm made the behavior of its 
cells superficially indistinguishable from protozoa, which “undergo changes of form from 
which, in outward appearance, are indistinguishable from the movements of these 
unicellular organisms.”42 For Wundt, the crucial difference between protoplasmic 
contractility in plant and amoeba or protozoa was that in plant cells one did not find any 
“psychological middle term” between a stimulus and a movement.43 These cells lacked 
any rudimentary conductive structure in protoplasm that absorbed nervous currents of 
stimuli. This middle term grew from cell evolution in ways that, in Wundt’s time, were 
still unknown. Germinal layers grew in more highly evolved cells like amoeba or 
protozoa and displayed separation of the ectoderm (cell wall) and the entoderm (inner 
cell contents), which indicated rudimentary differentiation of function. At this early 
evolutionary stage, the ectoderm was thought to both absorb sensation and to respond to 
it with movement, as seen in, for example, the absorption and reaction of an amoeba. 
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This unity of function differed from more highly evolved organisms that possessed 
functional differentiation between nerve and muscle cells. Wundt needed another middle 
term, and his attention then turned to multi-celled organisms that had neither a spine nor 
distinct sets of neurons and muscle cells.  
The hydra, a microscopic freshwater organism, appeared to scientists as a missing 
link between amoeba and multicellular organisms that displayed functional 
differentiation (fig. 48). The hydra featured prominently in the Grundzüge as part of a 
broader discussion and evolutionary framing of the gradual differentiation of nervous and 
movement function in life forms (fig. 49). For Wundt, this small organism was a key 
evolutionary link between these two contrasting organisms and modes of nervous 
reaction, movement, and respective psychic levels. Hydrae possessed what Wundt called 
“neuromuscular cells,” that were like little bits of ectoderm that handled processes of 
both sensation and reaction.44 Wundt located in the hydra a complication of evolutionary 
physiology, in which the functionality of a unicellular organism had become a 
multiplicity of more complex structures that still displayed a carryover or heredity of this 
combined structure of response and intake.  
Ernst referred directly to these organisms when he included imagery of hydrae in 
a small work from 1921 called Farcy Hydropic Parasitic Plantation (fig. 50). He was 
likely interested in the nature of these organisms as displaying deeply rudimentary levels 
of movement and psychic activity. Visual puns abound in this work, which, for example, 
Ernst has conjoined images of hydrae cells with the word “hydropic,” the term for an 
abnormal accumulation of fluid under a person’s skin, also known as dropsy.45 Swollen 
tissues were also a symptom of farcy or Glanders, an infectious bacterial disease spread 
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from animals to humans. During WWI, German soldiers used farcy as part of their 
arsenal of chemical warfare and infected Russian soldiers’ horses with the disease along 
the Eastern front.46 These events may have informed another well-known collage from 
this time, The Horse; He’s a Little Sick (1920), which is itself a pathological maelstrom 
of rearranged anatomy (fig. 51). Thus, one finds a basic, albeit patently absurdist, overlap 
concerning the fluid of dropsy, the freshwater environment of the hydra, and a passing 
reference to wartime trauma. Other works instance the artist’s interest in creating new 
forms of physiological and psychic function below the level of the human. 
References to this overall theoretical structure go deeper in the lengthily titled The 
Graminaceous Bicycle Garnished with Bells the Dappled Fire Damps and the 
Echinoderms Bending the Spine to Look for Caresses (1921), in which the artist 
combined imagery of plant cells with references to the rudimentary nervous systems of 
undersea life (fig. 52). Ernst began this work with a large diagram illustrating mitosis in 
plants, or growth through cell division. The word “Graminaceous” in the title is a likely 
reference to the grassy plant that was illustrated in the original diagram that the artist 
used as his source image. References to plants then move to a context of marine life in 
Ernst’s reference to echinoderms, which (despite Ernst’s claim these organisms have 
spines) are a family of invertebrate ocean creatures including starfish, sea urchins, and 
sea cucumbers. In addition to hydrae, these were the only other genus of organisms that 
had a nerve plexus, or what were known as neuromuscular cells in Wundt’s time. Ernst’s 
additions to the imagery consist mostly of hand-painted fronds of cilia—machinery of 
stimulus absorption—around the cell walls of the little organisms in the picture, 
resembling the additions to forms in Stratified Rocks that suggest growth or mutation is 
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underway. Plant cells that previously moved only with contractile protoplasm have 
sprouted evidence of neuromuscular cells. After Ernst altered them in new ways, these 
organisms became psychological middle terms of sculpted deviation that were akin to the 
artist’s refashioning of pathological anatomy on the more anthropomorphic scale of the 
works previously discussed.  
Although these mutations of neurophysiology are outside the human, as new 
modes of physiological change and movement, these entities are immediately connected 
to Ernst’s uses of more ostensibly human imagery. The artist offered a critical reshaping 
of the nature of the possible origins of consciousness and a person’s mental operation. 
Microorganisms gradually develop into more complex systems of nerve cells in 
multicellular organisms that culminate in the nervous system of the human body. It can 
be a human body or an amoeba, which has movement processes that indicate psychic 
conditions.47   
As in the representations of pathological anatomy, describing the alterations made 
to these images and organisms that give them new appearances and techniques of 
movement involves reference to a science in which any form of new movement generated 
consequences of psychological change. Thus, any tactical use of physiological 
psychology immediately implicates the subject. Ernst’s inquiry became a two-sided 
attack. On the one hand, these collages were pictures of psychophysical alteration and 
new forms of pathmaking at a microscopic level.  
In his critical approach to physiological psychology and in addition to his 
alterations of pasted images, Ernst disrupted the epistemological structures of these 
images further by combining representations of diverse scales. One finds various forms 
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of this investigation: combinations of different representational scales, as in Sitzender 
Buddha; brains sprouting grotesquely oversized dendritic endings, as in Stratified Rocks, 
or the playful weirdness of microscopic mutations wrought by overpainted imagery of 
cells, like Graminaceous Bicycle. As argued above, he also delighted in the analogical 
overlap, both visual and linguistic, between human nerves and structures outside the 
subject that displayed the appearance of nervatur. This pun fed into his pleasure in 
combining images of different scales, because it was a quality of visual appearance that 
one could locate in objects and surfaces of very different sizes and anatomical types.  
One gets a sense of how Ernst incorporated both dimensions of this playful 
anatomy in two related collages: The Assimilative Threads’ Attack Plans Found Out in 
Time on the Stronghold of Dada, 1:300,000 from 1920 (fig. 53) and the subsequent Arp 
Microgramme from 1921 (fig. 54).  Most of the images in Assimilative Threads’ are 
diagrammatic cross-sections of magnified bird feathers, which offer a visual pun on the 
common structures of venation [nervatur] in feathers and nerves.48  Given the scale, Ernst 
setting is massive, but his unit of measure remains unknown. Despite the source imagery, 
the representation looks like a close up view of the skin, with magnified representations 
of hair follicles, which are a person’s most extensive tactile sense area.  Both hairs and 
nerves worked like threads [Faden] and provided sense data to the brain about the body’s 
surroundings. The title of this work and its layered meanings were likely inspired by 
critical gestures such as Tzara’s well known “Dada Manifesto 1918,” published in Dada 
no. 3 (December 1918): “Logic is always false.  It draws the superficial fibers (fils) of 
concepts and words towards illusory conclusions and centers.”49  Tzara framed the false 
logic of rationalism as dependent on fibers leading to centers in the mind, which was a 
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basic metaphor of nerve fibers leading to the cortex. Ernst presented the body as a 
microscopic battlefield, on which new gestures move one toward new vistas of 
consciousness. 
Ernst likely meant to include a version of this work in Tzara’s ill-fated Dadaglobe 
publication, which he intended as a collection of international Dada works. A prose poem 
in Ernst’s handwriting with the same title as the collage exists in the Fonds Tzara: 
The excitement of the merciful sperm carriers, whose perspective is still 
biogenetically ordered, has increased to its highest level. Similarly, the further 
rootedness of the semenbearer’s structures entered separately, so that out of them 
we arrange the following: 1) hurling type 2) fertilization through water 3) 
brooding 4) overburdening of semen through dadaist burdens, weaker than six 
great so-called telescopic Dadaists who are considered no longer visible to our 
unarmed eyes. With the one hand bar the walls, with the other hold the 
motherdrum the Dadaist and persistent arp in the right foreground make music 
with their own separate conductors.50 
Sexuality in these lines is mechanical, categorized, and technical, more like Jarry than 
Freud.51 Ernst has taken the notion of the skin as a peripheral neural sense organ and 
made it into a fantastical battlefield of psychophysical manipulation and mutation far 
below the scale of the Freudian body. Rootedness, excitement, and vibrations all suggest 
sexual energy, but also speak to a more allegedly rational science of fleshly alteration of 
the psyche by means of nerves and improvisational gesture. Mention of the drum in 
connection to Arp suggests that the artists themselves are drums, or instruments of 
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emanating vibrations that send currents into the tissues. The artists vibrate in concert with 
separate conductors or conduction paths that sent vibratory charges of nervous energy.   
Ernst’s tactical inquiry of the relationship between microorganic nervous function 
and higher levels of consciousness occurred in his work Arp Microgramme that Ernst 
constructed and sent to Paris for publication in the May 1921 issue of Littérature. In the 
journal, the work appeared next to a poem about Arp that Ernst had written (fig. 54). 
Above all, the Arp Microgramme is a conjunction of pathological anatomy, as seen in the 
cross sections and microscopic inquiries of psychological function. Here, a collision of 
different scales undermines the taxonomic nature of the composition, which resembles 
pedagogical charts that the artist had mined for his collages.  A microgram is one 
millionth of a gram, but Ernst included imagery of fossils, like trilobites and coelacanths, 
that are much larger, and then placed a heading over the entire representation that places 
its scale at 1:25,000.   
Ernst’s ostensible portrait of Arp is, in fact, a highly ironic use of microscopic 
neural histology: no images of these phenomena appear directly, but the visual analogy is 
inescapable. Although he used a diverse range of imagery in his Arp Microgramme, 
many of the images are geological cross sections (fig. 55), which closely resemble 
histological cross sections of neural tissue that had appeared in Wundt’s Grundzüge (fig. 
56). Ernst’s pseudo-organic cross sections establish elements of Arp’s personality with 
images that have a very knowing proximity to the median representations in anatomical 
diagrams from texts like Wundt’s Grundzüge.  For example, in the key to the Arp 
Microgramme, illustration number two of the microgram, two geological cross sections 
become, in the collage, comparative histological cross sections of tissue that illustrate 
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different patterns of internal structure that occur during different moments of Arp’s sleep.  
Another geological cross section clearly resembles cross sections of nerves in the dermis, 
with a corresponding text that this image portrays “yellowstone park he keeps berenice’s 
hair there,” a reference to a star cluster associated to the constellation (and astrological 
sign) of Leo.52  Fossil images suggest nervous impressions on the tissue of Arp’s 
corporeal structure, or signify that Arp’s psychic operations are rudimentary like those of 
prehistoric life forms.  One finds a similar relationship in another fossil image and its 
corresponding caption, “arp head of hair and the daily sediments of his intelligence.”  
Again, there is a punning construct between the nervatur of fossilized leaf forms 
and the dendriform structure of nerves that played out in several other works from this 
period. Here, the association of nervatur to the brain is made in exacting fashion, and 
pathmaking is lampooned by allegorical images of fossils, the most concrete and 
immovable form of nervatur one could locate in the sea of imagery that shows examples 
of this broad concept. Its form resembles a slightly later textual portrait Ernst published 
in the Kölner Tageblatt that lauded his friend’s creativity: “If we take an action shot of a 
horizontal cross section through his original imagination, we will find there a 
conglomeration of magic words.”53 But beyond these playful references to constellations, 
national parks, and trilobites, a deeply critical reaction to physiological psychology and 
its connections to both microbiology and pathological anatomy is the guiding theoretical 
force of this collage, which connects it to other major works from this moment.  
 Pathological anatomy triggered observable neural change with actions of cutting. 
These were attempts by scientists to introduce more rapid, observable alterations to 
phenomena of neural function that changed more gradually as a result of new forms of 
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motion. The imagery of carved organs, new cells covered with cilia, and hodge podges of 
cerebral imagery suggest a fascination on his part with modifying and confusing the 
correspondences of neural structures to discursive structures of rational psychological 
function. 
 But is that all? In combining images that signified a science which held that new 
forms of mentality arose from unconventional forms of movement, Ernst suggested 
phenomena of change that were not necessarily visual, but internal. This critical venture 
involving imagery can rest alongside what may have been a non-visual foray on Ernst’s 
part into the broader field of potential nervous alteration arising from forms of motion 
that did not rely on habit. Based on the connections of these images to physiological 
psychology, it is possible to read his collage practices of association and conjunction as 
forms of motion that altered the artist’s own nervous system and consequently his 
experience of self and space. 
 Granted, Ernst never described his process in these terms, but he never wrote on 
his artistic practice during this time at all, and only ever described it in basic terms of 
biography later on in his life. There does not exist unequivocal statements from him 
describing how artmaking could become a means of neural alteration. However, he had 
access to the writings of Zürich Dadaists, Tzara in particular, in which the notion that art 
could do such a thing received full treatment and poeticization. Ernst originally intended 
Tzara as the recipient of many of his most famous works from this period, so perhaps he 
was grafting a visual dimension onto a theory of composition that was already present in 
the work of the person to whom he was sending his work.  
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As Zürich Dadaists expressed in their writings, the potential a work has to alter 
nerves lay in the opportunity the artist has in creating new systems of arrangement 
[Gestaltung] or energies of motion, if the motions of these arrangements unfolded in a 
spontaneous or improvised manner. Ambulation of this kind modified the determining 
neural energies or Kraft of movement and thought. For them, and possibly for Ernst as 
well, new reactions or interactions in space and the world of objects generated a new 
experiencing self as one facet of a work’s overall meaning. 
Although very little in Ernst’s work from this time looks spontaneous, the 
potential to read his compositional techniques as improvisational is certainly extent. His 
actions of selecting, cutting, and modifying the appearance of found imagery allowed for 
variation in extent structures of representation and meaning. For example, the work 
Canalization of Refrigerated Gas, already discussed, is closely related to a very similar 
work from the same period, titled Vademekum Mobile You Are Warned (1919) (fig. 57). 
In comparison to Canalization, this work is a variant arrangement of the same blocks and 
hand-drawn additions. The playful analogies of motion between bodily transport 
mechanisms and bicycle wheels are now linked to the word Vademekum, or a portable 
reference guide that was popular in German culture at the time. The work expanded upon 
a playful constellation of meanings that appeared earlier in Canalization. 
But another form of motion may be at work in the different arrangements found in 
each piece. Beyond the puns, these works also read as improvisational arrangements 
[Gestaltungen] of similar media that constitute distinct but closely related systems of new 
motion. As related inquiries of composition that comprised different sequences of 
gestural arrangement, each piece suggests a further refashioning of the nervous system. 
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Approaching Ernst’s work from this period in such a manner sheds light on the possible 
reasons for his inclusion of written texts with his work, whether these were lengthy titles 
or entire poems sent with the visual image to Tzara. In this association, the text offered a 
new syntactic rhythm of spatial arrangement in a manner connected to the more visual 
arrangements of found imagery. Thus, it is key to see both image and text as part of the 
same undertaking and informed by the same basic ideas of neural change. Ernst could 
have understood language in this manner, because Tzara, the intended recipient of many 
of these pieces, had written on language and artmaking in this manner in texts that 
appeared in Dada publications from Zürich that he had sent to Ernst.  
Ernst’s work form this period thus reveals a great many different approaches to 
physiological psychology that he undertook alone and in collaboration with other artists. 
For example, another way in which these two types of expression came together occurred 
in the project Ernst undertook with the aid of Arp known as FaTaGaGa. Based on the 
ideas of artmaking and language that came out of Zürich, this project gains a new 
significance with respect to the other work Ernst was making at the same time. 
FaTaGaGa 
Ernst’s Arp Microgramme may have been a playful tribute to his friend with 
whom he had collaborated intermittently during 1920 on a loosely connected group of 
works known as FaTaGaGa, a playful abbreviation of Fabrication des Tableaux 
Gasométriques Garantis.54 Arp visited Ernst in Cologne twice that year for certain; 
letters from Ernst to Tzara and André Breton place him there sometime before the end of 
February, and then a little before November.55  For these works, Ernst mostly made the 
collages and Arp provided titles and texts for the newly created images.  
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Scholars have tended to downplay Arp’s role in the creation of the FaTaGaGa 
pieces, generally arguing that since Arp did not contribute very much in the way of visual 
material, that the objects were not truly collaborative. This claim, coupled with Ernst’s 
contemporaneous claim that the collages could be shown without Arp’s texts, has tended 
to encourage resistance to the notion of shared creation of these works.56 But the 
relationship between word and image that existed in the historical context, particularly as 
established by Wundt and echoed (albeit very differently) in the work of Laban and 
Zürich Dada, in which language and artmaking were simply alternative dimensions of 
neural emanation, suggests that the two modes of creation were inseparable. Ernst 
himself described Arp’s poetry in such a manner of poly-sensory qualities in his essay on 
his friend in the Kölner Tageblatt, writing that Arp’s use of language was “colorful, 
precise, sensual, fantastic, and always visual to the point of portrait-like fidelity.”57 The 
problem with downgrading Arp’s involvement in this project is that it contradicts the 
artists’ sense of the interrelated nature of language and artmaking.  
Arp composed titles for the collages according to the basic structure of ideas that 
he had followed in Zürich. As argued in the previous chapter, Zürich Dadaists drew on 
and heavily reworked Laban’s ideas on language in their poetic composition and 
performance. The Zürich Dadaist emphasis on improvisation had altered Laban’s framing 
of these expressive modes into a powerful system of artmaking that made it a vehicle of 
continual corporeal alteration. Ernst had created his own particular variation on the 
method by inserting short poems into the visual field of his collages. These two 
compositional modes were, in fact, two interrelated Raumgestaltungen of movement 
language meant to disorient the artist and viewer’s pre-existent biorhythmic anchors of 
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rational sensibility. The visual and linguistic aspects of these objects were equally 
important, because both dimensions held an opportunity to alter the neurophysiological 
foundations of consciousness with improvised movements—i.e., of visual and material 
arrangements in collage and new modes of composed sound gestures [Lautgebärden] in 
poetry. The theory of language known to Arp from his awareness of Laban’s theories 
likely informed his and Ernst’s interconnections of image and text in the senses these 
practices had as embodied phenomena. 
Arp’s only contribution to the visual side of the FaTaGaGa production is a telling 
one that emphasized the mind-altering potentials of improvised expressive movements. 
He pasted a photograph of Sophie Taeuber stretching into Physiomythological Flood 
Picture (fig. 58), which Spies has established as the first FaTaGaGa work.58 The text Arp 
composed for this work placed both it and the entire project into a context of 
improvisational gesture involving imagery and language. His text is a chaotic story 
involving thieves, crones, and scatological humor, until dancing women like Taeuber, 
whose photograph appears in the collage, moves in like the wind to save the day: “But 
through free gymnastics (freiturnen) the women move the wind into multi-coloredness. 
The dadaists spring from this viewpoint, that a bird’s foot can damage nothing.”59 
Freiturnen is a composite term that encompasses Laban’s Freitanzen activities of 
exploratory improvisation and Dalcroze’s Turnen exercises that provided Laban with a 
major source of inspiration. Laban had previously included improvisational poetry 
composition as a major element of his free dance exercises. A text written by Ernst for a 
lost collage that Spies has dated to this moment contains equally playful approaches to 
rhythmic movement and Lebensreform. Written in honor of Ernst’s friend Job Haubrich, 
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the text claims that this individual “invented the elastic gymnasium . . . a dumbbell 
booklet for physical education teachers . . . guidelines for happy hiking.”60  
Arp’s inclusion of Taeuber’s image and his reference to shared improvisational 
movements of the body signaled an interest in making artistic production into a 
refashioning of physiological psychology. In both dimensions of practice, one finds a 
sensibility of collage that is corporeal—a composite of spontaneous gestures involving 
image and sound—and directed toward nervous alteration. Collaborative improvisation 
had a stronger potential for participants to experience nervous mutation out of newly 
discordant sequences of gesture.  Forging disjunctive sets of gestures in activated space 
was a central concern for Ernst and Arp’s experimental collaboration.  
 Compartmentalizing the diversity of work Ernst made during this time aids 
understanding of it, but it is crucial to remember that all of these endeavors were 
simultaneous. Thus, framing FaTaGaGa as being inspired by notions of the Freitanzen 
enriches the playful anarchism of collaborative artmaking and gives these experiments a 
degree of psychophysical consequence, but this reading also bolsters the potential interest 
Ernst may have had in these ideas when he made collages on his own. Sharing these 
works with Tzara guaranteed a viewer who knew full well the consequences of artmaking 
when its practitioners embraced a sense of gesture informed by the physiological tactic of 
experimental Freiturnen. Arp’s poetry often displays an interest in tonal play, which 
intermingles with Ernst’s newly associated gestures of images. Proximity to exercises of 
dance allowed the project to draw on its philosophy of gesture and collaboration in the 
artists’ deliberate intent to reforge both the experience of making a work and the nature 
of one’s experience. 
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 Doing so hinged on altering the body’s Kraft or determining energies of motion in 
spontaneous combination with another. This practice altered the thermodynamic 
functionality of the nervous system as the means to alter experience. The idea of the 
nervous system following the laws of the conservation of energy gave critical approaches 
to it an immediate connection to other scientific fields in which these laws also applied. 
One aspect of the filed deserves particular focus, because Ernst and Arp’s project was an 
ironic namesake of it. 
Gasometry is the activity of measuring or using pneumatically contained gases, 
and its most famous figure was the pioneering French chemist Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier 
(1743-1794), who once sat for a portrait by Jacques-Louis David (fig. 59). David’s 
portrait includes the tools of Lavoisier’s trade, such as a small gasometer—a vacuum tank 
that allowed for either the measurement or measured release of a particular gas—and a 
balloon flask, another pneumatic vessel into which different gases could be fed and 
synthesized (fig. 60). Lavoisier used two gasometers, far larger than the one in David’s 
portrait, to send oxygen and hydrogen into a balloon flask. This experiment allowed him 
to demonstrate that water was a combination of these two gases, thus ending millennia of 
reliance on Aristotle’s theory of elements (fig.61).61 When Lavoisier made his own water, 
its weight was equal to the collective amount of gas that he had transferred into the 
balloon flask.  
Based on this observation, he composed the thermodynamic law of the 
conservation of mass in chemical reactions, which stated that in a reaction, nothing is lost 
or gained; one will simply witness a change in material form. Water, for example, might 
become steam, or a certain weight of oxygen and hydrogen will create the same weight of 
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water. Lavoisier also coined the terms “oxygen” and “hydrogen,” based on the function 
of each element. Hydrogen, for example, was based on Greek words that, translated 
literally, mean “water former.”  
The laws of thermodynamics have applications to almost every scientific 
discipline, but the manner in which Ernst approached the law of the conservation of 
energy shows that he caught the analogical overlap between the systems theory of 
physical chemistry—process like water making steam—and the theories of nervous and 
mental change of physiological psychology. That law in physiology states that energy 
cannot be created or destroyed, but only transformed, as in cases of physical activity. In 
Ernst’s time, physical activity had immediate social applicability, as the sculpting of 
Kraft formed a pillar of Lebensreform. In these projects, reformists followed Helmholtz’s 
application of the law of the conservation of energy to the nervous system, which Wundt 
had accepted and repurposed in his argument that the nervous system changed shape in 
accordance with this law as the means to absorb new stimuli. Thus, habitual processes of 
moving and sensing—experience itself—followed laws of thermodynamics, which, as the 
basis of consciousness, made rational mental processes coincide with the inevitability of 
general physical laws. 
Works that Ernst made immediately prior to the FaTaGaGa collages displayed 
considerable knowledge of these concepts, which he saw fit to intertwine with notions of 
physiological psychology in a manner that took broad swipes at the common reliance of 
these discourses on thermodynamics. Ernst’s repurposing scientific imagery and 
terminology shows the artist’s clear delight in the humor that these collisions of scientific 
disciplines could bring to the overall critical thrust of his work. For example, in addition 
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to notions of physiological psychology already discussed, The Hat Makes the Man made 
direct reference to Lavoisier’s discoveries in its inscription discussed above. Ernst’s 
addition of the word “wasserformer”—a literal translation of the Greek root for 
hydrogen—offers a punning take on the notion of psychological pressure by associating it 
to the containment of pressurized gas in pneumatic vessels, like the pipes that appear in 
his collage. Bathroom humor is also never far from these works, and one must remember 
that “making water” is also slang for urination, and although the correct German phrase 
for this act is “Wasser lassen,” given the imagery, the connection of laboratory chemistry 
and body chemistry is a punning treatment of making water. 
Further references to chemistry appear in another work, also from 1920, titled 
Hydrometric Demonstration of Killing by Temperature (fig. 62). Hydrometers were 
instruments first used by Lavoisier to test the densities of liquids, which changed as they 
were heated or cooled—perhaps the “temperature” in Ernst’s title. As Spies has 
demonstrated, the images in this work came from a catalogue page advertising 
instruments that could demonstrate procedures in chemistry and physics (fig. 63).62 
Instruments also formed the basis of epistemology in the laboratories of physiological 
psychologists and it is likely that Ernst’s time in college had included demonstrations of 
both sets of these gadgets. This catalog may have given Ernst the idea to title the series 
after a gasometer, though the German term for the instrument—Gasbehälter—is not used 
in any of the works. He preferred the French term gasometrique.  
This is an important distinction to make, because prior to Ernst and Arp’s 
adoption of the French term, it appeared in early 1919 in Francis Picabia’s explosive 
work Poésie ron ron: “at the ministry of the Wrung tablecloth/now one 
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morning/gasometer smile of beautiful weather/a telegram of fearsome size/round like a 
blue pancake/made me turn pale.”63 Tzara certainly knew this poem, because drafts of it 
are in Picabia’s letters to him, and Ernst may have received this text along with issues of 
Picabia’s journal 391 that Tzara sent him throughout 1920. These uses of chemical 
instruments in Ernst’s early collages still do not explain the reasons that pre-revolutionary 
chemistry had such currency as a target of playful criticism that occurred alongside the 
assault on physiological psychology. These machines and their chemist meant a great 
deal to the public during the fin-de-siècle and for decades afterward. This currency 
indicates possible reasons for why German-speaking artists were so interested in making 
reference to a French chemist. Like their Dada friends in Paris, they were seeking to 
undercut icons of traditional knowledge. 
Lavoisier may have died during the Terror, but by 1900, he had become a major 
symbol of French superiority in chemistry and had a social presence in that country not 
unlike the reputation of Wundt in Germany. That year, France honored the recent 
centenary of Lavoisier’s death with a special exhibit on him at the Exposition Universelle 
(fig. 64) and unveiled a large statue of him in front of the Église de la Madeleine in Paris 
(fig. 65).64 At the turn of the century and in the face of Germany’s scientific prominence, 
Lavoisier offered the French a cultural hero, whose instruments embodied the country’s 
scientific ingenuity and authority. Before the emergence of the Curies in 1902, Lavoisier 
and his gasometers were key pieces of national history bolstering French claims of 
intellectual and institutional superiority in Europe, WWI, with its birth of mechanized an 
dchemical warfare, gave the overlap of mechanical and bodily thermodynamics an 
entirely new validity as the raw material of more critical approaches.  
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Once he began receiving the FaTaGaGa collages, Tzara quickly began peppering 
his manifestos and plays with references to gasometry, both for its ironic value as a 
repurposed symbol of French scientific authority and as a playful reference to more 
Rabelaisian dimensions of body chemistry and overall physiological functionality. These 
include linking body chemistry and the development of consciousness. For example, in 
his “Dada Manifesto on Feeble Love and Bitter Love,” first read at the Galerie 
Povolovsky in Paris on December 12, 1920, the term appeared in a vertiginous definition 
of the movement he helped invent: “Dada is a dog—a compass—the lining of the 
stomach—neither new nor a nude Japanese girl—a gasometer of jangled feelings.”65 The 
haywire inclusiveness of Tzara’s definition resists any synthesis of characteristics that 
could provide a sense of unilateral identity for the group of artists who gathered under its 
name. Nonetheless, partial associations or analogies can be made between, for example, 
the mention of a stomach and the gasometer. Both can hold gas, but the gases arise from 
different processes. 
Lighthearted associations of a very similar kind appear in one of the FaTaGaGa 
works titled Here Everything is Still Floating (fig. 66), for which Arp wrote the following 
lines: “for the first time ever the rainbow eater didn’t show the gut steamer and skeleton 
fish decided to take off.”66 In this work, Ernst has refashioned the hull of a steamship into 
a twisted mess of intestines, so that the gas it exudes into the air suggests flatulence, 
rather than steam. In this collage, mechanical thermodynamics and digestion have 
become inextricably linked. Another humorous example of associating conversions of 
matter to human digestion appears in the short text Arp composed for the work Laocoon, 
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another FaTaGaGa consisting of a large gob of intestines in a vitrine (fig. 67). His text 
reads:  
In contrast to the ancients’ view of Laocoon, Arp holds the modern view of  
volvulus, the three priests have stepped out for a wee-wee, while in a manner  
quite harmless to the visitor the worms in their glass cases go on muddling  
through.67  
Ernst and Arp worked in unison and reshaped the anatomical torsion of the classical 
sculpture Laocoon and his Sons (fig. 68) into an allegory of a volvulus, or abnormal twist 
in the intestine that prevents the body from digesting food and passing waste (fig. 69). 
Arp’s priests who make water continue the trend of bathroom humor in this piece and 
recall the playful association of hydrogen with urination in Ernst’s use of the word 
“wasserformer” in his collage The Hat Makes the Man from this same year. These 
various referrals to bodily gas or transport mechanisms for waste, such as intestines, 
created playful analogies between chemical processes of energy conversion in 
instruments and bodies.  
But one may also consider these lighthearted ventures as comprising one piece of 
Ernst’s broader critical exercises in pathological anatomy, in which the physics of the 
body has been modified in explosive fashion as a way to suggest the creation of new 
forms of consciousness. Thinking of these works in comparison to Wundt’s theory of the 
evolution of consciousness as being readable through varying complexities of neural 
systems and associated ambulatory processes raises the thrust of these objects beyond 
puns between digestion and matter transformation. What kind of mentality would the 
glop of Laocoon possess? The question is darkly humorous but no less potent in its 
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suggestions of bodily and mental alterity that Ernst had undertaken before he initiated 
FaTaGaGa with Arp. 
Ernst (and Arp’s) humorous constructs were exercises in pathological anatomy 
that unhinge the potentials of dissection to provide knowledge of psychological 
functionality, which both artists understood as shot through with theories of 
thermodynamic function. Given the context of gasometers in Paris during this time, what 
might Tzara have thought when these works of “guaranteed gasometry” appeared on his 
Paris doorstep? That Tzara understood  the play on Lavoisier and his instruments is 
likely, since linking his name as gasometry experiments were not only common 
knowledge, but were encoded in the rhetoric of French institutional authority. In relation 
to the additional notions of human thermodynamics from the historical context, as seen in 
the fascination the two artists had with Taeuber’s pursuits of improvisational movement, 
the neurophysiological foundations of consciousness had an ideological dimension of 
thermodynamic functionality. Framing the senses or the overall body as following the 
functionality of an instrument was a trend that did not begin with the avant-garde, but in 
physiological psychology, which applied laws of thermodynamics—especially that of the 
conservation of energy—to the behavior of the nervous system, which controlled the 
senses and provided the basis of consciousness.68 
In working with these spontaneous configurations of images and language, Ernst 
and Arp’s collaborative venture brought two dimensions of expressive movement into 
deeper correlation in a manner that was outside convention, but that utilized the scientific 
laws that formed the bases of alleged normalcy in both bodies and elements. Thus, titling 
their loosely knit group of works after a thermodynamic instrument gave their 
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undertaking a great deal of critical mileage. During this time, the body was recognized as 
a thermodynamic instrument that changed according to laws that one could apply to other 
physical structures and events. 
Tzara’s continued interest in viewing the body as a system of pneumatic or 
thermodynamic instruments appeared in his notorious play “The Gas Heart,” which 
premiered as part of the Dada Salon held at the Galérie Montaigne in June 1921. The title 
is a fascinating conjunction of a human organ with an engine, for although oxygen passes 
through the heart in the blood, a gas heart suggests something far more mechanical. 
Tzara’s cast of players is its own exercise in pathological anatomy: characters in the play 
consist of different body parts—eye, mouth, nose, ear, neck, and eyebrow, to be 
precise—all of which prattle chaotically outside any narrative trajectory. Most of these 
organs are sense receptors that send data of experience to the brain. In Tzara’s play, each 
character chatters incessantly and nonsensically, sending messages to the audience that 
never fuses into a sequential narrative.  
Considered in the lights of this study, the script reads as an allegory of manifold 
representation gone awry. Beyond the neural consequence of the performance, a referral 
to gasometry also appears, further reinforcing that for Dada, these two scientific fields 
were inseparable. For example, the eye favors the Greek hero Agamemnon’s wife 
Clytemnestra, and unleashes the following confession: “You are beautiful, Clytemnestra, 
the crystal of your skin awakens our sexual curiosity. You are as tender and as calm as 
two yards of white silk. Clytemnestra, my teeth tremble. I’m cold, I’m afraid. I’m green 
I’m flower I’m gasometer I’m afraid. You are married.”69 Making the eye a gasometer—
a precision machine—is a characterization that resembles turning the heart into an 
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engine, which again creates a very particular interface between human and machine 
based on apparent automatic processes.  
These very particular associations between human organs and mechanical or 
chemical instruments based on partial commonalities of function did not cast the body as 
an unencroachable mechanism. Rather, in word and image, these manipulations framed 
the body as an inherently moldable entity. But despite the grand ambitions suggested in 
the play, audiences in Paris walked out in the midst of the performance, which in that city 
was a worse insult than disrupting the performance. The uproar he sought did not appear, 
and Tzara left Paris that summer with a heart already heavy over growing distaste for him 
among French poets who had once so strongly admired him. It was time to regroup.  
  
 
Nerves in the Tirol 
July 1921 was one of many times in the early 1920s when the avant-garde 
witnessed a collision between an individualist outlook and a felt need for community that 
was starting to erode. Exemplifying the puckish manner that he had perfected, Picabia 
mocked Zürich Dadaists in an issue of his journal 391 called Le Pilhaou-Thiubaou. In it, 
he claimed that he and Marcel Duchamp had invented Dada, which drew the ire of Ernst 
and especially Arp, who both encouraged a meeting in Tarrenz, a small shepherd 
community in the Tyrolian Alps, in order to plan a counter-attack.  Eventually, Arp, his 
wife Sophie Taeuber, Ernst, his wife Luise, Tzara, and his companion Maya Chrusecz 
convened on the sleepy village in August, where they collaborated on the publication 
Dada Au Grand Air (Chrusecz provided the title) as a riposte to Picabia (fig. 70).70  They 
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were eventually joined briefly by Andre Breton, his wife Simone, Paul Eluard, and his 
wife Gala. 
These tempestuous months are often compartmentalized according to basic 
conceptions of avant-garde teleology: Breton, representing the Freudian side, eventually 
wins out over Tzara’s “anti-art” Dada side, which soon fades into relative obscurity. The 
disappearance of Tzara makes way for the birth of the interest in the Freudian 
unconscious during the early experimentation of Breton and Phillipe Soupault with 
automatic writing or the fabled époque des sommeils, in which the Paris Dadaists 
investigated the phenomena of mediums and clairvoyance.  This trajectory is a far too 
simplistic representation of what was, in fact, a highly tempestuous period. One 
constructive way to expand understanding of this moment in specific reference to Ernst’s 
artistic practice is to consider it in the light of the radical view of eurhythmics and 
Lebensreform that had unfolded in the Cabaret Voltaire and Galerie Dada, in which the 
experimental alteration of nerve paths had taken center stage as the creative heart and 
soul of the work.  
Several basic facts about this moment establish the likelihood that the radical 
definitions of movement that had erupted in Zürich and Ascona were still prevalent in the 
hills of Tarrenz.  In the summer of 1921, Tzara was a maelstrom of ambition and wanted 
to collaborate on a ballet with Ernst, which would likely have drawn on notions of 
choreography that he and Ball had designed for the Laban dancers at the Galerie Dada a 
few years before.71 Ernst’s initial experiments in frottage date from this period, and it is 
likely that the radical theories of movement hatched on the hills of Ascona and exercised 
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in the Cabaret Voltaire were a source of interest for Ernst and his friends as they gathered 
together that summer.   
These ideas likely informed a collaborative text composed by Tzara, Chrusecz, 
Arp, Taeuber, Ernst, and Sophie Taeuber (as Armanda Duldgedanzen). Ernst’s then-wife 
Lou is represented by the purported signature of nineteenth century realist painter Rosa 
Bonheur (1822-1899). This text, of which one page has been lost, and which remained 
unpublished during the lives of all its authors, was composed on the back of manuscript 
sheets for a portion of Tzara’s “Monsieur Aa” texts. It was likely written with the 
possibility of its inclusion in Dada Au Grand Air: 
[in French]When the slave hunter crosses the desert for the last time and the 
lightning strike pushes its flower into the stone, Dada cries: voilà la nature – it 
sings the hymn and the hair of our mother nature.  
[in German] In the garden bells of nervous lizards, the popes hang. Out of the drip 
flasks the shivers fall. One, the horse bit on the battens, two the globetrotters in 
the telephone wires, the mouse daughter glycerine. One, we want the hammer 
blocks in flannel, with the forced merry-making of winter bunting, when the days 
have disappeared in a haze into beauty. We want to return to NATURE. 
*second page missing* 
[in French]…bandages against the harvest and eyes of massacred fish. It is for 
them that we take off our shirts and moustaches to salute nature. But we put them 
back on when it rains mouldy Spaniards. 
[in German] Down with the compact majority of the ladies’ tailors!!!! We want to 
cook nature in fire. Long live nature in its monthly production.72 
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The text itself is a rather unique instance of textual collaboration between Laban dancers 
and Dada artists like Ernst, who did not participate in Zürich events, but whose 
participation in this undertaking (more than half of the original manuscript is in his 
handwriting) could indicate an interest in exploring artistic creation as a collective form 
of elemental gesture language with overt tones of improvisation and chance response—
one that he had explored a few months earlier in a different form with Arp.  
The return to nature called for in this text recalls the pursuit of this phenomenon 
on Ascona, in which communal forms of life and artistic expression were prominent 
practices. More specifically, artists believed that a purer form of natural existence could 
arise through a sharing of elemental gesture patterns. In the overarching context of 
anarchism, the feeling and practice of elemental movements in a collective withheld the 
habitual self-projection one found in more conventional forms of artistic practice. One 
instead joined a collective connected by newly forged paths of nervous energy that was 
akin to the metaphor of the telephone wires in the above text. 
In addition to some playful collaborative poetry by Ernst and Arp that they 
referred to as FaTaGaGalied, texts by Parisian Dadaists, and the inevitable potshots at 
Picabia, Tzara included an intriguing text attributed to his alter ego, Monsieur Aa, 
antiphilosophe, in which the bodily nature of language as a form of gesture takes center 
stage. Dada Augrandair continued the interest among Tzara, Ernst, and Arp in 
approaching language and artmaking as forms of body altering movement.  In this text, 
Tzara sought to establish the consequences of a bolder, anti-conventional use of language 
in which one pursues creation with full awareness that new uses of language will alter 
one’s physiological platforms of experience and fleshly ways of knowing.   
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Tzara is unequivocal concerning the depth that conventional language will control 
one’s corporeal platforms, but he is also boldly hyperbolic concerning the potential of the 
body and its nervous structure once it is refashioned: “Cowardice knows its order; it is 
the weight of fear we carry entirely in the nuclei of the bones.  Oceanic nerves are the 
rails of fervent wind.”73  One had to forge new linkages of creative currents through a 
new use of language in its understood structure of anatomical alteration that would 
separate itself or deviate from the “malaise fixed by the anonymous collectivity in a word 
– and the sentimental signification that it hides.”74  Tzara located the impersonal nature of 
conventional collective representations that have ascended from the group to its market 
structures and argues for a retooled use of language as a form of movement that will alter 
the body and make its nerves vast and oceanic. He played fast and loose with traditional 
anatomy and physiology in these lines, but the point is clear.  Cowardice of expression, 
the fear one has to strike out into uncharted expressive waters, results from and reinforces 
a form of internal constitution, down to the very cells of the bones. The curse of 
convention is bodily. Every use of it strengthens the connective tissues that enable its end 
result.  It is within a person, but below his or her levels of awareness.   
Ernst’s visual contribution to Dada Augrandair, an astonishing collage called The 
Preparation of Bone Glue, echoes sentiments expressed in Tzara’s essay about the 
fixative quality that a conventional use of language has to make one a prisoner of his/her 
own physiology (fig. 71). Considered in relation to Tzara’s text, the image suggests that 
the concretization of the physiological bases of mentality occurs through a conventional 
use of language which, in its capacity as nervous rhythms and conductions, repeatedly 
reinforces preexistent conventional biorhythmic paths of conduction and expression.  
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Ernst has turned a picture of physiological therapy, in which bodily pain is soothed by 
soft electric currents, into an infective diffusion of language into the body from the 
outside. Crucial in this relationship between image and text is the notion that language 
was a bodily phenomenon, that it entered the body as a system of currents, which is akin 
to Ernst’s image.  Tzara’s statement about conventional language as a fear that weighs 
down one’s very bones, coupled with Ernst’s macabre visualization of this premise, gives 
way to more hopeful ambition for language and creativity. Both gestures pursue the 
potentials of a critical approach to the psychophysical premise of language as a nervous 
emanation or oral gesture of sonorous texture—the definition explored by all interested 
parties in Zürich and Ascona.  
The next sentence in Tzara’s Monsieur Aa text extols the full potential of the 
nervous system: nerves are oceanic and vast, and can transform into feverish and 
torrential rails, like the trolley car lines that had spread through an entire city, connected 
by the same base charge.   This microbiology of linguistic seepage also appears in the 
following lines from the same text, where a conventional use of language becomes a 
toxin for the body’s tissues: “Words will become hostile conclusions – taking an 
existence which acts directly on the cell and the operation (spéculation) of blood.”75  
Everyday language and the rhythms of everyday life were too rational and mathematical.  
Language was one technique of the body that had to change.  Its infection of the cells and 
blood led to an “ineffective sonority” established as the base of a “market logic and 
compromise.”76  Tzara constructed the psychophysics of a literary sellout in these lines, 
which is why he used spéculation rather than circulation in reference to blood.  
Speculation means operation, but in terms of a market structure, not a body structure.  In 
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his framing of the conventional speaking body, the logic of the body’s movement patterns 
and emanatory nervous conduction paths, which generate linguistic expression, fall 
entirely in line with convention and meets a market demand.  Meeting this demand has its 
own reward, but the consequence is a vacancy of expressive potency: 
Nothing can be effective.  It’s always a retreat.  In tying words into a phrase, I 
arrive easily at the point.  I always find a result there.  The result and the phrase 
are created by the least animal resistance.  Giving them a value is a sign of 
vulgarity.77   
None of these conventional body mechanics or economy of symbols enables 
physiological change, and the vibrating sonority of conventional language as gesture 
could never alter the physiological platforms of consciousness outside of a market 
structure. The power of language would lie in the manipulation of its basic forms as these 
forms related to explicit movement qualities that would strengthen their quality of 
sonorous vibration based on new arrangements or maneuvers.   
For Tzara, the vibratory nature of language was a materia prima that an artist 
could sculpt in a manner that encouraged mental change. Conventional usages of words 
“cannot guarantee their real virtue, the jouissance I have in forcing their manipulation.”78  
Syntax will become a game of shifting textures that reduces language to shifting, 
elemental levels of sonority.  Again, this is no bare formalism.  This elemental level of 
increased rawness will alter the speaking body at levels far below the level of mentalité: 
 One should kill the result before finishing the phrase and not develop it after 
 grammatical necessities.  Syntax is algebraic and (our use of it) gives us 
 logarithms for calculations of delicacy.79 
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Tzara’s focus on syntax as an arrangement of sonorous texture exemplifies his positing of 
poetic creation on the most elemental bodily level of felt rhythm and nervous vibration.  
Addressing this elemental level was the only way to trigger its mutation.   
Consider the psycho-physiological consequences of these techniques in the light 
of Tzara’s relationship to the body-altering capacity of language.  Any use of language 
will be an expression of signification, but more importantly, it will be a transmission of 
nerve-altering movement. These new methods of coordinating linguistic texture unfold 
with the sole intent to return to base levels of expressive physiology that signal the return 
of consciousness to an elemental level.  Language, like artmaking, is both of and from the 
body.  New uses of it change that body and turn the nerves loose into an oceanic 
exponent. 
It was in this context of expression, in which new forms of expression and poetics 
were inextricable from alterities of neural embodiment and change, that Ernst made his 
initial investigations of frottage, or the composition of imagery out of combined graphic 
registries of surfaces. Ernst’s first investigations were modest, as in this small rubbing 
made on a piece of scratch paper (fig. 72). The method and resulting imagery quickly 
expanded to more complex territory with a work, also from 1921, titled The Trinity of 
Anatomy (fig. 73). This frottage work carries forth the artist’s interest in using imagery 
that suggests the neural changes that happened in his own body while making the new 
movements of the work’s construction—i.e., of conjoining new motions of tactile inquiry 
into a single space. The work likely began with appropriated images from anatomical 
charts illustrating the skeletal and muscular structures of the body. The artist has retained 
the numbered labeling of the figure’s various tissues but has removed the key in which 
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the muscles would be listed, thus withholding taxonomic correspondences between the 
body and information about it.  
Removing the anchor of classification then gave way to overt alterations of the 
body’s surfaces with new forms of tactile inquiry. He covered each of the four bodies 
with a mixture of different rubbed textures. Having placed the sheet over different 
surfaces, he then filled in certain areas on each body with varying bits of texture, such as 
the lace and netting of various kinds that overlap and intertwine across the span of each 
body. This small work is easily the most complex of the modest number of frottages the 
artist made from 1921 to 1925, the year in which the process became a major focus. This 
small frottage suggests in a novel way that new forms of motion in artistic process could 
alter the nerves and create, in this case—a trinity of anatomies, multiple forms of being 
and knowing.  
That Breton knew of these ideas is clear from the publicity surrounding Ernst’s 
first exhibition in Paris (May 3-June 3, 1921) at the Au Sans Pareil bookstore. Amidst a 
flux of puns, the flyer advertising the exhibition boasts that the artist would appear, albeit 
under a whisky sea, in “five anatomies,” which recalls the three anatomies in the title of 
the frottage previously discussed (fig. 74). That work did not appear in the Paris 
exhibition, but another, titled Deshabillés, did appear and posited the potentialities of 
neural alterity and multiplicity that could arise from the making of new art objects (fig. 
75). This work consists of two figures clipped from an anatomy textbook that illustrates 
the nervous system as it courses through the body to the brain. The work and its doubling 
of the nervous system confirms the artist’s interest in creating objects that could trigger 
nervous change. 
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Breton captured these notions in his brief essay that appeared in the modest 
catalog for the exhibition. His text illustrates the extent to which he had absorbed Tzara’s 
criticism in his considerations of Ernst’s works as objects that could alter the mind 
through the senses and nerves: 
But the marvelous ability to reach out, without leaving the field of our experience, 
to two distinct realities and bring them together to create a spark; to put within the 
grasp of our senses abstract figures with the same intensity, the same high relief 
as the others; and, by removing our systems of reference, to disorient us within 
our own memories—that is what holds Dada’s attention for the time being.80 
This notion of lyricism, or described by Breton in the above quotation, will feature later 
in his first Surrealist manifesto of 1924, in which he will pull all the stops from his 
accumulated intellectual strengths and sources. As Kim Grant has established, Breton 
adopted the notion of a lyrical construct—the combining of two distant realities into a 
new, third reality—came to Breton as a result of his friendship with Pierre Reverdy, who 
considered the compositional technique to be the foundation of modern poetry. In 
addition to Reverdy, however, the language Breton used—calling forth the senses, using 
intensity as a value of contact with the work, and describing the resulting mental 
phenomenon as a spark—drew on the critical approach to physiological psychology 
within Zürich Dada, which was known to both Ernst and Breton from their close 
friendship with Tzara.81 Although he would have bristled at any moment in his life at the 
very suggestion, Breton owed a great debt to Tzara’s groundbreaking theorizations of 
critical approach to science and psychology.  
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 It does, however, remain to be seen how this science figured into the broader 
complexities of the French context, in which Breton, as a former medical student, surely 
encountered it. The overall complexities of Paris do not allow a further investigation in 
the present study. However, Breton’s early reaction to Ernst’s work is a clear indication 
that he had an interest in modifying these notions of physiological psychology within a 
sphere of radical artmaking. 
With respect to Ernst’s work, it is useful to close this chapter by establishing that 
his interest in the altered nervous system was an interest that he carried well into the 
1930s. For example, Ernst directly addressed the notion of neural alteration through 
artistic process in a little known frottage called Birth of a Nervous System (1925), which 
he made around the time he was producing objects that would constitute the better known 
Histoire Naturelle series (fig. 76).  In the work, nerve endings creep like ivy across a 
surface in the foreground that gives way to a seemingly limitless vista.  Considered in 
relation to the frottages from 1921, the work encapsulates in its title the overall intention 
of the processes used to create it. The work suggests that the new forms of movement 
used to make the frottage could, in fact, engender a new nervous system out of 
unconventional systems or patterns of tactile engagement with the world of objects. 
 Another fascinating work is a photogram the artist constructed as one of the 
illustrations for Breton’s essay “Le Chateau Étoilé,” which appeared in Minotaure no. 8 
(1936). In this work, Ernst placed large leaves over photographic paper so that the 
venation of the different bits of foliage overlapped to create a dazzling play between 
symmetry and irregularity (fig. 77). Its suggestive caption, Unir ton systeme nerveux au 
mien dans la nuit profonde de la connaissance, plays on the visual and structural 
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similarities of leaf venation and the nervous system that Ernst had explored in works 
since the early 1920s. The image confirms his ultimate goal as an artist to explore new 
frontiers of mentality, regardless of whether extant theories of that mentality correlated or 
reinforced one another. With respect to the rest of the material discussed, the relative 
lateness of this work and of Birth of a Nervous System testify to Ernst’s continuing 
interest Ernst had in offering critical reactions to and remobilizations of the German 
physiological psychology he knew so well. The ways in which this interest came into 
play with his better documented contacts with Freudian psychoanalysis remains to be 
studied.  
I have focused most extensively on Ernst’s contacts with ideas of gesture coming 
from Zürich as the means to establish the critical approach to physiological psychology 
as a major area of interest during his formative years as a Dada artist. Additionally, it has 
been my hope to understand in a fuller way his artistic practice outside rote visualizations 
of Freudian symbolism. Ending this study prior to Ernst’s arrival in Paris was necessary, 
because the chaos, both artistic and personal, that immediately preceded and followed his 
arrival in Paris falls outside the scope of this study.  
Foremost among the turmoil in Ernst’s life came from his friendship with Paul 
Eluard and his romantic involvement with Eluard’s then wife, Gala. Ernst met the 
Eluards in November 1921. Aside from all the personal, romantic intrigue that this trio 
created among themselves, Ernst’s friendship with Eluard eventually drew him further 
into Paris Surrealism and away from hopes for an internationalist Dada subcollective as 
represented by Tzara, which, due to all the clashing egos in Paris, had since lost its 
appeal. Breton was the main conductor behind this push away from Tzara’s brand of 
 363
Dada and others were quick to listen, given Breton’s status as the editor of Littérature. 
This journal had been a main Dada vehicle, to the extent that Tzara and Breton had hoped 
it would become the single Dada publication after Tzara arrived in Paris. But by the 
beginning of 1922, however, Breton was looking to expand his scope by organizing an 
international meeting of artists and writers that had the rather verbose title “International 
Congress for the Determination and Directions and Defense of the Modern Spirit.”  
Despite his later participation in the Weimar Congress, Tzara thought Breton’s 
proposal contradicted the spirit of radical artmaking. He was part of a four-person 
tribunal—also including Eluard, the poet and critic Georges Ribemont-Dessaignes, and 
the composer Erik Satie—who confronted Breton at the Closérie des Lilas café on 
February 17 and forced him to abandon any hopes for a Congress. As Breton groped for 
allies, he tried to reconnect with Picabia, who jumped at the chance to attack Tzara, 
having recently been attacked by Tzara in the pages of Dada Au Grand Air. At this time, 
Breton had also begun to shift Littérature away from Tzara’s brand of Dada, publishing 
statements against Dada as a whole and, in particular, against Tzara. 
In early 1923, Ernst and Picabia submitted work to the Salon des Independants, at 
which the relationship between Tzara and Breton had another chance to be mended. 
However, too many egos were involved, and this time, a clash between Picabia on one 
side and Tzara and Soupault on the other. Tzara received the blame for this failed 
settlement of differences, and shortly thereafter received a letter signed by the Parisians, 
as well as by Ernst, which essentially barred Tzara from further participation in Paris 
Dada. That ban carried over to the early years of Surrealism, but Tzara’s career after he 
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received excommunication has not received the attention it deserves—namely, the ways 
in which he operated in this supposed obscurity.  
These events culminated in the shameful confrontations of physical violence 
surrounding Tzara’s “Evening of the Bearded Heart” in July 1923. At different times 
during the various performances, Breton stormed the stage and broke the poet Pierre de 
Massot’s arm, while Eluard bounded past the footlights to strike Tzara and René Crevel. 
Despite Ernst’s closeness to the Littérature group and especially to Eluard, he did not 
participate in this protest of Tzara’s event. This must have been a confusing time for him. 
Not only were his personal relationships rather tempestuous, but his relationship to any 
form of avant-garde subcollective that was akin to his experiences with Tzara and Arp 
must have looked impossible in the face of all the cliques in Paris.  
The Parisians poeticized these years of indecisiveness by referring to it as le 
mouvement flou, which connotes an overt kind of flux and indeterminacy—i.e., a sort of 
drift in orientation away from any single outlook or potential creative outpost. But Dada 
itself also has this chaotic nature, one that pervaded Ernst’s early career, but also 
encouraged a coming together of artists into small groups that fomented certain modes of 
critical practice and spaces for shared expression. Based on the findings outlined in the 
preceding study, this flou is a useful termination point for this look at the avant-garde and 









                                                 
1 When the art historian Evan Maurer asked Ernst about his early awareness of primitivism, the 
artist unsurprisingly named Freud, but he also named Wundt. Given the context of the discussion, 
the artist was likely referring to the VP. As previously argued, that work gives one both a 
refresher in physiological psychology and a rigorous application of its main tenets to the history 
of cultural development. Evan Maurer, “In Quest of the Myth: An Investigation of the 
Relationships between Surrealism and Primitivism”, PhD Diss., University of Pennsylvania, 
1974, 191; cited by Legge, Max Ernst: The Psychoanalytic Sources, 209 n. 7.  For a lengthier 
discussion of Ernst’s time at university, see Edward Trier, “Was Max Ernst studiert hat,” in 
Herzogenrath (ed.), Max Ernst in Köln, exh. cat., (Köln : Rheinland-Verlag, 1980): 63-68.  
According to Legge, Ernst also took an introductory course in experimental psychology, which 
would have included extensive reading of Wundt’s Grundzüge as outlined in chapter one.  Legge, 
Ibid, 209 n. 6.  Legge’s claim that Ernst’s suspicion of Kulpe’s focus on classifying higher mental 
function necessitated a dismissal of Wundt is problematic. Given the divergent methods of the 
two men, the claim does not really hold up in the way presented. My interest in returning to this 
material is to theorize Ernst’s Dada works in a manner that resists collapsing them into narrative 
scenes in the way a Freudian analysis would, and to uncover the ways in which the psychological 
ramifications of the works as approaches to physiological psychology were more suggestive of 
mental change than declarative (albeit symbolically) of being caused by the affective 
unconscious.  
2 Max Ernst, “Vergleichung,” Blätter für Kunst und Kritik, literary supplement to Kölner 
Tageblatt (January 7, 1917). Reprinted in Herzogenrath (ed.), Max Ernst in Köln (exh. cat., 




6 William Camfield, Max Ernst: Dada and the Dawn of Surrealism, exh. cat (Houston: Menil 
Collection and Munich: Prestel, 1993), 39-40. Camfield’s book remains the central source on this 
period in Ernst’s career, both for its readability and attention to detail. I would like to thank him 
again for encouragement and hospitality during my work in Houston and Paris. 
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7 For more on the importance of this exhibition in the overall history of the Werkbund, see 
Frederic J. Schwartz, The Werkbund, 174-176. 
8 Save the contact with theatre, although Ernst certainly knew of these applications from his 
connections to the Blaue Reiter. 
9 Arp was in Zürich with other Dada artists and writers like Tzara, working on Der Zeltweg, the 
final Dada publication from Zürich. Arp and Ernst first met in 1914. By “last,” I mean the last 
publication from Zürich as a geographical locale. The final publication, Dada au Grand Air, is 
discussed below and involved Ernst directly. In this rich climate of artistic, literary, and political 
activity, Ernst’s style underwent radical metamorphoses as he fished around for new ideas in the 
work of his contemporaries Giorgio de Chirico, Francis Picabia, Kurt Schwitters, and Alexander 
Archipenko by trying out different facets of his fellow artists’ techniques in exploratory drawings, 
paintings, collages, and Merz-like assemblages.  
10 Baargeld, “…knocks the warm egg out of the hand,” Bulletin D (Fall 1919), unpaginated, repr. 
and trans. in Kuenzli, ed., Dada (London: Phaidon, 2004), 242. 
11 The original publication’s title appears in lowercase. Baargeld’s father funded the publication 
of this volume. 
12 This tension within the graphic as found is a key concept in, for example, Marcel Duchamp’s 
Standard Stoppages (1914), for which he created delicate curving lines by taking meter long 
strings and dropping them from an elevation of one meter, after which he traced the shape of the 
string onto wood and cut out the shape, thus creating delicate curving lines with very little 
application of hand drawn artistic acumen. Ernst’s work, by contrast, featured a tension between 
these two creative practices in conjunctions of the mechanical and handmade, as in Don’t Smile. 
In this combination Ernst is more in line with Picasso’s Cubist collages, which often contain 
combinations of collages graphic imagery on which the artist then drew or painted, or contain bits 
of found paper with a mass-produced visual representation that was originally hand drawn. Ernst 
has departed from this more classic dichotomy in using printing blocks, rather than found images, 
to include visual representations into his work. This technique would, of course, change quickly. 
13 It is this complexity that separates Ernst’s process entirely from artists whose work appears to 
resemble his, such as that of de Chirico, who never approached artistic media with such a clear 
interest in complexities of this kind. 
14 My analysis of this piece is based on condition reports made in connection with the Menil 
exhibition, “Max Ernst: Dada and the Dawn of Surrealism,” undertaken by William Camfield and 
the conservation staff at the Menil Collection, Houston, during the summer of 1993. With Dr. 
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Camfield’s encouragement, I have also drawn on unpublished lecture notes outlining these 
condition reports that he gave to the Menil Collection, coupled with personal conversations with 
Dr. Camfield that occurred throughout the writing of this dissertation. Full credit is due to him 
and the conservators at the Menil for locating these discrepancies of process in Don’t Smile, to 
which I have appended an interpretation based on Ernst’s contact with Schwitters. I would like to 
thank Geri Aramanda, archivist at the Menil Collection, for her assistance with the Camfield 
papers. 
15 For a list of the print sources see Spies, Max Ernst Collages, 486. 
16 The notion that these works sculpt a psychically pathological subject position is not incorrect, 
but it is partial, and dependent on a very conventional notion of the artist as a social critic who 
calls attention to the ills of modern society that others have tried to repress. It is a narrow sense of 
criticality and of what an artist does or should do. Social commentary does not have to depend on 
a reflective address from the individual psyche framed as a pathological entity.  
17 But the problem with these interpretations is that all of them require a certain iconography of 
symbolic gesture or staging of the visual representation that undercuts a sense that the creative 
drive of the work could be unconscious. Ernst made work during this period that addressed this 
category of gesture. For example, Elizabeth Legge has shown how Ernst borrowed poses and 
gestures from Emil Kraepelin’s various texts on dementia praecox and hysteria. But the collages 
of body parts differ considerably from representations of figures making gestures. 
Epistemological knots like this one have plagued methods of art history that rely on 
psychoanalysis, because historians cannot or will not arbitrate between the different modes of 
creative orientation that result from Ernst’s clear skill at symbol arranging and inquiries into 
what, if anything, could constitute a true work of art that sprang from unconscious drives—a 
notion that eventually came to a head in the early debates within Surrealist painting. See for 
example, Kim Grant, Surrealism and the Visual Arts: Theory and Reception (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). Given this warrens of problems, coupled with the separate 
psychological discourse under study here, it is not the place to undertake a concerted study of the 
problems that arise in studies of Ernst’s work that lean too heavily on psychoanalysis.  
18 Wundt, Principles of Physiological Psychology, Titchener trans., 153. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid, 154. The subjects of these tests were most often chimps, horses, or dogs. 
21 But, again, degeneration was not a hidebound type. The geneticist or racialist discourse of 
degeneracy that found its way into discourses on art through the work of, among others, Max 
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Nordau, is antithetical to the Wundtian notion of degeneracy, which simply means an assault on 
tissues that had psychological consequences. See Nordau, Degeneration (London, Hennemann, 
1895). 
22 The direction this transformation corresponded with the nature of the conduction path, so motor 
degeneration was centrifugal and sensory degeneration moved centripetally. These two levels of 
inquiry were essential, but Wundt cautioned that sole reliance on only these two methods would 
not lead toward structured results.  Consequently, this method is at best an aid for other types of 
experiments that foster understanding of the relations between definite areas of the cortex and 
peripheral sensory organs.  One may also focus on paths of conduction in the central organs of the 
brain (Ibid).  These mapping exercises would give a researcher a sense of how the subject 
functioned in space with varying degrees of success or atunement. Wundt’s caveat about sole 
reliance on physiology should be remembered here, however.  He never believed that mere 
testing could uncover the true inner workings of psychology as Geisteswissenschaft.  One could 
only flesh this puzzle out in the deepest terms by means of comparative ethnohistory.   
23 For more on the interest Ernst had in Mary Wollstonecraft-Shelley’s Frankenstein, see Spies, 
Max Ernst: A Retrospective, exh. cat., (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2005), 97. This 
text was written at a time when human thought and mental function was first being framed in 
terms of physics, thermodynamics, and other mechanical structures of energy, as in the writings 
of Fechner and Herbart. It is perhaps why Shelley made her ill-fated protagonist German rather 
than British. 
24 Umland et al, Dada in the Collection of the Museum of Modern Art, 142-147. 
25 The coccyx is the final bone segment of the spinal column. 
26 These planes are imaginary axes through the body that determine the nature of what is shown in 
a cross section. The coronal median divides the body into front and back, while the sagittal 
divides it right and left, being a vertical plane through the longitudinal axis of the trunk. The 
author would like to thank his mother, Mary Mowris, R.N., for explaining this difference on 
several separate occasions. 
27 The forearm has two main bones; the radius is the bone on the thumb side of the wrist. 
28 I would like to thank the staff of the Department of Prints and Drawings at the Museum of 
Modern Art, New York, who graciously fitted me into their busy schedule in order for me to 
study the work, which luckily happened to be unframed at the time. 
29 Given the phallic nature of the forms in the work, in addition to the references to sperm or seed, 
scholars have analyzed this work in Freudian terms as a critique of bourgeois, masculinist display 
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and repression, despite the fact that the majority of hats in the image are not the categorical 
bourgeois top hatsThe majority of the hats are tri-corner and bucket hats, which would be the 
accessory of a peasant, not an urban bourgeois. The basic reading of this work focuses on the man 
as seedless and seed-covered, which implies that the figure has masturbated. The most successful 
and best outlined argument of this theme in Ernst’s Dada period is by Hal Foster, “A Bashed Ego: 
Max Ernst in Cologne,” in Dickerman and Witkovsky, eds., The Dada Seminars (Washington, 
DC: National Gallery of Art and New York: Distributed Art Publishers, 2005), 127-150. 
30 either as an entire venation system, or as individual dendriform endings on the cells (the 
splayed endings of neurons are still referred to as dendrites). 
31 Tzara, “Note on Art: H. Arp,” Dada no. 2 (December 1917), unpaginated, repr. in Tzara, O.C. 
vol. 1, 396. 
32 In German culture, these visual similarities of physiological structure had supported major 
pillars of Geisteswissenschaft. It is likely that this punning construction of internalist 
anthropomorphism is also a tongue in cheek reference to the early physiologist Gustav Fechner’s 
argument that plant forms had a psychic life, based on morphological similarities in nature that 
suggested the existence of a sort of cosmic consciousness existed from which all life forms drew. 
For analysis of these issues in Ernst’s later work see Elizabeth Legge’s fascinating essay, 
"Zeuxis's grapes, Novalis's fossils, Freud's flowers: Max Ernst's natural history," Art History 16 
(March 1993): 147-172. 
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2003), 155-157; Charles Edward Stuart, Weapons of Mass Casualties: A Terrorism Handbook 
(Boston and Toronto: Jones and Bartlett, 2005), 98-99; Gregory R. Cittione, ed., Disaster 
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47 Wundt, Principles of Physiological Psychology, Titchener trans, 33. One should remember that 
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49 Tzara, in Wright, trans., Seven Dada Manifestoes and Lampisteries, 11. 
50 Ernst, “Rechtzeitig erkannte angriffsplane der assimilanzfaden auf die feste dada,” handwritten 
mss., Fonds Tzara, Bibliothèque littéraire Jacques Doucet, Paris, TZR.C. 1465. 
51 All of these exercises undercut completely the anthropomorphic scale of the Freudian body. 
The presentation of sex as mechanized and dehumanized is not associable only to Ernst, but 
clearly drew on the artist’s awareness of Duchamp and Picabia as well. See Henderson, Duchamp 
in Context. 
52 Translation of this work and the poem may be found in The Dada Reader: A Critical 
Anthology, ed. Dawn Ades (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 205-206.  
53 Ernst, “Der Arp,” Kölner Tageblatt, December 6, 1921, repr. in Herzenograth, ed., Max Ernst 
in Koln, 85. 
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teaching aids catalogs.  From October to November of 1920, Ernst and Arp worked intermittently 
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with Arp on the FaTaGaGa collages never resulted in a finished production, although the once 
existent 150-page folio of carefully organized images and inscriptions once held by Tristan Tzara 
clearly indicate the possibility of such a final goal. This folio was subsequently dismantled and 
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Following his final break with Dada in May 1917, Hugo Ball began writing that 
fall a lengthy treatise that fall, the explosive and very problematic Critique of the German 
Intelligentsia, which was published in January of 1919. The text’s rather shocking anti-
Semitism is largely the reason for its notoriety today. His view of the Jews was part of a 
broader suspicion of any religion or state structure that, in his opinion, threatened the 
formation of what he defined as a more wholesome variety of Catholic community. Ball 
had been inspired to pursue such a vision after reading medieval Catholic scholars who 
worked in Germany before the Protestant Reformation.  
 Intellectuals in Ball’s own time, such as Ernst Bloch and Hermann Bahr, and 
figures from the present, like Anson Rabinbach, have criticized the overarching racism 
and epistemological blind spots in Ball’s Critique.1 Scholars struggling to tackle the 
nature of Ball’s racism have dominated studies of this text, a factor that has led to a 
general neglect of other intellectual ventures Ball sets forth in its pages. Aside from more 
dominant criticisms of Ball’s text, one small bit of diatribe against the Lutheran 
backgrounds of many major German intellectuals is a telling glimpse of the way in which 
the intellectual landscape has altered in the time since Ball wrote his text: “Rarely since 
the Reformation has a significant figure emerged in Germany who did not count a 
clergyman in his ancestry. Lessing and Schelling, Fechner and Wundt, Mommsen and 
Lamprecht, Harnach and Nietzsche are all sons of pastors.”2 That these men were the 
sons of Lutheran pastors contributed, in his opinion, to their establishment of a broader 
cultural outlook that Ball described as “rational-minded” and obsessed with “mastery of 
physical being.”3 Like so many other artists of his day, Ball took issue with the 
ideological ramifications of science as a cultural force—both for what it said and for what 
its doctrine implied about the potentialities of the mind or the limitations on it. 
 Wundt’s name is simply tossed off in a list of German intellectual giants, and 
unlike other figures from German intellectual history like Martin Luther, Fichte, or 
Goethe, he did not receive any extensive analysis by Ball. Yet in its own way, this bare 
reference is very suggestive of the text’s historical moment. In dropping this name, the 
ex-Dadaist assumed a great deal about his reader of 1919. That Wundt can simply be 
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mentioned in this manner is testament to his visibility at the time and contains the tacit 
assumption that a reader of 1919 would, he trusted, not only know of the psychologist, 
but also possess a sufficient understanding of his ideas to allow for comprehension of the 
different ways in which his extensive theoretical systems encouraged mastery “of what is 
met with and what is at hand, of immediate and sentient existence!”4 Essentially, Ball 
trusted that his reader knew enough of Wundt’s ideas so that he or she could reflect on 
them critically in reference to the author’s condemnation of the Lutheran faith as being, 
like Wundt’s science, a kind of poison. In Ball’s view, such systems were preventing the 
potential spiritual growth of a community in the immediate aftermath of a war that had all 
but overpowered sentient existence with mechanized warfare and had turned Europe into 
an abattoir.  
Ball’s broad swipe at German intellectual culture invites a dialogical reading or 
reflection on the ways in which Wundt’s intellectual system contributed to Ball’s view of 
Germany’s ontological and ideological flaws. In a broader sense, it encourages the 
historian to consider what a radical artist would have thought of the social place of 
physiological psychology during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Ball 
likely selected Wundt for the ontological implications of the psychologist’s system and 
for what it had allowed in other intellectual disciplines. Wundt was also the last 
physiological psychologist who could guarantee universal acceptance in his lifetime as 
the discipline’s figurehead. After Wundt, the field of physiological psychology became 
more diffuse, with competing theories of higher mental function that, nonetheless, were 
anchored to varying degrees in his earlier studies of elementary neural function. In testing 
varying modes of reaction time and thresholds of the senses, Wundt focused on the 
simplest possible neural phenomena that he understood as being connected to a person’s 
ultimate mental function. His career gave physiological psychology its first laboratory 
and extensive system of experimental practices and tests, which constituted the dominant 
epistemological reference point for all psychology well into the twentieth century. 
 Wundt’s attempt to restrict the scope of experiment to these simplest of nerve 
functions came from his belief that experimentation could not illuminate higher modes of 
thought, which were inherently social and based on interactions between people in a 
group, an idea that provided the basis of his massive project known as the 
 376
Völkerpsychologie. Wundt’s students generally avoided the Völkerpsychologie as the 
method which would provide a new understanding of higher mental functions as being 
particular to certain societies, places, and times.5 German physiological psychology after 
Wundt expanded (recklessly, in his opinion) the scope of experiment to include psychic 
testing, as opposed to nervous testing, and in focusing on developing laws which guided 
formation of a functional hardware for a rational consciousness, provided European and 
American scientists with an understanding that the machinations of the psyche were 
conformable to an outside structure of data sets, rather than a socially contrived series of 
conventions that varied with space and time. This split between laboratory and cultural 
studies shattered the stability of the field Wundt had worked to maintain, but that break 
made his reach entirely more pervasive in the intellectual culture of the fin-de-siècle and 
the twentieth century. Locating the reach of his Völkerpsychologie in fields like 
ethnology, sociology, and anthropology indicates that at an institutional level, Wundt’s 
vast theoretical and scientific contributions were already open for a selective 
consumption by many different figures, who often departed entirely from the 
psychologist’s ambitions and beliefs. Whether it was for theories of empathy in 
architecture or the basing of ornamental compositional techniques on alternative spatio-
cognitive neural formats, as one sees in the work of Riegl, Durkheim, Boas, Lipps, or 
Worringer, Wundt’s use of the nervous system as the basis of cultural development was 
deeply ingrained within mainstream German aesthetics by the close of the nineteenth 
century.  
My brief attention to Kandinsky and Ball’s friendship in the context of Munich 
theatre suggested that Ball’s awareness of psychology, like Kandinsky’s, already 
contained a high degree of modification exercised by figures who served competing 
interests in their various attempts to reconfigure innervatory structures in the interests of 
heightening expressive acumen or triggering social reform. The sheer availability of this 
science for adoption and modification clearly motivated a large number of applications of 
physiological psychology to the ends of improving or changing society with new forms 
of body-based restructuring. The clearest indication of Dada’s radicality came from the 
ways in which the artists continuously made chance, spontaneity, and improvisation, in 
the sense these phenomena had as embodied experiences, into the essence of many works 
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of art throughout a range of different media, from performance to collage. These 
practices essentially undercut the upward structuring of new selves that constituted the 
overall theme of any outlook in Lebensreform. 
Wundt’s idea that culture manifested a mode of social psychology that was based 
on shared patterns of motion among people in a space lends a great deal of weight to the 
critical force of Dada’s approach, because figures in Lebensreform read Wundt’s 
description of cultural formation as the basic framework for projects of cultural renewal 
or reformation. The Völkerpsychologie went from being a method of study into a system 
of formation and reformation that a group could undertake for itself. The theory could be 
adopted as the overall grounding philosophy of social reform that based its operations on 
the reorganization of collective ambulation in space. This drastic and prevalent shift in 
reception differed immediately from applications of Wundt’s theories by historians like 
Riegl or Wölfflin. Proponents of Lebensreform took the mechanics of social 
(re)formation as a structure to be applied, rather than studied from the outside. The 
former likely encouraged the latter, because the assumed readability of cultural 
production as modes of shared neural transmission and psychic energy contained within it 
a potential for a reflexive application, since the theory was based on common human 
neurophysiology. Anyone who applied ideas of the Völkerpsychologie to their own social 
group possessed this crucial hermeneutic insight, which constituted the most dominant 
manner of reading Wundt’s work against the grain in the early twentieth century. 
But beyond a certain manner of reading and using physiological psychology, 
Steiner, Laban, and Dalcroze each sought to compose a unique relationship between the 
energized matter of the body and the social formation of the mind. The developmental 
trajectory of culture, moving from bodies to minds and then to cultural expression, 
became a vehicle of change with machinery that was open to manipulation and diversion. 
Essentially, it came down to what kinds of access or possible modifications were 
available in certain domains of cultural practice, and the motivations each figure had for 
his or her system. Consequently, interpretations of Dalcroze eurhythmics as a 
programmatic mode of social control, in which rhythmic motion bolstered Taylorist 
ambitions for improving production, cannot simply be placed wholesale over other 
applications of eurhythmics. Too much of it happened in communes. 
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 For example, Laban’s projects in Ascona were searches for potential 
modifications to the relationship between bodily motion and psycho-social formation that 
Wundt made the generative process of all cultural development. The psychologist’s 
interconnection of bodily habits to cultural and social practices—processes like dance, 
rhythm, language, and poetry—gave the choreographer a point of departure, for these 
associations were inherently mutable. Mutability was the office of the very bodies 
thought to compose a singular trajectory for a particular culture and its practices. In 
Laban’s mind, the body could trigger both immediate and gradual social change. The 
Freitanz was the most immediate way in which this change could begin. In the Freitanz, 
the full potentials of neural change unfolded as energized bodies interacted spontaneously 
with one another. Reshaping the mind with the unconventional motions of the moving 
and reacting body laid the groundwork for a shaping of the body and mind that 
culminated in the purpose play.  
In this activity, Laban’s goals overlapped with the ambitions of Steiner to 
communicate higher truths of existence with new forms of collective bodily motion, but 
despite the choreographer’s contacts with anthroposophy and other occult doctrines, his 
overall project of cultural reformation cannot fit neatly within any single motivating 
perspective. Steiner’s overall project displays a different sort of complexity, in that his 
use of physiological psychology expands historical comprehension of his approach to the 
occult. Wundt’s descriptions of how bodily changes affect the mind fed Steiner’s 
suspicion of material stasis in both mind and matter, and in utilizing rhythmic group 
movement, he adopted and modified the supposed positivism of Wundt as one means to 
expand consciousness and reach transcendent realities. This science that essentially 
established the nature of immediate experience and reality became a system that Steiner 
and his adherents modified into part of a programmatic exploration of higher realities. 
In light of this psychology, the group dimension of Lebensreform expressed the 
felt need to take Wundt’s ideas of social formation and modify the projected results in a 
manner that altered or improved upon the social customs of the group’s immediate 
surroundings. The movement possessed an overtly materialist sense of mind/body 
connections as the foundation of more decidedly occultist or idealist pronouncements. In 
both Steiner and Laban’s cases, the metaphysical domain of that balance is far better 
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known in retrospect and is an effect of separating the occult from science that would be 
alien to these people. Physiological psychology was the gateway through which figures 
like these two began their search for higher forms of consciousness and new forms of 
expressive gesture that could communicate higher truths. Steiner’s work offers the 
clearest gateway to understanding the perceived limitations of physiological psychology 
and, at the same time, the potential this system had for a critical reader who sought 
unconventional uses of it. 
These uses in Lebensreform were all pursuits of an alternative Bildung, or the 
gradual and teleological formation of the mind through the motions of the body. The 
physical cultures of these reformist movements were unavoidably developmental. In that 
progressive approach to social formation, each figure in Lebensreform was attempting to 
create a new kind of Völkerpsychologie out of new takes on the systemic means Wundt 
had outlined in his cultural studies. It was these overall theoretical orientations toward 
society and culture as either method (an entity to study) or application (an entity to 
reform) that Ball described as being motivated by a need for “mastery of physical being,” 
or the control of “immediate and sentient existence.” The notion that cultural forms—
whether of language, visual art, or music—provided the culmination of social formation 
had begun to look increasingly distasteful during the war. By 1919, the place of culture as 
a teleological culmination of a harmonious society, was no longer a value that could 
withstand the butchery of modern geopolitics. The only place such a notion could survive 
was the museum.  
A more spontaneous mode of creation placed a shared experience of embodied 
change as the essence of artistic production, rather than making art into one more 
culmination of a pre-existent set of socio-cultural values. This shift allowed the group to 
live up to Ball’s demand to “discard the Ego like a coat full of holes,” and to 
simultaneously forge a new kind of group politic that was guided not by doctrine but by 
its own self-imposed dynamism of shared and spontaneous creation. As embodied 
experiences, these spontaneous endeavors—Ball’s performances, for example—did not 
necessarily require the creation of a finished art object, but certainly could, as in Taeuber 
and Arp’s collaborative collages. In light of this analysis, however, the nature of visual 
quality in an object has a certain place that is anywhere but at the top of a hierarchy of 
 380
aesthetic qualities. Concepts that informed the nature of motion in artistic process that 
occurred alongside the retroactively dominant nature of visual quality in these collages 
does not do away entirely with the visual sense of the object, but instead connects its 
partial mental energies to other potencies of sense that have long since vanished: the 
motions of sharing with another the moving of paper squares across a surface and the joy 
of working together in the creation of new aesthetic and mental harmonies.  
This science and approaches to it by cultural figures can shift understanding of 
definitions of abstraction or “non-objective” painting that arose during this moment, for 
rather than being somehow non-observational, a new variant on sensory experience—one 
connected to higher realities—was not only possible, but reachable and shapeable in and 
through culture. Possibilities that new sensations, especially the most basic types, could 
reenergize the base levels of experience and consciousness provided a broad field of 
strategy out of which artists selectively utilized basic forms and laws of change to their 
own ends. The idea that a structured relearning of sense experience could trigger 
neurophysiological and psychic change in both artist and viewer clearly deserves a more 
extensive study.  
The scope of pre-Dada uses made Dada’s approach to this science appear in a 
manner that makes this supposedly divisive group appear more deeply knit to its context 
as a concerted reaction to the embodied dimensions of expression and social reform that 
had contributed to the upsurge of nationalism in the lead-up to WWI. Not only the 
science, but the general response to it by cultural figures had a generally conservative 
political dimension, as at Hellerau, or an idealist mode of occultism like that of Steiner, 
which, after the war began, took on a more idealist tinge. Zurich Dadaists’ careful 
borrowing of Labanic pedagogy from free dance exercises exemplifies the manner in 
which Ball’s political awakening made for a more meticulous and multi-layered 
absorption of intellectual sources that shied away from both total idealism and utter 
loyalty to a single system of expression or ontology. Dadaists did not necessarily reject 
anything wholesale in Lebensreform, except for its nationalism. Far more often, they 
adopted and utilized particular dimensions to their own ends, such as the 
neurophysiological alteration promised by improvisation or spontaneity, or the idea that 
language was a collectively contrived series of articulatory gestures. The nature of use in 
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the case of Dada gave its diverse practices a force and expressive strength. That potency 
comes from knowing that Dada did not get there first; they skimmed from a movement of 
social reform based on particular responses to modes of scientific inquiry that is little 
known in the world of art history today.  
Initially it strikes the historian as odd that Ernst, an artist so fascinated in the 
creation of visual art would be interested in critically engaging physiological psychology, 
since any reshaping of this discipline in Lebensreform or Zurich Dada tended to display a 
focus on alterations of bodily motion through chance, spontaneity, or a concerted 
rebuilding of the body’s practice patterns following a dissolution of prior restrictions in 
conventional Kraft. In Zurich, it was less frequent that an approach to physiological 
psychology necessitated creation of a concrete object, and when these occurred, it was 
generally in a style of geometric design. By contrast, Ernst created a macabre dimension 
of visual representation within a context of critical approach to a science that seemed to 
fall outside the boundaries of visual representation. In this attention to the visual, Ernst 
was still, in fact, engaging the science in question, for physiological psychology relied on 
an authority of images. The Grundzüge’s hundreds of illustrations of human tissue 
connoted a dimension of usefulness in educating a person about the ways in which a 
mind should function. Projected from this functional imperative was a sense of what a 
rational or “normal” mind looked like and how it formed. Ernst saw an opportunity to 
create humorous and often unsettling alternatives. The difference between Ernst’s 
approach to visual representation and Zurich Dada’s use of performance is a testimony to 
the diversity that a critical modification of physiological psychology could offer artists in 
the early twentieth century.  
The nature of this modification was already extent in the context of European 
culture, which is a presence that causes the nature of Dada to emerge in a far clearer 
focus as closely knit to the intellectual culture of its moment. Only Dada used its culture 
in a manner that undermined its most dominant values. In the case of Dada, we have only 
begun to understand this use-oriented dimension of their art. 
  
                                                 
1 Outlined in Rabinbach, “Introduction,” Ball, Critique of the German Intelligentsia (1919), trans. 
Brian L. Harris, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), xxiv-xxviii. 
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2 Ball, Critique of German Intelligentsia, 60. 
3 Ibid, 62 
4 Ibid, 66. 
5 It is telling that none of these men stayed on at Leipzig, which was normally an admirable thing 
to do in the context of laboratory practice and pedagogy. Generally, a young psychologist could 
teach and conduct tests and research of his own, provided that the research coincided with the 













Fig. 2. Max Ernst, Sitzender Buddha, 1920. Gouache and ink on printed reproduction, 8 










Fig. 3. Drawing of instruments utilized in reaction time experiments, featuring a Hipp 
chronoscope (center), as published in the first edition of Wundt’s Grundzüge der 
























Fig. 4. Control hammer as illustrated in the fourth edition of Wundt’s Grundzüge der 



































Fig. 5. Illustration of the chronograph used in Wundt’s laboratory. Illustration from 
Zimmermann, Preisliste über psychologischen und physiologischen Apparate, XVIII 

































Fig. 6. Staged photograph of collaborative testing method, featuring Wundt (third from 































Fig. 7. Diagram of pons after Wundt, Grundzuge der Physiologischen Psychologie 














Fig. 8. Synoptical table of Panofsky’s iconographic method, from “Iconography and 
Iconology: An Introduction to the Study of Renaissance Art” (1939). After Panofsky, 






















































Fig. 9. The Dalcroze Institute in Hellerau, before 1914. After Dalcroze, Eurhythmics 



























Fig. 10. Edouard Claparède, illustration of four-step “evolution of movement.” After 
Claparède, Du sens musculaire à propos de quelques cas d'hémiataxie 






































Fig. 11. Illustrations of Turnen exercises. After  



















Fig. 12. Ultimate realization of Dalcroze’s eurhythmics, Festspiele at Hellerau, July 









Figs. 13-14. Photographs documenting the Freitanz exercises of Laban’s courses at the 
Monte Verità commune, Ascona, Switzerland, both c. 1914. After Dörr, 2008, pp. 137-






Fig. 15. A more formalized “purpose play” featuring the Hamburg Movement Choir in 


























Fig. 16. Left: Marcel Janco, Untitled, 1917-1918, painted board and twine, 31 ½ x 18 in. 
Collection Sylvio Perlstein, Antwerp. Right: Janco, Portrait of Tzara, 1919, paper, board, 
burlap, ink, and gouache, 21 ½ x 10 x 2 ¾ in. Paris, Centre Pompidou. After Dickerman 














































Fig. 18. Sophie Taeuber dancing, c. 1917. Mask by Janco, costume possibly by Hans 



















































Fig. 20. Tzara, typescript for L’amiral cherche une maison à louer, 1916. After Tzara, 



















Fig 22. Marcel Janco, Study for Brilliant Empire Architecture, 1918. Collage, 14 ½ x 12 






Fig. 23. Sophie Taeuber-Arp and Hans Arp, Duo Collage, 1918. Collage, 32 x 24 ½ in. 




























Fig. 24. Hans Arp, Untitled (Collage arranged according to the laws of chance), 1916-























Fig. 25. Arp, Untitled, 1916. Ink was on paper, 17 x 24 in. New York, Museum of 




































Fig. 26. Arp, Untitled, 1916-1917. Painted wood relief, 16 x 13 x 4 in. Zurich, Kunsthaus. 











Fig. 27. Theatre by Henry van de Velde, built for Werkbund exhibition in Cologne, 1914. 














Fig. 28. Glass house by Bruno Taut with Franz Hoffmann, built for Werkbund exhibition, 









Fig. 29. Johannes Baargeld, Men/Be Careful Dear Heinz, c. 1920. Reproduced in die 





























Fig. 30. Max Ernst, Don’t Smile, ca. 1920. Pencil rubbings of printer’s blocks with 





































Fig. 33. Ernst, Canalization of Refrigerated Gas, 1920. Stamps of printer’s blocks with 
ink, watercolor, and gouache on paper mounted on paper, 21 ¼ x 15 in. Houston, Menil 


























































































Fig. 37. Ernst, Stratified Rocks, 1920. Gouache and ink on printed reproduction, 6 x 8 1/8 























Fig. 38. Cross section of human nerves in the skin, based on histological microscopic 






Fig. 39. Ernst, jeune homme chargé d’un fagot fleurissant, 1920. Gouache and ink on 



























Fig. 40. Ernst, The Punching Ball ou l’immortalite de buonarotti, 1920. Collage, 















Fig. 41. Ernst, Sitzender Buddha, 1920. Gouache and ink on printed reproduction, 8 1/8 x 




















Fig. 42. Ernst, The Hat Makes the Man, 1920. Collage, watercolor, gouache, and ink on 



























































Fig. 44. Illustration showing basic nervous venation [nervatur] of dendrites or branch 
paths from central nerve cell or neurite. After Wundt, Grundzüge, sixth edition (1902), 























Fig. 45. Top: Detail from top right corner of The Hat Makes the Man 





Fig. 47. Ernst, Leaf Landscape, 1920. Gouache and ink on printed reproduction, 8 ½ x 10 
























Fig. 48. Ernst, The Word, 1921. Gouache and ink on collaged engravings on paper, 7 ¼ x 













Fig. 49. Illustrations of stages of motion in an amoeba from Wundt, Grundzüge (1902), 




























































Fig. 52. Ernst, Farcy Hydropic Parasitic Plantation, 1921. Watercolor, gouache, and ink 
on reproduction mounted on paperboard, 3 ¾ x 5 in. Cologne, Galerie Rudolf Zwirner. 

























Fig. 53. Ernst, The Horse, He’s a Little Sick, 1920. Collage and pencil on printed 
reproductions, 5 ¾ x 8 ½ in. New York, Museum of Modern Art.  


























Fig. 54. Ernst, The Graminaceous Bicycle, 1920. Gouache and ink on printed 




























Fig. 55. Ernst, The Assimilative Threads’ Attack Plans Found Out in Time on the 
Stronghold of Dada, 1:300,000, 1920. Cut and printed reproduction and ink on paper, 8 x 












Fig. 56. Ernst, Microgramme Arp, 1921. Original lost, reprinted in Littérature, May 1921. 
















     
 
Fig. 58. Two illustrations of histological cross-sections of human anatomy and nerves 
from Wundt, Grundzüge (1902), Titchener trans. (1904). Top: typical forms of sensory 














Fig. 59. Ernst, Vademekum Mobile You are Warned, 1919-1920. Stamps of printer’s 
blocks with ink, watercolor, and gouache on paper mounted on paper, 16 ½ x 21 in. 







Fig. 60. Max Ernst and Hans Arp, Physiomythological Flood Picture, 1920. Gouache, 
pencil, and ink on collaged photographs and reproductions, 4 ½ x 4 in. Hanover, Sprengel 























Fig. 61. Jacques-Louis David, Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier (1743-1794) and His Wife 
Marie-Anne-Pierrette Laulze (1758-1836), 1788. Oil on canvas, 102 ¼ x 76 ⅝⅝ in. New 















Fig. 63. Postcard showing Lavoisier’s gasometers on display at Conservatoire National 

























Fig. 64. Ernst, Hydrometric Demonstration of Killing by Temperature, 1920. gouache, 
ink, and pencil on printed reproduction, 9 ½ x 6 ½ in. Private collection.  











Fig. 65. Page illustrating chemical apparatus from Bibliotheca Paedagogica (1914), page 












Fig. 66. Exposition Universelle, Paris, 1900; Vitrine commemorating Lavoisier.  








Fig. 67. Statue of Lavoisier in front of Église de la Madeleine, 1906. (Destroyed by 
















Fig. 68. Ernst, Here Everything is Still Floating, 1920. Collaged reproductions and 

























Fig. 69. Ernst, Laocoon, 1920. Original presumed lost, reproduced in Hans Richter, 


































        
 
 
Fig. 70. Hagesandros, Polydoros, and Athanadoros of Rhodes, Laocoön and His Sons, c. 
























Fig. 71. Illustration of sigmoid volvulus, showing intestinal swelling. After University of 





Fig. 72. Cover of Dada Outdoors The Singers’ War in the Tirol, September 1921. After 











Fig. 73. Ernst, The Preparation of Bone Glue, 1921. Collage of engravings and ink on 



























Fig. 74. Ernst, Animal Head on Pedestal, 1921. Pencil rubbing on paper, 8 ¾ x 7 ¼ in. 

























Fig. 75. Ernst, Trinity of Anatomy, 1921. Pencil rubbing on paper, 18 x 36 cm. Paris, 

































Fig. 76. Flyer advertising Max Ernst exhibition in Paris at Au Sans Pareil gallery and 


















Fig. 77. Ernst, Déshabillés, c. 1920. Collage, dimensions unknown. Current location 
















Fig. 78. Ernst, Naissance du système nerveux, 1925. Pencil rubbing on paper, 15 x 14 cm 
Formerly collection Eluard, Rene Gaffe, and Galerie Berggruen. Paris, Private collection. 

















Fig. 79. Ernst, Unir ton sytseme nerveux au mien dans la nuit profonde de la 
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